I Understanding Bell's Statements on Freedom of Choice

[Lynch101]

TL;DR Summary

I'm looking to get a better understanding of some statements made by John Bell on the freedom of choice of experimenters.

I recently saw this video by Sabine Hossenfelder on free will, which prompted me to re-watch and re-read a few different resources. One of those resources is a book called John S. Bell on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (by Bell, Gottfried, and Veltman).

An Exchange on Local Beables - J.S. Bell - Free Variables and Local Causality (p.103)

Roughly speaking it is supposed that an experimenter is quite free to choose among the various possibilities offered by his equipment. But it might be that this apparent freedom is illusory. Perhaps experimental parameters and experimental results are both consequences, or partially so, of some common hidden mechanism. Then the apparent non-locality could be simulated.

Is he referring here to what some people refer to as "superdeterminism"? Is that what is meant by "the apparent non-locality could be simulated?

"It has ben assumed that the settings of instruments are in some sense free variables..."
For me this means that the values of such variables have implications only in their future light cones. They are in no sense a record of, and do not give information about, what has gone before.

Does this mean that the experimenters choice is only free when that choice is correlated to events in its (the choices) causal future and not its causal past; meaning, no information from the experimenter's own past light cone and accessible to the experimenter at the moment the choice is made, can be assumed to have a causal influence on the choice in question?

 

[PeterDonis]

Is he referring here to what some people refer to as "superdeterminism"?

Yes.

Is that what is meant by "the apparent non-locality could be simulated?

Yes.

no information from the experimenter's own past light cone and accessible to the experimenter at the moment the choice is made, can be assumed to have a causal influence on the choice in question?

No; that condition is obviously too strong. Taken literally, it would mean that, for example, the experimenter's choice of instrument settings must not convey any information about what the experimenter told his lab assistant about how he was going to set up the measurement settings, five minutes before he set them up. Which is obviously not going to be the case in any experiment that involves more than one person.

The actual requirement, if we assume that we want to eliminate superdeterminism as a possibility, is only that the measurement settings and the preparations of the objects to be measured, before measurement, are independent of each other. If we want to make extra sure of that, we set things up so that the preparations of the objects to be measured, and the selection of the measurement settings, occur at spacelike separated events, as, for example, in the Aspect experiments. And if we want to double check afterwards, we simply do statistical analysis of the distribution of measurement settings vs. the distribution of preparations, to ensure that they are independent.

(Technically, the above doesn't logically eliminate superdeterminism as a possibility; it's impossible to eliminate it logically since one can always hypothesize some particular superdeterministic model with some carefully chosen set of initial conditions that would produce the same results. But it makes superdeterminism seem a lot more implausible.)

 

[Lynch101]

Thanks @PeterDonis.

...the measurement settings and the preparations of the objects to be measured, before measurement, are independent of each other.

Ah, this is what is meant by "statistical independence", is it?

"It has ben assumed that the settings of instruments are in some sense free variables..."
For me this means that the values of such variables have implications only in their future light cones. They are in no sense a record of, and do not give information about, what has gone before.

Just on the emboldened part. This isn't true for all events is it, that they are in no sense a record of, nor give information about, what has gone before?

 

[PeterDonis]

this is what is meant by "statistical independence", is it?

In this particular context, yes.

Just on the emboldened part. This isn't true for all events is it

It's not really true of any events, taken literally. Every event gives some information about something that has gone before.

I think that, in context, Bell meant something more limited, along the lines I suggested in my previous post. But of course I can't know for sure, and unfortunately Bell is no longer around to be asked for clarification.

 

[Lynch101]

It's not really true of any events, taken literally. Every event gives some information about something that has gone before.

OK, cool. That's what I was thinking. I was wondering how it would be possible to have the device settings be free variables in that sense.

I think that, in context, Bell meant something more limited, along the lines I suggested in my previous post.

The actual requirement ... is only that the measurement settings and the preparations of the objects to be measured, before measurement, are independent of each other. If we want to make extra sure of that, we set things up so that the preparations of the objects to be measured, and the selection of the measurement settings, occur at spacelike separated events, as, for example, in the Aspect experiments.

I tend to go off track around this particular point because I'm not sure how to make the link between the statistical independence [of the measurements settings and the preparations of objects] and the freedom of choice of the experimenter. Would you have any thooughts on how the two are connected?

I've read a few articles on experiments that propose to close the "free will loophole" where light from distant stars is used to set the angle of the polarisers. I thought the purpose of this was to attempt to remove the experimenters free will from the experimental set-up entirely, but I've also heard that this isn't the case because the experimenters free choice is still being exercised with regard to choosing the source that ultimately sets the measurement settings. Would that mean that the "free will loophole" hasn't been closed?

 

[PeterDonis]

I'm not sure how to make the link between the statistical independence [of the measurements settings and the preparations of objects] and the freedom of choice of the experimenter. Would you have any thooughts on how the two are connected?

Suppose you are an experimenter and you are worried that what seems to you like "free choice" of experimental settings might not be (for example, you might be worried that something like superdeterminism is true and that what seem to you like "free choices" are actually determined by carefully chosen initial conditions). How would you test that?

The only real test you have is whether your choices of measurement settings are statistically independent of the preparations of the objects you are measuring.

I've read a few articles on experiments that propose to close the "free will loophole" where light from distant stars is used to set the angle of the polarisers. I thought the purpose of this was to attempt to remove the experimenters free will from the experimental set-up entirely, but I've also heard that this isn't the case because the experimenters free choice is still being exercised with regard to choosing the source that ultimately sets the measurement settings.

To me the people who raise objections like that to closing the "free will loophole" are quibbling. Since humans are the ones who think up the experiments in the first place (because we are the ones who care about the results), obviously you're always going to be able to say that "human free will" was involved somewhere in the process. So it's obviously absurd to insist on completely eliminating "human free will" from the entire process as a condition of accepting that the "free will loophole" is closed.

I also think the term "free will" in this connection is actually irrelevant. If we're testing what kinds of theories are not ruled out by experiment, it doesn't matter how the measurement settings are chosen--whether by human free will, by computerized random number generators, by watching decays of radioactive atoms, or by watching light from distant stars--as long as the measurement settings are statistically independent of the preparations of the objects being measured. Going through all these elaborate procedures for how the measurement settings are determined is, in my view, just taking extra precautions because we know our tests for statistical independence only have finite accuracy (since any real test does), so we want to have other indirect ways of increasing our confidence that the independence we want to be true is actually true.

 

[Lynch101]

The only real test you have is whether your choices of measurement settings are statistically independent of the preparations of the objects you are measuring.

I also think the term "free will" in this connection is actually irrelevant. If we're testing what kinds of theories are not ruled out by experiment, it doesn't matter how the measurement settings are chosen--whether by human free will, by computerized random number generators, by watching decays of radioactive atoms, or by watching light from distant stars--as long as the measurement settings are statistically independent of the preparations of the objects being measured.

If none of these methods for choosing measurement settings violate statistical independence, does that not tell us that the computerized random number generator's choice of measurement settings, or that of the light from distant star, is as free as the experimenters choice of measurement settings?

EDIT: or should we take it that these experiments simply tell us nothing about the free will of the experimenter?

 

[PeterDonis]

should we take it that these experiments simply tell us nothing about the free will of the experimenter?

This is what I would say, since we are comparing a method involving humans "making a choice" with methods that do not involve humans at all.

 

[Lynch101]

This is what I would say, since we are comparing a method involving humans "making a choice" with methods that do not involve humans at all.

Ah OK. Thank you.

 

[Lynch101]

I came across the following in an article by Howard Wiseman in Nature and I'm wondering if this is an accurate summation of the issue in question?

The issue is whether the settings in one laboratory are uncorrelated with variables (hidden or otherwise) in the other. If they are correlated, then the experiment violates the assumptions of Bell’s theorem, opening the free-choice loophole, so called because of how it can be closed: the only things correlated with free choices are their effects, so (by Einstein’s principle) settings that are freely chosen late enough would be uncorrelated with the other variables, as desired.

Physics: Bell’s theorem still reverberates

If it is, then it will probably come as no surprise that I have been looking at the question all wrong.

 

[PeterDonis]

I came across the following in an article by Howard Wiseman in Nature and I'm wondering if this is an accurate summation of the issue in question?

He's equating "free choice" with "a human makes a free choice". To me that's a red herring, but he might be insisting on this meaning of "free choice" because he is concerned with the "collapse loophole": if a human doesn't consciously register the result, one could always argue (though such arguments quickly become highly contrived) that the measurement wasn't actually completed. By analogy, if a human doesn't consciously choose a measurement setting, one could always argue that it wasn't really "freely chosen". This all seems contrived to me--to me, using, say, the unpredictable decay of radioactive atoms as the source of "free choices" about measurement settings is quite good enough--but people's opinions differ.

 

[Morbert]

"It has ben assumed that the settings of instruments are in some sense free variables..."
For me this means that the values of such variables have implications only in their future light cones. They are in no sense a record of, and do not give information about, what has gone before.

This is very similar to free will as stipulated by Kochen[1] (of the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem fame). I.e. If an experiment is freely chosen, it means the choice of experiment is not a function of information accessible to the experimenter.

As mentioned previously in the thread, an experiment cannot be wholly free. And also, this definition is very much stipulative. Its purpose is not to address questions about the nature of our will and whether it is free.

[1] https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604079

 

[Lynch101]

Can I try and outline my reading of a number of statements with regard to Bell's theorem and free will? It might be easier that way, to identify incorrect assumptions and gaps in the reasoning.

Assumptions
One of the key assumptions of Bell's theorem is that of statistical independence. The absence (or violation) of statistical independence necessarily leaves us with superdeterminism.

In order for statistical independence to be preserved Bell says (as above):

it has been assumed that the settings of instruments are in some sense free variables.

He goes on to say (as above):

for me this means that the values of such variables have implications only in their future light cones. They are in no sense a record of, and do not give information about, what has gone before.

@PeterDonis you mentioned that, taken literally, it's not really true of any events that they are in no sense a record of the past. "Every event gives some information about something that has gone before." I'm reading this to mean that, in general, effects are correlated with their causes.Correlation
In an offline conversation with a mathematician friend*, he told me that the chain of correlation can be extended back through the chain of causality. For example, if A causes B and B causes C, then A and C can be correlated. This would seem to be an issue for the idea of statistical independence because the values of these variables wouldn't be correlated with only their future light cones, but also their past light cones.

To me, superdeterminism sounds as though it is this basic idea taken to its necessary conclusion, that the chain of correlation stretches back through the chain of causality until we reach a common cause.Human Free Will
If we consider this statement then:

The issue is whether the settings in one laboratory are uncorrelated with variables (hidden or otherwise) in the other. If they are correlated, then the experiment violates the assumptions of Bell’s theorem, opening the free-choice loophole, so called because of how it can be closed: the only things correlated with free choices are their effects, so (by Einstein’s principle) settings that are freely chosen late enough would be uncorrelated with the other variables, as desired.

Here Wiseman says, "if they [the settings] are correlated, then the experiment violates the assumptions of Bell’s theorem". We might ask how they might possibly be correlated? The default answer might seem to be superdeterminism; that is, they are correlated because an effect is correlated not only with its cause, but with the causes of its cause, and so on back through the chain of causality.

Wiseman says, this opens the "free-choice loophole, so called because of how it can be closed". This seems to suggest that human free will is a necessity to establish statistical independence. The reason being that human free will (if such exists) is a pretty unique phenomenon in the Universe because it is, by way of necessity, only correlated with its effects.@Morbert The following from the Conway-Kochen Free Will paper seems to be saying something similar:

replacing the human choice by a pseudo–random number generator does not allow us to dispense with the Free Will assumption since free will is used in choosing this generator! The necessity for the Free Will assumption is evident, since a determined determinist could maintain that the experimenters were forced to choose the computer programs they did because these were predetermined at the dawn of time.

*I'm not stating this as an appeal to authority, I'm just saying that I can't reference it here. Well, I could post the voice note if necessary. His answer was in response to a general question also, so it's possible that I didn't give him all the necessary details.

 

[PeterDonis]

"Every event gives some information about something that has gone before." I'm reading this to mean that, in general, effects are correlated with their causes.

I didn't mean anything that specific. I was simply trying to caution against an overly literal reading of Conway's statement.

For example, suppose we measure the spin of a spin-1/2 particle. The Free Will Theorem basically says that if we are free to choose the orientation of the spin measuring device, the particle is free to choose which result is obtained. A literal reading of the way Conway defines "free" would mean that the orientation of the spin measuring device gives no information about anything in the past light cone of the measurement. But that is obviously not literally true. Setting the orientation of the device is not an instantaneous process that happens at a single point. It is a continuous process that covers a significant region of spacetime. Conway's definition of "free" implies that there must be some event during that continuous process that gives no information about what is in the past light cone of that particular event; but it in no way implies that the entire process, the whole region of spacetime occupied by it, gives no information about what is in the past light cone of that whole region of spacetime.

To me, superdeterminism sounds as though it is this basic idea taken to its necessary conclusion, that the chain of correlation stretches back through the chain of causality until we reach a common cause.

No, that's just determinism. Superdeterminism (at least as applied to QM) means, not just that every event in spacetime is included in some chain of causation, but that the initial conditions are carefully chosen so that measurement results are consistent with QM even though the underlying physics is not QM at all. In other words, superdeterminism claims that the initial conditions of a deterministic universe are carefully chosen to mislead us about what the actual underlying physics of the universe is.

It is true, however, that Conway's definition of "free" excludes determinism, not just superdeterminism. Conway's definition of "free" requires that there are some events that are only part of a chain of causation to their future, not their past. That is inconsistent with determinism, which requires that every event is part of a chain of causation to both its future and its past.

Wiseman says, this opens the "free-choice loophole, so called because of how it can be closed". This seems to suggest that human free will is a necessity to establish statistical independence.

If that is what Wiseman is suggesting, I think he's wrong, at least if by "human free will" he means "free" by Conway's definition, since, as above, Conway's definition is inconsistent with determinism (not just superdeterminism, but determinism period). It is perfectly possible for different events to be statistically independent in a deterministic universe, so "free will" in Conway's sense is not required.

 

[Lynch101]

Conway's definition of "free" implies that there must be some event during that continuous process that gives no information about what is in the past light cone of that particular event; but it in no way implies that the entire process, the whole region of spacetime occupied by it, gives no information about what is in the past light cone of that whole region of spacetime.
...
Conway's definition of "free" requires that there are some events that are only part of a chain of causation to their future, not their past. That is inconsistent with determinism, which requires that every event is part of a chain of causation to both its future and its past.

Apologies that I need spoon feeding on this one Peter, but is there a difference between what you say here (or your interpretation of what Conway says) and what Bell says here?

For me this means that the values of such variables have implications only in their future light cones. They are in no sense a record of, and do not give information about, what has gone before.

 

[PeterDonis]

is there a difference between what you say here (or your interpretation of what Conway says) and what Bell says here?

Bell appears to be using Conway's definition of "free", more or less, yes. But the "variables" he speaks of might just be individual microscopic events that are only part of a chain of causation to their future, not their past.

 

[Lynch101]

Bell appears to be using Conway's definition of "free", more or less, yes. But the "variables" he speaks of might just be individual microscopic events that are only part of a chain of causation to their future, not their past.

Am I correct in saying that both appear to be saying that, in the absence of these "free variables", these individual microscopic events, we are left with superdeterminism?

 

[PeterDonis]

Am I correct in saying that both appear to be saying that, in the absence of these "free variables", these individual microscopic events, we are left with superdeterminism?

I'm not sure. If they are saying that, I would disagree; I don't think determinism, which is all that would be implied by the absence of the "freedom" they appear to be describing, is the same thing as superdeterminism. It's perfectly possible to have a deterministic universe whose initial conditions are not carefully set up to make measurement results mislead us about what the underlying physics is.

 

[Lynch101]

I'm not sure. If they are saying that, I would disagree; I don't think determinism, which is all that would be implied by the absence of the "freedom" they appear to be describing, is the same thing as superdeterminism. It's perfectly possible to have a deterministic universe whose initial conditions are not carefully set up to make measurement results mislead us about what the underlying physics is.

Ah OK. Am I at least correct in saying that in the absence of these individual events/free variables statistical independence is violated?

If so, would that then mean that, in the absence of these free variables, simple determinism can account for the observed correlations i.e. the violations of Bell's Inequality?

 

[PeterDonis]

Am I at least correct in saying that in the absence of these individual events/free variables statistical independence is violated?

No. It's perfectly possible to have a completely deterministic underlying physics but still have particular measurement settings and results be statistically independent.

in the absence of these free variables, simple determinism can account for the observed correlations i.e. the violations of Bell's Inequality?

No. For example, Bohmian mechanics is a perfectly deterministic theory that accounts for Bell inequality violations just fine. It's just a nonlocal deterministic theory; it violates Bell's locality assumption.

 

[Lynch101]

Just when I thought I was getting a grasp on it

Thank you for your patience btw!

I'm not sure if you've ever heard of the Irish TV show called Father Ted, but I'm reminded of this scene:

 

[Lynch101]

No. It's perfectly possible to have a completely deterministic underlying physics but still have particular measurement settings and results be statistically independent.

Is Bohmian Mechanics an example of that?

No. For example, Bohmian mechanics is a perfectly deterministic theory that accounts for Bell inequality violations just fine. It's just a nonlocal deterministic theory; it violates Bell's locality assumption.

Is it possible to maintain locality but drop the assumption of statistical independence?

 

[PeterDonis]

Is Bohmian Mechanics an example of that?

With the usual assumption about initial conditions (that they satisfy the particular constraints that are required for the Born Rule to work), I believe so, yes.

Is it possible to maintain locality but drop the assumption of statistical independence?

I don't know what that would mean, specifically, or whether there is any interpretation that does this.

 

[Lynch101]

With the usual assumption about initial conditions (that they satisfy the particular constraints that are required for the Born Rule to work), I believe so, yes.

Is that assumption about initial conditions required by every interpretation of quantum mechanics, for the Born Rule to work, or is it just Bohmian Mechanics that requires it?

I don't know what that would mean, specifically, or whether there is any interpretation that does this.

Am I correct in thinking that the following two statements (from yourself and Wiseman) are statements about statistical independence?

The actual requirement ... is only that the measurement settings and the preparations of the objects to be measured, before measurement, are independent of each other.

The issue is whether the settings in one laboratory are uncorrelated with variables (hidden or otherwise) in the other. If they are correlated, then the experiment violates the assumptions of Bell’s theorem.

 

[PeterDonis]

Is that assumption about initial conditions required by every interpretation of quantum mechanics, for the Born Rule to work, or is it just Bohmian Mechanics that requires it?

Just Bohmian mechanics.

Am I correct in thinking that the following two statements (from yourself and Wiseman) are statements about statistical independence?

Mine is. I'm not sure about Wiseman's, because I'm not sure that the proof of Bell's Theorem requires any assumptions about the statistical independence of the measurement settings and the properties of the particles to be measured. I think it only requires statistical independence of the probabilities of measurement results (the joint probability has to be factorizable).

 

[Lynch101]

Just Bohmian mechanics.

Are there variations of BM which don't incorporate the assumption about initial conditions? As in, do you know if the version of BM that @Demystifier advocates includes it?

Mine is. I'm not sure about Wiseman's, because I'm not sure that the proof of Bell's Theorem requires any assumptions about the statistical independence of the measurement settings and the properties of the particles to be measured. I think it only requires statistical independence of the probabilities of measurement results (the joint probability has to be factorizable).

Ah, OK, cool that's an interesting take on it. I haven't come across that idea before, thanks. Could you recommend some literature that discusses that?

Does that assumption, that only the probabilities of measurement results be statistically independent, also require the presence of individual microscopic events that are only part of a chain of causation to their future?

EDIT: Aren't the experimental violations of Bell's inequality (as it is traditionally represented) based on the actual outcomes of experiments, as opposed to the probabilistic predictions of those outcomes?

 

[PeterDonis]

Are there variations of BM which don't incorporate the assumption about initial conditions?

No. BM has to have them in order to match the predictions of standard QM.

Does that assumption, that only the probabilities of measurement results be statistically independent, also require the presence of individual microscopic events that are only part of a chain of causation to their future?

I don't think there is a definite answer. Statistical assumptions generally leave open multiple possibilities for the underlying microscopic physics.

 

[Lynch101]

No. BM has to have them in order to match the predictions of standard QM.

Ah, OK! Thank you, that's very interesting.

I don't think there is a definite answer. Statistical assumptions generally leave open multiple possibilities for the underlying microscopic physics.

Could you recommend some literature on that particular interpretation of Bell's theorem? I haven't come across it before.

Would that assumption change the calculation of the inequality? To my mind it sounds like it should, because the traditional rendering of Bell's theorem appears to be based on the actual experimental outcomes, as opposed to the probabilities of the outcomes.

What would a violation of that rendering of the theorem tell us? From the literature I've read, Bell's formulation of the theorem was predicated on 4 basic assumptions:
1. Relativistic locality
2. Realism
3. Relativistic local realism
4. Free will - or the microscopic events mentioned previously.

Violation of the inequality then meant that one of those 4 assumptions would have to be abandoned. Would the rendering you have suggested here mean that of the assumptions 1-3 would have to be violated, while remaining silent on #4?

 

[PeterDonis]

Could you recommend some literature on that particular interpretation of Bell's theorem?

What interpretation? I was stating my understanding of what Bell is assuming in his papers that derive the theorem.

From the literature I've read, Bell's formulation of the theorem was predicated on 4 basic assumptions

You really need to look at the actual math in Bell's papers. Ordinary language is not a good tool here since different people put different, incompatible intepretations on the words you are using. The mathematical assumptions underlying Bell's theorem are clear from his papers, and those are a much better starting point for understanding.

 

[Demystifier]

Are there variations of BM which don't incorporate the assumption about initial conditions? As in, do you know if the version of BM that @Demystifier advocates includes it?

In Bohmian mechanics, even if the initial conditions are not consistent with the Born rule, a sufficiently complex system typically evolves towards an equilibrium which corresponds to the Born rule. That's analogous to similar behavior in classical statistical physics, where most initial conditions imply evolution towards a thermal equilibrium. That's briefly discussed in my paper, with references to further details.

 

[Lynch101]

What interpretation? I was stating my understanding of what Bell is assuming in his papers that derive the theorem.

Ah, my apologies. I hadn't heard the distinction made before and you seemed to be contradicting what both Bell and Conway say about the assumption of free variables.

You really need to look at the actual math in Bell's papers. Ordinary language is not a good tool here since different people put different, incompatible intepretations on the words you are using. The mathematical assumptions underlying Bell's theorem are clear from his papers, and those are a much better starting point for understanding.

You yourself have stated that you think Bell's theorem only requires statistical independence of the probabilities of measurement results, which seems to suggest that perhaps the assumptions encoded in the mathematics are not entirely clear and are perhaps open to interpretation.

The purpose of this subforum is to discuss interpretations of the mathematics though and in applying the mathematics to real world experiments we can use ordinary language. That relativistic local causality is expressed mathematically in the theorem doesn't preclude us from talking about its consequences - namely that causal influences can only propagate at a finite speed meaning that the outcome of the measurement on one system cannot depend on which measurement is performed on the other.

With regard to the mathematics, I understand that Bell's inequality would be obeyed if the assumptions of EPR were correct, however, the observed violations in quantum experiments mean that at least one of Bell's assumptions must be given up:
1. Relativistic local causality, as mentioned above
2. Realism or counterfactual definiteness - that unobserved properties are nonetheless real
3. Local realism - local hidden variables
4. Human Free Will or microscopic events which are only correlated with their effects.

At least, that is how it appears to be presented in the literature.

 

[PeterDonis]

The purpose of this subforum is to discuss interpretations of the mathematics

Yes, but you can't do that unless you are already clear on what the mathematics itself says.

At least, that is how it appears to be presented in the literature.

And in the literature you will find multiple different, inconsistent definitions of each of the ordinary language terms you used. So using them is useless if you don't also point to exactly what property in the math you are using each of the terms to refer to. Or else give specific references for each of the terms that use them in the way you intend to use them, so we can look at those references to see if they pin down a well-defined meaning for the terms.

 

[PeterDonis]

which seems to suggest that perhaps the assumptions encoded in the mathematics are not entirely clear and are perhaps open to interpretation

No, it means that a given ordinary language term is used by different people to refer to different assumptions encoded in the mathematics. That's why it's best to just go back to the math itself and start from there.

 

[Lynch101]

Yes, but you can't do that unless you are already clear on what the mathematics itself says.

Are those authors wrong when they say that the mathematics says the following?

Bell's inequality would be obeyed if the assumptions of EPR were correct, however, the observed violations in quantum experiments mean that at least one of Bell's assumptions must be given up:
1. Relativistic local causality, as mentioned above
2. Realism or counterfactual definiteness - that unobserved properties are nonetheless real
3. Local realism - local hidden variables
4. Human Free Will or microscopic events which are only correlated with their effects.

Being clear on what the mathematics says is a matter of interpretation and by necessity refer back to the non-mathematical world.

And in the literature you will find multiple different, inconsistent definitions of each of the ordinary language terms you used. So using them is useless if you don't also point to exactly what property in the math you are using each of the terms to refer to. Or else give specific references for each of the terms that use them in the way you intend to use them, so we can look at those references to see if they pin down a well-defined meaning for the terms.

The mathematics itself refers back to the real world and so it is possible to discuss the phenomena to which the mathematics refer.

For example, is it accurate to say that relativistic local causality is the idea that causal influences can only propagate at a finite speed, meaning that the outcome of the measurement on one system cannot depend on which measurement is performed on the other?

No, it means that a given ordinary language term is used by different people to refer to different assumptions encoded in the mathematics. That's why it's best to just go back to the math itself and start from there.

That's where communication is indispensable. Given that the mathematics of quantum mechanics make predictions of observable phenomena, we can talk in terms of those observable phenomena.

 

[PeterDonis]

Are those authors wrong when they say that the mathematics says the following?

I have no idea unless you give me a specific reference by a specific author that defines what in the math the author means by those terms. I have already said repeatedly that using ordinary language terms without saying precisely what in the math you are referring to by each of those terms is pointless. I have no interest in a pointless discussion.

Being clear on what the mathematics says is a matter of interpretation and by necessity refer back to the non-mathematical world.

Such pontification is pointless unless you actually show me some math. You haven't.

The mathematics itself refers back to the real world and so it is possible to discuss the phenomena to which the mathematics refer.

But you're not doing that. None of the terms you are throwing around refer to directly observable phenomena.

is it accurate to say that relativistic local causality is the idea that causal influences can only propagate at a finite speed, meaning that the outcome of the measurement on one system cannot depend on which measurement is performed on the other?

Depends on who is saying it. Without a specific reference I cannot answer this question. As I have already said repeatedly, different sources give different meanings to these terms. So talking as if the terms have a single well-defined meaning is pointless. I have no interest in a pointless discussion.

Given that the mathematics of quantum mechanics make predictions of observable phenomena, we can talk in terms of those observable phenomena.

You're not doing that. You're just throwing around terms as if they had a single well-defined meaning, when they don't. That's pointless.

 

[Lynch101]

I have no idea unless you give me a specific reference by a specific author that defines what in the math the author means by those terms. I have already said repeatedly that using ordinary language terms without saying precisely what in the math you are referring to by each of those terms is pointless. I have no interest in a pointless discussion.

I would have thought the idea that light propagates at a finite speed and therefore that causal influences cannot propagate at a speed faster than that, would be fairly well understood, regardless of which authority might state it.

If that is understood, then it is a simple question of whether or not that is encoded in the mathematics as one of the assumptions?

But you're not doing that. None of the terms you are throwing around refer to directly observable phenomena.

No, but the consequences do. That is the whole point of Bell's theorem. IF those unobservable phenomena were correct, as postulated by EPR, then Bell's inequality would be obeyed. However, experimental observations demonstrate that it isn't obeyed and therefore at least one of those unobservable phenomena must be incorrect.

Depends on who is saying it. Without a specific reference I cannot answer this question. As I have already said repeatedly, different sources give different meanings to these terms. So talking as if the terms have a single well-defined meaning is pointless. I have no interest in a pointless discussion.

I know you're not going to claim to be unfamiliar with the idea that light propagates at a finite speed, or the idea form relativity theory that causal influences cannot exceed that maximum speed.

Are you familiar with any interpretation of that, that is encoded in the mathematics?

You're not doing that. You're just throwing around terms as if they had a single well-defined meaning, when they don't. That's pointless.

Bell's inequality is violated in experiments. This refers to the observations made in experiments where measurements made on spatially separated entangled particles display higher than expected correlations. Here we are talking about observable phenomena i.e. the measurement outcomes on entangled particles.

Note, we say that the correlations are higher than expected. We can then ask what was the expected correlation? It was, of course, Bell's inequality. We can then ask, what does this violation mean?

In the literature, there are very clear statements about what the violations of Bell's inequality means. It means that one of the assumptions of the theorem must be given up.

What are those assumptions, we might ask.

One of them is the well understood idea that causal influences cannot propagate at a speed faster than light. I'm fairly certain you are familiar with this concept. Another is the idea that the settings on the measurement devices are free variables. Here, the term "measurement devices" refers to the physical piece of equipment used to measure the particle - it is an observable phenomena.

The term "free variable" according to Bell means a variable that it is only correlated with its effect. This is somewhat unusual because usually events would be correlated with their causes also - cause and effect being a observable phenomenon.

Bell appears to invoke the notion of human free will because human free will is a [supposedly] unique phenomenon where the variable of "the will" is only correlated with its effect because it can have no cause, otherwise it wouldn't be free. The actions of the experimenter and their choice of measurement settings are all observable phenomena.

You have suggested that what is being referred to was microscopic events which are only correlated with their effects, suggesting that you at least had some level of comprehension as to what I was talking about.

 

[PeterDonis]

I would have thought the idea that light propagates at a finite speed and therefore that causal influences cannot propagate at a speed faster than that, would be fairly well understood, regardless of which authority might state it.

The term "causal influence" is ambiguous, unless it just means "things that don't propagate faster than light", in which case the statement is a tautology.

Instead of continuing to wave your hands with generalities, why not find a specific reference and give it as a basis for further discussion?

Bell's inequality is violated in experiments.

Agreed.

This refers to the observations made in experiments where measurements made on spatially separated entangled particles display higher than expected correlations.

No, it doesn't. The correlations were not higher than "expected". Everybody expected the correlations to be those predicted by QM, which violate the Bell inequalities.

The correlations, since they violate the Bell inequalities, are higher than what could be produced by any model that satisfies Bell's assumptions. The usual term for such models is "local hidden variable" models. The assumptions involved are clearly stated in Bell's papers in mathematical terms, so that is where I recommend that you look if you want to understand them.

What are those assumptions, we might ask.

No, we might read Bell's papers and find out. Which is a much better idea than reading ordinary language descriptions in the literature without ever trying to match them up with the math.

I see no point in participating further in this discussion until you have done that.

 

[PeterDonis]

You have suggested that what is being referred to was microscopic events which are only correlated with their effects

That statement by Bell was in a different paper from any of the ones where he gives mathematical proofs of his theorem. IIRC Bell in that paper does not say what specific mathematical assumption that goes into his theorem corresponds to what he says he means by "the settings of instruments are in some sense free variables". The best way to make any further progress on such questions is to look at the actual math in Bell's papers where he derives his theorem.

 

[Lynch101]

The term "causal influence" is ambiguous, unless it just means "things that don't propagate faster than light", in which case the statement is a tautology.

Instead of continuing to wave your hands with generalities, why not find a specific reference and give it as a basis for further discussion?

Have you ever heard the term "causal influence" before, other than in the context of this discussion?

It's not difficult to understand and I can explain it in terms of specific observable phenomena, if necessary. Basically, even with a laypersons understanding of the notions of cause and effect and the finite speed at which objects move, including light, you can understand the concept.

No, it doesn't. The correlations were not higher than "expected". Everybody expected the correlations to be those predicted by QM, which violate the Bell inequalities.

Higher than expected under the EPR assumptions. I'll try to be more explicit in future. As long as the rest of it was right though, that's the important thing.

The correlations, since they violate the Bell inequalities, are higher than what could be produced by any model that satisfies Bell's assumptions. The usual term for such models is "local hidden variable" models.

Yes, I'm familiar with the idea of local hidden variables, even without knowing the mathematics because local hidden variables refers to [potentially] real world phenomena which can be understood in the context of other real world phenomena.

The assumptions involved are clearly stated in Bell's papers in mathematical terms, so that is where I recommend that you look if you want to understand them.

Those mathematical terms either describe or predict real world phenomena and so can be discussed in that context. For example, Bell's inequality predicts the expected correlations of the measurements of two spatially separated particles, under the EPR assumptions. The measurements are observable phenomena. Violations of the inequality are observed phenomena.

The violation of the inequality means that at least one of the underlying assumptions of the theorem need to be given up. While the theorem uses mathematics to predict the observable phenomenon, based on mathematically encoded assumptions, those mathematically encoded assumptions refer to [potentially] real world phenomena and so can be discussed on that basis.

One of those assumptions pertains to the finite speed of light and the finite speed at which a phenomenon can affect other phenomena in its locality. This can be understood, quite easily, in terms of real world phenomena.

No, we might read Bell's papers and find out. Which is a much better idea than reading ordinary language descriptions in the literature without ever trying to match them up with the math.

I see no point in participating further in this discussion until you have done that.

We still need to relate the mathematics back to the real world phenomena they describe.

I am attempting to learn the mathematics, but at a finite speed. That doesn't mean, however, that the phenomena to which the mathematics relates, cannot be discussed.

That statement by Bell was in a different paper from any of the ones where he gives mathematical proofs of his theorem. IIRC Bell in that paper does not say what specific mathematical assumption that goes into his theorem corresponds to what he says he means by "the settings of instruments are in some sense free variables". The best way to make any further progress on such questions is to look at the actual math in Bell's papers where he derives his theorem.

It is in a paper where it appears he is replying to a paper by Clauser Horne and Shimony. While he doesn't give a mathematical proof of his theorem and doesn't say what specific mathematical assumption the "free variables" assumption goes into, he does clearly state that it is in there.

If the assumptions are clearly there in the mathematics, should it not be easy to discern where this particular assumption is embedded? Unless the implication is that Bell is mistaken about what assumptions are in his own theorem?

 

[PeterDonis]

Have you ever heard the term "causal influence" before, other than in the context of this discussion?

Of course I have. You are seriously mistaken if you think the issue we are having with this discussion is that I am not sufficiently familiar with the terminology.

The issue we are having with this discussion is that it needs to be grounded in the actual math before it can usefully proceed further. If you are not presently familiar enough with the math to have that grounding, then the discussion needs to stop until you are.

That doesn't mean, however, that the phenomena to which the mathematics relates, cannot be discussed.

If we limit the discussion to just the phenomena, it will be a very short discussion: the Bell inequalities are violated, but special relativity is obeyed and Bell inequality violations cannot be used to send signals faster than light. Those are the phenomena. End of discussion.

What you actually want to discuss are various possible mathematical models that have been proposed, what predictions they make, and what properties they must have, or must not have, in order to predict and account for the observed phenomena. And that discussion needs to be grounded in the actual math in order to usefully proceed further. Trying to ground it in ordinary language terms without specific math to link them to is not working.

If the assumptions are clearly there in the mathematics, should it not be easy to discern where this particular assumption is embedded?

The way for you to answer this question is to read the papers, learn the math, and find out. If you need to take some time to do that, that's fine. I'll still be here whenever you are ready. There is no need to rush things.

 

[Lynch101]

The principle is fairly straight forward. IF the mathematics of quantum mechanics and/or Bell's theorem tell us anything about the observable universe, then we can talk about those observable real world phenomena. If the mathematics tells us anything about the universe that we may not necessarily be able to observe e.g. hidden variables, then we can discuss those in terms of their observable consequences and the real world properties they are assumed to have.

If, as is the case with the mathematics in Bell's theorem, the predicted observations do not match the actual observations then we can ask why this may be. There is an abundance of literature from physicists who certainly do understand the mathematics, which says that at least one of Bell's assumptions must be given up.

IF the mathematical codification of Bell's assumptions correspond to real world phenomena, then we can discuss them in terms of those real world phenomena.

You're statement here demonstrates that it is possible to have a discussion in the absence of the mathematics:

the Bell inequalities are violated, but special relativity is obeyed and Bell inequality violations cannot be used to send signals faster than light. Those are the phenomena. End of discussion.

Yes, the Bell inequalities are violated. What does this tell us about Bell's theorem? It tells us that at least one of the assumptions Bell used to calculate the inequality must be incorrect. What are those assumptions we might ask? Well, they are the EPR assumptions. What were the EPR assumptions we might ask.

One of those EPR assumptions was the idea that properties such as position and momentum can be ascribed to particles, even if they aren't measured. I believe this is referred to as counterfactual definiteness or sometimes as "realism". I might be incorrect about the specific terms, but the idea of particles having those properties prior to measurement, I'm pretty sure is one of the EPR assumptions and therefore one of Bell's. Is that accurate?

Now, you mention that special relativity is obeyed and that Bell inequalities cannot be used to send signals faster than light. We might wonder then about causality as opposed to signaling. Can causal influences propagate faster than light even if signals can't.

If there is any trouble in understanding what is meant here then it can be explained, quite simply, in terms of observable real world phenomena, such as that of throwing a baseball.

What you actually want to discuss are various possible mathematical models that have been proposed, what predictions they make, and what properties they must have, or must not have, in order to predict and account for the observed phenomena.

What I want to discuss in this particular thread are the statements made by Bell and others about the assumption of free will in Bell's theorem.

You initially seemed content to engage with this, correcting the idea that it was human free will that was meant - in spite of the fairly clear statements from Bell, Conway-Kochen, Wiseman (and others). The issue seemed to arise, ironically enough, when I asked a question about the math.

You made the statement:

I'm not sure that the proof of Bell's Theorem requires any assumptions about the statistical independence of the measurement settings and the properties of the particles to be measured. I think it only requires statistical independence of the probabilities of measurement results.

Note the language you use "I'm not sure", "I think". This despite stating that the assumptions of Bell's theorem are clear from his papers. What is clear from Bell's own statements is Bell's own interpretation of the mathematics. It is clear that he believes that he invoked the assumption of free variables i.e. events that are only correlated with their effects.

What is also clear from the statements of Bell, Wiseman and Conway-Kochen is that, in the absence of these free variables (they actually invoke human free will), then the assumption of statistical independence is violated and this would account for the observed violations of Bell's inequality.

You seem to disagree with the interpretation of Bell, Wiseman, Conway-Kochen (and others) and have your own interpretation. I was trying to explore that interpretation by asking about its implications. In particular your statement:

the statistical independence of the measurement settings and the properties of the particles

I was wondering how this idea (that I have only heard from your good self), would change the calculation of Bell's inequality or what it would actually mean. Clearly Bell's inequality is a prediction of measurement outcomes (under certain assumptions) i.e. the properties of particles. The violations of Bell's inequality is clearly due to the actual outcomes of experiments not matching the predictions of Bell's theorem. The other authors seem to suggest if the measurement settings and measurement outcomes are in fact correlated, then the violation of Bell's inequality are explained. This, they suggest, would seem to necessitate the dropping of the free variable assumption or, as Bell, Conway, and Wiseman seem to beleive, human free will.

You seem to have a different interpretation.

Of course I have. You are seriously mistaken if you think the issue we are having with this discussion is that I am not sufficiently familiar with the terminology.

The issue we are having with this discussion is that it needs to be grounded in the actual math before it can usefully proceed further. If you are not presently familiar enough with the math to have that grounding, then the discussion needs to stop until you are.

I had no doubt that you well understood the term "causal influence", the issue is that you were trying to maintain that it was unintelligible without recourse to mathematics, when it is easily explicable in terms of real world phenomena; such as that of throwing a baseball.

The discussion is grounded in the actual math. We are discussing the interpretation of that math. Interpreting the mathematics is seeing how the math applies to the world around us. It can be explained in terms of real world phenomena.

The way for you to answer this question is to read the papers, learn the math, and find out. If you need to take some time to do that, that's fine. I'll still be here whenever you are ready. There is no need to rush things.

I am doing that, and will continue to do so, but the mathematics still needs to be interpreted in relation to the world around us. It can, therefore, be discussed on the basis of real world phenomena.

I do appreciate your time and energy. I think perhaps we have somewhat of an ideological difference on this point. Until such point as I understand the mathematics however, I take at face value the different statements that I encounter as I cannot evaluate their veracity. That doesn't however mean that a meaningful discussion cannot be had. It could be the case that Bell, Wiseman, Conway-Kochen, yourself, all the other posters on here, and the posters elsewhere are all engaged in an elaborate conspiracy and that none of the statements are actually correct. That, however, doesn't prevent me from taking those statements at face value and drawing inferences and conclusions about them. This can all be done on the assumption that the statements are accurate representations.

 

[PeterDonis]

Note the language you use "I'm not sure", "I think". This despite stating that the assumptions of Bell's theorem are clear from his papers.

Yes, because I didn't have the papers in front of me and it's been a while since I read them, and, unlike you, I do not think it is a good idea to throw around ordinary language statements about these things without being sure what specific things in the actual math they refer to.

You seem to have a different interpretation.

No, I just, as I have said multiple times, believe that the discussion has reached a point where it cannot usefully proceed further without being grounded in the actual math instead of ordinary language descriptions. So I stopped proceeding until one of us took the time to go look up the actual math. I haven't had the time to do it, and you haven't done it either. So it hasn't been done, and I have not proceeded.

I had no doubt that you well understood the term "causal influence", the issue is that you were trying to maintain that it was unintelligible without recourse to mathematics, when it is easily explicable in terms of real world phenomena; such as that of throwing a baseball.

You are far too optimistic. David Hume, several centuries ago, already made the correct observation that "causality" is not something we directly observe; it's something we put into our models.

Until such point as I understand the mathematics however, I take at face value the different statements that I encounter as I cannot evaluate their veracity.

This is not a good approach. If you don't understand the mathematics, you don't know what the statements mean, since all of them refer to something in the mathematics; none of them refer only to directly observable phenomena that can be understood without knowing the mathematics.

 

[Lynch101]

Yes, because I didn't have the papers in front of me and it's been a while since I read them, and, unlike you, I do not think it is a good idea to throw around ordinary language statements about these things without being sure what specific things in the actual math they refer to.

No, I just, as I have said multiple times, believe that the discussion has reached a point where it cannot usefully proceed further without being grounded in the actual math instead of ordinary language descriptions. So I stopped proceeding until one of us took the time to go look up the actual math. I haven't had the time to do it, and you haven't done it either. So it hasn't been done, and I have not proceeded.

That's fair enough that you haven't you haven't read the papers recently and can't remember the math. Perhaps that means that you are not best placed to answer the questions being asked then? I do, genuinely appreciate your taking the time because you are always a good help in these discussions. There may, however, be other members here who are more familiar with the math to address the specific questions.

I will certainly continue my own attempt at studying the math but that will probably be a slow process. In the meantime, I was hoping to "stand on the shoulders of giants" and get the insight from those that are best placed to provide it.

On the point about "throwing around" ordinary language statements, I wouldn't quite say that I'm throwing around ordinary language statements. I'm referencing the statements of people who are obviously familiar with the mathematics.

And even the language itself is not so ordinary. Talking about variables being correlated only with their future light cones appears to be reasonably technical and specific. While this idea can be encoded in mathematics, it is equally an idea that can be discussed using ordinary language.

This is not a good approach. If you don't understand the mathematics, you don't know what the statements mean, since all of them refer to something in the mathematics; none of them refer only to directly observable phenomena that can be understood without knowing the mathematics.

The issue can also be discussed entirely hypothetically based on certain assumptions and "pending mathematical comparison". Those assumptions are:
1) Bell understands his own theorem well enough to make statements about it.
2) Wiseman, Conway-Kochen (and others) understand the mathematics sufficiently to make statements about it.
3) The statements made refer to real world phenomena.

In this manner, we wouldn't even need recourse to the mathematics because we would be discussing these statements about the theorem. This would allow us to draw certain conclusions that would have to be supported by the mathematics, if our reasoning is correct and if Bell et al do understand the theorem well enough to make the statements they have made.

It could even be discussed in the form of the Chinese Room argument, where the actual meaning of the terms doesn't even need to be understood. The terms themselves can simply be arranged in a given order to arrive at conclusion.

You are far too optimistic. David Hume, several centuries ago, already made the correct observation that "causality" is not something we directly observe; it's something we put into our models.

We don't need to be able to observe "causality" we can instead talk about "causality" as it is in relativity theory, or simply the idea that Mohammed Ali's famous quip about being so fast that when he turned out the light, he was in bed before the room was dark, is not possible. We can talk about how spatially separated events cannot have an instantaneous effect on each other.

We can also talk about the idea that effects are correlated with their causes. In fact, we don't need much else other than that for this particular discussion.

 

[PeterDonis]

Perhaps that means that you are not best placed to answer the questions being asked then?

If someone else wants to jump in based on the ordinary language terms without any grounding in the math, they're welcome to try. I don't think such a discussion would be productive at this point, but of course someone else's opinion might differ.

I'm referencing the statements of people who are obviously familiar with the mathematics.

Yes, I know, but if you yourself aren't familiar with the math, you don't know what those people are talking about, because you cannot match up the terms they're using with anything you personally understand.

You might think you can substitute intuitive concepts that you are familiar with for the actual math, but that strategy has a very poor track record, particularly in areas like this. Whatever intuitive concepts you have before you learn the math are simply not going to match up well with what's in the math. That's one of the things that makes QM so challenging to study.

1) Bell understands his own theorem well enough to make statements about it.
2) Wiseman, Conway-Kochen (and others) understand the mathematics sufficiently to make statements about it.
3) The statements made refer to real world phenomena.

1: yes. 2: yes. 3: no. The key ordinary language terms they are using do not refer to real world phenomena. They refer to particular mathematical things in particular theoretical models (or types of models). And different sources often use the same ordinary language term to refer to different mathematical things.

We don't need to be able to observe "causality" we can instead talk about "causality" as it is in relativity theory

Which means we're not talking about any "real world phenomenon", we're talking about a mathematical feature of a theoretical model. Which can't be described precisely in ordinary language.

We can talk about how spatially separated events cannot have an instantaneous effect on each other.

Which then pushes the problem back to what counts as an "effect". If that word had a single well-defined meaning, there would not be so much literature written about whether violations of the Bell inequalities count as an "instantaneous effect" or not.

We can also talk about the idea that effects are correlated with their causes.

Same problem, except now it's with the word "cause" as well as the word "effect". Do violations of the Bell inequalities count as "effects being correlated with their causes"? Depends on who you ask. We're not going to settle questions like that here.

 

[Lynch101]

If someone else wants to jump in based on the ordinary language terms without any grounding in the math, they're welcome to try. I don't think such a discussion would be productive at this point, but of course someone else's opinion might differ.

Again, why I do genuinely appreciate your taking the time to even discuss this far.

Yes, I know, but if you yourself aren't familiar with the math, you don't know what those people are talking about, because you cannot match up the terms they're using with anything you personally understand.

The issue of dispute appears to be whether the statements by Bell and other or the inferences I am drawing from the statements match up with the math. As you rightly point out, I am not in a position to evaluate whether they are or not. You seem to have ruled yourself out in that regard also.

That is OK, however, because we can make conditional statements about the issue, and at some later point, when I finally understand the math or when you re-read the papers, or someone more familiar with the mathematics responds, the correspondence of the statements to the mathematics can be checked.

Basically, we can still make statements like:
IF Bell meant abc, when he stated that in the theorem he assumes abc, then xyz must be the case.

You might think you can substitute intuitive concepts that you are familiar with for the actual math, but that strategy has a very poor track record, particularly in areas like this. Whatever intuitive concepts you have before you learn the math are simply not going to match up well with what's in the math. That's one of the things that makes QM so challenging to study.

The mathematics predicts the measurement outcomes of experiments. We can express this very crudely in ordinary language: this means they tell us how many dots to expect to hit a particular region of a screen over a given number of experiments.

The mathematics give us probabilistic predictions as opposed to deterministic predictions. This means they don't tell us the outcome of every individual experiment but rather the expected percentages over an ensemble.

We can talk about the propagation of light at a finite speed and we can talk about "cause and effect" in terms of throwing a baseball and breaking a window.

1: yes. 2: yes. 3: no. The key ordinary language terms they are using do not refer to real world phenomena. They refer to particular mathematical things in particular theoretical models (or types of models). And different sources often use the same ordinary language term to refer to different mathematical things.

Which means we're not talking about any "real world phenomenon", we're talking about a mathematical feature of a theoretical model. Which can't be described precisely in ordinary language.

The "mathematical things" themeselves refer to assumptions about the real world. They codify assumptions about the real world, in mathematic al terms. As such, they refer back to the real world and we can ask what are those mathematically encoded assumptions about the real world? What do they correspond to in the real world?

Which then pushes the problem back to what counts as an "effect". If that word had a single well-defined meaning, there would not be so much literature written about whether violations of the Bell inequalities count as an "instantaneous effect" or not.

We can talk about cause and effect in terms of observable phenomena. We can talk about throwing a baseball at a window and the window breaking. We can then talk about the length of time the baseball takes to travel from me to the window. We can talk about the speed of light and how it is finite.

We can also talk about cause and effect in terms of the observations we make in experiments i.e. that flash of light on the detector screen. We can drop the words "cause" and "effect" and instead talk about those particular phenomena.

Same problem, except now it's with the word "cause" as well as the word "effect". Do violations of the Bell inequalities count as "effects being correlated with their causes"? Depends on who you ask. We're not going to settle questions like that here.

We might be able to make certain deductions in relation to that question, if we talk in terms of the observable phenomena.

For example, if a particle registers on a detector in Alice's lab (A), is it possible for that event to interact with a particle in Bob's laboratory (B) located on another planet? Does this happen "instantaneously" or does it require time for any influence to travel between A and B - similar to how it takes time for the baseball to travel to the window?

We can talk about the experimental set-up similarly, and what observations we would expect to make given certain assumptions about how the world works. If the observations don't match the predictions, then we can deduce that one or more of our assumptions must be wrong.

 

[PeterDonis]

You seem to have ruled yourself out in that regard also.

Only for now since I don't have the time to go look up the papers again, and since you aren't doing it. I understand you have a lot of other things to learn besides those specific papers, but if you haven't, for example, read Bell's own papers about his theorem, aren't you at least curious what they say? They're not that long and fairly easy to read, and should be easily findable online.

we can still make statements like:
IF Bell meant abc, when he stated that in the theorem he assumes abc, then xyz must be the case.

Only if you can specify "abc" in terms of math, not ordinary language. Otherwise you're just trading one ambiguous ordinary language expression for another.

The rest of your post is just more examples of things you think "we can talk about" without math, that are really, again, just trading one ambiguous ordinary language expression for another.

 

[Lynch101]

Only for now since I don't have the time to go look up the papers again, and since you aren't doing it. I understand you have a lot of other things to learn besides those specific papers, but if you haven't, for example, read Bell's own papers about his theorem, aren't you at least curious what they say? They're not that long and fairly easy to read, and should be easily findable online.

I have read them but I tend to glaze over when it comes to the math, because I presume I won't understand it. I'll go back and have another read.

Only if you can specify "abc" in terms of math, not ordinary language. Otherwise you're just trading one ambiguous ordinary language expression for another.

The rest of your post is just more examples of things you think "we can talk about" without math, that are really, again, just trading one ambiguous ordinary language expression for another.

Interpretation of the mathematics necessarily means relating it to the real world i.e. interpreting what it says about the real world, including the assumptions. Without specifying what aspects of the real world the math is referring to, the math does not predict the outcomes of experiments.

 

[PeterDonis]

I have read them but I tend to glaze over when it comes to the math, because I presume I won't understand it.

Certainly there are physics papers that appear to be using math more as a bludgeon to beat the reader into submission than as an actual tool for modeling and exposition. However, I don't think that is at all the case for Bell's papers.

Interpretation of the mathematics necessarily means relating it to the real world

Sure, but that means you need both sides. You need to know what real world phenomena you are talking about, and you need to know the math. Otherwise how can you possibly understand how they relate to each other?

Do you think that the [finite] speed of light in a vacuum is an ambiguous concept?

As you've stated it, yes, because you haven't specified what you mean by "speed". Now go look for all the PF threads where exactly this ambiguity has caused confusion and misunderstanding (the cosmology forum is a good place to start). I can assure you there are a lot of them.

 

[Lynch101]

Certainly there are physics papers that appear to be using math more as a bludgeon to beat the reader into submission than as an actual tool for modeling and exposition. However, I don't think that is at all the case for Bell's papers.

Thanks, I'll go back over them and hopefully have a better time making sense of the math.

Sure, but that means you need both sides. You need to know what real world phenomena you are talking about, and you need to know the math. Otherwise how can you possibly understand how they relate to each other?

Ideally yes and if I did know both sides I wouldn't need to ask these questions.

In essence, I am asking anyone know knows the mathematics side of things to confirm, or deny, that the real world phenomena, which Bell and others have stated are encoded in the mathematics, are in fact encoded in the mathematics.

If someone confirms that they are, I will take it at face value. If someone says they are not, then I would be inclined to ask what assumptions are actually encoded in the mathematics - again, taking what they say at face value.

As you've stated it, yes, because you haven't specified what you mean by "speed". Now go look for all the PF threads where exactly this ambiguity has caused confusion and misunderstanding (the cosmology forum is a good place to start). I can assure you there are a lot of them.

But you probably have a decent idea of what I am referring to. Perhaps the velocity of light would be a more accurate term to use. Either way, the idea that everything in the Universe requires a non-zero amount of time to travel between two spatially separated laboratories is intelligible in terms of real world phenomena. Yes, it can be encoded in mathematics, but to interpret the mathematics, we need to interpret it in terms of real world phenomena.

 

[PeterDonis]

If someone confirms that they are, I will take it at face value. If someone says they are not, then I would be inclined to ask what assumptions are actually encoded in the mathematics - again, taking what they say at face value.

So you basically think that waiting around for someone else to do this for you--which could take days, or weeks, or months, or might never happen at all--is a better option than just looking up the papers for yourself and reading what they say? And you think that taking what other people say at face value about anything you don't understand yourself is a better option than trying to understand it yourself?

For the record, I think you are showing very bad judgment if that really is your preference.