What Lies Beyond the Limits of Consciousness?

[Loren Booda]

What is beyond consciousness?

 

[hypnagogue]

Could you be more specific? The question as currently stated, I think, is too ambiguous to be much more than a kind of Rorschach inkblot.

 

[Loren Booda]

Can one realize the difference between that which is sensed or observed, that which is known or theorized, and that which is neither?

 

[azneternity]

I've never had a kid but my friend had a baby, and i was around it a lot. I watched as the baby grew up, he's only 1 and a half now. But as he's growing up, its funny to see him immitate us. he picks up the phone and presses buttons then holds it up to his head, immitating what we do. He turns on the TV, tries to use forks and spoons.

Everything we have learned is through immitating others. We are just a compilation of our peers. How can we perceive which is beyond what we can observe. What we observe is all we know.

 

[moving finger]

Can one realize the difference between that which is sensed or observed, that which is known or theorized, and that which is neither?

Sorry, what do you mean by "realize the difference between"? Do you mean can we explain what is the difference between sense & observations on the one hand and knowledge & theorems on the other? Sure we can.

MF

 

[jimmie]

What is beyond consciousness?

Extinction.

Either I am, or not.

And, I am.

 

[Loren Booda]

moving finger,

"realize the difference between" - recognize as distinct entities, with minimal uncertainty.

 

[rygar]

Everything we have learned is through immitating others. We are just a compilation of our peers. How can we perceive which is beyond what we can observe. What we observe is all we know.

this is not necessarily true!
with the advent of modern cognitive science, most have significantly lessened the scope of behavism's role in the learning process.
i believe there is an underlying cognitive architecture that guides how we store and retrieve information, but the process is anything but a simple exchange. for instance, in linguistics, we don't acquire language through a behavioral mapping of syntax and lexicon. if we did, the reverse process of mapping natural syntax should prove an easy task--after all, babies can do it!
instead, there is most likely a syntax/language faculty of the brain that has innate formalism, whether abstract or categorical, that already knows the rules or contraints of a grammar. the learning, through mechanisms unknown, occurs at a cognitive level, re-arranging the constraints of universal grammar.
on any observable level, we have failed to account for the acquisition of language.
in a very different sort of argument, i could also point to kant's belief of the absolute notions of time and space to show that we know more than we observe.
but all philosophy boils down to a matter of opinion, so take it for what it's worth...

 

[dubmugga]

what is beyond consciousness ?

unconsciousness...

...I think I need another drink after that

man that was taxing...

 

[El Hombre Invisible]

If I understood the question correctly, I would say this:

We can infer a reality underlying conscious experience by the correlation of past conscious experiences. That this works so well, so consistently, forming the basis of the scientific method, tells us "with minimal uncertainty" something about the underlying nature of observed phenomena. From that, we can infer that this underlying nature holds whether we observe it, and so are conscious of it, or not.

Nonetheless, we cannot 'know' it without somebody having a conscious experience that infers it. Until a theory has been experimentally verified, it has more than minimal uncertainty. Likewise, where neither the theory nor the conscious experience exists, we cannot know anything about a phenomena until either does exist.

So we can know "with minimal uncertainty" a great deal about what exists beyond our consciousness - namely, the laws of nature and anything that emerges from them and only those that are known with minimal uncertainty. However this is always preceded by conscious experience.

Or by "beyond consciousness" do you mean that which we can/will never consciously experience? I would say we know nothing of such things. This does not comprimise any aspect of scientific theory, so long as you are rigorous with definition. For example, we cannot consciously experience an electron in and of itself, but if we define an electron strictly as that group of phenomena we attribute to the electron, we are okay to proceed with our current models "with minimal uncertainty".

 

[meL]

What is beyond consciousness?

nothing, you idiots

Have a peek!

It's ok :-)

Don't faint.

 

[Rade]

What is beyond consciousness?

Existence.

 

[Dmstifik8ion]

Existence precedes consciousness sequentially, but apart from consciousness is meaningless.

 

[quantumcarl]

I was wondering the same thing... what lies beyond what we consider to be consciousness.

I thought... does a stick carry its history? Conscious or not.

I figure it does in a purely physical sense. It carries the consequences and the potentials of its existence.

This cartage of events could be construed to be a form of data storage without consciousness. Much like a computer. Only in a stick or a rock or a sun etc...

There is nothing "beyond" consciousness per sey there is the quantum consciousness which is some what different from the biological consciousness.

 

[Jonny_trigonometry]

Can one realize the difference between that which is sensed or observed, that which is known or theorized, and that which is neither?

I don't think there has to be any distinction between what is sensed and what is observed. As far as the other part, beliefs tell a person the difference between known and theorized things. I believe that everything that I experience is known to me, and therefore every theory i come across is known to me, every theory i make is known to me. So I would say that there is no need to distinguish between what I know and what is theory.

Or do you want to stress the idea of truth? How do we know what truth is, and how can we distinguish true theories from false ones based on our knowledge of truth? Do you want to ask if truth itself is realizable? There are objective truths and personal truths. There are two differences between the two, objective differences and personal differences. A person can define to themself what an objective truth is, and all people can agree on a definition of objective truth. The definition agreed upon by all is the objective definition of objective truth, and this is the basis of decyphering between personal and objective truth in science and math. A personal definition of objective truth is also a personal truth, and an objective definition of personal truth is an objective truth. An objective definition of anything is an objective truth. A personal definition of anything is a personal truth. This is because there is no reason to lie to ourselves if our goal is to realize truth.

Is this my personal truth of how I define these things, or is it agreed upon by the scientific community also, and therefore I am speaking of objective truths? Perhaps I'm not using the true definition of truth? What is the true definition of truth? Is truth simply what we all agree upon? Couldn't we all agree upon something that is actually untrue?

What in my post do you find to be true and what do you find to be false? How do you know that your answers to this question are true? Are they true to you, or true objectively? Is there a need to distinguish these things? truely? truth truth truth and more truth. Does the meaning of a word lose it's meaning the more you use it? Have you sensed what you read, or did you observe it? Do you connotate the word "observe" with using mainly your eyes to sense something, or do you also include your other senses to obtain an observation? Do you connotate the word "sense" with the stimulation of your five sneses, or do you also include intuition and emotional feelings? Do you connotate the word "know" with things you are familiar with, or simply all the things you experiance? Do you connotate the word "theory" with things that aren't perceivable with your five senses, or do you also include it with things you can directly feel including the five senses, intuition, knowledge, and emotion?

I think I've made it clear that I believe there is no need to distinguish between the four things you ask. I can't prove it to you, but I can realize it based on my beliefs.

 

[Rade]

Existence precedes consciousness sequentially, but apart from consciousness is meaningless.

Yes, and both are meaningless apart from identity. Thus an axiom is suggested, existence exists and its identity precedes the content of consciousness.

 

[quantumcarl]

What is beyond consciousness?

Beyond consiousness is hard to recognize because one is not conscious when one is in the condition of "beyond conscousness".

One can consciously speculate what is beyond consciousness... but, one will remain biased by the form of consciousness they have come to know so well and that they also utilize in their speculation.

In fact it is entirely probable that every cell and no doubt every molecule of our bodies has become so accustomed to the support and aid of a consciousness over the last 3 billion year (more or less) that it is a challenging and difficult task for one to picture or grasp any element of the condition "beyond conscousness".

Our physical and conscious bias is what skews an otherwise clear picture of those conditions that, somehow, do not rely on a consciousness or, at least, do not rely on what some people have defined as consciousness.

A perplexing contradition remains: ... as far as our pre-judgmental conscious bias is concerned... we simply cannot observe anything outside of consciousness because we need to be conscious to observe it and also to examine it in retrospect.

A conscous examination of the resulting experiences or artifacts obtained that may shed light on the condition of "beyond consciousness" will, quite obviously, be contaminated by our conscious bias or bioaware prejudices.



Challenging topic, thanks.

 

[Loren Booda]

Johnny,
I was comparing the sets of that which is {sensed or observed} vs that which is {known or theorized} vs that which is {neither}. Can any of you give an example of that which is neither {sensed or observed} nor {known or theorized}?

 

[Jonny_trigonometry]

hmm... yes... How about a hishmithingewesitch? I bet you have no idea what that is, so you can't sense it, observe it, or theorize it, or know it. In fact, I could provide you with thousands of examples. Then you may ask what they are, and when I tell you, then you will know what they are, so leave it a mystery and you have your wild goose.

 

[El Hombre Invisible]

Johnny,
I was comparing the sets of that which is {sensed or observed} vs that which is {known or theorized} vs that which is {neither}. Can any of you give an example of that which is neither {sensed or observed} nor {known or theorized}?

By definition, you can not. To conjecture something that is not sensed, observed or known is to theorise it, even if it is to theorise only it's existence, non-existence or possible existence. But nonetheless, the set that is neither {sensed or observed} nor {known or theorized} is valid: it is the set of things we have no knowledge of. If we know/theorise/sense/observe everything then it is empty, but it's still there. It is a set of an unknown number of unknown things.

 

[quantumcarl]

Johnny,
I was comparing the sets of that which is {sensed or observed} vs that which is {known or theorized} vs that which is {neither}. Can any of you give an example of that which is neither {sensed or observed} nor {known or theorized}?

A prominent medical physicist agreed with me about the mechanical nature of all things physical, including life. We agreed that all physical systems are interdependent like the cogs of a transmission.

However, this observation can only be based on observation and intuition and, as el hombre invisible says, and with retrospect to the nature of "nature" there is a...

"set of an unknown number of unknown things"

... that perhaps provides the motivation or "drive train" for what we observe as a mechanical, physical universe. This would not include "energy" because, as far as is observable, energy is a part of the mechanics of the physical world.

Furthermore, an apple will always describe an orange as an apple.

 

[Jonny_trigonometry]

Furthermore, an apple will always describe an orange as an apple.

za?

 

[quantumcarl]

za?

In other words, definitions are constrained by the condition of those who compile the definition.

Aren't you glad I didn't say mango?
_________________________________________________________


I would also add that 'unknown" is not necessarily a probablility.

Just because we are not conscious of something does not mean we don't know about it.

We can know something without being conscious of the fact that we know it.

 

[Jonny_trigonometry]

mango who?

 

[quantumcarl]

mango who?

Orange u mango?
__________________________________________

The idea that a person carries knowledge of which they are not conscious is reminicent of what I said in my first post in this thread which is:

does a stick carry (knowledge of) its history (and potential)? Conscious or not.

I would suggest that biological consciousness comes with constraints that minimize the quality and quantity of knowledge we are aware of. Even if we have the knowledge, we may not be able to access it because of these constraints.

"These constraints" are imposed by the biological tendency to overide knowledge that does not pertain to the survival of the biological unit and that, in fact, may detract from its goal of survival.

For a non-biological consciousness, if it can be called that, there is no "unknown" since there are no constraints with regard to biological survival.
However, there are constraints of another kind of "survival" that we know as "physcial laws" which appear to maintain the balance of the physical universe, and in so doing, maintain the survival of physical existence and universe.

The constraints of physical laws may actually inhibit the amount of knowledge attainable even for a non-biological unit.

Could someone please tell me what I'm talking about?

 

[John_Charles_Webb]

What is beyond consciousness?

Beyond consciousness is infinite possibility that is brought into manifestation, one thing at a time, by the focused concentration of consciousness.

 

[emrandel]

What is beyond consciousness?

There is sub-conscious: The exploration of self.

There is consciousness: The exploration of all you can observe in a "normal" state of mind.

Then there is the "beyond conscious" state of mind: Which implies that you have what alcoholics refer to as "mental clarity". This is what is sought after by many drug users for it allows you too "see" the answer to life. An umbrella term which encompasses, basically, the answer to the question Why? in any given situation.

Once you have had a taste of "mental clarity" you well spend the rest of your life seeking another pitiful glimpse of it. For it is so wonderful, and so superior to the average conscious state of mind the average individual finds himself in most of the time.

 

[Rade]

Could someone please tell me what I'm talking about?

Sure, you talk about "constraint", which is an important concept of general systems theory. A constraint is a relation between two sets. It is obtained when the "variety" that exists under one condition is less than the variety under another. And, constraints are important because "when a constraint exists advantage can usually be taken of it" (Ross Ashby, 1956, An Introduction to Cybernetics"). Thus, as you state, every law of nature is a constraint, and every object of Reality is a constraint. Prediction is possible only because constraints exist. All machines, all learning are constraints. As applies to biology, organisms can adapt just so far so the real world is constrained, and no further. The opposite of constraint is total chaos.

 

[jackle]

Can one realize the difference between that which is sensed or observed, that which is known or theorized, and that which is neither?

I don't think so.

We all have a strong impression of sensed/observed objects being "out there" rather than "in your head" (known/theorised). This is all well and good until one encounters a hallucination. At this point it becomes apparent that we didn't know the difference between something "out there" and something "in your head" after all. I get brief hallucinations for the first few seconds after I wake up from sleep sometimes. They often fool me completely.

On close inspection, psychologists have discovered that we all routinely hallucinate in the sense that specific experiments can be conducted to show discrepencies between what is there and what we actually see. Although this is normally pretty subtle, it raises the issue of how we can be sure of anything at all on a personal level.

What is "out there" and what is "in your head"? How do we know we know something? Are we seeing our theories or do we theorize from what we see? And what about the stuff that just isn't real at all? Normally we start with a framework of assumptions, and then I think we can do it.

For example, I discard my waking-up hallucinations after a few moments when they disappear, on the assumption that the rest of my experience is right instead. Some religious people might consider them visions or spirits on a different set of assumptions. The trouble is that these assumptions seem to be too fundamental to ever test.

 

[sd01g]

What is beyond consciousness?

Since the future is beyond everything, I would say the FUTURE is what is beyond consciousness. If you do not like this answer, then consider it is the UNKOWN that lies beyond consciousness. Maybe NOTHING is beyond consciousness. Probably we will never know for sure. Maybe this question has no meaning. At the least, it is an interesting question.

 

[Rade]

What is beyond consciousness?

Existence.

 

[steersman]

Originally Posted by Loren Booda
What is beyond consciousness?

Awareness?

The higher dimensional architecture that supports and instantiates conscious thought --

beyond that possibly yet unseen complex and evolving forces, far more complex than fundamental forces we see in our everyday 3 dimensional view of the world.

 

[meteor]

The way i see it, Consciousness is a subset of a more general whole called "Mind". Similarly, Intelligence is a subset of the set Consciousness.

Thus, a human being would have Mind, Consciousness and Intelligence. A dog would have Mind and Consciousness, but not Intelligence. An ant would have Mind but would lack the other two qualities.

 

[moving finger]

The way i see it, Consciousness is a subset of a more general whole called "Mind". Similarly, Intelligence is a subset of the set Consciousness.

Thus, a human being would have Mind, Consciousness and Intelligence. A dog would have Mind and Consciousness, but not Intelligence. An ant would have Mind but would lack the other two qualities.

Why would you think a dog has consciousness? How would you tell?

I don't see that an agent necessarily needs to possesses consciousness in order to possesses intelligence.

Consciousness seems to be the ability of an agent to form a temporally extended and detailed self-representation, and to relate this self-representation to information gathered from (exchanged with) the “external” world.

Intelligence seems to be the ability of an agent to solve problems (the more difficult or intractable the problems, the more intelligence we ascribe to the agent).

I grant that consciousness and intelligence often go hand in hand (especially in biological agents which have evolved by natural selection), but it does not follow from this simple association that intelligence entails consciousness.

as for "Mind" - I'm not really sure what you mean by this.

Best Regards

MF

 

[Paul Martin]

The way i see it, Consciousness is a subset of a more general whole called "Mind". Similarly, Intelligence is a subset of the set Consciousness.

I can see it your way. For the purposes of this discussion I will agree with these relationships.

Thus, a human being would have Mind, Consciousness and Intelligence.

I am not willing to agree with this. What you say here is that the Mind is a constituent part or a possession or a component of a human. I am of the opinion that the human being is subordinate to a Mind, which I claim is outside and separate from this physical world and its bodies. Now, if by "having a Mind" is taken to mean "behaves as if it had a Mind", then I would agree that you could say that a human being appears to have a Mind. But so would a remotely controlled robot being operated by a human. I think that we would agree that the robot, in spite of its behavior, would have neither a Mind nor a consciousness.

Why would you think a dog has consciousness? How would you tell?

Good questions. On the other hand, Why would you think a human has consciousness? How would you tell?

Consciousness seems to be the ability of an agent to form a temporally extended and detailed self-representation, and to relate this self-representation to information gathered from (exchanged with) the “external” world.

While I agree that consciousness seems to have that ability, I don't think this is a sufficient condition for consciousness. With respect, I think that all of the functions you describe here can be programmed into a computer and yet not imbue the computer or the program with consciousness.

About a year ago, you and I worked out a mutually-agreed-upon set of necessary and sufficient conditions for free will (in the Libet's half-second delay thread, I believe). Maybe we can do the same for consciousness.

You have provided a starting point in this quote. I think that having these abilities is a necessary condition for consciousness, but I don't think it is sufficient. What is missing, IMHO, is the ability to know that the self-representation has been formed and to know not only that the self-representation is related to the worldly information, but also what the relationship is and at least something about how the two are related.

Now, in light of what I have already learned from you, I don't insist that the knowledge be infallible, except for some single bit of primordial knowledge at the very top of an enormously broad and deep hierarchy of knowledge. Thus, at the very top, the agent could declare with absolute certainty that "I know that I think I know that I think I know that..." We have been through this once before, so I think you know what I am getting at.

What are your thoughts?

Paul

 

[moving finger]

Good questions. On the other hand, Why would you think a human has consciousness? How would you tell?

There is no “objective test” that I know of for consciousness.
One could ask the agent to provide a report on its experiential states (if it has any), and try to form a judgement from that – but this works only for agents which are able to provide intelligible reports, hence would not work for a dog (unless we can find some way of complex intelligent communication with a dog).
Judgements based on such reports may also be fallible (depends on whether one believes in the possibility of zombies or not).

While I agree that consciousness seems to have that ability, I don't think this is a sufficient condition for consciousness.

I think your observation, though correct, misses the point. I did not suggest this as a “sufficient condition”, I suggested it as one way in which consciousness differs from intelligence, to show that intelligence is not (logically) necessarily a subset of consciousness.

With respect, I think that all of the functions you describe here can be programmed into a computer and yet not imbue the computer or the program with consciousness.

Agreed, but as I say I did not claim that my post was intended to provide any “sufficient conditions” for consciousness, only that I was trying to point out that consciousness and intelligence can be very different things.

About a year ago, you and I worked out a mutually-agreed-upon set of necessary and sufficient conditions for free will (in the Libet's half-second delay thread, I believe). Maybe we can do the same for consciousness.

You remember? I am flattered!
I’ve been unconscious for a while (as far as this forum is concerned)

You have provided a starting point in this quote. I think that having these abilities is a necessary condition for consciousness, but I don't think it is sufficient. What is missing, IMHO, is the ability to know that the self-representation has been formed and to know not only that the self-representation is related to the worldly information, but also what the relationship is and at least something about how the two are related.

Hmmm. Ability to “know”. Or ability to “believe”?
Knowledge entails truth, whereas belief does not. I do not think it is necessary that a conscious agent have true beliefs in order to claim consciousness, only that it has beliefs (which may be false). I would thus rather favour :
“the ability to form a belief that the self-representation has been formed, and to form a belief not only that the self-representation is related to the worldly information, but also what the relationship is and at least something about how the two are related.”
This condition allows that a conscious agent forms beliefs about how its self-representation is related to worldly information, but (unlike your suggestion) does not require that those beliefs be true. (For example, a brain in a vat could be conscious, but at the same time not believe, hence not know, that it was a brain in a vat).

Now, in light of what I have already learned from you, I don't insist that the knowledge be infallible, except for some single bit of primordial knowledge at the very top of an enormously broad and deep hierarchy of knowledge. Thus, at the very top, the agent could declare with absolute certainty that "I know that I think I know that I think I know that..." We have been through this once before, so I think you know what I am getting at.

Hehehehe ….. I answered the previous paragraph before I read the last paragraph! We think alike! In the intervening period of my unconsciousness, I have studied a little and learned a little about the differences between knowledge and belief.

I am not sure I agree with your claim that the agent could declare with absolute certainty that "I know that I think I know that I think I know that..."
I think the best any agent can ever claim (with absolute certainty) is that “I believe that I know……..” etc.

Nice to meet you again,

Best Regards

MF

 

[selfAdjoint]

Paul and moving finger; in these last couple of posts it sounds like you are closing in on http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/metzinger/precis.pdf", which I pointed to on another thread. What do you think?

 

[Paul Martin]

Nice to meet you again,

Likewise. Welcome back.

Hmmm. Ability to “know”. Or ability to “believe”?

Yes. That is the question. ... er... I mean "I believe that is the question".

I have studied a little and learned a little about the differences between knowledge and belief.

I am delighted to hear that. It means that I may be able to learn even more from you.

I am not sure I agree with your claim that the agent could declare with absolute certainty that "I know that I think I know that I think I know that..."

That is certainly understandable. My claim was intentionally vague. It was intended to summarize an inference from my personal, unorthodox, poorly described (by me), and persistent, model of reality. As we have discussed before, a major tenet in my model is that consciousness does not reside in the brain, or even in our physical world. This is actually a derivative of a more fundamental tenet, that there is only a single conscious agent in all of reality. So when I discuss notions such as the ability to know, or the ability to believe, I think of them in terms of that single agent as the sole entity possessing those abilities. Of course, I use those terms in the vernacular to refer to "human abilities", but I believe that in reality, those abilities are only illusions and the real abilities inhere only in that one single consciousness.

Now, in our previous discussions, we have agreed to talk only about some non-specific 'agent' which/who might be conscious, have free will, can know, or believe, etc. I think this is a good move because that way you don't necessarily have to buy into my strange model and yet we can have a rational discussion. Likewise, I can discuss those ideas as if humans had those abilities, and yet in the back of my mind, believe (or strongly suspect) that humans are merely vehicles through which the single consciousness acts, knows, perceives, wonders, etc. etc.

So, when I "claim that the agent could declare with absolute certainty that "I know that I think I know that I think I know that..."", I am interested in your opinion wrt some arbitrary and non-specific agent -- could be human, dog, or anything else. But, again, in the back of my mind, I see the vast hierarchy I mentioned as starting with the single cosmic consciousness at the top, and cascading down the various levels making appearances in vehicles such as humans and dogs giving the illusion that the humans and dogs can actually know or believe.

But don't get hung up on thinking you have to accept my model just yet. Instead, let me try to learn from you what the differences are between the ability to know and the ability to believe.

Would you agree that we seem to be forced to take these terms as primitive and undefined in the mathematical sense? Or do you think we can come up with a reasonable definition for either term?

Do you think an agent can believe without knowing it? Or is the ability to know a fundamental prerequisite for being able to believe?

I'm a little short of time right now, but I have been sitting here at the keyboard in a quandary over whether to try to articulate what I really see going on here. I'll make a quick stab at it and see how it comes out:

If we introspect and try to ascertain exactly what we know about something or other, it seems to me that we reach a point where we can say something like, "I don't know exactly what is going on when I see blue, but I know that I see blue." "I know an explanation of what is going on having to do with certain frequencies of EM radiation and my central nervous system, but this explanation doesn't satisfactorily explain blueness, which I know about." "I believe that explanation has at least something to do with the perception I know I am having, but I know, at the times I am looking, that I do have the experience of perceiving blue."

In the process of introspection like this, it seems to me that we can't know much if anything about what we claim to know, i.e. what we believe. But it also seems inescapable that at some point or stage, we certainly know at least something. That "something" seems not to be describable. If it really is indescribable, then it seems to me that the entire structure of knowledge is a hierarchy of beliefs with only a single item of true knowledge at the very top of the hierarchy.

Now, if that helped you understand what I was trying to say, good. Otherwise we will have to talk more about it later. Right now I have to go.

Good talking with you again, MF.

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

Paul and moving finger; in these last couple of posts it sounds like you are closing in on Metzinger's construction, which I pointed to on another thread. What do you think?

Thank you for your interest in my thoughts. I expressed my thoughts on Metzinger's construction in post #3 of your Metzinger thread.

Paul

 

[moving finger]

I must say it makes a nice change (in these types of fora) to have a rational and unemotional debate with someone who is prepared to make lucid and coherent arguments!

As we have discussed before, a major tenet in my model is that consciousness does not reside in the brain, or even in our physical world. This is actually a derivative of a more fundamental tenet, that there is only a single conscious agent in all of reality.

That is interesting. May I ask why you believe this?

So when I discuss notions such as the ability to know, or the ability to believe, I think of them in terms of that single agent as the sole entity possessing those abilities.

Understood.

Of course, I use those terms in the vernacular to refer to "human abilities", but I believe that in reality, those abilities are only illusions and the real abilities inhere only in that one single consciousness.

Understood. Regardless of whether one believes in a single consciousness, or multiple consciousnesses, the definitions of “to know” and “to believe” should not be affected.

I define knowledge as justified true belief. Would you agree?
(this is commonly referred to the JTB definition)
Thus for S to know that T there are three necessary and sufficient conditions :
1 T is true
2 S believes that T
3 S is justified in believing (has evidential justification for believing) that T

Now, in our previous discussions, we have agreed to talk only about some non-specific 'agent' which/who might be conscious, have free will, can know, or believe, etc. I think this is a good move because that way you don't necessarily have to buy into my strange model and yet we can have a rational discussion.

Agreed

So, when I "claim that the agent could declare with absolute certainty that "I know that I think I know that I think I know that..."", I am interested in your opinion wrt some arbitrary and non-specific agent -- could be human, dog, or anything else.

According to the above definition of knowledge, for any agent S to “know with absolute certainty that T” would require not only that S believing that it knows that T, but also that S cannot be wrong in S’s belief that it knows that T.

It is this condition that S cannot be wrong which I find problematic.

Would you agree that we seem to be forced to take these terms as primitive and undefined in the mathematical sense? Or do you think we can come up with a reasonable definition for either term?

I think I have answered that (at least in terms of knowledge).

Do you think an agent can believe without knowing it? Or is the ability to know a fundamental prerequisite for being able to believe?

“S believes that T” can be a true statement even if T is false (ie S may be mistaken in its belief).

Similarly, “S believes that S knows that T” can be a true statement even if T is false (ie S may be mistaken in its belief).

However, according to the JTB definition of knowledge, the statement “S knows that T” can be true if and only if T is true (knowledge entails truth). If T is not true, then the statement “S knows that T” is false (even if S believes that S knows that T).

Now let us look at your question :“Do you think an agent can believe without knowing it?”

Let proposition P = “S believes that T”.
Your question is (if I understand it literally), given P, is it necessary that S know that P?

Condition (1) of JTB is satisfied. P is true (by definition, it is a premise that S believes that T).
Condition (2) of JTB is (usually) also satisfied. S believes that P (in most cases).
But could there be some “contrived cases” where we could argue “S believes that T” is true, but at the same time “S believes that (S believes that T)” is not true? I’m not sure. Your thoughts?
And condition (3) of JTB is also satisfied. If “S believes that T” is true, then S is justified in believing that “S believes that T”.

Conclusion : In most cases, where P = “S believes that P”, and if P is true, then it follows “S knows that P” is also true. Is this true in all cases?

If it is, then it seems one thing we can know with certainty is that we hold beliefs (but it does not follow that those beliefs are true beliefs). (T may be false, and yet P could still be true, and S would know that P is true).

If we introspect and try to ascertain exactly what we know about something or other, it seems to me that we reach a point where we can say something like, "I don't know exactly what is going on when I see blue, but I know that I see blue." "I know an explanation of what is going on having to do with certain frequencies of EM radiation and my central nervous system, but this explanation doesn't satisfactorily explain blueness, which I know about." "I believe that explanation has at least something to do with the perception I know I am having, but I know, at the times I am looking, that I do have the experience of perceiving blue.".

I follow this, but in the above you have NOT referred to “certain knowledge” here, only to “knowledge”. I agree that an agent can know “anything”. (If it justifiably believes X, and X turns out to be true, then by definition it knows X). What it cannot possesses (with the possible exception of knowledge of its own beliefs) is certain knowledge (Why? Answer - How do we prove that X is true with certainty?).

In the process of introspection like this, it seems to me that we can't know much if anything about what we claim to know, i.e. what we believe. But it also seems inescapable that at some point or stage, we certainly know at least something. That "something" seems not to be describable..

If we cannot say exactly what it is that we know, how can we claim to know it? That seems incoherent to me.

If it really is indescribable, then it seems to me that the entire structure of knowledge is a hierarchy of beliefs with only a single item of true knowledge at the very top of the hierarchy.

But “true knowledge” of what exactly?
If “S knows that T” is this true knowledge at the top of the hierarchy, what is T?.

Best Regards

MF

If one pays attention to the concepts being employed, rather than the words being used, the resolution of this problem is simple. (Stuart Burns)

 

[moving finger]

Paul and moving finger; in these last couple of posts it sounds like you are closing in on http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/metzinger/precis.pdf", which I pointed to on another thread. What do you think?

Interesting paper. I'm reading it now...

MF

 

[moving finger]

Paul and moving finger; in these last couple of posts it sounds like you are closing in on http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/metzinger/precis.pdf", which I pointed to on another thread. What do you think?

Metzinger's paper is wonderful! He mirrors my thoughts almost completely, especially the claim that the existence of "self" is an illusion created by conscious awareness!

Thank you, selfAdjoint, for pointing me in this direction!

Are his ideas discussed in another thread on here?

Best Regards

MF

 

[selfAdjoint]

I see you found it! I am going to look into the paper again with regard to your concerns about his "minimal consciousness". My unformed idea is that this concept IS programmable, with a sufficiently simplified toy experential world. But I'll see.

 

[Paul Martin]

I am short of time again so I can't do justice to your entire post right now. But I can answer your easy question from the top of my head:

That is interesting. May I ask why you believe this[, that there is only a single conscious agent in all of reality]?

Yes, of course you may ask. I'll even assume that you are asking and I'll list the reasons that come to mind. They will be sort of chronological wrt when they came to my attention throughout my life.

1. It seems to answer a puzzle that has bothered me since childhood: Why, out of the 12 billion or so human eyeballs on earth, can I see only out of these two?
2. I think I remember seeing it for myself during a couple of altered-state experiences.
3. It seems to be nearly unanimously reported by the mystics of the past, especially in the Buddhist tradition.
4. It makes it easy, if not trivial, to explain how absolute justice prevails in this seemingly unjust world.
5. It provides a framework for a reasonable answer to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.
6. Gregory Bateson made a compelling (to me) case for the cosmos to be something like a Mind.
7. All reasonable explanations for a fundamental ontology (excluding ravens or endless stacks of turtles) seem to be converging on some sort of concept. Concepts are artifacts of Mind. This implies the primacy of Mind. Parsimony then suggests that there is only one such.
8. It fits into Gregg Rosenberg's "...Place for Consciousness" like a hand in a glove.
9. It was logically deduced, and believed, by Erwin Schroedinger, whose thoughts I very much respect.

More will undoubtedly come to mind the instant I post this, but they will have to wait.

Sorry to be in such a rush.

Paul

 

[eggman]

Mind cannot go beyond itself...

The question (What is beyond consciousness) is incorrect.

It appears to be based on an assumption.

 

[eggman]

Exsistance preceeds Essence I read somewhere...

The rest seems to be just mind games...

 

[Loren Booda]

eggman

The question (What is beyond consciousness) is incorrect.

It appears to be based on an assumption.

The assumption that consciousness may be limited?

 

[Rade]

Metzinger's paper is wonderful! He mirrors my thoughts almost completely, especially the claim that the existence of "self" is an illusion created by conscious awareness!

I do not agree with this logic. It requires that within any human a real consciousness is priori to a real self, which is impossible, for while it is possible for a human self to exist without a consciousness, it is not possible for a human consciousness to exist priori to or outside a self. Both the self and consciousness of Metzinger are real, and one can only hope that Metzinger knows it, for I cannot think of a more depressing mental state than not knowing that one exists as a self.

 

[moving finger]

Metzinger's paper is wonderful! He mirrors my thoughts almost completely, especially the claim that the existence of "self" is an illusion created by conscious awareness!

I do not agree with this logic. It requires that within any human a real consciousness is priori to a real self, which is impossible, for while it is possible for a human self to exist without a consciousness, it is not possible for a human consciousness to exist priori to or outside a self. Both the self and consciousness of Metzinger are real…..

According to Metzinger, there is no “real” self, the intuition of a “self” is an illusion brought about by the phenomenon of consciousness. All perfectly logical and self-consistent, there is nothing “illogical” about it.

Whether you agree with the premise that the “self” is an illusion is another matter, but your disagreement on this premise does not make Metzinger’s ideas “illogical”.

I find it an intuitively beautiful and totally coherent concept which explains everything that we need to explain, from the illusion of qualia, the illusion of free will and moral reponsibility, to the illusion of the “Hard Problem”.

Best Regards

MF

 

[moving finger]

1. It seems to answer a puzzle that has bothered me since childhood: Why, out of the 12 billion or so human eyeballs on earth, can I see only out of these two?

Because “you” is a concept created by the processing of the brain in that particular head. It makes no sense to think that “your” brain can create the concept of a “you” which is looking out of someone else’s eyeballs when your brain is not connected to those eyeballs.

2. I think I remember seeing it for myself during a couple of altered-state experiences.

No comment.

3. It seems to be nearly unanimously reported by the mystics of the past, especially in the Buddhist tradition.

No comment.

4. It makes it easy, if not trivial, to explain how absolute justice prevails in this seemingly unjust world.

Does absolute justice prevail? I don’t think it does. I’m not even sure what the concept is supposed to mean.

5. It provides a framework for a reasonable answer to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.

To my mind a more rational and coherent answer, without the need to invoke metaphysical universal consciousness, is Metzinger’s solution.

6. Gregory Bateson made a compelling (to me) case for the cosmos to be something like a Mind.

Not aware of this one.

7. All reasonable explanations for a fundamental ontology (excluding ravens or endless stacks of turtles) seem to be converging on some sort of concept. Concepts are artifacts of Mind. This implies the primacy of Mind. Parsimony then suggests that there is only one such.

Interesting. Parsimony suggests there is only one electron/positron also (originally Feynman’s idea), but it never got off the ground. Parsimony doesn’t always rule.

8. It fits into Gregg Rosenberg's "...Place for Consciousness" like a hand in a glove.

OK.

9. It was logically deduced, and believed, by Erwin Schroedinger, whose thoughts I very much respect.

OK (but believing in X simply because Y believes in X and one respects Y is not, to my mind, a good philosophy)

Best Regards

MF