Vygotsky vs Reality: Evidence Supporting/Contradicting Claims on Mind

[Lievo]

What evidences support or contredict Vygotsky's philosophy of mind? I'm interested specifically in the experimental evidences supporting or contradicting:

1-that self-awareness in human is the result of language
2-that any "higher mental abilities" is the result of language and cultural evolution.
3-that chimps can extrospect, but they are not introspective - able to have thoughts about their thoughts.

As an example of the kind of response I'm looking for

Evidence contradicting claim 3 can be found http://www.springerlink.com/content/755235w58453268q/".

The current study attempted to address these two criticisms by presenting great apes (seven gorillas, eight chimpanzees, four bonobos, seven orangutans) with a seeking information task whose basic procedure consisted of presenting two hollow tubes, baiting one of them and letting subjects choose. Conditions varied depending on whether subjects had visual access to the baiting, the cost associated with seeking information, the time interval between baiting and choosing, the food quality and the additional information offered regarding the food’s location. Although subjects showed a high retrieval accuracy when they had witnessed the baiting, they were more likely to check inside the tube before choosing when high stakes were involved (Experiment 3) or after a longer period of time had elapsed between the baiting and the retrieval of the reward (Experiment 2). In contrast, providing subjects with indirect auditory information about the food’s location or increasing the cost of checking reduced checking before choosing (Experiment 1). Taken together, these findings suggest that subjects knew that they could be wrong when choosing.

I'm not very familar to Vygotsky's work, so if there exists even more interesting claims AND experimental evidences to support it, thanks for sharing your knowledge. Please number the claim to facilitate the discussion.

 

[Pythagorean]

No evidence, but 1 doesn't seem restricted to humans. Animals use language too, and find their place with it (particularly other mammals)

Of course, in say, ants, roles seem more biologically determined. But is that solely the case? Or will ants breed more workers when they need more workers?

 

[Lievo]

1 doesn't seem restricted to humans.

Sure, but that's apeiron's words thus not self-awarness as you and I would understand it. It's supposed to be some specific self-awarness specific to humans. Maybe a clearer (for you and I) way of reformulating the claim would be:

1'-that human language makes human self-awarness different from animal self-awarness.

 

[JDStupi]

I think that if you wish to understand Vygotsk'y ideas, you shouldn't start a thread on the subject, but rather pick up "Thought and Language" and read it.

No evidence, but 1 doesn't seem restricted to humans. Animals use language too, and find their place with it (particularly other mammals)

This is the reason why you shouldn't start a thread, because (nothing against anybody) views are thrown about based off of misinterpretations. Vygotsky completely agrees that language is found in other animals and even cites language-like relations in ant colonies and the like. Vygotsky does not wish to identify thought with language at all, this is something he argues against. Vygotsky's position is that the emergence of specifically human higher mental functions comes about through the changes in the functional interrelations between the language function and the thought function.
He dedicates an entire chapter to "The Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech" (keep in mind, he doesn't mean genetic as in gene theory) I will quote a summarization of 6 points from this chapter

1. Thought and Speech have different genetic roots
2. The two functions develop along different lines and independently of each other
3. There is no clear-cut and constant correlation between them in phylogenesis
4. Anthropoids display an intellect somewhat like man's in certain respects (the embryonic use of tools) and a language somewhat like man's in totally different respects (the phonetic aspect of their speech, its release function, the beginnings of a social function)
5. The close correspondence between thought and speech characteristic of man is absent in anthropoids
6. In the phylogeny of thought and speech, a prelinguistic phase in the development of thought and a preintellectuial phase in the development of speech are clearly discernible

1'-that human language makes human self-awarness different from animal self-awarness

I suppose to be nitpicky we'll say this, maybe I'm silly I just kind of assumed that coming from a psychologist, concerned with development, art, culture and human higher functions this was evident.

The general idea is that the human "I" and human self-reflective capabilities come about through the evolution of language and social interaction. The development of speech is intimatley related to our socialization, language is taught to children and they associate the word with the scenario it represents. Speech becomes manifest as a social function, and is entirely external, the egocentric coefficient measured by Piaget can be experimented upon by putting children through various tasks and puzzles and seeing how external egocentric speech is related to their awareness and problem-solving capabilities. Younger children put through these experiments show an increase in ego centric speech (which is the measure of ego-centric statements to total statements---for more information see "The Langauge and Thought of the Child-Piaget)--as older children are put through similar experiments they are found to sit quietly and look at the problem, being asked to say what they are thinking their speech is startlingly similar to the younger childs external egocentric speech. This leads Vygotsky to suppose that the function of egocentric speech is that it serves as a mediator between socialized speech and its internalization for personal speech.From here personal speech becomes a psychological tool for problem solving, its relation to human self-awareness is that our personal awareness emerges by viewing ourselves from the perspective of how others view us. This internalizing of an originally socialized function, and its growing interrelation with problem solving leads to higher mental forms.
In the light of ideas about mirror neuron discovery, I do not think this is at all controversial, or should be.

Also, for a slightly similar perspective from a different point of view see Wilfrid Sellar's ideas particularly "The Myth of Jones" http://www.iep.utm.edu/sellars/

In fact, see how similar Wilfrid Sellar's reasoning regarding how Jones comes to make inferences about other's behaviours and how people come to make inferences regarding their own behaviours to the aformentioned ideas about problem-solving

 

[apeiron]

As an example of the kind of response I'm looking for...

Discussing this seems a waste of time as you just appear to want to score points rather than put any effort into studying the arguments or providing proper citations.

But briefly, the example of the chimps is about complex trains of thought scaffolded by the immediate situation.

What would be thoughts about thoughts in the human language scaffolded sense would be if a chimp went off and later that afternoon was known to be sitting there, thinking over the tactics it employed, perhaps cursing a wrong decision, considering what might work better next time - then drifting off into daydream fantasies about a pretty bonobo he saw, etc.

JDStupi gave a clear general answer with plenty of supporting refs. So if you really want to pursue a fruitful conversation Lievo, you have to be prepared to answer specific questions as they are raised and be able to back your assertions with examples drawn from the relevant literature. And you can't keep asking for sources then saying it is too much like hard work to read them (though of course you will ).

 

[Pythagorean]

Thank you for clarifying JD. I do not have time for Vygotsky currently, but I don't want to argue for his wrongness, only to understand the position better.

This leads Vygotsky to suppose that the function of egocentric speech is that it serves as a mediator between socialized speech and its internalization for personal speech.From here personal speech becomes a psychological tool for problem solving, its relation to human self-awareness is that our personal awareness emerges by viewing ourselves from the perspective of how others view us.

This all seems straightforward. Wernicke's area is unique to humans of course. So to be clear, there's no statement equivalent to "No such equivalent tool exists in non-human animals"?

 

[apeiron]

Wernicke's area is unique to humans of course.

As the quotes from Ramachandran show, there are still a lot of people who expect to find unique brain areas underlying higher human mental abilities, yet the trend is for such differences not to be found in the gross morphology of the primate cortex.

For instance...

http://home.gwu.edu/~sherwood/2010.Chimp.AreaTpt.ProcRSocB.pdf

http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1000170

http://www.frontiersin.org/human_neuroscience/10.3389/neuro.09.031.2009/full

And of course others argue the other way...

http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/full/29/37/11523

So this is still a fluid area of research. But generally the findings, in my view, show that there is surprisingly little that is different about human brain architecture.

Which of course is another line of evidence for the Vygotskian position that the invention of symbolic language was the big jump.

The crucial biological change was perhaps just the redesign of the human throat to allow rapid syllabic utterances. Probably for refined emotional vocalisation - the singing ape hypothesis. This then enforced a serial utterance constraint on the brain, a fruitful constraint that quickly allowed full blown grammatical speech to evolve (evolve socially that is).

There would have been brain adaptations to - but more a host of minor tweaks, or reasonably major ones of maturation schedule. And also a major one of more "top-downness" in neural connectivity.

One of the actual striking difference between apes and humans is that human primary visual cortex is much more foveally-dominated, for instance. We devote more space to mapping the centre of vision presumably because we are much better at being able to anticipate where our vision most needs to focus in any moment.

 

[Pythagorean]

So this is still a fluid area of research. But generally the findings, in my view, show that there is surprisingly little that is different about human brain architecture.

So the question is can we socialize self-consciousness in apes then?

And perhaps we can, eventually (in a way that is meaningful to humans, I mean; which I don't know how we'd measure that in apes); I know there are some interesting projects underway, but I haven't reviewed them in any depth. I know we can teach them language and they can make their own word combinations in meaningful ways (watermelon = "candy fruit")

But do we ever see apes sitting alone signing to themselves (allegedly pondering) or are they only particularly interested in language during seeking behavior?

 

[Lievo]

if you wish to understand Vygotsk'y ideas, you shouldn't start a thread on the subject, but rather pick up "Thought and Language" and read it.

Fair enough. But you did not get the idea of starting this thread. Up to now, I'm absolutly not interested in Vygotsky ideas. Or, more properly said, I don't think it's worse spending the time, and time is a very acute limite.

So what I'm looking for here, is reasons to change my mind. All one need to do is to present some interesting statement plus the experimental evidences that support it (by fairness, contradicting evidences should be looked for too). I started with three interesting claims apeiron made because he already suggested it was evidence based and easy for him to provide a bunch of reference. Still waiting.

But the question would hold irrespective of apeiron's behavior: if there is anything that you think may correspond to what I'd like to see, that would be a pleasure to discuss it.

 

[Math Is Hard]

It seems like there could be some confusion between the ideas of Vygotsky and the ideas of apeiron from another thread. I know that apeiron loves Vygotsky, but I don't know if his assertions are identical or if there is some extrapolation.

It also seems like this thread is more about the question of metacognition in animals than anything else.

Which way would we like to go here?

 

[apeiron]

But do we ever see apes sitting alone signing to themselves (allegedly pondering) or are they only particularly interested in language during seeking behavior?

In fact this has been observed with Kanzi, the bonobo that learned signing from infancy. It was said to sign to itself in private monologue during idle moments.

 

[apeiron]

Which way would we like to go here?

Clearly Lievo started the thread asking the world to prove something to his satisfaction. He also PMed me politely so I gave him a couple of reference packed links that addressed his questions. If he wants to dispute some of that evidence publicly, this could be his next legitimate move. Provided of course he can rustle up some sources to back anything he may claim.

In the meantime, to legitimate even opening the thread, he supplied a single putative counter-example. To which I replied, pointing out the error in logic. He can either let my explanation stand, or refute it - with sources.

But I don't yet get the impression that Lievo's real mission here is to understand the pros and cons of a Vygotskean approach to the higher mental faculties.

 

[Lievo]

I gave him a couple of reference packed links that addressed his questions.

The two references you sent me had nothing to do with experimental evidences, which the topic of this thread. Again, you have strongly suggested that evidences exist that support your claims. But you never show any. Maybe because you confound discussing the pros and cons and exhibiting experimental evidences? Not the same thing!

But I don't yet get the impression that Lievo's real mission here is to understand the pros and cons of a Vygotskean approach to the higher mental faculties.

And you are right. Again, the 'mission' of this thread is to collect the experimental evidences that supports or contredict Vygotsky's most interesting claims....or what one may think is Vygotsky's claims. I notice it seems controversial that your claims are truly identical to Vytgotsky ideas. I'm not qualify to judge that. Enough to me it's close to this stream of ideas.

 

[Lievo]

Which way would we like to go here?

Anywhere one can find experimental evidences. Maybe the best move would be to look at what support/challenge the 6 points JDStupi summarized:

1. Thought and Speech have different genetic roots
2. The two functions develop along different lines and independently of each other
3. There is no clear-cut and constant correlation between them in phylogenesis
4. Anthropoids display an intellect somewhat like man's in certain respects (the embryonic use of tools) and a language somewhat like man's in totally different respects (the phonetic aspect of their speech, its release function, the beginnings of a social function)
5. The close correspondence between thought and speech characteristic of man is absent in anthropoids
6. In the phylogeny of thought and speech, a prelinguistic phase in the development of thought and a preintellectuial phase in the development of speech are clearly discernible

 

[apeiron]

The two references you sent me had nothing to do with experimental evidences, which the topic of this thread. Again, you have strongly suggested that evidences exist that support your claims. But you never show any. Maybe because you confound discussing the pros and cons and exhibiting experimental evidences? Not the same thing!


And you are right. Again, the 'mission' of this thread is to collect the experimental evidences that supports or contredict Vygotsky's most interesting claims.


...or what one may think is Vygotsky's claims. I notice it seems controversial that your claims are truly identical to Vytgotsky ideas. I'm not qualify to judge that. Enough to me it's close to this stream.

More evasion. You put forward a specific example in the OP. I replied with an explanation. Now let's hear your response.

 

[apeiron]

It would still be nice if Lievo responded to the argument against his original example. But in the meantime, here is a test that gets closer to the cutting edge of human/ape differences in social cognition.

There is currently much controversy about which, if any, mental states chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates understand. In the current two studies we tested both chimpanzees’ and human children’s understanding of both knowledge–ignorance and false belief – in the same experimental paradigm involving competition with a conspecific. We found that whereas 6-year-old children understood both of these mental states, chimpanzees understood knowledge–ignorance but not false belief.

http://email.eva.mpg.de/~tomas/pdf/Kaminski_Cog_08.pdf

The study concludes that the reason for the failure is 1) it is a specific brain function that just has not evolved in chimps, 2) chimps have less ability to inhibit the wrong choice, or 3) the Vygotskian answer. And they throw in a few concrete reasons for preferring 3.

Third is the possibility that children’s development of a fully representational theory
of mind, including false beliefs, is dependent on several years of linguistic communication – and of course chimpanzees are not evolved for this. There is much evidence for the role of language in the development of false belief understanding, including the findings that deaf children who do not learn sign language in the normal way are much delayed in this task (Peterson & Siegal, 2000) and that children who are given special training in certain kinds of linguistic discourse pass the task earlier than those who are not given such training (Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003; see Astington, (2001), for a review).

Evidence for a Vygotskian perspective comes from a wide variety of sources (which I supplied Lievo as requested) including feral children, deaf/mutes, child development of self-regulation, children's drawing, EEG recordings of throat muscles, cross-cultural anthropology, etc. There is also good negative evidence, such as a lack of marked brain architecture differences, the too rapid emergence of symbolic culture in sapiens, and so forth.

The metacognition literature is more likely to confuse than enlighten IMHO as you cannot really devise experiments that show what animals are thinking about off-line. You can only create a cognitive task to be performed at that moment. And the abilities of large brain primates to extrospect (or even dolphins, elephants and ravens) is not that much inferior to us. That would indeed be the Vygotskian hypothesis - they would be on an evolutionary continuum. It is only the introspective abilities which are the product of sociocultural learning.

But anyway, when it comes to experimental evidence - something Lievo says is important to him - clearly it is better to focus on tests that reveal a reliable discontinuity between humans and apes, rather than ones where apes are able to do what humans can do.

 

[SolidGold]

Cats' language has been quantified to about 900 different sounds and meanings. Newer studies actually prove that not only chimps, but dumber capochin monkeys can have thoughts about their own thoughts, or introspect. Why pursue such idiotic philosophy of this guy and waste all this time?

There are even groups of monkeys that run through the jungle together and are of different species, and they all communicate with each other with their own language, making them all bilingual.

 

[Pythagorean]

SolidGold, you should provide references to your post so that those of us that are interested can look into it more.

 

[JDStupi]

Okay, first...That doesn't prove anything considering as was said one million times the speech function was never denied existence in other animals, simply the close functional interrelationship between thought and speech.
Second, from the tone of your post I find everything you say questionable, whether it be blatant lies or mis-interpretations I don't know. As always, I could be wrong, but I doubt it. I'm certainly interested in these alleged experiments that "prove" that monkeys have "meta-representations" of themselves and introspect.

*edit, haha not "as always I doubt that I'm wrong" but rather "as always I could be wrong, but in this case I doubt it".

*Moreover, your helping nobody's case as I'm fairly sure that even the thread starter who disagrees with Vygotsky's approach, or at least isn't convinced, would disagree with the verisimilitude of your claims.

 

[Lievo]

I'm fairly sure that even the thread starter who disagrees with Vygotsky's approach, or at least isn't convinced, would disagree with the verisimilitude of your claims.

Well I'm still waiting for a single experimental evidence supporting or contradicting blabla. I saw apeiron repeteadly claiming he was having plenty, none he could cite it seems. Now SolidGold is claiming the opposite and provides exactly the same number of experimental evidence. Honestly, as long as no one tries to support his/her claims, I don't even care to agree or disagree. :zzz:

 

[apeiron]

Honestly, as long as no one tries to support his/her claims, I don't even care to agree or disagree. :zzz:

That comment doesn't fool anyone. You cited an example to legitimate the thread. I explained why it doesn't prove what you say it proves. You can either argue it further, or just keep quiet and hope people forget.

 

[Lievo]

Apeiron, I opened this thread with the candide belief you'd provide the citations you were claiming to have. This was not a trap at all. I just don't understand the smoke and rethoric you're making as if this thread was supposed to be a battle and not something for getting information. Look at your last reply: you say that I should stay quiet and hope people forget ...forget what? That the evidence I indicated as an example of what I wanted would be questionnable? True or not, for what reason on Earth should I be ashamed of that? Of course I can understand you're ill-at-ease with your own inability to provide experimental evidences to support your claim, despite your repeatedly claimed you could cite many. Again, it was not the purpose of this thread to prove you were pretending. The fact it is... honestly that's belongs to you and I will stop this discussion now. Just don't be surprised if I don't take your word for granted next time.

 

[apeiron]

Apeiron, I opened this thread with the candide belief you'd provide the citations you were claiming to have.

And after you PM-ed me, I posted you links to the two best introductory sources that lay out the arguments, the nature of the evidence, full sets of references.

If, having got acquainted with the literature, you want to come back with further specific queries, feel free.

For instance, you might want to dispute the feral children evidence, the deaf/mute evidence, the EEG throat recording evidence, the development of self-regulation in children and other paedogogic evidence, the cross cultural anthropological evidence...I really can't guess what in advance.

The fact it is... honestly that's belongs to you and I will stop this discussion now. Just don't be surprised if I don't take your word for granted next time.

The only thing that could surprise me here is if you did what was asked and reply to the challenge regarding your original assertion.

You said this evidence contradicts the Vygotskean perspective:

Evidence contradicting claim 3 can be found here.

The current study attempted to address these two criticisms by presenting great apes (seven gorillas, eight chimpanzees, four bonobos, seven orangutans) with a seeking information task whose basic procedure consisted of presenting two hollow tubes, baiting one of them and letting subjects choose. Conditions varied depending on whether subjects had visual access to the baiting, the cost associated with seeking information, the time interval between baiting and choosing, the food quality and the additional information offered regarding the food’s location. Although subjects showed a high retrieval accuracy when they had witnessed the baiting, they were more likely to check inside the tube before choosing when high stakes were involved (Experiment 3) or after a longer period of time had elapsed between the baiting and the retrieval of the reward (Experiment 2). In contrast, providing subjects with indirect auditory information about the food’s location or increasing the cost of checking reduced checking before choosing (Experiment 1). Taken together, these findings suggest that subjects knew that they could be wrong when choosing.

I pointed out that it doesn't:

the example of the chimps is about complex trains of thought scaffolded by the immediate situation.

What would be thoughts about thoughts in the human language scaffolded sense would be if a chimp went off and later that afternoon was known to be sitting there, thinking over the tactics it employed, perhaps cursing a wrong decision, considering what might work better next time - then drifting off into daydream fantasies about a pretty bonobo he saw, etc.

You can now remain silent and indeed "never take my word for granted again" .

 

[JDStupi]

Lievo, I'm just wondering, what are your beliefs regarding humans higher mental functionality and/or self-consciousness? This isn't meant to attack you, I"m simply curious, because honestly you seem very against Vygotsky's ideas, not just passively skeptical, but doubting the theoretical premise and everything, and I"m curious as to the nature of your beliefs that would cause such a response. What do you believe about the phenomena of ego centric speech in children? What is its functionality? How does it relate to their "self" and the general developmental process?...

 

[SolidGold]

Anything that has memory has some sort of introspection period. Here's something I found in about 3 seconds of googling.

http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/terrace99/usem/usem-hampton3.htm

Notice how this PHD guy is concluding that monkeys can introspect. Whether you believe it or not it doesn't matter, because he has more credibility than you. The other one was from a Discover Magazine article which I will find. In the article, monkeys were trying to steal oranges from a guy, and they would wait until he looked away to steal. Which means they are introspecting on their desire to want to steal the orange, and thinking about the consequences, and also reasoning that the guy may see them if he isn't looking away. This means they have to put themselves in the guys shoes to imagine how they would feel if they tried to steal the orange in front of him.

Here is the definition for introspect.
http://www.google.com/search?sclien...g1g-s1g-sx1g1g-sx4&aql=&oq=introspect+d&psj=1

More to come I just don't have all the time right now.

 

[SolidGold]

http://discovermagazine.com/2008/no...te-economics/?searchterm=monkeys steal island

 

[SolidGold]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6kvQHGZU86A&feature=related

 

[SolidGold]

 

[Math Is Hard]

SolidGold, could you please also summarize the points made in the videos rather than just posting the links? Some of us are on slower connections, and using youtube videos as references is a bit iffy, anyway. I'd like to know that I'm going to get something meaningful if I have to wait through the streaming. Thanks.

 

[SolidGold]

SolidGold, could you please also summarize the points made in the videos rather than just posting the links? Some of us are on slower connections, and using youtube videos as references is a bit iffy, anyway. I'd like to know that I'm going to get something meaningful if I have to wait through the streaming. Thanks.

Before I posted the references I summarized the points. I provided a link to the definition of introspect. The discover magazine link is to the article done by a scientist on some island, which shows proof that little monkeys can introspect. The youtube videos are from BBC Life documenting the cleverness of the monkeys, of which retrospection is necessary to accomplish. The other two videos are of the multilingual capacities of interracial monkey traveler groups in the jungle, which I mentioned in my first comment. All of it is worth watching.

 

[JDStupi]

OK You win. "This Phd guy said it". (Not to mention that the first article was about learning, the visual pathway, and memory and the second article the psychologist explicitly stated that she wasn't sure that monkeys knew we had minds or thoughts) So who is concluding this exactly? And, again, how does this demonstrate the error in Socially-mediated views on psychology?...

 

[Lievo]

Lievo, I'm just wondering, what are your beliefs regarding humans higher mental functionality and/or self-consciousness?

At present day, I agree with all interpretations which doesn't claim to have solve the hard problem of consciousness. Regarding higher mental functions, I would bet that such a notion will one day be considered as more misleading than helpfull.

 

[Pythagorean]

I'm still not sure how people define "higher" mental functions vs "lower" mental functions. I'm guessing it has to do with how much information is being integrated (at the higher levels, you are integrating a lot of different sensory and memory Information, at the lower levels a single or small set of input/s is being computed such as in reflexes. )

but we don't consider a reflex a mental function I guess, but you get the idea...

 

[apeiron]

I'm still not sure how people define "higher" mental functions vs "lower" mental functions. I'm guessing it has to do with how much information is being integrated (at the higher levels, you are integrating a lot of different sensory and memory Information, at the lower levels a single or small set of input/s is being computed such as in reflexes. )

but we don't consider a reflex a mental function I guess, but you get the idea...

The answer in the context of this thread is easy as it is a Vygotskean distinction. Basically it is what we share with animals, and then that which is distinctively human (and due to language/society).

See: http://psych.hanover.edu/vygotsky/subbot.html

But you can also make such distinctions just with the biological animal mind (because higher and lower are also hierarchical distinctions). So we can talk of attentional processing as higher, habit level or automatic level as lower.

Spinal and brainstem reflexes are even lower of course . Attention vs habit really is a distinction of the higher brain! So about cortex~striatum.

Hierarchy theory explains just why we see brains organised with this logic...

Holarchy approach gives some essential true insights - holons at the higher levels of the hierarchy enjoy progressively more degrees of freedom and holons at the lower levels of the hierarchy have progressively less degrees of freedom. Moving up the hierarchy, we encounter more and more complex, flexible and creative patterns of activity. Moving down the hierarchy behavior becomes more and more mechanized.

http://www.scaruffi.com/nature/emergenc.html

 

[ThomasT]

Anything that has memory has some sort of introspection period.

Of course. I have no doubt that monkeys, dogs, birds, etc. introspect. They just don't do it with agile terms (words). And neither do we most of the time. We, as well as other animals, introspect in terms of sensual recollections of events and our emotional associations with those events. As a wise man once said, you might not remember anything of what someone has said to you, but you will remember how that person made you feel.

 

[ConradDJ]

Anything that has memory has some sort of introspection period.

Of course. I have no doubt that monkeys, dogs, birds, etc. introspect. They just don't do it with agile terms (words). And neither do we most of the time. We, as well as other animals, introspect in terms of sensual recollections of events and our emotional associations with those events. As a wise man once said, you might not remember anything of what someone has said to you, but you will remember how that person made you feel.

I remember a high-school English teacher who told us that "we think with words" and I got incensed (as I often did in that class)... it was so obvious to me that most of what I'm "conscious of" can't even be put into words.

However, human language operates within consciousness at a much deeper level. As we learn to talk, we not only learn how to perceive and interpret the world as other people do, but most importantly, we learn how to conduct purposeful communicative relationships with them. As apeiron noted in a parallel thread –

The point about humans is that we carry around in our heads a second "objective" view of ourselves - the view that society would have of our actions and our existence.

In conversation we learn to see ourselves as other people see us, and also begin to conduct conversations with them and with ourselves, in our heads. This process couldn’t happen without words and grammar. But the “internal dialogue” in our heads also involves all those feelings and perceptions that we can’t “put into words.” So “talking to ourselves” evolves into the process called “thinking” in which words and grammar fall into the background.

So it’s true that what we’re “conscious of” goes way beyond words. But it’s also true that the ability to think about things beyond the “here and now” or to think about ourselves – which is what I understand by “introspection” – is completely dependent not only on the tools of language, but even more basically on the kinds of interpersonal relationships we develop through talking, including our relationship to ourselves.

I think investigations into the mentality of other primates are very interesting... the pre-linguistic brain-hardware we inherit from our ancestors is such remarkably sophisticated technology that I’m sure we’ll still be making major new discoveries about how it works a hundred years from now, long after we’ve figured out physics. But I don’t see that this argues against the importance of linguistic software in the way humans think.

 

[Pythagorean]

None of this seems unreasonable to me. I had the idea from the opening post that this was a Nature vs. Nurture argument and Vygostsky took the side of Nurture.

But now it seems (with Conrad and apeiron's contributions) more that Vygotsky only makes the point about Nurture's contributions, not claims they're the end-all.

It seems to me, anyway, that the Nature vs. Nurture arguments is long dead. Nature and Nurture are shown to be coupled to each other; this should be especially clear in the wake of the "junk DNA" and epigenetics. Protein action can effect genes, genes code proteins...

proteins interact with neurons, which interact with stimuli, which come from the environment. There's an obvious Nature side to our higher mental functions (the evolutionary developments that allow us to have larger brains in the first place also constrains how the brains must operate.) And then coming, full circle, the evolutionary development of the brain is guided by stimuli from the environment. This is actually very exciting for neuroscience:

An organism's behavioral and physiological and social milieu influence and are influenced by the epigenome, which is composed predominantly of chromatin and the covalent modification of DNA by methylation. Epigenetic patterns are sculpted during development to shape the diversity of gene expression programs in the organism. In contrast to the genetic sequence, which is determined by inheritance and is virtually identical in all tissues, the epigenetic pattern varies from cell type to cell type and is potentially dynamic throughout life. It is postulated here that different environmental exposures, including early parental care, could impact epigenetic patterns, with important implications for mental health in humans. Because epigenetic programming defines the state of expression of genes, epigenetic differences could have the same consequences as genetic polymorphisms. Yet in contrast to genetic sequence differences, epigenetic alterations are potentially reversible. This review will discuss basic epigenetic mechanisms and how epigenetic processes early in life might play a role in defining inter-individual trajectories of human behavior. In this regard, we will examine evidence for the possibility that epigenetic mechanisms can contribute to later-onset neurological dysfunction and disease.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20053376

Here, we're particularly interested in stimuli from other members of our species, or even other species (which we call social). But we still have a very powerful source from Nature to consider that drives social development: sync. This is beyond genes, even: our solar system's dance gives us night and day (earth's rotation), months (moon cycle), seasons and years (earth's orbit).

The way sync appears in the social context (as in syncing behavior of members of a group of organisms) is fascinating... but what's even more fascinating is the feedback loop that develops between Nature and Nurture across many spatiotemporal scales in this view.

Strogatz (Author of "Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos" textbook) on sync:
http://www.ted.com/talks/steven_strogatz_on_sync.html

I have no doubt that the development of language has greatly influenced the Nature of man. That should be a rather uncontroversial statement.

The only question I have at the moment is how we know whether another species has an equally complex and articulate language that we don't happen to comprehend because we weren't raised (socially "encoded") by these species, and once we have an example of someone who is (animal raised feral children) ... we don't understand them (or they us) enough for such an inquiry.

I think dolphins could be such a candidate. While looking at other primates is interesting because we're primates, we tend to forget that all the other species (including other primates) have evolved in parallel with us.

What's particularly motivating for me is that I have experience with wild porpoises (I used to fish commercially) who like to play with humans (no, we don't give them our fish) and have been known to save humans, even. And these aren't even dolphins (who have the second highest brain/body ratio next to humans).

But here's a more expert opinion:

Like most other animals, dolphins do have communication. Their squeals and whistles communicate emotional states and, often, the presence of danger and food in the area. They may also help them coordinate “herding” processes. Dolphin females often act as “midwives” to new mothers, and every dolphin in the pod cares for the others.

But do they communicate linguistically? There’s some evidence for it. Dolphins tend to stay within their own pods, and may have trouble understanding “foreign” dolphins. In studies done on dolphins near Scotland, individuals appear to have names; or at least, other dolphins use specific and unique whistles only in the presence of certain other dolphins, as if calling them by name. Unlike any other animal besides humans, dolphins exhibit a great tendency to take turns when vocalizing – making their communications sound like a conversation.

There have also been very basic linguistic studies of dolphin sound patterns. According to some studies, dolphin sounds follow the same basic patterns of all human-based language, from Morse code to Chinese. Though we cannot understand what they’re saying, it’s not beyond the bounds to state that dolphins may indeed have language, though it’s certainly a language unlike any we know today.

http://www.dolphins-world.com/Dolphin_Language.html
(bolded mine, note: not a scientific study, don't know the author, but summarizes a nature show or two I've seen)

Anyway, my point being that if these findings are accurate, then apeiron's demands might be met by Dolphins:

The animal sense of self would be the completely subjective emboddied form. The point about humans is that we carry around in our heads a second "objective" view of ourselves - the view that society would have of our actions and our existence. Our every emboddied response or impulse is being run through that secondary layer of ideas that is socially evolved.

 

[apeiron]

Anyway, my point being that if these findings are accurate, then apeiron's demands might be met by Dolphins:

I think not. Proper researchers, like Louis Herman at Hawaii's Kewalo Basin Marine Mammal Laboratory, have spent years attempting to teach dolphins to communicate. Like apes, you can get to the level of grammatical fluency of a two year old, but it never takes off like it does in humans. Their brains just aren't wired for speech as we know it.

Dolphins are of course smart and sociable and so have sophisticated calls. But that article you linked to is little over the top.

 

[Pythagorean]

I think not. Proper researchers, like Louis Herman at Hawaii's Kewalo Basin Marine Mammal Laboratory, have spent years attempting to teach dolphins to communicate. Like apes, you can get to the level of grammatical fluency of a two year old, but it never takes off like it does in humans. Their brains just aren't wired for speech as we know it.

Dolphins are of course smart and sociable and so have sophisticated calls. But that article you linked to is little over the top.

Was there a particular claim you wanted to refute from the article?

Animal Communication: Do Dolphins Have Names?
Robert A. Barton
Volume 16, Issue 15, 8 August 2006, Pages R598-R599

Also, recognize from Barton's article...

Although it may be tempting to jump to the most cognitively remarkable and anthropomorphic interpretations consistent with the data, further careful experiments together with objective interpretations of their implications will be paramount.

.. that my point is only that the question deserves more investigation. I'm aware of my tendency to view things anthropomorphically, but on the other side I'm aware that we all share an ancestor.

Also, from you're own reference, Louis Herman:

"Comperehension of sentences by bottlenosed dolphins"
Cognition
Volume 16, Issue 2, March 1984, Pages 129-219

The comprehension approach used was a radical departure from the emphasis on language production in studies of the linguistic abilities of apes; the result obtained offer the first convincing evidence of the ability of animals to process both semantic and syntactic features of sentences. The ability of the dolphins to utilize both their visual and acoustic modalities in these tasks underscored the amodal dependency of the sentence understanding skill.

 

[apeiron]

Was there a particular claim you wanted to refute from the article?

Sorry, where is the bit which says dolphins have a sociocultural sense of self because they have grammatically-structured symbolic speech (rather than being social animals with sophisticated calls)?

 

[Math Is Hard]

Sorry, where is the bit which says dolphins have a sociocultural sense of self because they have grammatically-structured symbolic speech (rather than being social animals with sophisticated calls)?

What does it mean to have a sociocultural sense of self? Does it mean you introspect about your role in a group? About the roles of others in your group?

 

[Pythagorean]

Sorry, where is the bit which says dolphins have a sociocultural sense of self because they have grammatically-structured symbolic speech (rather than being social animals with sophisticated calls)?

I asked you what claim you wanted to refute from the article. Is this response a distraction, a delay, or some sort of cryptic Socratic wisdom? Because I've already addressed this point, which I'll reiterate:

I explicitly questioned whether:

b) the evidence shows that the "because" in your distraction question is worth investigating
c) there is strong evidence for the statements on either side of the "because".

So now I'm confused as to the nature of your question

your counter to b) was:

Louis Herman at Hawaii's Kewalo Basin Marine Mammal Laboratory, have spent years attempting to teach dolphins to communicate. Like apes, you can get to the level of grammatical fluency of a two year old, but it never takes off like it does in humans. Their brains just aren't wired for speech as we know it.

Which I found insufficient as a proof, especially with:

"but it never takes off like it does in humans" (a quantitative statement, where we're discussing quality has no bearing on the discussion).

and:

"Their brains just aren't wired for speech as we know it."

Which is not a rebuttal at all, since you qualified it with "as we know it", which is the point I've made.

 

[apeiron]

What does it mean to have a sociocultural sense of self? Does it mean you introspect about your role in a group? About the roles of others in your group?

It means you step back to see yourself as a self. You have debates about your actions, weighing your personal wants against social constraints. Self-regulation, impulse control, conscience, rebellion, all that kind of stuff.

The Vygotskean view is that language upgrades all mental faculties. So animals recognise, but humans also recollect. Animals anticipate, humans imagine. Animals think, humans also reason. Animals feel, humans have socialised emotions (scripts such as loyalty, bravery, respect). And so on.

The key difference is animals are driven by external contexts. They respond intelligently to the world as it is happening. Or in response only to very simple internal drives/feelings like hunger, lust, lethagy.

Humans can carry around language-encoded and socially evolved contexts. We apply this extra set of constraints "at all times". We are reacting also to inner ideas, independent of what is going on around us.

Psychologists often call this "voluntary" behaviour. Vygotsky explains the mechanism by which humans can act as selves, rather than just simply react as selves.

 

[apeiron]

I asked you what claim you wanted to refute from the article.

You are not making any sense. You asked if you had answered my question, and quoted a passage...

The animal sense of self would be the completely subjective emboddied form. The point about humans is that we carry around in our heads a second "objective" view of ourselves - the view that society would have of our actions and our existence. Our every emboddied response or impulse is being run through that secondary layer of ideas that is socially evolved.

So again, what about the dolphin papers addresses that passage?

And what is it that you are really trying to argue?

That dolphins have speech...of a sort that does not add that extra level of sociocultural evolution and control over mentality that humans enjoy?

Or that dolphins have a human-like mentality...even though they don't have human-type explosive fluency?

My confusion has only been compounded because the caution of your second reference directly contradicted the breezy assurance of the first...

Do these results resolve the controversy over signature whistles? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that there should now be no doubt that dolphins produce individually distinctive whistles that others recognize; but no, in the sense that the cognitive significance of these whistles remains highly uncertain. Janik et al. [8] suggest that signature whistles may be an example of referential communication, the use of a stereotyped signal to refer to things or individuals. This would imply that dolphins, like humans, have names. It is important to be clear, however, that this has not yet been demonstrated. There is a danger of slippage, evident in media coverage of this study (for example, see http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/edinburgh_and_east/4750471.stm) between accepting that dolphins can recognize and copy one another’s whistles, and the notion that they are using these calls to refer to individuals, either themselves or others.

 

[SolidGold]

OK You win. "This Phd guy said it". (Not to mention that the first article was about learning, the visual pathway, and memory and the second article the psychologist explicitly stated that she wasn't sure that monkeys knew we had minds or thoughts) So who is concluding this exactly? And, again, how does this demonstrate the error in Socially-mediated views on psychology?...

How does this demonstrate the error in socially mediated views on psychology? You demonstrated it in your post I quoted.

The first guy, who is accredited, said that this provides some evidence that monkeys can introspect. He came to this conclusion by studying the actual brain.

In the discover magazine, the girl is also accredited by a socially mediated institution, and although perceiving behavior that fitted the empirical definition of "introspect", said she wasn't sure monkeys knew we had minds or thoughts.

However, they obviously they had to not only introspect, which was required for the logical reasoning of their actions, but also had to use empathy to calculate how the guy being stole from would react (or feel) if he was to witness the theft. So they had to introspect on OUR feelings. It wouldn't be unreasonable to say that all feelings are thoughts as well.

It kind of shows how educated people are so locked into this "static" perception of reality as Paulo Freire called it, which is defined only by what they are told, by perceptions that are constructed FOR them by educators, and failing to use their brains to trust or create their own perceptions. It is a very narrow filter that completely disregards one's obvious perceptions.

 

[Pythagorean]

@apeiron

There's no "breezy assurance". I quoted the same exact sentiments from the first paper and have pointed out twice now that it's worth investigating (meaning it's an unanswered question). The second caution you quoted is equivalent:

"but no, in the sense that the cognitive significance of these whistles remains highly uncertain"

Which has been my point from the start "How do we know other animals don't..."

You, on the other hand, seem to be claiming that you already know the answer based on the fact that we can't get them past two-year old human thinking. I don't see how that is an argument, since we don't expect the dolphins biosocial evolution to be the same as ours.

I'm also confused that you recently used this as an argument to support your seemingly anthropocentric stance:

"[dolphin] brains just aren't wired for speech as we know it." (1)

But before were using the argument that primate brains are all practically identical when indicating the social component:

"But generally the findings, in my view, show that there is surprisingly little that is different about human brain architecture." (2)

So my question here is that based on your social motivation for (2) how can you really get behind (1) and suddenly drop the social motivation that seems to be the basis of your stance?

(by the way, I am agreeing with (1) since you've qualified "as we know it" from because "as we know it" is the whole problem with trying to make judgments about phenomenology. The only reason we're comfortable doing that with other humans is because of our similarities, our "as we know it".)

 

[Lievo]

Vygotskean view (...) animals are driven by external contexts. They respond (...) in response only to very simple internal drives/feelings like hunger, lust, lethagy.

Oh boy... Let me make an analogy. Descartes' philosophy of mind is interesting, but it would be ridiculous to defend his view about animals spirits and pineal gland, isn't it?

Vygotsky's views might also be interesting, I don't know, but it would definately be not a reason to defend any single words he said. If I was trying to attack him, as JDstupi turned to believe, it would have been easy to emphasized this outdated view that animals are driven by external context only.

I did not because this view is clearly ridiculous, because assessing it would have been as unfair as attacking Descartes' animal spirits, and most of all because I thought nobody would pretend it's anything but a must-be-forgoten view. But you apeiron seem to defend it, and even to consider it's at the heart of Vygotsky philosophy. Is it really what you think?

 

[JDStupi]

Lievo, Solid gold. I appreciate that you guys are now saying that you are not looking to shoot down the whole thing, nor accept it all. I would be willing to (though I haven't read enough about it) admit that lower animals have some sense of introspection. That said, I don't think it completely discredits all of the Vygotsky perspective. Is it a coincidence that those animals that are highly sociable exhibit the properties closes to what we call a human "self"? Other aspects of the existence of human inner speech wouldn't be completely discredited by new findings about the behavior of chimps. I think that you should (I don't have the time right now) see if you can google Vygotsky's experiments/perspective on ego-centric speech and then you may see where he is coming from. I'm not saying we should follow him like a bible, I just think the social perspective on certain ways of human thought seems as though it could be a promising research direction.

 

[apeiron]

@apeiron

There's no "breezy assurance". I quoted the same exact sentiments from the first paper and have pointed out twice now that it's worth investigating (meaning it's an unanswered question). The second caution you quoted is equivalent:

"but no, in the sense that the cognitive significance of these whistles remains highly uncertain"

Which has been my point from the start "How do we know other animals don't..."

You, on the other hand, seem to be claiming that you already know the answer based on the fact that we can't get them past two-year old human thinking. I don't see how that is an argument, since we don't expect the dolphins biosocial evolution to be the same as ours.

I'm also confused that you recently used this as an argument to support your seemingly anthropocentric stance:

"[dolphin] brains just aren't wired for speech as we know it." (1)

But before were using the argument that primate brains are all practically identical when indicating the social component:

"But generally the findings, in my view, show that there is surprisingly little that is different about human brain architecture." (2)

So my question here is that based on your social motivation for (2) how can you really get behind (1) and suddenly drop the social motivation that seems to be the basis of your stance?

(by the way, I am agreeing with (1) since you've qualified "as we know it" from because "as we know it" is the whole problem with trying to make judgments about phenomenology. The only reason we're comfortable doing that with other humans is because of our similarities, our "as we know it".)

I can't follow your points here at all. Why for instance would I expect dolphin brains to be closely similar to primate brains? Why should I interpret "highly uncertain" as "probably yes"? What do individual calls have to do with introspective self-awareness (do humans run round shouting out their own name as primary evidence that they know who they are )? There is no thread of argument that I can follow.

 

[apeiron]

Oh boy... Let me make an analogy. Descartes' philosophy of mind is interesting, but it would be ridiculous to defend his view about animals spirits and pineal gland, isn't it?

Vygotsky's views might also be interesting, I don't know, but it would definately be not a reason to defend any single words he said. If I was trying to attack him, as JDstupi turned to believe, it would have been easy to emphasized this outdated view that animals are driven by external context only.

I did not because this view is clearly ridiculous, because assessing it would have been as unfair as attacking Descartes' animal spirits, and most of all because I thought nobody would pretend it's anything but a must-be-forgoten view. But you apeiron seem to defend it, and even to consider it's at the heart of Vygotsky philosophy. Is it really what you think?

So an attack that "isn't an attack" that means you can again dodge supplying actual arguments and sources? :zzz:

What do you think the chimps are sitting there thinking about as they laze in the sun an hour after doing the experimenter's test. Tell us something believable and not clearly ridiculous, like that they are mulling over their performance and tactics in the lack of an external context to trigger any thoughts.