Is Consciousness Just the Result of Electrical Activity in Our Brains?

[Rothiemurchus]

The fact that we try to avoid pain is an evolutionary response:avoid pain and usually you avoid serious injury and survive.Pain like any other conscious experience is "real"
in the sense that it has a certain magnitude for a certain time - just like ,for example, the mass of an energetic particle.Pain could just be a propery of matter,like mass, that exists with a certain magnitude for a certain time at a certain place.
I would guess that conscious experiences like pain colours sounds and so on are properties
stitched into the fabric of space whereas things we don't experience consciously like atoms have properties such as charge that can move through space.Dark energy fron the realm of cosmology is a property of space
and so could be associated with consciousness.Because there are many
more dimensions in string theory than just 3 space and 1 time dimension,
I wouldn't be surprised if these extra dimensions are connected to conscious experience which would require at least 5 dimensions - one for each sense.
So I would expect string theory to be the ultimate theory of the cosmos.

 

[RingoKid]

I have reckoned for a while now that

consciousness is a place/dimension we as living entities have the ability to tap into and project onto a fabric of spacetime that then sustains the universe. A collective illusion based on percievable sensory input.

Due to us all being in different times, places, dates of inception and genetic makeup, we experience differently but it all makes up the collective human experience which we feedback into the consciousness domain possibly when we sleep or dream.

It makes it easier for me to think of my dead loved ones still having a consciousness that exists someplace else that i can interact with when my time in this universe is done.

 

[RingoKid]

when you see a light in the distance is it the light hitting your retina or are you projecting a wave of thought towards the light ?

you are conscious of the light but is it consciousness on an absolute reality level of perhaps strings changing to accommodate the movement of the universe and your projection of consciousness on to it or is it just the light traveling as a wave/particle towards you on a superficial reality level that limits our perceptions to the sensory ?

If light and consciousness propagate exclusive of our 4d universe as strings/extra dimensions and we are locked in the system forever the goldfish in our mirrored bowl then how would you know what is "really" moving and what is "really" real if we can only "see" within a limited spectrum and to certain extent ?

 

[babsyco]

Why are you looking to physics to explain consciousness? We don't try to explain why two books tell different stories in terms of the phsyical makeup of particles and their relationships, and why? because the particle makeup is irrelevant to the information they carry. Magic particles is no explanation for consciousness, and as Hypnagogue said, is completely unsupported by scientific data. Linking the extra dimensions of string theory to consciousness? WHY?

Consciousness I think, will be eventually explained by the physiology of the brain, nothing supernatural or phenomenal as far as physics principles go. Why look outside what we know about physics already. We don't explain thoughts or base desires or any 'unconscious' brain activity in terms particle physics, so why do it with consciousness? Of course you COULD say that if it were based on the physiology of the brain then that would mean that it is possible for two identical consciousnesses to exist. To that I say, for anything of substance to be exactly the same as something else, they not only have to share all properties and aspects, but must inhabit the same place at the same time, meaning that a single consciousness cannot inhabit two bodies. Aside from this, the likeliness that two consciousnesses (is that right?) WOULD be the same is ridiculously small, considering that they would have to have the same physical composition down to a tee, and also have to have shared the exact same past in order to have been exposed to the exact same sensory input.

And come on, that's not what was originally meant by the term 'point of view', it wasn't a reference to a certain point in our brain that contains a unique particle bar code for us. It was simply a reference to viewing anything from a particular vantage point that effected what we saw. How can a discussion on consciousness have so little scientific evidence? I think there is more reason to talk about consciousness in terms of information processing-the principle our brains and minds operate on, NOT particle physics. As I said, we don't analyse novels in terms of the particle composition, and why? because those particles are irrelevant to the information carried by the arrangement of letters into words, sentences, etc.

I think there is no reason to think that consciousness is outside the realm of what we know about physics, and all you have to do is look at the rate of advancement of new information processors and how fast what they can accomplish advances, all without any new physics discoveries.

 

[Fliption]

I think there is no reason to think that consciousness is outside the realm of what we know about physics, and all you have to do is look at the rate of advancement of new information processors and how fast what they can accomplish advances, all without any new physics discoveries.

There is quite a bit of philosophical credibility to the idea that physics, as it exists today, CANNOT explain consciousness. The problems of consciousness run much deeper than just "we haven't had time to figure it out yet but soon we'll link it all to effects of the brain."

 

[selfAdjoint]

Yeah, if you talk to the philosophers they tend to agree with that. Meanwhile the research goes on, as if the philosophers had never spoken. It's like a wife trying to get her husband to care about flowered valances over the windows.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Yeah, if you talk to the philosophers they tend to agree with that. Meanwhile the research goes on, as if the philosophers had never spoken. It's like a wife trying to get her husband to care about flowered valances over the windows.

Yes the research goes on, but the research hasn't yet found the secret of consciousness. One needn't be a "philosopher" to observe exceptional events and refrain from assuming a priori what the explanation is.

 

[babsyco]

I know that there are quite a few philosophers who tend to suspect that consciousness will turn out to beyond what we already know of the universe or some other phenomenal cause, but I have to say I'm afraid I (in my infinite and always consistent knowledge-[joke]) disagree with them. I cannot say it WON'T be the case, but I CAN say I have seen absolutely no reason to think it will so far, and doing things like linking it to extra dimensions in string theory doesn't exactly do wonders for the arguments credibility to me, either. What on Earth is the basis for links like that? If you have any sites or books that you think pose the phenomenal argument well, I seriously would love to read them, as I must admit I have been a bit bias to the other side in what I read about consciousness, and could do with a better idea of the phenomenal argument, but I just (in the past) have been put off by what I've seen as unsupported theories.

Thanks, Babsyco.

 

[anuj]

Anyone trying to understand consciousness may have to read a little about the Hindu philosophy. I myself do not understand the meaning of consciousness fully but I do not reject it too just because it is difficult to explain it scientifically. To make our society more progressive, peaceful and prosperous we need both science as well as religion. Science for the materialistic development and religion for the control of our own mind, which if left uncontrolled can turn the benefits of science into great disasters.

This is where I think we need to sit quitely and explore the world within ourself, reason out who are we, me, myself etc. In short explaining consciousness. Recently I came across an article in an Indian newspaper which I found quite interesting. I think, the contributors to this thread may like to read.

Check this site: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/902912.cms

 

[babsyco]

I think you need to look at some of the atrocities that religion has caused before you say that we need it to in some way keep our minds or scientific discovery in check. Beliefs work both ways: cause good and bad.

Thanks, Babsyco.

 

[olde drunk]

Yeah, if you talk to the philosophers they tend to agree with that. Meanwhile the research goes on, as if the philosophers had never spoken. It's like a wife trying to get her husband to care about flowered valances over the windows.

do we have valances over the windows? oh, i hung them? lol

 

[hypnagogue]

doing things like linking [consciousness] to extra dimensions in string theory doesn't exactly do wonders for the arguments credibility to me, either.

I absolutely agree with you on this point. Don't take such wild speculations as representative of the general argument that physicalism can't account for consciousness.

If you have any sites or books that you think pose the phenomenal argument well, I seriously would love to read them, as I must admit I have been a bit bias to the other side in what I read about consciousness, and could do with a better idea of the phenomenal argument, but I just (in the past) have been put off by what I've seen as unsupported theories.

David Chalmers has a number of good papers online about the argument. Check out http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html for starters. Chalmers also has a couple of books on consciousness (The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory and Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem) if you are interested in a more in-depth discussion.

Even if you don't find Chalmers convincing, I would highly recommend Gregg Rosenberg's A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Rosenberg motivates the argument against physicalism differently from Chalmers, and proceeds to develop a metaphysical framework in which experiential consciousness finds a natural place in the order of things. His framework might be regarded as metaphysically extravagant by some, but the manner in which it dissolves many of the seemingly intractable paradoxes surrounding consciousness into a very natural and pleasing picture of nature makes me believe that he's at least on the right track.

 

[Les Sleeth]

A Fallacy in the Physicalist Theory of Consciousness

I know that there are quite a few philosophers who tend to suspect that consciousness will turn out to beyond what we already know of the universe or some other phenomenal cause, but I have to say I'm afraid I . . . disagree with them. . . . (in the past) have been put off by what I've seen as unsupported theories.

A favorite argument is David Chalmers’ zombie analogy and qualia model, which has been discussed at length here in the past. I see Hypnagogue beat me to it, but I’ll give you a site anyway where you can find links to articles both for and against Chalmers’ argument:
http://dmoz.org/Society/Philosophy/Philosophers/C/Chalmers,_David/

Speaking for myself, I am unenthusiastic about physicalist theories of consciousness for other reasons. Leaving my personal experiences out it (which I admit is the main reason for my skepticism), and instead just relying on what is observable by everyone, then I believe at least one physicalist conclusion drawn from observations is what's called in philosophy the fallacy of composition. I’d think this fallacy in physicalist theory would fit your complaint of being “put off by what I've seen as unsupported theories.”

An example one of my philosophy dictionaries gives of the fallacy of composition would be to conclude that because all members of a baseball team are married, the baseball team as a whole therefore must have a wife. I’ve used an artist’s painting in the past to describe the fallacy. It goes something like this:

Say a research probe arrives here from another planet and finds Leonardo da Vinci’s painting of Mona Lisa. The probe takes samples of the paint and analyzes its chemistry; it takes samples of the canvas and records its composition; the probe analyzes the wavelengths of light reflected by the paint; it weighs the painting; it describes how all these factors are interconnected. Finally when every possible measurable factor is listed, it sends a report back to its home planet.

Question: do the planet’s inhabitants fully understand that painting? Has the painting been completely described by its list of components, its chemistry, its physics, and the interrelationships involved in all that? Is it logical to conclude that the whole is solely defined by the parts? This is what physicalist theory is. No more and no less. It is a description of the parts, their relationships, and their functions. That’s why physicalists now say they’ve explained life (ha!), and why they say they will eventually explain consciousness.

But just like that type of description of Leonardo da Vinci’s painting didn’t account for the creative organization present there, so too does physicalist descriptions of consciousness fail to account for why consciousness behaves in creatively organizing ways that are not observed in any non-living physical situation.

Buckminster Fuller once wrote, “Life is antientropic. It is spontaneously inquisitive. It sorts out and endeavors to understand.” Why isn’t consciousness entropic if it is matter-created? Why should survival be so important to matter-created consciousness? Shouldn’t it instead be just like its parent and behave disintegratively? Yet when a consciousness is like that, we consider it unhealthy or even psychopathic.

So I say physicalist theory is just as “unsupported” as supernatural creationist theories or wild mixes of quantum, string, etc. theories to form exotic metaphysics. I believe an unbiased mind must admit we don’t understand what causes the organizational drive and quality found in life and consciousness, and so would be open to the possibility there’s other unrecognized force(s) present in our universe causing that organization and consciousness's desire to manifest it.

 

[hypnagogue]

I'd just like to point out quickly that Les's arguments here aren't representative of kinds of arguments against physicalism given by Chalmers or Rosenberg. That is to say, one can reject Les's above arguments above but still accept the ones put forth by Chalmers/Rosenberg, because they are based on different principles.

I myself do not find anything troublesome for physicalism when it comes to accounting for life, or paintings, or the way a mind functions; I believe that a proper physicalist perspective can answer all of these questions satisfactorily, at least in principle. Nonetheless, I do not believe that any physicalist perspective can even begin to account for experiential consciousness, even in principle.

My objective here isn't to argue against Les, but just to establish the scope and flavor of the problem. The core dilemma (as propounded by Chalmers/Rosenberg) revolves around how we can account for experiential consciousness, and consideration of this dilemma does not entail that life, mind (in the purely physical/functional sense), etc. should also be problematic phenomena for physicalism (although one may find these phenomena problematic for physicalism on different grounds).

 

[Les Sleeth]

I'd just like to point out quickly that Les's arguments here aren't representative of kinds of arguments against physicalism given by Chalmers or Rosenberg. That is to say, one can reject Les's above arguments above but still accept the ones put forth by Chalmers/Rosenberg, because they are based on different principles.

Quite true. I was actually trying to contrast the two approaches.

I myself do not find anything troublesome for physicalism when it comes to accounting for life, or paintings, or the way a mind functions; I believe that a proper physicalist perspective can answer all of these questions satisfactorily, at least in principle.

Well, here we strongly disagree then. I would like to see how you explain the organizational quality found in life and consciousness with physical principles. I've challenged many people here to do it, and no one has yet. If Chalmers were participating here, I'd question him too for conceding to a physicalist theory of life.

Nonetheless, I do not believe that any physicalist perspective can even begin to account for experiential consciousness, even in principle. . . . My objective here isn't to argue against Les, but just to establish the scope and flavor of the problem. The core dilemma (as propounded by Chalmers/Rosenberg) revolves around how we can account for experiential consciousness, and consideration of this dilemma does not entail that life, mind (in the purely physical/functional sense), etc. should also be problematic phenomena for physicalism (although one may find these phenomena problematic for physicalism on different grounds).

I hope it isn't necessary to accept Chalmers and/or Rosenberg as undisputable authorities on how to argue against physicalistic assertions before one can post opinions on consciousness. While I do appreciate and respect your admiration of them, they don't impress me similarly. I'm afraid I perceive them as not empircial enough, and consequently too rationalistic for my tastes. I hope we can agree that each person is free to make his case relying on whatever best suits his predilections.

 

[RingoKid]

If consciousness exists as it must for us to rationalise the universe we live in then where does it exist. Solely in the brain or outside of it ?

I say outside in line with dualist schools of thought. That would make the best candidates for this dimension of consciousness we have so far being wrapped up in every point of 4d spacetime and we by the nature of our vibrational makeup tap into it.

Does a string have to vibrate in all dimensions to have an effect on 4d spacetime ?

No, if it vibrates in any less than our 3, forget time for a minute cos we only want a snapshot, then it probably only registers as an effect like gravity or light/heat.

so why not apply the effect of strings vibrating in an extra dimension of conciousness but not fully in our 4d universe and open up the possibility on a true theory of EVERYTHING ?

I mean neural oscillations in the cerebral cortex; sounds like vibrational string activity when applied to a living entity.

Haven't you ever known something without knowing why or made an intuitive leap without knowing how ? Where does such "knowledge" originate ?..collective memory ?

To me it seem the simplest explanation and in line with current physical speculation especially if we have these extra dimensions anyway. Subjective experience can be accounted for by virtue of no 2 entities being exactly a like due to time and spatial variations at the time of conception.

If consciousness is a "state of awareness" and that state exists physically but not in our 4d universe then it exists elsewhere and can be blanketed to include consciousness/awareness in all multiverse scenarios.

Do to consciousness what big bang does to matter and rewind it back to it's genesis and what do you get, where do you end up and what do you think ?

We experience the universe

If this view is right, then in some ways a theory of consciousness will have more in common with a theory in physics than a theory in biology. Biological theories involve no principles that are fundamental in this way, so biological theory has a certain complexity and messiness to it; but theories in physics, insofar as they deal with fundamental principles, aspire to simplicity and elegance. The fundamental laws of nature are part of the basic furniture of the world, and physical theories are telling us that this basic furniture is remarkably simple. If a theory of consciousness also involves fundamental principles, then we should expect the same. The principles of simplicity, elegance, and even beauty that drive physicists' search for a fundamental theory will also apply to a theory of consciousness.

 

[hypnagogue]

I hope it isn't necessary to accept Chalmers and/or Rosenberg as undisputable authorities on how to argue against physicalistic assertions before one can post opinions on consciousness. While I do appreciate and respect your admiration of them, they don't impress me similarly. I'm afraid I perceive them as not empircial enough, and consequently too rationalistic for my tastes. I hope we can agree that each person is free to make his case relying on whatever best suits his predilections.

Of course, of course. I didn't mean to imply that one couldn't make any other arguments on the matter, and I wasn't interested in critiquing your position here either (otherwise I would have gone into more detail). I apologize if it came off that way. I just wanted to emphasize that the arguments you presented in your post are different from those of Chalmers, in order to make the point that even if one does not accept your arguments, one still may accept theirs, and vice versa.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Of course, of course. I didn't mean to imply that one couldn't make any other arguments on the matter, and I wasn't interested in critiquing your position here either (otherwise I would have gone into more detail). I apologize if it came off that way. I just wanted to emphasize that the arguments you presented in your post are different from those of Chalmers, in order to make the point that even if one does not accept your arguments, one still may accept theirs, and vice versa.

Yes, I should have assumed that. Since you've been here you have been a most charitable sort.

P.S.
Is it just me or have the Smileys been rearranged?

 

[StatusX]

one indication that it may be beyond science is that it is impossible to test, something fundamental to the scientific method. i can make a simple program that simply prints the words "I am conscious." then I could make an advanced AI program that is capable of carrying on a conversation about art or love or something, and then when i ask it if its conscious, it says "I am conscious." is the second program any more conscious than the first?

there is nothing i can say or do that would convince you i am conscious, and yet it is completely obvious to me. if you could scan my brain as i was being asked the question, it is conceivable you would be able to tell that i would say yes, seemingly independent of whether it was actually true. that is to say, there is a place in our brain that we go to for the answer to that question, just like there's a place where we get our height or age if someone asks. so what's different between me and the programs? is consciousness an illusion? if this is the answer science will give us in the end, can we conclude that science was not adequate for that question, or do we accept it?

edit: i took my theory about memory out, i realized it doesn't really address experience.

 

[Canute]

Even if you don't find Chalmers convincing, I would highly recommend Gregg Rosenberg's A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Rosenberg motivates the argument against physicalism differently from Chalmers, and proceeds to develop a metaphysical framework in which experiential consciousness finds a natural place in the order of things. His framework might be regarded as metaphysically extravagant by some, but the manner in which it dissolves many of the seemingly intractable paradoxes surrounding consciousness into a very natural and pleasing picture of nature makes me believe that he's at least on the right track.

I don't know Rosenberg's ideas. Are you able to give a v. quick summary of them?

 

[hypnagogue]

I don't know Rosenberg's ideas. Are you able to give a v. quick summary of them?

It's difficult to give a quick summary (even when explaining it in depth, I've found that sometimes the best recourse is to just direct the reader to the book), but I'll try.

Rosenberg observes that many of the conceptual problems involved with phenomenal conscious revolve around questions of causation (eg interactionism which denies causal closure of the physical, vis a vis epiphenomnalism which denies P-consciousness any causal powers at all, etc.). In order to place consciousness into the natural order in a non-ad hoc way, he re-examines our theories of causality, finds them lacking, and constructs a new one. His new account of causation introduces receptivity, which is roughly a system's capacity to be affected, and characterizes effective causation as an operator of constraint on a given domain of possible states. He develops the theory formally by creating a directed graph notation.

He goes on to argue that physical theory ultimately describes a schema composed of bare differences, and finds such a schema ontologically lacking. In other words, he characterizes physics as an entirely extrinsic theory, and finds extrinsic phenomena to be incoherent in the absence of some kind of bottom-line intrinsic phenomena that can instantiate and realize such extrinsic/schematic relationships. He proposes phenomenal and experiential properties to be the perfect sort of intrinsic candidate to do the job. So he winds up with a panexperientialist theory where physical phenomena are just the set of functional relationships that phenomenal properties engage in.

In elaborating this idea within his detailed theory of causation, he

* assigns P-consciousness causal relevance without slipping into interactionism or epiphenomenalism,
* manages to neatly solve a number of paradoxes surrounding consciousness such as the boundary problem,
* comes to a sort of functionalist view on consciousness that avoids the usual observor-relative and ontological problems associated with it,
* avoids falling into the usual pitfalls associated with panexperientialism/panpsychism,
* and more.

You might also find the following brief summary helpful: http://www.cise.ufl.edu/~anand/html/Rosenberg.html

 

[StatusX]

i have a question for those who think consciousness is beyond the physical: if the physical structure of our brains were exactly the same, but we weren't conscious, wouldn't we still have these discussions? the arguments we are making about experience, how its definition is so elusive, how were sure we have it but can't prove it; all these arguments are coming from our physical brains, and are completely independent of our conscious experience.

there is a place in our brain that is accessed when we are asked if we are conscious. now, either that place is all there is to consciousness, or it is in direct contact with whatever supernatural phenomenon is the real cause.

 

[hypnagogue]

i have a question for those who think consciousness is beyond the physical: if the physical structure of our brains were exactly the same, but we weren't conscious, wouldn't we still have these discussions? the arguments we are making about experience, how its definition is so elusive, how were sure we have it but can't prove it; all these arguments are coming from our physical brains, and are completely independent of our conscious experience.

A very pertinent question. You are essentially invoking the hypothetical philosophical entities called zombies, which are much discussed by both physicalists (eg Dennett) and anti-physicalists (eg Chalmers). My position on this question is that, yes, we would still have the same discussions, because our discussions are driven by physical causal mechanisms. Of course, our discussions would not be meaningful, because we would not really be referring to phenomenal consciousness, since by definition in this thought experiment we would not have it.

there is a place in our brain that is accessed when we are asked if we are conscious. now, either that place is all there is to consciousness, or it is in direct contact with whatever supernatural phenomenon is the real cause.

Depending on your metaphysical outlook, there are subtler points to be raised. For example, in Rosenberg's framework (which I favor) one could say both that this place in the brain is all there is to consciousness and that it is in direct contact with the metaphysical phenomena responsible for consciousness. But we need to make some qualifications. 'This place in the brain' is all there is to consciousness, but a purely physical account of this place in the brain is not all there is to the brain (on Rosenberg's view), so physicalism fails here. And the purely physical structure of the brain is in contact with phenomenal consciousness not in the sense that it is affected by it, but rather in the sense that the physical structure literally is just the effective causal content of the phenomenal consciousness. So these two are directly related in a way that is somewhat analogous to the way that the abstract structure of a building is directly related to the material that instantiates that structure.

 

[Rothiemurchus]

Intrinsic = existing in space AND time
Extrinsic = existing outside of space AND time i.e in space-time.
Consciousness is different to what is regarded as physical reality i.e space-time.
It could just be that there are some particles that don't obey relativity theory
and that this is the only difference between consciousness and the absence of consciousness (tachyons - particles with negative squared mass - are hypothesised to travel faster than light).

 

[hypnagogue]

Intrinsic = existing in space AND time
Extrinsic = existing outside of space AND time i.e in space-time.

That's not what the terms mean, or at least, I've never seen them used this way in philosophy. Nor have I meant them in this way when I've used the terms.

Consciousness is different to what is regarded as physical reality i.e space-time.
It could just be that there are some particles that don't obey relativity theory
and that this is the only difference between consciousness and the absence of consciousness (tachyons - particles with negative squared mass - are hypothesised to travel faster than light).

We've been over this already. The reason physicalism is typically rejected, as in considerations from the 'hard problem' of consciousness, is the argument that no physical mechanism can account for experiential consciousness, even in principle. That critique covers your stipulative law breaking particles as well. Introducing a new set of particles does nothing to advance us on the core of the problem: Why are these particles and their interactions accompanied by experiential consciousness? If you suppose that these new particles have some sort of ad hoc property that magically produces consciousness, you might as well transfer that ad hoc property to the accepted particles.

 

[gerben]

Introducing a new set of particles does nothing to advance us on the core of the problem: Why are these particles and their interactions accompanied by experiential consciousness?

I do not think this is a question that needs to be answered for a scientific understanding. We also do not know the answer to such questions about theories that are supposed to be very successful like:
why do masses attract other masses?

(the following does not matter at all for the philosophical question, but to be more conform with modern physics I should have said something like this: Why do masses curve space-time and why do masses follow geodesics in curved space-time?)

If someone could introduce some particles plus some rules of how these particles behave and then have a system that resembles consciousness that theory would be very welcome

 

[StatusX]

If there was some parellel universe where these zombies lived, they might be able to answer any problem of science, but no matter how hard they try, they'll never understand consciousness. Why? Because it isn't really there for them. It's a "defect" of their brain that they think its there, and no matter how hard you try to convince them otherwise, they'll just say "But I'm looking right now, I see that red apple. Why can't science tell me why red looks the way it does?" It's a really tough problem, because there is really nothing different between us and these zombies, except we presume that we really are consciouss and they aren't.

I think the premise is flawed, and that if there were beings with the exact same physical brain structure as us, we couldn't be different. One possibility is that we are both conscious, and any system whose components interact the way our neurons do, whether its made of protein, silicon, wood, or whatever, would also be conscious. If you were to slowly take pieces of our brain away, somehow still keeping us alive, it seems that our consciousness would in some sense fade away gradually. If a retarted human had the same basic brain structure as a chimpanzee, how could one be conscious and not the other? So basically what I'm saying is, all animals with brains would be conscious, to some degree. Maybe other systems would be too. I read that article by Chalmers, and his idea that a thermostat could have some extremely simple form of consciousness is appealing physically, because it doesn't resort to the religious idea that life is anything other than a collection of atoms obeying physical laws (his idea simply altering these laws slightly), but its hard to swallow.

The other possibility is that there is no consciousness. This is hard to accept, obviously, since in a way, our own consciousness is the only thing we truly do know (although, remember: "knowing" is a physical process of our brain). And yet, the zombies argument show that any system like us would behave the same way, independent of whether it was conscious. We could, like the zombies, spend hundreds of years searching futilely for something that isn't there. In other words, consciousness isn't something fundamental to the universe or outside physics, it is simply a biological property that we have a hard time dealing with because we can't get "outside the system."

It's also interesting to note that, presumably, everything about the world can be explained purely by the physical methods we have now (or will soon possess, once a unified theory is formed), except consciousness. We can, in principle, start from the laws of quantum mechanics and work all the way to explain why we have philosophical debates about the nature of consciousness. But consciousness itself would remain unexplained. On the other hand, maybe a unified theory will not fall into place until we accept consciousness as something fundamental and work towards incorporating it into a true theory of everything.

Damn, how many times did I say conscious? Is there another word I could use?

 

[RingoKid]

If someone could introduce some particles plus some rules of how these particles behave and then have a system that resembles consciousness that theory would be very welcome

I think we should call them "imagyons" and they need a place to exist for a start like a different dimension, the system is us and the universe in general, the particles behave according to observation of the human race across a broad spectrum taking into account cultural, geograhical and spatio temporal differences.

I and others here really should put in the legwork to develop the idea and help the rest of the planet get up to speed so we can move onwards and upwards.

It would be simple, elegant and beautiful. Noble values to aspire to

peace

 

[Canute]

StatusX

... since in a way, our own consciousness is the only thing we truly do know (although, remember: "knowing" is a physical process of our brain). And yet, the zombies argument show that any system like us would behave the same way, independent of whether it was conscious.

I agree that our own consciousness is all we can know for certain. But on what evidence do you say that knowing is a physical process of our brains? By assuming that this true you are in effect assuming that consciousness is caused by brains, which is exactly what we are not yet able to prove.

Also the zombie argument shows us nothing at all about the nature of consciousness. It would show us a lot about it if we ever came across a real zombie, but as yet they are hypothetical creatures, so we cannot deduce anything about consciousness from their hypothetical existence, any more than we can from their hypothetical non-existence.

 

[StatusX]

I agree that our own consciousness is all we can know for certain. But on what evidence do you say that knowing is a physical process of our brains? By assuming that this true you are in effect assuming that consciousness is caused by brains, which is exactly what we are not yet able to prove.

Everything about the brain that can affect the physical world can be explained by physical laws. This is just an assumption, but I think its probably true, because anything that affects the physical world can be experimentally tested. This includes our ability to know, remember, speak, see, etc. When I talk about consciousness, I mean the subjective experience of what its like to be you, to see red, to feel happiness. This is something fundamentally different than anything science has explained in the past, becuase it is not a functional relation between things, but an absolute. For example, quantum mechanics explains how one measurement relates to another one, but it doesn't explain what an electron is. Consciousness needs to be explained as what it is, not what it does.

Just to be clear, when I say knowing is a physical function of the brain that can be explained by physical laws, I don't mean the subjective experience of what its like to know something. I mean that, in principle, if you could scan someones brain with sufficient accuracy and you had a sufficient understanding of neurobiology (both of which are probably at least a hundred years away), then you could derive everything that this person knows. This includes his opinion that he is a conscious being. However, these facts alone do not describe what its like to have this knowledge

Also the zombie argument shows us nothing at all about the nature of consciousness. It would show us a lot about it if we ever came across a real zombie, but as yet they are hypothetical creatures, so we cannot deduce anything about consciousness from their hypothetical existence, any more than we can from their hypothetical non-existence.

The fact is, zombies are something we can conceive of, so there is at least the possibility that they could exist. This is very important if you think about what a zombie would be like. They could discover every physical law succesfully, just like us. They would try to explain consciousness, just like us. But no matter how hard they tried, they couldn't, because its not really there. There is nothing you could say to convince them they aren't really conscious. They could describe what it's like to be conscious just as well as you could. Basically what I'm saying is, there is at least the possibility that we are zombies, and that there is no such thing as consciousness.

Another possible take you can have on the zombies is that they couldn't really exist, even hypothetically. In this view, anything that has the physical properties of our brain must also have consciousness. Now these are both materialist views, so if you disagree with materialism, then you will have a different opinion. But it is entirely possible, and very common, for a non-materialist to still think that every functional property of the brain can be explained by physical laws, so that isn't where the argument breaks down.

 

[anuj]

To understand consciousness, we first need to understand how do we ourself work. Human brain is that biological body part which drives our life with the feedback received from other sensor organs such as nose, tongue, eye, ear and sensation received from skin. The body as a whole trains itself with experience from the surroundings/ environment.

Our life starts as soon as we are born. I presume we are born with zero thoughts in our mind (empty memory cells). Is it posible to figure out what a newly born baby would be thinking after his birth. Because this is the least disturbed state of human mind and more closer to an attempt to understand what is consciousness.

 

[hitssquad]

Our life starts as soon as we are born.

Apparently not.

 

[anuj]

Apparently not.

If the life (the thought activity of our brain) does not start with its birth, we need to know at what stage it starts. I mean the evolution of our thought process starting from zero thought in the begining.

 

[Canute]

Everything about the brain that can affect the physical world can be explained by physical laws. This is just an assumption,...

I don't see that as an assumption. By definition the operation of the physical brain can be explained by physical laws.

but I think its probably true, because anything that affects the physical world can be experimentally tested. This includes our ability to know, remember, speak, see, etc.

Now that's what I call an assumption.

Consciousness needs to be explained as what it is, not what it does.

I agree completely. However it's a tricky one. According to most scientists it doesn't do anything at all, so studying what it does is not possible. Unfortunately scientifically-speaking it's existence has not yet been verified, so studying what it is is also a problem.

Just to be clear, when I say knowing is a physical function of the brain that can be explained by physical laws, I don't mean the subjective experience of what its like to know something.

Is it possible for ones brain to know something that one is not subjectively aware of knowing, and for which there is nothing that it is like to know it? That seems unlikely to me.

I mean that, in principle, if you could scan someones brain with sufficient accuracy and you had a sufficient understanding of neurobiology (both of which are probably at least a hundred years away), then you could derive everything that this person knows. This includes his opinion that he is a conscious being. However, these facts alone do not describe what its like to have this knowledge.

Facts? If you could prove anything you've said in this para. your name would go down in neuroscience's hall of fame.

The fact is, zombies are something we can conceive of, so there is at least the possibility that they could exist.

This is a sort of ontological argument for zombies. Unfortunately it doesn't work for zombies any better than it does for God. Personally I can't conceive of a zombie, as defined by philosophers, without abandoning my reason, something I'm not prepared to do. They are a useful concept in some thought experiments, but a zombie would never report that there is 'something that it is like' to feel pain, while human beings do so all the time. I'd say this shows that an unconscious entity would not and could not behave like a human being.

This is very important if you think about what a zombie would be like. They could discover every physical law succesfully, just like us. They would try to explain consciousness, just like us.

Why would they try to explain something that for them does not exist?

But no matter how hard they tried, they couldn't, because its not really there. There is nothing you could say to convince them they aren't really conscious.

If one is not conscious one cannot be convinced of anything at all, let alone that one is not conscious. To be convinced one has to be conscious. Try convincing your PC that it isn't conscious. You have to be very careful with zombie arguments, it's very easy to be led astray.

They could describe what it's like to be conscious just as well as you could.

Doesn't it seem rather unlikely that an entity that is not conscious could describe what it like to be conscious as well as an entity that is conscious?

Basically what I'm saying is, there is at least the possibility that we are zombies, and that there is no such thing as consciousness.

Are you sure about this? Why does being awake feel different to being asleep?

Another possible take you can have on the zombies is that they couldn't really exist, even hypothetically. In this view, anything that has the physical properties of our brain must also have consciousness.

I'm afraid your conclusion doesn't follow from your premise here. It is quite possible for someone to believe that a zombie is an incoherent concept while not believing that consciousness is simply a property of brains.

 

[StatusX]

I don't see that as an assumption. By definition the operation of the physical brain can be explained by physical laws.
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Now that's what I call an assumption.

Those are all processes that can affect the physical world. You have to understand the difference between the subjective experience of a function and the function itself. The easiest way to understand this is by asking, what do you know about another person that you haven't inferred about them under the assumption they are just like you? You know they know things, since you can ask a question and get an intelligent reply. You know they can see, because you can throw a punch at them and theyll try to duck. You know they can speak, because you hear them. For this information to get from them to you, it had to affect the physical world, and so all these functions are physical. However, you don't know they have an experience of these things. That you infer because you assume all humans are like you.

Your whole argument seems to rest on this, so let me just make it clear. Someone asks you: "Are you conscious right now?" This rattles your eardrum, and makes neurons begin firing. This starts a chain reaction that goes into your cerebrum where, due to its physical structure, a new signal is sent to your vocal cords to make the sound "yes." At every point in this process, the operation is physical, and there is no reason to doubt that every step will one day be explained by conventional science, just like digestion or circulation is now.(I know these aren't completely understood, but hopefully you get my point) Your conscious experience during this time is a sort of side effect, and would not affect the results of an experiment.

It basically comes down to this: Do you think an artificial intelligence program could, in principle, behave exactly like a human? Maybe our technology will never get there, but is it physically possible? If you don't, then you think there is something about the brain that is nonphysical besides consciousness, and you'll have to explain what it is. If you do, then you can understand why this could be a realizable example of a zombie.

Is it possible for ones brain to know something that one is not subjectively aware of knowing, and for which there is nothing that it is like to know it? That seems unlikely to me.
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Facts? If you could prove anything you've said in this para. your name would go down in neuroscience's hall of fame.
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This is a sort of ontological argument for zombies. Unfortunately it doesn't work for zombies any better than it does for God. Personally I can't conceive of a zombie, as defined by philosophers, without abandoning my reason, something I'm not prepared to do. They are a useful concept in some thought experiments, but a zombie would never report that there is 'something that it is like' to feel pain, while human beings do so all the time. I'd say this shows that an unconscious entity would not and could not behave like a human being.
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Why would they try to explain something that for them does not exist?
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If one is not conscious one cannot be convinced of anything at all, let alone that one is not conscious. To be convinced one has to be conscious. Try convincing your PC that it isn't conscious. You have to be very careful with zombie arguments, it's very easy to be led astray.
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Doesn't it seem rather unlikely that an entity that is not conscious could describe what it like to be conscious as well as an entity that is conscious?
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Are you sure about this? Why does being awake feel different to being asleep?

Everything this zombie says is, as I described before, a consequence of his total physical brain structure. If a being had the exact same brain structure, it would respond to the same stimuli the same way. This includes any questions about consciousness. When we argue about consciousness, it is our physical brains that read the arguments, access memories and logically analyze ideas for counterarguments, and control our fingers to type a response. During all of this, yes, we are aware. But a thrid party could not know this, and it is not logically necessary that we be conscious during any of it. I don't mean we could do it in our sleep, because our physical brain state would be radically different. I mean even a zombie could do it.

In particular, your argument that a non-conscious being couldn't be convinced of anything is very weak. Yea, your computer couldn't be convinced of anything anymore than a hamster or a piece of toast could. They don't have the physical cognitive structure. It has nothing to do with consciousness. You could imagine a very intelligent but non-conscious AI program which is programmed to think it is conscious. It could be convinced of plenty of things, but you would have a hard time convincing it that it isn't conscious.

Just as another example: a zombie would know the difference between wake and sleep because his brain would be in a different state, and his behavior would be different. When he woke up, he would also have written in his memory that he was recently sleeping, and could tell us that. Consciousness is not necessary, and would not change anything we could observe about him.

I'm afraid your conclusion doesn't follow from your premise here. It is quite possible for someone to believe that a zombie is an incoherent concept while not believing that consciousness is simply a property of brains.

I mentioned that. These are the two possible materialist viewpoints. Materialism is the view that the physical properties of something completely describe it. That is, two systems that are physically identical can't be different in any possible way.