What Is the Nature of Consciousness and Its Distinction from Awareness?

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The discussion centers on the nature of consciousness, exploring its definition, its presence in humans and other animals, its origins, and the differences between conscious and non-conscious beings. Participants express varying views on whether consciousness is unique to humans or shared with other animals, particularly mammals like dogs, which exhibit complex behaviors suggesting awareness. The conversation touches on the mirror test as a measure of self-awareness, with some arguing that failing this test does not equate to a lack of consciousness. The role of the brain in consciousness is debated, with references to the thalamo-cortical network as crucial for conscious experience. The concept of blindsight is introduced, illustrating that intelligent behavior does not always indicate consciousness. Participants also discuss the implications of defining consciousness and the challenges of understanding it in non-human entities, emphasizing that consciousness may exist on a spectrum influenced by sensory processing and environmental interactions. Overall, the dialogue reflects a deep inquiry into the complexities of consciousness across different life forms, highlighting both scientific and philosophical dimensions.
  • #31
Originally posted by hypnagogue
recieving information from its environment via some kind of sense mechanism: cell membranes can 'detect' molecules in the immediate environment via protein gates, receptors, etc. on the cell membrane as well as on the surface of the nucleus. Also, there is sensitivity to hormones/neurotransmitters/etc. in order to 'communicate' with other cells.

means to process that information: protein transport systems to get the desired molecules into and out of the cell nucleus/membrane

something that we might call a "brain": DNA/RNA

ability to formulate a deliberate response: the functioning of the entire cell, as guided by the DNA/RNA, to detect and take in desired molecules and process/excrete molecules as needed
Given all this, I think you are correct to assert cells of the body can be fit into my criteria.
I ought, therefore to adopt them into the range of things I think need to be examined under the suspicion of having consciousness, but for some reason I can't pinpoint right now I don't suspect them. I'm going to have to think about this and try to figure out why.
Why can't all the individual brains be added to make a big 'meta brain'? Isn't this analogous to how neurons, populations of neurons, nuclei, lobes, etc converge to create the brain?
The analogy would work if such a thing ever happened in Nature. In fact there doesn't seem to be any mechanism hereby this could be accomplished. People aren't designed such that the remarkable coordination of imput, informaion processing, and decision making that happens in an individual's brain ever happens when more than one individual is involved. What is the means whereby you and I could "add" our brains together to become a third, greater consciousness? We can become better and better at sharing information but we would always remain two distinct individuals, hampered by communications gaps that two neurons wouldn't have to deal with (Or if they did, would go into a seizure.)
As Monique pointed out, we do get things like law making bodies, law enforcing bodies, etc. that act like an emergent 'consciousness' of the society,
A loose analogy can be made, but it is quicky rendered specious if you try to push it over into actually meaning society can develop a consciousness that is literally the sum of the individual consciousnesses that exist in the society.
I don't see how the comparison must break down, given the criteria you gave.
We discovered we're pretty much in agreement that consciousness is dependent on the existence of a "brain". If, by my criteria, I am put in the position of having to grant consciousness to each individual cell of the human body, it still doesn't follow that a human's consciousness results from the combined consciousness of all the cells. They would remain individually conscious. The greater consciousness that a human individual possesses is still generated by the dedicated tissues of the Thalamus, and is completely independent of any awareness the hypothetically aware individual cell possesses.

"...So what is it that is responsible for deliberate behavior, such that we can say a mechanistic human or paramecium acts deliberately but a falling apple does not?"
This is a fine can o' worms. This is definately another point where my criteria have outlived their usefullness as a conversational focal point. They need revision.
Actually I think this is an important work for anyone who is interested in consciousness to read thoroughly:
I will take a look at it.

I'm actually more interested in the thalamo-cortical network because it holds the promise of more purely scientific information about consciousness. What is it about the way its cells are constructed and linked and behave that gives rise to what we call consciousness? What part does the
EM field generated when a neuron fires play in consciousess, if any?

If you haven't already read it I think you will be surprised by some of the stuff found at the link I put in my first post in this thread.

-Zooby
 
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  • #32
Originally posted by sage
so what exactly happens if the thalamo cortical region is damaged?
There will be a total or partial defect in consciousness. The exact nature of the problem is dependent on the exact nature of the damage.

Whenever seizure activity reaches this circuit the is always a total loss of consciousness. This happens in Tonic-Clonic seizures, Atonic seizures, and Absence seizures. In these cases there need be no damage in this circuit.
Just the fact of the seizure activity getting into that circuit completely interrupts consciousness.

Absence seizures are of particular interest here because they represent a situation where consciousness seems to be the one and only thing affected by the seizure activity. There is no muscular involvement, no autonomic involvement. All that happens is that the person's consciousness is suddenly shut off like a light switch for a few seconds or less.
They just stop moving and stare blankly. When it comes back on they feel briefly confused, realize they've lost their train of thought, and that something is not Kosher.
does this region exists in other animals.
It was discovered in animals before it's existence in humans was confirmed. I believe the common cow was the first animal in which the thalamus was discovered.
 
  • #33
Originally posted by zoobyshoe
The analogy would work if such a thing ever happened in Nature. In fact there doesn't seem to be any mechanism hereby this could be accomplished. People aren't designed such that the remarkable coordination of imput, informaion processing, and decision making that happens in an individual's brain ever happens when more than one individual is involved. What is the means whereby you and I could "add" our brains together to become a third, greater consciousness? We can become better and better at sharing information but we would always remain two distinct individuals, hampered by communications gaps that two neurons wouldn't have to deal with (Or if they did, would go into a seizure.)
It seems funny to me that a nation cannot represent a conciousness, but a cell CAN.

Zooby, could you tell us a little more about your background so that I know where you are coming from? I am a biochemist studying cell biology, if you wondered.
 
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  • #34
Originally posted by Monique
It seems funny to me that a nation cannot represent a conciousness, but a cell CAN.
Ah, but if you read what I said in my response to Hypnagogue you will see that I'm not willing to grant consciousness to the cell. I am merely maintaining that the single celled organism, which is something different than "the cell", should not be dismissed as unconscious because it seems too simply constructed to have a consciousness. The reason I maintain this is that we don't know enough about how the cells of the thalamus work to generate consciousness, to say that an amoeba cannot be conscious.

Now, I'm confused about what you're saying about nations. I thought earlier you claimed that nations actually possesses some kind of collective consciousness. Now you merely seem to be saying the way a nation works can be used as an analogy for consciousness.

Zooby, could you tell us a little more about your background so that I know where you are coming from? I am a biochemist studying cell biology, if you wondered.
In college I majored in theater. I have never had any physics, biology, chemistry, math, or other "science" education past the general science class I had my second year of high school. I didn't have the least interest in physics until I was about 30. I am extremely interested in the brain and neurological disorders which started when I got interested in Oliver Sack's books and have followed many trains of literature on this subject.
 
  • #35
Good work, you sound very knowledgeble :)
 
  • #36
Originally posted by sage
how can one objectively distinguish between an entity that is both intelligent and conscious and another who is intelligent but unconscious? unless such a demarcation between conscious intelligent and unconscious intelligent behavior can be made it seems doubtful whether one can ascertain whether other animals are conscious or not. for example imagine an animal who looks all the world like us humans and at least as intelligent but does not have consciousness. how would its behavior differ from us. or is intelligence and conscioussness dependant on each other and one cannot have one without the other? your views

You cannot have intelligence without consciousness. If you are not conscious of anything, you have nothing to think about, and you must think about something in order to be intelligent (since intelligence is a measure of ability in thinking).
 
  • #37
It seems to me that the distinction between self-consciousness and overall awareness has not been made clearly yet.

Only sentient and subsentient beings are known to be self-conscious. Self-consciousness is the knowledge of "what it's like to be me".

Consciousness altogether (which is the same thing as "awareness") is an entirely different matter. Simple, unconscious, reactions are a sign of some measure of awareness (=consciousness) but not of self-consciousness.
 
  • #38
Another thing I don't think has been covered nearly enough is the issue of "thought".

People speak of "pictures in the mind" or "subjective qualia", but this betrays a scientific method of understanding the brain for one that is either Idealistic (which introduces non-physical attributes) or infinitely regressive (the homunculan problem that I've discussed at some length in the Philosophy forum).

What I'm basically saying is that a truly scientific theory of higher consciousness is a truly Materialistic one, and must thus explain "thought" and proaction in terms of (and only) in terms of electrochemical activity in the brain.

P.S. By "higher consciousness", I mean consciousness at the level of (at least) semi-sentient beings.
 
  • #39
Originally posted by Mentat
Simple, unconscious, reactions are a sign of some measure of awareness (=consciousness) but not of self-consciousness.

So unconscious reactions are conscious? :wink:

Consciousness entails qualia-- the subjective experience of something. Unconscious reactions may indicate responsiveness to the environment, but equating responsiveness with consciousness is a confounding of terms. Any physical motion, really, can be said to be a simple reaction to a "stimulus," but clearly we reserve the term "consciousness" to mean something more than this. Again, for something to be conscious, it must be "like something" to be that thing.
 
  • #40
'Thoughts' and 'things' are names for two sorts of object, which common sense will always find contrasted and will always practically oppose to each other. Philosophy, reflecting on the contrast, has varied in the past in her explanations of it, and may be expected to vary in the future. At first, 'spirit and matter,' 'soul and body,' stood for a pair of equipollent substances quite on a par in weight and interest. But one day Kant undermined the soul and brought in the transcendental ego, and ever since then the bipolar relation has been very much off its balance. The transcendental ego seems nowadays in rationalist quarters to stand for everything, in empiricist quarters for almost nothing. In the hands of such writers as Schuppe, Rehmke, Natorp, Munsterberg -- at any rate in his earlier writings, Schubert-Soldern and others, the spiritual principle attenuates itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition, being only a name for the fact that the 'content' of experience is known. It loses personal form and activity - these passing over to the content -- and becomes a bare Bewusstheit or Bewusstsein überhaupt of which in its own right absolutely nothing can be said.

I believe that 'consciousness,' when once it has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether. It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy. During the past year, I have read a number of articles whose authors seemed just on the point of abandoning the notion of consciousness,[1] and substituting for it that of an absolute experience not due to two factors. But they were not quite radical enough, not quite daring enough in their negations. For twenty years past I have mistrusted 'consciousness' as an entity; for seven or eight years past I have suggested its non-existence to my students, and tried to give them its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience. It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded.

To deny plumply that 'consciousness' exists seems so absurd on the face of it -- for undeniably 'thoughts' do exist -- that I fear some readers will follow me no farther. Let me then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function. There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked. That function is knowing. 'Consciousness' is supposed necessary to explain the fact that things not only are, but get reported, are known. Whoever blots out the notion of consciousness from his list of first principles must still provide in some way for that function's being carried on.
 
  • #41
Originally posted by Mentat
It seems to me that the distinction between self-consciousness and overall awareness has not been made clearly yet.
It seems to me that it would be better to use the term "self-awareness" because "self-consciousness" has a negative connotation.
[B}Only sentient and subsentient beings are known to be self-conscious. Self-consciousness is the knowledge of "what it's like to be me".[/B]
What definition are you using for sentience here? What would be an example of a "sub-sentient" state?

Consciousness altogether (which is the same thing as "awareness") is an entirely different matter. Simple, unconscious, reactions are a sign of some measure of awareness (=consciousness) but not of self-consciousness.
I have the same problem with this as Hypnagogue. That which is unconscious is, by definition, not conscious. It can be sophisticated and appropriate to the situation, but if it is unconscious it is not an example of consciousness. Take for instance the autonomic functions. Extremely sophisticated and reactive to the environment, but no consicousness involved. You can do it in your sleep.
 
  • #42
Originally posted by Jeebus
'Thoughts' and 'things' are names for two sorts of object, which common sense will always find contrasted and will always practically oppose to each other. Philosophy, reflecting on the contrast, has varied in the past in her explanations of it, and may be expected to vary in the future. At first, 'spirit and matter,' 'soul and body,' stood for a pair of equipollent substances quite on a par in weight and interest. But one day Kant undermined the soul and brought in the transcendental ego, and ever since then the bipolar relation has been very much off its balance. The transcendental ego seems nowadays in rationalist quarters to stand for everything, in empiricist quarters for almost nothing. In the hands of such writers as Schuppe, Rehmke, Natorp, Munsterberg -- at any rate in his earlier writings, Schubert-Soldern and others, the spiritual principle attenuates itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition, being only a name for the fact that the 'content' of experience is known. It loses personal form and activity - these passing over to the content -- and becomes a bare Bewusstheit or Bewusstsein überhaupt of which in its own right absolutely nothing can be said.

I believe that 'consciousness,' when once it has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether. It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy. During the past year, I have read a number of articles whose authors seemed just on the point of abandoning the notion of consciousness,[1] and substituting for it that of an absolute experience not due to two factors. But they were not quite radical enough, not quite daring enough in their negations. For twenty years past I have mistrusted 'consciousness' as an entity; for seven or eight years past I have suggested its non-existence to my students, and tried to give them its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience. It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded.

To deny plumply that 'consciousness' exists seems so absurd on the face of it -- for undeniably 'thoughts' do exist -- that I fear some readers will follow me no farther. Let me then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function. There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked. That function is knowing. 'Consciousness' is supposed necessary to explain the fact that things not only are, but get reported, are known. Whoever blots out the notion of consciousness from his list of first principles must still provide in some way for that function's being carried on.
What's the source of this post Jeebus? Please share it with us. What paper is reference [1]?
 
  • #43
Originally posted by Mentat People speak of "pictures in the mind" or "subjective qualia", but this betrays a scientific method of understanding the brain for one that is either Idealistic (which introduces non-physical attributes) or infinitely regressive (the homunculan problem that I've discussed at some length in the Philosophy forum).
The syntax in this sentence is not firing on all four cylinders. I don't know what it means
What I'm basically saying is that a truly scientific theory of higher consciousness is a truly Materialistic one, and must thus explain "thought" and proaction in terms of (and only) in terms of electrochemical activity in the brain.
The way this thread stands so far, you're preaching to the choir.

By "higher consciousness", I mean consciousness at the level of (at least) semi-sentient beings.
Again, I'm not sure what a "semi-sentient" being is.We haven't really come up with an agreement on what constitutes consciousness such that we can say Koko the gorilla is conscious and explain why. (We in this thread, I mean.)
 
  • #45
Not to change the direction of the thread, but as I started reading I began to wonder if people in a catatonic state would be considered 'conscious'? They seem to not be conscious of occurances surrounding them, but what of internal consciousness? What are they conscious OF? Do they think anything at all?
 
  • #46
Originally posted by Tsunami
Not to change the direction of the thread, but as I started reading I began to wonder if people in a catatonic state would be considered 'conscious'? They seem to not be conscious of occurances surrounding them, but what of internal consciousness? What are they conscious OF? Do they think anything at all?
Did you ever see "Awakenings" With Robert DeNiro and Robin Williams? It was based on a book by Oliver Sacks, which was the account of his actual experiences with trying L-Dopa on these patients. They were not catatonic as such (I can't remember the name of their neurological diagnosis) but behaved the same way, for all intents and purposes. When the L-Dopa "woke" them they reported they were perfectly conscious the whole time. What that means is that it is perfectly possible that catatonic people are also totally conscious.
 
  • #47
Originally posted by Tsunami
Not to change the direction of the thread, but as I started reading I began to wonder if people in a catatonic state would be considered 'conscious'? They seem to not be conscious of occurances surrounding them, but what of internal consciousness? What are they conscious OF? Do they think anything at all?

It's possible. There's no way of knowing for sure, as it stands right now. You could always ask someone who has been in a coma and come out of it eventually. But this too is problematic. If the person answers yes, we can't immediately rule out that he believes he was somehow conscious but actually wasn't, and only thinks he was due to some 'mixing up' in the brain due to coma-related damage. Likewise, if he answers no, then it is possible that he was somehow conscious during his coma, but simply has no memory of it.

There is really no objective measure of consciousness-- we can only take behavioral hints and make our best guess at it. Whether there will someday be an accurate objective measure of consciousness is an open question.

As for the question, "what would a person in a coma be conscious OF?" I think it is worth noting that there need not necessarily be a specific 'content' of consciousness for there to exist some form of consciousness. For instance, the entire goal of most meditation practices is to achieve a state of consciousness that is free of any specific 'content,' other than perhaps consciousness of consciousness itself.
 
  • #48
Originally posted by zoobyshoe
Did you ever see "Awakenings" With Robert DeNiro and Robin Williams? It was based on a book by Oliver Sacks, which was the account of his actual experiences with trying L-Dopa on these patients. They were not catatonic as such (I can't remember the name of their neurological diagnosis) but behaved the same way, for all intents and purposes. When the L-Dopa "woke" them they reported they were perfectly conscious the whole time. What that means is that it is perfectly possible that catatonic people are also totally conscious.
Yes, I saw the movie (quite excellent, I thought), but since they weren't true catatonics, it didn't really answer the full question. Guess I'll need to do some serious research on catatonia for a full answer. Wish there were 36 hours in a day...:wink:
Hypnagogue, do you know of any true catatonics that have ever 'come out of it'?
 
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  • #49
Tsunami, I've heard phrases such as "he was in a coma for 6 months before he snapped out of it" fairly often (as often as one could expect to hear that, at least), but I don't have any specific knowledge about that sort of thing. Maybe some of our biology friends can help us out. :smile:
 
  • #50
Originally posted by hypnagogue
Tsunami, I've heard phrases such as "he was in a coma for 6 months before he snapped out of it" fairly often (as often as one could expect to hear that, at least), but I don't have any specific knowledge about that sort of thing. Maybe some of our biology friends can help us out. :smile:
But coma and catatonia are not the same, as far as I know. Guess I'll research it out myself. Didn't mean to hijack this thread...
SORRY! Back to business...
 
  • #51
Tsunami, you're quite right.

Hypnagogue, you are confusing coma and catatonia. They are two separate things. Do a little search on catatonia and the difference will soon be clear.
 
  • #52
Originally posted by zoobyshoe
Tsunami, you're quite right.

Hypnagogue, you are confusing coma and catatonia. They are two separate things. Do a little search on catatonia and the difference will soon be clear.
Unfortunately, there is a rock band called Catatonia. That's all I get. Even when I do Mental Health + Catatonia I get zippo. I'll keep trying...

edit: I found some stuff. I'll get back to you... Should we start another thread and let these nice biology folks have theirs back?

edit#2: from this website, http://www.healthatoz.com/healthatoz/Atoz/ency/catatonia.html
it would appear that there is still consciousness involved with either type of catatonia. If I find out differently, I'll start another thread. This is also a good one (although it has a poor choice for a name ) http://www.nuts.cc/prob/schizophrenia.html
 
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  • #53
Here you go:

Catatonic Schizophrenia
Address:http://www.behavenet.com/capsules/disorders/catschiz.htm
 
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  • #54
Ah yes, I see how I was confusing the two now.

As far as coming out of catatonia, one of the links Tsunami posted states that "Catatonia usually responds quickly to medication interventions." So there are at least some cases where one can be in a catatonic state but not permanently. In those cases you can simply ask recovered catatonic patients whether or not they were conscious during their states of catatonia. (Zooby's reference to 'Awakenings' seems to imply that at least some of them were.) Whether or not these results can be generalized to all bouts of catatonia is uncertain.
 
  • #55
The patients in "Awakenings" were not catatonic. They had some neurological disorder (whose name escapes me) that had similar symptoms, that's all. These people were conscious of what was going on around them.

I brought this up simply to point ou that people can seem unconscious due to unresponsiveness but still be lucidly conscious. I was saying that, since this was the case with the "awakenings" disease, it might also apply to catatonic people.

More research on catatonia would probably uncover what someone who had been in that state reported it to be like. What occurred to me on finding that it is called "Catatonic Schizophrenia" is that the people suffering from it could be in an altered state of consciousness - hallucinations.
 
  • #56
I have a pretty good handle on it now. Thanks, guys!
 
  • #57
Originally posted by Mentat
It seems to me that the distinction between self-consciousness and overall awareness has not been made clearly yet.

Only sentient and subsentient beings are known to be self-conscious. Self-consciousness is the knowledge of "what it's like to be me".

Consciousness altogether (which is the same thing as "awareness") is an entirely different matter. Simple, unconscious, reactions are a sign of some measure of awareness (=consciousness) but not of self-consciousness.

but as i said, a dog or a cat can see its body. so it can detect its own existence(can it?views). you say a animal not self-conscious do not know what it is like to be itself. so what is it like to be human? i am stumped. what about everyone here.
note-this thread is strictly scientific. we accept(i hope) that consciousness is a biologically derived phenomenon. so you need not worry about that.

observation- everyone is pretty muddled with such words like consciousness, awareness, selfconsciousness, sentience etc. i think we should affix their meanings first lest we get bogged down with semantics.
 

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