Ultimate question: Why anything at all?

[JordanL]

Ah. I agree on direction but not on decision. I am inclined to intuitive arguments which discard mutual exclusion as an emergent property of a delusional linguistic game.

Hmmm... how do you describe will without something like decision? How can you have intended direction without decision?

 

[MarcoD]

Hmmm... how do you describe will without something like decision? How can you have intended direction without decision?

Decision implies binary choice, at least, to me. I don't think that (binary choice) exists, in an ontological sense.

It's a bit of more lengthier thought experiment, but it starts of with the question: Have you ever experienced a 'thing'?

To me, the answer to that question is: No. And since I deny that things exist, as atomic undividable entities, and see them as linguistical delusions, I reject mathematics (which is a more precise, and therefor, to me, more flawed form of language) as a delusion.

(My general feeling described very briefly.)

EDIT: I should have said that if you deny that things exist, that then choice is a delusion.

EDIT: Essentially, this is a reversal of the Platonic argument. Plato stated that 'real' things exist as imperfect approximations of 'ideals.' In that terminology, I would state that 'ideals' are the imperfect approximations of 'real' things.

 

[Evo]

Re-reading your post, it is still ambiguous.

Are you meaning to say here that you believe the correct definition of a dichotomy is indeed "an impossibility to decide"?

Can you answer directly, yes/no. Then I might have some clue about the source of your complaint.

I said to stop making up your own words for definitions. Show me where "crisp metaphysical choice" is a definition of "dichotomy".

Once again the rules.

explicitly defining key terms;

In particular, please make a concerted effort to adequately define key terms whose meaning might otherwise be ambiguous and to provide proper justification for any claims that might be contentious. Doing so will go a long way towards stimulating productive discussion, whereas failure to do so will inevitably lead to lots of confusion, wasted words, and effort, and ultimately to moderator intervention as outlined above.

How likely is it that someone will be confused by, or misinterpret, what I have written? You should strive to make your posts intelligible, well supported, and unambiguous.

If you wish to be allowed to post here, you need to obey the rules. One of the biggest problems with online *philosophy* is sticking to well known, clear definitions that are understood by all. Acting obtuse isn't helping you.

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=47294

This thread needs to get back on topic.

 

[JordanL]

Decision implies binary choice, at least, to me. I don't think that (binary choice) exists, in an ontological sense.

It's a bit of more lengthier thought experiment, but it starts of with the question: Have you ever experienced a 'thing'?

To me, the answer to that question is: No. And since I deny that things exist, as atomic undividable entities, and see them as linguistical delusions, I reject mathematics (which is a more precise, and therefor, to me, more flawed form of language) as a delusion.

(My general feeling described very briefly.)

Hmmm... I don't see decision as being binary either, even in the way I described it, which is not mathematical either. Allow me to elaborate.

Let's suppose that we are creating a list of things which are true about our planet. Not an exhaustive list, just some of the things that are true. It has an atmosphere, it has gravity, it has liquid water, it exists approximately between -40 and +40 centigrade on the surface.

Now these sets of things are approximated facts. But they, by definition, exclude other possible facts. For instance, it if has an atmosphere it cannot lack an atmosphere, which is an alternative but invalid fact. If it has gravity it attracts other masses, instead of not interacting or repelling them.

The idea that the truths of our planet have non-binary but opposed falsities does not inherently imply decision. But it is necessary for decision.

The following is an argument I am presenting for philosophical reasons, not because I believe it to be true.

Suppose that the facts of our planet represented intent. That they are "supposed" to be this way. In order to be intended, it must represent a set of facts that do not include ALL facts. If it included all facts, then both those intended and not intended would be true. So within existence, which contains all truths of any meaning to us, the specific truths of any given thing, in this case the Earth, represent a portion of all truths.

Intent requires the exclusion of possible truths, or the transformation of a true statement into a false statement. For example, in the absence of reality, any statement is tautologically true by its utterance. But reality in many ways is not tautological, and this implies that not all statements are true (which we observe to be an accurate statement).

The statement is not reversible. The presence of possible false statements does not prove intent, they simply must be possible for intent to be an explanation. Why, if intent represents direction only, is this the case? Direction would be the pursuit of a specific truth or specific set of truths, not the exclusion of possible truths or the presence of possible falsities.

It is because decision, or the ability to exclude possible truths from the group of all truths, is also necessary for intent. Will is defined as follows:

1.the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action
3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/will

Using these definitions I will paraphrase and connect the ideas by stating that will is the expression or the act of intent.

Decision does not imply binary choice in my opinion. Decision implies the acceptance of some non-empty group of possible truths, and the rejection of some non-empty group of possible truths, but not between binary choices, simply incompatible ones.

In that sense, what I am saying is not that Ontologically there is absolute truth and absolute falsity; I am saying that existence requires that the false exists in order for it to be rejected. If the Universe were to have will, then all truth and all falsity exist, even if not within our Universe. The implication of that, in my opinion, would be far more important than the idea that the Universe has will. My original point, which again I didn't express very well and perhaps am still not expressing very well, is that the existence of all possible statements and ideas is necessary for the Universe to express will, and that a "place" to contain the statements and ideas which are false within our Universe must exist as well if the Universe can express will.

So I see the question of whether or not the Universe has will as being the same as whether or not there exists an infinite multi-verse, because in my mind, an infinite multi-verse is required for the Universe to have will, even if the reverse is not true.

In the sense of all things being linguistic illusions, regardless of the "illusion" being presented, the illusion exists within some thing that can contain the illusion as a truth or a falsity. The presence of the illusion proves the existence of existence, for the purpose of creating an illusion.

 

[MarcoD]

Hmmm... I don't see decision as being binary either, even in the way I described it, which is not mathematical either. Allow me to elaborate.

The problem with a lot what you said is that what you feel is not a linguistical delusion, I think is, and what you feel is not a binary choice on existence, I feel is.

I basically seem to default to a not very well fleshed-out current-day version of Parmenides view that the universe is an undivisable whole. (At least, I don't think there are things with clear cut boundaries. Since math [/logic] assumes that, I wonder about the relation between math and the world and our understanding of it.)

In the sense of all things being linguistic illusions, regardless of the "illusion" being presented, the illusion exists within some thing that can contain the illusion as a truth or a falsity. The presence of the illusion proves the existence of existence, for the purpose of creating an illusion.

Evidently.

 

[JordanL]

The problem with a lot what you said is that what you feel is not a linguistical delusion, I think is, and what you feel is not a binary choice on existence, I feel is.

I basically seem to default to a not very well fleshed-out current-day version of Parmenides view that the universe is an undivisable whole. (At least, I don't think there are things with clear cut boundaries. Since math assumes that, I wonder about the relation between math and the world and our understanding of it.)

Evidently.

Interesting. I see where we're diverging too.

I seem to default to the following: Anything that can be described exists within the fact that it can be described. Because of this the Universe and existence are as divisible or undivisible as you describe them to be, even if not within our experienced Universe or existence. (That is, all statements and ideas are true, even if they are not locally true.)

 

[apeiron]

Nothing serious has happened. Or at least we can put it aside.

Nothing except more infractions for no defensible reason. A philosophy forum should be moderated by people with a working knowledge of philosophy.

 

[MarcoD]

Interesting. I see where we're diverging too.

I seem to default to the following: Anything that can be described exists within the fact that it can be described. Because of this the Universe and existence are as divisible or undivisible as you describe them to be, even if not within our experienced Universe or existence. (That is, all statements and ideas are true, even if they are not locally true.)

Hmm, no.

I saw a falling star tonight when I was thinking about the 'undivisability' of things. Great, I had my first mystic experience!

I asked the question: Did you ever experience a 'thing'? So, let's take the falling star as an example.

What is a falling star? I know, from hearsay, that it is a collection of rubble passing through our atmosphere. Does it have a boundary which makes it a 'thing'? No. It consists of rubble, a level deeper of atoms (silicon, water, air molecules it interacts with, light it dissipates), a level deeper QM 'clouds'.

Does it exist? I would say no. The abstraction 'falling star' exists, but not in physical reality, but as a linguistic experience, a fuzzy abstraction (a sign) of an imperfect [sensory] experience of a physical phenomenon.

The same seems to be true for 'a chair,' 'a star,' 'a person,' anything.

But the basis of math, arithmetic, is that I can abstract physical phenomena into abstract things and can, for instance, count them. One falling star, two falling stars, etc. But discrete things don't seem to exist in reality, except as linguistical phenomena. How can we assume that counting things actually says anything about reality? [Except as an imperfect approximation?]

Similarly, the basis of the denial of the existence of things is that those (discrete) things exist. But discrete things don't seem to exist, only the linguistic abstraction, how can we deny the existence of physical things except as a word game? Does the denial of the linguistic abstraction imply the non-existence of the physical phenomenon?

The basis of logic, and the excluded middle, is that something is, or is not. And this then, to me, seems to be a reduction at absurdum, an abstraction [logic] of an abstraction [linguistics] of [imperfect experiences of] physical phenomena? The first abstraction I have doubts about, the second abstraction might as well be called absurd?

 

[JordanL]

Nothing except more infractions for no defensible reason. A philosophy forum should be moderated by people with a working knowledge of philosophy.

I've worked large forums as a moderator before, so I have some advice:

Forums and their moderators are not about fairness or correctness or truth. It is about following instruction. It does not matter if the rules are not applied how you interpret them, they are applied as the moderators and administrators interpret them.

Forums are kind of like dictatorships, in that the merit of a decision does not matter. Or rather, your interpretation of the merit does not matter. If the moderator has been tasked with enforcing rules, it is because their judgment has been trusted as the final interpretation of those rules.

The defensible reason for any infraction is that it has been given. The very fact that the person who gave was capable of giving it is the reason that it is correct, within the context of this forum. That is why there are many different forums with many different kinds of communities.

If Evo cited a rule to challenge something you posted, you cannot both defend your position and understand the reason. It is one or the other, because the moderator is correct and you are not, because they are the moderator. In that sense, defending the position inherently means misunderstanding the reason, and moderators often have few tools to deal with that situation other than conversation and infraction.

My advice to you would be this: if you believe that the reasoning is flawed, first accept that you received some kind of infraction, then seek out the moderator in a PM with the solitary intent of understanding how you violated the rules. Do not seek to change the rules, or change interpretation, try and find under what assumptions the infraction is valid, then understand that participating in this forum means agreeing with those assumptions.

 

[JordanL]

Hmm, no.

I saw a falling star tonight when I was thinking about the 'undivisability' of things. Great, I had my first mystic experience!

I asked the question: Did you ever experience a 'thing'? So, let's take the falling star as an example.

What is a falling star? I know, from hearsay, that it is a collection of rubble passing through our atmosphere. Does it have a boundary which makes it a 'thing'? No. It consists of rubble, a level deeper of atoms (silicon, water, air molecules it interacts with, light it dissipates), a level deeper QM 'clouds'.

Does it exist? I would say no. The abstraction 'falling star' exists, but not in physical reality, but as a linguistic experience, a fuzzy abstraction (a sign) of an imperfect [sensory] experience of a physical phenomenon.

The same seems to be true for 'a chair,' 'a star,' 'a person,' anything.

But the basis of math, arithmetic, is that I can abstract physical phenomena into abstract things and can, for instance, count them. One falling star, two falling stars, etc. But discrete things don't seem to exist in reality, except as linguistical phenomena. How can we assume that counting things actually says anything about reality? [Except as an imperfect approximation?]

Similarly, the basis of the denial of the existence of things is that those (discrete) things exist. But discrete things don't seem to exist, only the linguistic abstraction, how can we deny the existence of physical things except as a word game? Does the denial of the linguistic abstraction imply the non-existence of the physical phenomenon?

The basis of logic, and the excluded middle, is that something is, or is not. And this then, to me, seems to be a reduction at absurdum, an abstraction of an abstraction of physical phenomena? The first abstraction I have doubts about, the second abstraction might as well be called absurd?

Ah, but you see, your interpretation of reality is within mine, it just excludes the rest of my interpretation. As the interpretation exists, it discretely exists, even if not within this Universe. Similarly, my interpretation does as well, even if not within this Universe.

All ideas which can be described with language are things, even your interpretation, and as things, they neither represent an objective truth nor represent any kind of permanence. There was a state in which both of our interpretations were not extant, so neither of our interpretations represent a constant truth of any kind from any perspective. Tautologically both of our interpretations are approximations of some "thing", not the thing itself.

Whether or not a thing is experienced or conveyed as information is completely irrelevant to the existence of those things, because all things, whether abstractions or not, had a time or a state in which they were absent, and so do not represent any kind of ultimate truth, either for you or for anyone else. They can be more true or less true, but not the truth.

Experiences are just as valid and invalid as knowledge for justifying existence, because they are both part of existence. In order to justify existence you must describe it within something larger than existence, otherwise you describe it incompletely.

A more concrete example of this principal would be the following: suppose you had a program to simulate the deterministic nature of a Universe. Could this program simulate our own Universe from within it? No, it could not, as it would require all of the totality of our existence within this Universe to create a simulation of our existence within this Universe. Our existence can be described as real or simulated, but they describe the same thing.

If real, they are discrete, and if not, they can only exist within some thing discrete which can contain their indiscreteness in order to be experienced as discrete. The fact that they can be interpreted as discrete, even if they are not, means that their discreteness holds at some level, even if it is a level beyond our own experience of existence.

 

[MarcoD]

Ah, but you see, your interpretation of reality is within mine, it just excludes the rest of my interpretation. As the interpretation exists, it discretely exists, even if not within this Universe. Similarly, my interpretation does as well, even if not within this Universe.

Great!

All ideas which can be described with language are things, even your interpretation, and as things, they neither represent an objective truth nor represent any kind of permanence. There was a state in which both of our interpretations were not extant, so neither of our interpretations represent a constant truth of any kind from any perspective. Tautologically both of our interpretations are approximations of some "thing", not the thing itself.

This is my point. I wonder whether 'discrete' things exist, as far as I know, I have a fuzzy understanding of the universe, and even a fuzzy experience of the linguistic abstractions I assign to what I experience. I find it a leap of faith to conclude from that those things exist, in an ontological sense, from that fuzzy understanding.

Since logic and math presuppose the existence of things (which don't exist), any mathematical description of the universe [as a collection of things] would therefor be flawed.

Whether or not a thing is experienced or conveyed as information is completely irrelevant to the existence of those things, because all things, whether abstractions or not, had a time or a state in which they were absent, and so do not represent any kind of ultimate truth, either for you or for anyone else. They can be more true or less true, but not the truth.

For the sake of the argument (I am not that rabid on it), I deny the existence of things altogether.

Moreover, you presuppose the existence of things by them being able to be absent. Like Parmenides I would say: Nothing is absent, nothing is present, the whole universe is the only thing there.

Experiences are just as valid and invalid as knowledge for justifying existence, because they are both part of existence. In order to justify existence you must describe it within something larger than existence, otherwise you describe it incompletely.

The existence of the universe, yes. The existence of discrete things within it, no.

A more concrete example of this principal would be the following: suppose you had a program to simulate the deterministic nature of a Universe. Could this program simulate our own Universe from within it? No, it could not, as it would require all of the totality of our existence within this Universe to create a simulation of our existence within this Universe. Our existence can be described as real or simulated, but they describe the same thing.

I would agree to that since the universe is an undivisable thing, and therefor couldn't be put in itself.

If real, they are discrete, and if not, they can only exist within some thing discrete which can contain their indiscreteness in order to be experienced as discrete. The fact that they can be interpreted as discrete, even if they are not, means that their discreteness holds at some level, even if it is a level beyond our own experience of existence.

Again. I wonder, and for the sake of the argument deny, that there are discrete things. Except for the one universe.

I would say that 'discreteness' is a fuzzy delusion of my perception of my internal linguistical games. So, I again deny that discreteness holds, in an ontological sense, at some level.

EDIT: Again, it's a bit of stretch, but it comes from my own, say even mystical, experience, that I never in my life have met 'a thing.' And I wonder what that means.

 

[JordanL]

This is my point. I wonder whether 'discrete' things exist, as far as I know, I have a fuzzy understanding of the universe, and even a fuzzy experience of the linguistic abstractions I assign to what I experience. I find it a leap of faith to conclude from that those things exist, in an ontological sense, from that fuzzy understanding.

The existence of the universe, yes. The existence of discrete things within it, no.

You find it to be a fuzzy understanding, but in concluding that it is fuzzy, you assign varying degrees of truth or falsity to them. How could one do so with things that do not exist? Things. In the absence of discreteness within the things of our Universe, there would be no such thing as truth or falsity at all, for any particular thing that is either true or false would be a declaration of the truth of falsity of existence itself.

For the sake of the argument (I am not that rabid on it), I deny the existence of things altogether.

Moreover, you presuppose the existence of things by them being able to be absent. Like Parmenides I would say: Nothing is absent, nothing is present, the whole universe is the only thing there.

In denying the existence, you confirm it exists. How can you deny that which is not extant? In order to deny it must be described, and this that can be described exists tautologically within its description.

I am not saying that the absence of things confirms their existence. Quite the opposite. I am saying that the things which can be declared false or can be denied must be present so that they can be declared upon.

How can one deny that which is not anywhere or within anything? The denial of it provides it exists within the context of denial. That has nothing to do with whether or not it is a thing or whether or not it is discrete. It by definition exists, as an idea, as a thing, or as something indescrete, in order to be commented upon at all.

I suppose the leap I am describing is that knowledge and experience are as concrete an existence as physical existence, they just interact with our Universe using different rules and different mechanisms. But they are a part of existence, or existence is a part of them, however you wish to phrase it.

Again. I wonder, and for the sake of the argument deny, that there are discrete things. Except for the one universe.

I would say that 'discreteness' is a fuzzy delusion of my perception of my internal linguistical games. So, I again deny that discreteness holds, in an ontological sense, at some level.

EDIT: Again, it's a bit of stretch, but it comes from my own, say even mystical, experience, that I never in my life have met 'a thing.' And I wonder what that means.

If the issue is mostly about whether or not the parts are discrete or not, and thus can be confirmed to exist inherently instead of as a part of the whole, then I would say that the idea of inherent or whole existence as you are describing it is missing the point.

Things do not need to be separate to be inherent, and the whole does not need to be divisible to have things. You can choose to engage all things as part of arbitrarily large or small systems, (ontological systems), because the only part of existence that has been utterly consistent has been this: all things exist within a larger existence, and contain smaller existences.

Where you decide to stop along this infinite chain of regress is unimportant and arbitrary in my opinion. Each thing within it contains the same infinite microchasms of existence, just as all things are contained within the larger macrochasm of our Universe's existence, and at least to me, logically it is also contained within infinitely larger existence.

There is no stopping point or starting point. Existence contains the Universe, the Universe does not contain existence, so dividing the Universe up into the real and not real is unimportant to me from an ontological perspective.

Side note: I am not actually trying to convince you of anything, and I would like to say that I've found your points fascinating and thought-provoking. This is an angle I have not had to consider the idea I'm proposing from before, and even as I explain it within the context of what you are presenting, my conclusions are not fully formed, and I am not nearly as firm in these opinions as I'm sure I seem to be.

 

[Willowz]

Nothing except more infractions for no defensible reason. A philosophy forum should be moderated by people with a working knowledge of philosophy.

I found your old thread very readable. https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=301514

 

[MarcoD]

You find it to be a fuzzy understanding, but in concluding that it is fuzzy, you assign varying degrees of truth or falsity to them. How could one do so with things that do not exist? Things.

No, you see. That's where I totally disagree with you. In the claim of 'assignment of varying degrees of truth of falsity,' is a presupposition that things exist. (To what can I assign if I don't believe in things, but think that the concept of 'thing' is a delusion?)

Again, I don't deny that I (fuzzily) perceive 'things' as emergent attributes from an internal linguistical game which is the result of an imperfect reflection on reality, but I fail to see how that would make things exist since everything I perceive is fuzzy, and -again- I have never encountered an (undividable/atomic) thing in reality, or in thought.

In the absence of discreteness within the things of our Universe, there would be no such thing as truth or falsity at all, for any particular thing that is either true or false would be a declaration of the truth of falsity of existence itself.

Yes, there cannot be a thing, as truth, since things don't exist. Truth itself is a delusional linguistic abstraction stemming from a linguistic game.

In denying the existence, you confirm it exists. How can you deny that which is not extant? In order to deny it must be described, and this that can be described exists tautologically within its description.

I deny the existence of things, not the universe. The universe I perceive, it exists.

I deny that description is the proof of existence of things. The description is a delusional linguistical game in itself.

I am not saying that the absence of things confirms their existence. Quite the opposite. I am saying that the things which can be declared false or can be denied must be present so that they can be declared upon.

Which is a stretch to far for me, since I deny things exist, and therefor, things cannot be declared false.

How can one deny that which is not anywhere or within anything? The denial of it provides it exists within the context of denial. That has nothing to do with whether or not it is a thing or whether or not it is discrete. It by definition exists, as an idea, as a thing, or as something indescrete, in order to be commented upon at all.

No, the denial is on the fact that 'How can one deny that which is not anywhere or within anything,' is a linguistical stament, a word game, an imperfect delusion. 'The universe is,' is also a word game, but something I experience; 'that what is not' is (only) a word game, since it cannot be experienced.

I suppose the leap I am describing is that knowledge and experience are as concrete an existence as physical existence, they just interact with our Universe using different rules and different mechanisms. But they are a part of existence, or existence is a part of them, however you wish to phrase it.

To me, knowledge and experience and physical perception is the universe - they are all -for lack of better words- 'fuzzy'.

(After that, there is the process of accepting that there is also a physical universe, that I am a part of that, and that knowledge and experience are probably reducable to the universe itself- but I really don't want to start a debate on materialism.)

If the issue is mostly about whether or not the parts are discrete or not, and thus can be confirmed to exist inherently instead of as a part of the whole, then I would say that the idea of inherent or whole existence as you are describing it is missing the point.

Things do not need to be separate to be inherent, and the whole does not need to be divisible to have things. You can choose to engage all things as part of arbitrarily large or small systems, (ontological systems), because the only part of existence that has been utterly consistent has been this: all things exist within a larger existence, and contain smaller existences.

Yeah, well, unless I deny that last statement since the universe is undividable. No things exist.

There is no stopping point or starting point. Existence contains the Universe, the Universe does not contain existence, so dividing the Universe up into the real and not real is unimportant to me from an ontological perspective.

Ah. But you constantly do divide, or make statements which imply that you can divide things. For instance, a 'decision between accepted or rejected.'

Why do I reject decision (in free will)? Because:

A) I reject 'things' exist, except as for as delusions from my mind stemming from a linguistic game. And
B) A decision is a choice between (two) things.

Therefor, decisions don't exist. It is impossible since there is nothing to chose between.

Side note: I am not actually trying to convince you of anything, and I would like to say that I've found your points fascinating and thought-provoking. This is an angle I have not had to consider the idea I'm proposing from before, and even as I explain it within the context of what you are presenting, my conclusions are not fully formed, and I am not nearly as firm in these opinions as I'm sure I seem to be.

I am not trying to convince anyone of anything here too. I just think that I am deluded in my perception of reality, that's an uncommon stance.

 

[bohm2]

But I mostly reject mathematics as a basis for philosophical answers.

So I'm guessing you wouldn't agree with Friedman's quote below?

"the philosophers of the modern tradition from Descartes are not best understood as attempting to stand outside the new science so as to show, from some mysterious point outside of sciences itself that our scientific knowledge somehow mirrors an independently existing reality. Rather, they start from the fact of modern scientific knowledge as a fixed point, as it were. Their problem is not so much to justify this knowledge from some 'higher' standpoint so as to articulate the new philosophical conceptions that are forced upon us by the new science. In Kant's words, mathematics and the science of nature stand in no need of philosophical inquiry for themselves, but for the sake of another science: metaphysics."

If you don't agree, what are some reasons you think this view is mistaken?

 

[MarcoD]

So I'm guessing you wouldn't agree with Friedman's quote below?

"the philosophers of the modern tradition from Descartes are not best understood as attempting to stand outside the new science so as to show, from some mysterious point outside of sciences itself that our scientific knowledge somehow mirrors an independently existing reality. Rather, they start from the fact of modern scientific knowledge as a fixed point, as it were. Their problem is not so much to justify this knowledge from some 'higher' standpoint so as to articulate the new philosophical conceptions that are forced upon us by the new science. In Kant's words, mathematics and the science of nature stand in no need of philosophical inquiry for themselves, but for the sake of another science: metaphysics."

If you don't agree, what are some reasons you think this view is mistaken?

Well, for those who missed it, I just gave an ontological/metaphysical argument that math may fall short of describing reality by questioning a fundamental assumption in it: the existence of things. (Which leads to, among others, counting and the law of the excluded middle.)

I have no other reason except for a) a feeling that we know way less than we think, b) the above argument, and c) (a reason stolen from fundamentalist Islamist) that the rational method leads to reductions at absurdum, or, doesn't seem to have improved our understanding of nature one iota, and d) doesn't seem to have solved any fundamental problem in the world.

I therefor, jokingly, posted that a more fundamental question than 'Why change?' would be 'Who are you?' Now that seems like an unscientific question, but stemming from Greek tradition, if we drop all assumptions, shouldn't the question about other intelligences be more fundamental to our core (ontological) knowledge of the world given what we experience?

 

[apeiron]

but stemming from Greek tradition, if we drop all assumptions...

Do you have a source for this?

Perhaps you mean here the method of induction. So where does that leave deduction (and hence mathematical argument)?

 

[bohm2]

a) a feeling that we know way less than we think,

This is what really confuses me also. On the one hand, one can't help but have this sense of immense progress in selected domains (like in physics) so that we are getting closer to ‘the real properties of the natural world’ and yet if we assume we are like all other animals and not gods, our knowledge must be pretty slim. It seems almost a sure thing that things-in-themselves (if that term even applies) will forever be hidden from us as Kant argued. Consider Pinker's argument:

We are organisms, not angels, and our minds are organs, not pipelines to the truth. Our minds evolved by natural selection to solve problems that were life-and-death matters to our ancestors, not to commune with correctness.

Thus, it's argued that our minds like most other biological systems/organs are likely poor solutions to the design-problems posed by nature. They are, "the best solution that evolution could achieve under existing circumstances, but perhaps a clumsy and messy solution." Thus, it seems we cannot have direct knowledge of how the world is like as the knowledge has to be routed in terms of the resources available to our theory-building abilities/mental organs and these are not likely to be "pipelines to the truth".

What is even stranger is the "the Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences". Why is abstract mathematics so effective especially given its unlikely role in natural selection. I mean abstract mathematical thinking doesn't appear to have played any role in our evolution. I mean our ancestors didn't even know they had it, I think? I mean, what survival advantage does the ability to do abstract mathematics have to do with dealing with every day objects?

 

[MarcoD]

Do you have a source for this?

Perhaps you mean here the method of induction. So where does that leave deduction (and hence mathematical argument)?

One might wonder whether deduction, and you should define that, is a mathematical argument.

EDIT: Critical thinking is assigned to the Socratic school of thought, but probably older than that. I forgot why it is assigned.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_thinking

 

[MarcoD]

This is what really confuses me also. On the one hand, one can't help but have this sense of immense progress in selected domains (like in physics) so that we are getting closer to ‘the real properties of the natural world’ and yet if we assume we are like all other animals and not gods, our knowledge must be pretty slim. It seems almost a sure thing that things-in-themselves (if that term even applies) will forever be hidden from us as Kant argued. Consider Pinker's argument:

We are organisms, not angels, and our minds are organs, not pipelines to the truth. Our minds evolved by natural selection to solve problems that were life-and-death matters to our ancestors, not to commune with correctness.

Fortunately, this problem is solved by all religions. (This was a joke. Thing is in your argument you assume an awful lot, which I tried to avoid in the ontological denial.)

Thus, it's argued that our minds like most other biological systems/organs are likely poor solutions to the design-problems posed by nature. They are, "the best solution that evolution could achieve under existing circumstances, but perhaps a clumsy and messy solution." Thus, it seems we cannot have direct knowledge of how the world is like as the knowledge has to be routed in terms of the resources available to our theory-building abilities/mental organs and these are not likely to be "pipelines to the truth".

Plato's cave enhanced with biology and evolutionary theory. The problem is that Plato already showed that without biology and evolutionary theory our understanding is hopelessly ineffective. (But to be honest, I don't care to much about these questions. The only interesting thing about my original denial of existence of things is that it might reasonably show that math is inadequate to describe reality. I don't really care to much about the other, for me, unanswerable questions of existence.)

What is even stranger is the "the Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences". Why is abstract mathematics so effective especially given its unlikely role in natural selection. I mean abstract mathematical thinking doesn't appear to have played any role in our evolution. I mean our ancestors didn't even know they had it, I think? I mean, what survival advantage does the ability to do abstract mathematics have to do with dealing with every day objects?

I don't buy into that claim except for that I think it's nice to believe as a physicist.

As for the last question, it just seems to me that nukes come in handy when dealing with existential questions of survival.

But, also, you reduced to Darwinism, which is amoral. I rather stopped worrying about that, and wonder more about why we fail to 'transcend' amorality.

EDIT: Maybe we should stop the thread, or discuss the reasonability of math being able to describe reality, or it's unreasonable effectiveness elsewhere.

 

[bohm2]

The thread would be most productive if we could go through Tegmarks reasonings for a mathematical universe. That is, why does he think it is indispensabile? "Just because it is", doesn't cut the mustard.

I think Tegmark comes to that conclusion because to a large extent,

"the propositions of physics are equations, equations that contain numbers, terms that refer without describing, many other mathematical symbols, and nothing else; and that these equations, being what they are, can only tell us about the abstract or mathematically characterizable structure of matter or the physical world without telling us anything else about the nature of the thing that exemplifies the structure. Even in the case of spacetime, as opposed to matter or force—to the doubtful extent that these three things can be separated—it’s unclear whether we have any knowledge of its intrinsic nature beyond its abstract or mathematically representable structure."

Thus, in physics, the propositions are invariably mathematical expressions that are totally devoid of direct pictoriality. Physicists believe that physics has to 'free itself' from ‘intuitive pictures’ and give up the hope of ‘visualizing the world'. Steven Weinberg traces the realistic significance of physics to its mathematical formulations: ‘we have all been making abstract mathematical models of the universe to which at least the physicists give a higher degree of reality than they accord the ordinary world of sensations' ( e.g. so-called 'Galilean Style').

But I think it's far-fetched to jump the ship and say there is nothing but math because one still has a "math-phenonology" unification problem replacing the mind-body explanatory gap. For how do mathematical entities lead to phenomenology? It seems to me that mathematical objects because of their abstractness are just the best mental objects/tools we have for describing stuff that our senses and every day notions cannot describe. But there seems to be far more than just mathematical objects as introspection/subjectivity reveals:

"And Since we know—more certainly than anything else—that experience is real, and is therefore wholly physical, if materialism is true, we have reason, as materialists, to think, with Priestley, Russell, Eddington, and others, that experientiality is a fundamental feature of the physical."

http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/chapters/0262513102pref2.pdf

 

[klimatos]

This is the kind of question that makes me bang my head on my desk. Why do people spend time on such useless questions? Oh, I know, philosophy asks the questions that don't need to be asked. <bangs head on desk>

Carry on.

My sympathies, Evo. I only hope that you have an indefinitely large supply of desks. I would have said "an infinite supply" except that some reader would have been sure to ask me "just exactly what do you mean by 'infinite'".

 

[Evo]

My sympathies, Evo. I only hope that you have an indefinitely large supply of desks. I would have said "an infinite supply" except that some reader would have been sure to ask me "just exactly what do you mean by 'infinite'".

LOL, unfortunately I only have one head.

 

[foolishwun]

Reality is an illusion, but the thing that's being eluded is also a part of that illusion.
First consider the fact that there is a possibility that all that exists is the very moment where you understand what I am saying now, with all memories of the even recent past nothing but an artificial arrangement of atoms and electrical activity. There is no objective present, only a quantumly subjective one. Think of it as a quantumly decided random outcome in infinite dimensions. A random position, a random present, a random set of universal laws, a random observer existent in any way that agrees with the universal laws and the logic that allows it to exist in the first place. It's like when you look directly at an electron or photon or whatever and say "why am I in the universe where this is here, instead of somewhere else in the wave funtion?" The same concept can be applied to every dimension of your subjectivity: location, present, even the universe that allows you to exist in the first place. Each of these things exists, at an abstract level, perpendicularly to the last, and the observer is a random outcome in any place where he/she is possible.
Anyone get what I mean? >.>

 

[estro]

Reality is an illusion, but the thing that's being eluded is also a part of that illusion.
First consider the fact that there is a possibility that all that exists is the very moment where you understand what I am saying now, with all memories of the even recent past nothing but an artificial arrangement of atoms and electrical activity. There is no objective present, only a quantumly subjective one. Think of it as a quantumly decided random outcome in infinite dimensions. A random position, a random present, a random set of universal laws, a random observer existent in any way that agrees with the universal laws and the logic that allows it to exist in the first place. It's like when you look directly at an electron or photon or whatever and say "why am I in the universe where this is here, instead of somewhere else in the wave funtion?" The same concept can be applied to every dimension of your subjectivity: location, present, even the universe that allows you to exist in the first place. Each of these things exists, at an abstract level, perpendicularly to the last, and the observer is a random outcome in any place where he/she is possible.
Anyone get what I mean? >.>

To me it sounds like a random collection of words.
Can you describe the idea, using short logical arguments. [after all philosophy should be logical?]

 

[estro]

Today I have a mood for some philosophy!

...
Why there is something rather than nothing?
...

Do you know why does a dog lick his balls?
I guess you can put the dog as a metaphor for the universe. =)

 

[Willowz]

Today I have a mood for some philosophy!


Do you know why does a dog lick his balls?
I guess you can put the dog as a metaphor for the universe. =)

Durrrrr! Does not compute.

 

[estro]

Durrrrr! Does not compute.

You can answer these both questions using similar logic...=)

 

[NorEaster]

Interestingly, this post was sent as a post-reply forum alert (within a forum email), and I remember commenting on this subject, and yet I can't find whatever it was that I posted within this thread. I guess I'm just not doing something right, but I still can address some of this.

Reality is an illusion, but the thing that's being eluded is also a part of that illusion.

The truth is that your singular perception of reality is an illusion - crafted by the cognitive vetting process that manages all information that is allowed to be loaded into your corporeal brain's short term memory. That said, to believe that the whole of reality is an illusion is to suggest that you are the Alpha and Omega of what lies above and beyond existence itself and are being served by that existential whole as the central purpose of that whole. A good self image is important, but there are boundaries between what is good and what is a little too good, and your assertion might be an illustration of the crossing of such a boundary in this case.

First consider the fact that there is a possibility that all that exists is the very moment where you understand what I am saying now, with all memories of the even recent past nothing but an artificial arrangement of atoms and electrical activity.

In reference to your perception, this is true, but only regarding your perception. The caveat that I would inject here is that what you understand to be "now" is anywhere from 3-7 seconds in the past (delayed reality perception) since the cognitive vetting process takes a moment to shed, mask, amplify, minimize, and otherwise "massage" all the data (stored residual, ruminative, audio/visual/sensory) that is streaming into your short term memory as a mix-down wash of corporeal consciousness at this specific instant.

Once that data has been streamed in (in the form of a residual data clone of the real associated "burst" whole of indivisible conscious intellect) the carbon storage material (that we're all constructed of) stores that cloned data for quick access, since this is on-board data storage/access/application/configuration capacity is what makes the brain itself such a superior survival data management system (as opposed to the point-of-application DNA directives system found in much more primitive corporeal matrix wholes). The original Intellect "burst" (a dynamic information/event unit hybrid) immediately associates with existing "bursts" from the same corporeal authoring brain, forming a unique existential hybrid collective, but that's a subject for discussion within a different thread.

There is no objective present, only a quantumly subjective one.

Actually, there is a definitive present, but it only lasts the span of the contextual environment's Unit Rate of Change (URC) before being replaced by the next change (event) unit. We refer to each of these indivisible event units as "now", and it's fair to say that they are very short-lived. They do - however - survive as associated unit configurations of information (the facts of these event units having occurred), but that's a completely different form of physical existence, so in truth, these event units do not literally survive the instant. That said, they can logically survive as contributive holon units within larger event holons, which can also be integral to progressively larger event holons, giving all associated event units logically representative survival as long as the umbrella event trajectory survives.

It can get pretty complicated when you start examining umbrella event holons that approach the sophistication of those that we perceive as material existence. By that time, the holon layers are fairly extreme, and the contextual ramifications are very rigid (by juxtapositional default impact, of course), and the potentials have become comfortably predictable.

Think of it as a quantumly decided random outcome in infinite dimensions. A random position, a random present, a random set of universal laws, a random observer existent in any way that agrees with the universal laws and the logic that allows it to exist in the first place. It's like when you look directly at an electron or photon or whatever and say "why am I in the universe where this is here, instead of somewhere else in the wave funtion?" The same concept can be applied to every dimension of your subjectivity: location, present, even the universe that allows you to exist in the first place. Each of these things exists, at an abstract level, perpendicularly to the last, and the observer is a random outcome in any place where he/she is possible.

What you're suggesting is superposition, which defies the elegant efficiency of the real reality that sits beneath you and allows you the progressive stability and capacity to consider its structure. What we know of reality - that it is exceedingly crisp in its elimination of what is cumbersome and non-essential - is directly contrary to the launching-of-infinite-realities-upon-the-manifestation-of-the-choice-not-made notion that bases what you just described. What exists as stable and relatively reliable can't be structured as a result of that which is random and infinitely malleable, since these qualities sets are incompatible with one another at a core level. This means that the random existential foundation that you describe can't progress into the stable and dependable real that serve you as well as it does from moment to moment. The point of stability in any system that is inherently instable simply does exist. There can't logically ever emerge a transition point from true instability and randomness to what is essentially its own antithesis.

As far as random is concerned, it is exactly what it suggests that it is - completely undependable and unpredictable. There are no actual degrees of randomness. There are only incorrect perceptions of that which is not truly random, but actually structured within a pattern scheme that has yet to be accurately discerned or observed by the unassociated and freely dynamic Intellect. If you are positioned 3 inches from a 100 square yard patterned whole, your point of perspective is simply too close to allow you to view the pattern that exists despite your inability to observe it. That doesn't mean that the pattern doesn't exist until you finally get around to realizing its existence. It means that you are incapable of observing it in its entirety until that moment when the pattern becomes obvious to you. This is why there is the material capacity to back up a bit and take another look. Maybe not "why" that capacity exists, but since it does exist, it's good to take advantage of it now and again.

Reality exist, and while it's not Harry Potter-ville, it's pretty amazing.

Anyone get what I mean? >.>

I get what you mean. Do you get what I mean?

 

[shashankac655]

Why there is something rather than nothing?

Actually, this itself is an assumption! what makes you think there is something?
What if our consciousness is just an illusion.
Some Ancient Indian philosophers came up with the theory that the universe is our consciousness(an illusion)
Maya

Don't ask me for proofs ,i was just trying to tell that some people have tried to answer this question.

 

[bohm2]

What if our consciousness is just an illusion.

That doesn't make sense. How can consciousness be an illusion?

 

[shashankac655]

That doesn't make sense. How can consciousness be an illusion?

I was thinking that our whole life is a big dream and we will all wake up when we die.

 

[chiro]

Why anything at all?

Well anything is just a term we use in a descriptive capacity.

Like a fish that lives in water, we are the same but in a different kind of fish-bowl.

We only know of how to describe things that we can sense, or things that we have a created a way to sense, like mathematics.

No one can visualize four dimensions visually, but mathematics provides a gateway to sensing this in a new way, and like any other language, it helps us make sense of the world by reducing some aspect of it down so that it can be attempted to be understood.

My best guess is that these "senses" will evolve with new language that is beyond our current understanding.

Just in the way that the pythagoreans couldn't come to terms with real numbers, it will probably be the same with us. The future will have language that is so far removed from our current state of being, just like we take the complex numbers for granted now, when even a couple of hundred years ago, many could not comprehend the necessity and the power that these give us.

 

[Sefrez]

You would think that you could not differentiate the two, something and nothing. But it does seem, here, that I can by simply saying that this question wouldn't be asked if there were nothing. But that is implying that nothing is of what we think nothing is to be. Or in other words, is this question even something? I'm unsure.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Actually, the original question assumed anything exists. I demand proof that anything exists.

 

[bohm2]

Actually, the original question assumed anything exists. I demand proof that anything exists.

Descartes: "I think, I exist"? I think one would have trouble trying to question their own existence.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Descartes: "I think, I exist"? I think one would have trouble trying to question their own existence.

I exist. But I'm not sure about you or Descartes. Besides, the question is "why" anything exists. I exist, but I have no idea why.

 

[apeiron]

I exist. But I'm not sure about you or Descartes.

You only need the existence of one particular thing to motivate the more general question of why should anything exist. And it is a legitimate metaphysical question that is worth taking more seriously.

Some try to answer it in terms of material cause (some event like a quantum fluctuation).

Some employ final cause (existence is necessary to complete some sort of purpose).

The OP was about an argument based on formal cause - the ways to exist far out-number the simple alternative of non-existence.

So it is a question that forces you to question your very understanding of "existence" and "causality". What is the ground beneath these fundamental notions?

 

[SW VandeCarr]

So it is a question that forces you to question your very understanding of "existence" and "causality". What is the ground beneath these fundamental notions?

Frankly I find these discussions rather useless and annoying. The OP's question as to "why" anything ultimately exists has no answer IMO outside theology and as such should be off limits, even in this forum.

 

[apeiron]

Frankly I find these discussions rather useless and annoying. The OP's question as to "why" anything exists has no answer IMO outside theology and as such should be off limits, even in this forum.

That seems an odd reaction to me. Philosophy is in fact more about how to frame questions properly than in delivering the certainty of an answer. You can always hope to do at least that much.

While perhaps theology does start with its answer, then seeks its supporting framework of argumentation (in so far as it needs to justify what people are going to believe from social indoctrination anyway).

But here in this forum, it is pretty clear that you have to demonstrate why the question has no possible answer before you can call for it to be ruled "off limits". Are you suggesting it is a tautology or ill-posed for some other standard reason?

 

[SW VandeCarr]

But here in this forum, it is pretty clear that you have to demonstrate why the question has no possible answer before you can call for it to be ruled "off limits".

I would challenge that outright. I don't need to show that no possible answer exists. I have only to refer to this thread and other similar threads that have made no progress toward a satisfactory answer or to even suggest how a satisfactory answer could be formulated outside of some first cause argument. When a first cause argument is framed in terms of "why", it's difficult to see how it's not theological.

 

[Nano-Passion]

THANK YOU FOR POSTING THIS! That was an extremely interesting read to say the least! I've grappled with this question hard and long and this was a very invigorating read.

"Why is there Something rather than Nothing?
If you don’t get dizzy, you really don’t get it."

I like this quote, its very true!

 

[apeiron]

I would challenge that outright. I don't need to show that no possible answer exists. I have only to refer to this thread and other similar threads that have made no progress toward a satisfactory answer or to even suggest how a satisfactory answer could be formulated outside of some first cause argument. When a first cause argument is framed in terms of "why", it's difficult to see how it's not theological.

But the OP did not offer a "first cause" argument. It was an argument from formal cause.

And when you say "first cause", it is not clear here whether you in fact mean efficient cause or final cause.

Some arguments posit a first event (an efficient cause) - either a god chosing to act, or something like the first arbitrary swerve of an atom in Greek atomist philosopy.

More sophisticated arguments, like Aristotle's, are based on final cause. Things start out as merely potential and then develop towards the actual. So Aristotle's "unmoved mover" was not a god of the "lighting the blue touch paper" variety but the concept of a final state (of actualised perfection) that draws the potential towards it, "inspiring it to develop".

It is the outcome that causes the move. Or perhaps the better way of putting it, it is the limit on change. This is an ontology in which the problem is not about getting anything started, but finding the reason it eventually stops. A very different way of thinking about "why anything".

 

[ThomasT]

Think of all the possible ways that the world might be, down to every detail. There are infinitely many such possible ways. All these ways seem to be equally probable—which means that the probability of anyone of these infinite possibilities actually occurring seems to be zero, and yet one of them happened.

This depends somewhat on how one views/defines the evolution of our universe. Apparently, there's only one possible way "that the world might be, down to every detail" at any given instant, during any given interval -- which is the way that the world actually is.

Depending on one's view/definition of the evolution of our universe, some of the future possibilities that might seem apparent wrt certain views can be ruled out, rendered impossible, wrt certain views. In the views where the evolution of the universe is limited in some way, there's a limited number of possible continuations with each possibility having a positive (> 0) finite probability of occurring.

The assumption that certain fundamental dynamical laws (maybe just one fundamental dynamic) are operational seems to suggest that the evolution of the universe will exhibit certain evident salient, and therefore predictable, characteristics. For example, wrt a local deterministic universe where the speed of change is limited by c, the prediction that the spatial configuration of the universe one nanosecond from a time, t, will not be appreciably different from the spatial configuration at t.

Anyway, wrt our universe, the possibilities don't seem to be infinite, but instead seem to be quite limited -- depending, as I mentioned, on the assumptions one starts with, and there don't seem to be an infinite number of reasonable alternatives from which to choose.

“Now, there’s only one way for there to be Nothing, right?” There are no variants in Nothing; there being Nothing at all is a single state of affairs. And it’s a total state of affairs; that is, it settles everything—every possible proposition has its truth value settled, true or false, usually false, by there being Nothing. So if Nothing is one way for reality to be, and if the total number of ways for reality to be are infinite, and if all such infinite ways are equally probable so that the probability of anyone of them is [essentially] zero, then the probability of ‘there being Nothing’ is also [essentially] zero.” Because there are an infinite number of potential worlds, each specific world would have a zero probability of existing, and because Nothing is only one of these potential worlds—there can be only one kind of Nothing—the probabilily of Nothing existing is zero.

The problem is that there aren't, based on observation and certain inferences relating to observation, reasonably, an infinite number of ways for reality to be. The fact of the matter, the reality of any given universal configuration, is the configuration itself -- which necessarily entails that it isn't some other possible configuration.

But we're just considering the two possibilities, something and nothing. If, since we don't know why there's something rather than nothing, we give these two possibilites equal weight (which I think is the usual probabilistic approach), then each has a 1/2 probability.

However, there is something rather than nothing. Which is all that we know, or can know, about the something vs nothing problem, since, by definitions, we can't experience nothingness. So, we can't even say that nothingness is a possiblity.

Thus, the question does, imo, reduce to, "why/how our universe?". Wrt this I think that there are some cosmological models that extrapolate/speculate back to before the point of departure of the mainstream "big bang" cosmologies.

Does the argument sound persuasive?

No.

 

[apeiron]

A good thinker on the issue is the process philosopher Nicholas Rescher.

See "On explaining existence" - http://cla.calpoly.edu/~rgrazian/docs/courses/411/Rescher-OnExplainingExistence.pdf

Briefly, he outlines why efficient cause-based explanations fail. Then argues for a "constraint of possibility" approach - what he calls the hylarchic principle.

Existence-explanation via a hylarchic principle of protolaw turns on a distinction between substantival explanations in terms of the operations of entities and process explanations in terms of primordial operational principles - principles that underlie rather than merely reflect the nature of the real. It is predicated on acknowledging that explanation in the case of existence-at-large cannot operate in the orthodox order of the efficient causation of preexisting things. In resorting to a hylarchic principle one can thus abandon altogether the hoary dogma that things can only come from things. A fundamental shift in explanatory methodology is at issue with this hylarchic approach - the shift to a nomological mode of explanation that operates in terms of laws which lack any and all prior embedding in an order of things. The fact of the world’s nonemptiness is now accounted for as the consequence of a constraint by principles rather than as the product of the operation of causes.

The neat trick he wants to then pull off is to show that because there are grades of possibility - with only the constraint-satisfying kinds being "real" - then the possibility of nothingness can be ruled out (so proving there must always be something as some possibilities will always become the actual due to the causality of proto-laws).

The role of a hylarchic principle is now clear. As a protophysical law of a characteristically preexistential kind, it reduces the range of real possibility so as to exclude from it (inter alia) those worlds that are existentially empty. A hylarchic principle is simply a particular sort of possibility-restricting condition - a rather special one that narrows the range of eligible cases down to nonempty worlds. And so the task of explaining why there is something rather than nothing can be discharged by relatively orthodox, direct and unproblematic means, since what is necessary must be actual.

Still more ambitiously, Rescher hopes then to connect to science by suggesting that GR or QM may already be laws of this form - ones that exclude null outcomes as actual possibilities.

For such an approach to work, it would have to transpire that the only ultimately viable solutions to those cosmic equations are existential solutions. This explanatory strategy casts those “fundamental field equations” in a rather special light. They are not seen as ordinary laws of nature that can be construed as describing the modus operandi of real things that are already present in the world, but rather as preeconditions for the real - as delimiting the sorts of possibilities that can be realized. We thus have an account of the following structure: The fundamental field equations, seen to function not merely as laws OF nature, but as laws FOR nature, as protolaws in present terminology - delineate the domain of real possibility. And the nature of this domain is then, in its turn, such as to constrain the existence of things.

 

[ThomasT]

@ apeiron,

Thanks for the links and comments. Whatever you write wrt anything has always made me think and provided motivation to learn more.

 

[bohm2]

But I mostly reject mathematics as a basis for philosophical.

This sort of of argument is a very strong argument against the original position at the start of the thread, I think. If one assumes that mind-independent reality transcends mathematical (necessary) truths/logic (e.g. reality is not mathematical), then these types of arguments are arguably not very convincing. I'm going to read the Rescher piece. Looks interesting.

 

[ThomasT]

This sort of of argument is a very strong argument against the original position at the start of the thread, I think. If one assumes that mind-independent reality transcends mathematical (necessary) truths/logic (e.g. reality is not mathematical), then these types of arguments are arguably not very convincing. I'm going to read the Rescher piece. Looks interesting.

I'm glad you're going to read the Rescher piece. I was printing it out (I like to read upside down ... resting) when I ran out of black ink.

I will trust your assessment of it.

What I've read of it so far seems to be in line with the my current mode of thinking on this.

 

[bohm2]

I will trust your assessment of it.

I don't trust myself because I'm having a lot of difficulty understanding some his arguments. In my mind, of all of Rescher's possible responses to the question "Why is there anything at all?", the one that I found the most compelling (but unfortunately also unappealing, as Rescher notes) is Mystification: the question is legitimate but unanswerable for a linguistic ground chimp like us. Back to Mcginn's argument, again.

Specifically, I had trouble understanding his Nomological Approach for the major reason that he notes himself:

"How is one to account for the protolaws themselves?". It seems like that approach is just passing the buck elsewhere and the problem remains? I kind of was sympathetic to the mathematical/probabilistic arguments quoted at start of this thread because they were simple but in all honestly I think MarcoD's criticism is extremely persuasive to me, especially since I lean towards treating mathematical objects as mental stuff. I'm guessing that someone who is more of a Platonist on mathematics (e.g. Tegmark’s mathematical universe hypothesis, come to mind) may be more persuaded by Rescher's arguments, I think? One author who takes a very Platonic approach in trying to answer this question is Rickles:

The strategy I am advocating is that physics, in becoming more or less completely aligned to mathematics (in terms of content, at least), will be able to penetrate down the ladder of explanation to the very deepest rung of all: existence. We do not have the same kind of problem with the existence of mathematics. Mathematical statements are necessarily true in the sense that if they are true in one world (in the sense of modal logic) then they are true in all worlds. They are not created. They are not located in spacetime. The question of why is there something rather than nothing simply does not make sense if the somethings in question are mathematical.

http://www.fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Rickles_Rickles_fqxi_2.pdf

 

[qsa]

How about this take. Something implies that there was a chain of causes that resulted in that something and that means there is a reason for it to be true. But, Nothing is by definition has no cause so it is missing what can make it true.

But what was the initial cause is a question for physicists and not philosophers.