Why randomness means incomplete understanding

[Morbert]

In the simulated miniverse, ''whoever is using quantum mechanics'' is simulated as well, hence their choices must be determined by the simulation alone.

Well, so far we have only considered a detector, which obviously does not use quantum mechanics to understand its surroundings. But if the miniverse is suitably prepared, quantum mechanics will permit a description of it in terms of possible planetary formations and emergences of biological systems that understand the frequencies and correlations in their observations by constructing a theory they call quantum mechanics.

 

[A. Neumaier]

quantum mechanics will permit a description of it in terms of possible planetary formations and emergences of biological systems that understand the frequencies and correlations in their observations by constructing a theory they call quantum mechanics.

This is pure speculation. How? A simulation must be programmable in principle!

 

[DarMM]

Summary: We lack a fundamental understanding of the measurement process in quantum mechanics.

The traditional interpretations are way too vague to allow such a blueprint to be made, even in principle

I think in a traditional Copenhagen view or extensions of it like Decoherent histories you cannot make this simulation for the theory only gives one a guide to macroscopic impressions of the microscopic realm. Taking QM as non-representational they would indeed agree that such a blueprint/simulation cannot be made. As I think @Morbert is getting at a simulation of QM would encompass a simulation of the range of answers and their associated probabilities that an experimenter would obtain for a specific history of questions. However it would not be a simulation of reality itself.

 

[vanhees71]

They are (like everywhere in the statistics of measurement) just predictions of a typical value for the square of the deviation of each measurement result from the best reproducible value.

Born's rule is not consistent in many ways; see my critique in Section 3.3 of Part I, and more explicitly the case for the QED electron in a new thread.

Great! All of a sudden the "Thermal Interpretation" again has the usual statistical meaning. So, what's the difference to the minimal statistical interpretation?

If you then deny the validity of Born's rule, how can you then justify the (as far as I see) equivalent statement that expectation values of arbitrary observables and thus also all moments of the probability distribution and thus the probability distribution itself is determined by the general Born's rule, i.e., the usual trace formula $\langle A \rangle = \mathrm{Tr}(\hat{A} \hat{\rho})$.

Concerning your criticism in your paper: Can you prove your claim about the ion trap, i.e., can you show, using standard relativistic QFT that there's faster-than-light propagation? Of course, in non-relativistic QT, nothing prevents this, but why should it since non-relativistic QT is not supposed to obey relativistic causality to begin with.

 

[Morbert]

This is pure speculation. How? A simulation must be programmable in principle!

I don't see how this is different from our previous talk about the detector in the miniverse. My understanding so far:

We both agree that a fully quantum theory of the miniverse will consist of an appropriate density operator and dynamics. I say this theory let's us run a simulation that returns probabilities for alternative possible histories of both the detector (or detector + scientist in the miniverse if you like) and the variable it is detecting. I.e. A fully quantum treatment of both the detector and the detected. You say this implies our theory is incomplete, since our simulation expects not only a density operator + dynamics, but also a set of alternatives for which probabilities are returned.

Before I respond: Have I correctly described the issue, or is there some other issue?

 

[Stephen Tashi]

In the simulated miniverse, ''whoever is using quantum mechanics'' is simulated as well, hence their choices must be determined by the simulation alone.

How do we evaluate whether this requirement is met? Suppose the writer of a simulation says it simulates a user of QM by a certain collection of processes. Can we disprove this? In fact, if the writer of the simulation says the simulation doesn't simulate a user of QM, can we be sure he is correct? Another person might pick a collection of processes within the simulation and claim it can represent a user of QM.

Is the representation or non-representation of a user of QM a matter of the intent and interpretation of the writer of the simulation or his critics?

 

[artis]

I am somewhat relating to @georgir post #67 on this issue as well as @julcab12 post #64,

not just the time precision of the total number of decays but also the "Schrödinger factor" is what makes me doubt such absolutely fundamental randomness because from the Schrödinger cat we know that this decay of most of the atoms is also not linear with respect to time but can happen randomly(not taking into account the disturbance potentially caused by an observer interference) which means most of the atoms that have to decay in a single half life can decay in the beginning of the half life yet the few left over ones will "sit and wait" patiently as if they were told by someone of authority to do so. This fact seems incompatible with the general understanding of probability because at least to me the randomness of probability in general over many such atoms in a system seems at odds with the randomness of spontaneous decay of a single atom or in fact of many single atoms at any given time within this system.Many such peculiar details make me personally draw more towards the idea of built in determinism but by mechanisms which we still don't understand or maybe have no way of understanding or even getting to them, maybe that is also a fundamental property of nature, but surely without being able to prove or disprove this I should not speculate but then again we could argue that saying that nature is fundamentally random can also be speculation just a popular one.

 

[Jarvis323]

This criteria for "random" has problems. Ruling out repeatable series means that any "random" series that is recorded for future replays could not be considered random. That would include running the random generator first, recording the numbers, and then using them. Being able to repeat the series should not rule it out from being "random". A definition of "random" that has advantages is if it is not possible to compress the series at all. With that definition, most computer pseudo-random number generators are not random, regardless of how they are seeded.

You have to talk about the source (or process), not a given sequence. Note that how compressible a given sequence is has nothing to do with how random its source is, after all there are many realizations of the fair coin that are quite ordered, e.g. 11111111111111. Shannon entrooy is a measure of randomness, but it is defined for disrete random variables, not strings. Woth a long enough string, you can get a crude estimation. For strings you can talk about Kolmogorov complexity, but it's not computable, and interpretation is still open.

 

[FactChecker]

You have to talk about the source (or process), not a given sequence.

Why?

Note that how compressible a given sequence is has nothing to do with how random its source is, after all there are many realizations of the fair coin that are quite ordered, e.g. 11111111111111.

I would not use a sequence of ones as a random sequence no matter what the source was. I would say that you are giving an example here that contradicts your first statement.

 

[Jarvis323]

Why?
I would not use a sequence of ones as a random sequence no matter what the source was. I would say that you are giving an example here that contradicts your first statement.

Then how are you choosing your random sequences? Are you pulling out strings that look too ordered? If so, then what sequence shows up after you've selected it will not be random, some of its properties will be predictable. You've chosen it for particular reasons.

 

[FactChecker]

I agree. I see your point that a long string of ones allows compression. So that violates the criteria that I had mentioned. I thought you were talking about a sequence of all ones, which I would not use no matter how they were created.

 

[vanhees71]

Too "choose" random sequences (e.g., for doing Monte-Carlo simulations with a computer) is a quite difficult task, and it must be done with great care and precision! FAPP there are "deterministic" sequences which look pretty much like random numbers (usually in very good approximation uniformly distributed over an interval of real numbers), but they are not really random numbers of course.

According to the physical laws we know today, quantum theory can provide "true random numbers", i.e., numbers that are really indetermined. The most simple case to produce a (discrete) sequence of random numbers is to prepare a polarization entangled photon pair in a Bellstate (like the singlet state), which nowadays is easy using parametric downconversion. You can use one of the photons as "trigger, heralding the presence of the other photon". Then you are sure to get a truly random outcome determining the other photon's polarization (encoding, say, horizontal representation with 1 and vertical with 0, you get a "truely random" sequence of 0s and 1s).

 

[Jarvis323]

According to the physical laws we know today, quantum theory can provide "true random numbers", i.e., numbers that are really indetermined. The most simple case to produce a (discrete) sequence of random numbers is to prepare a polarization entangled photon pair in a Bellstate (like the singlet state), which nowadays is easy using parametric downconversion. You can use one of the photons as "trigger, heralding the presence of the other photon". Then you are sure to get a truly random outcome determining the other photon's polarization (encoding, say, horizontal representation with 1 and vertical with 0, you get a "truely random" sequence of 0s and 1s).

Which ones, many laws of physics are known to be non-truths (e.g. Newtons laws). And what does it mean to say a theory can provide "true random numbers". It is the physical thing itself that does that. You can argue that the theory (or the randomness in the theory) cannot be replaced, but that in itself doesn't tell us about the physical thing itself. Unpredictability, or uncertainty, and randomness are not the same thing. Heck, even simple, stationary, bounded deterministic dynamical systems (e.g. the logistic map) are mathematically impossible to predict. You would need at least to (1) store infinite amounts of information, (2) process infinite amounts of information, (3) and compute iterative solutions at infinite temporal frequency; All that just to even get a time-invariant bound on accuracy at all, or even a reasonable bound on accuracy over a given fixed length of time. We could go deeper analyzing what we know about the thermodynamic costs of information storage, processing, and so forth.

If that isn't enough, even simple discrete computational problems cannot be solved, like a method to determine the outcome of the game of life for arbitrary initial conditions. The inability for us to make predictions (notwithstanding even bigger surprises than wrong laws of physics) is logically deducible from even our best non-physical axioms.

That said, what goes on at the quantum level, or beyond, is a mystery, and we cannot rule out weirdness that changes the limitations we assume based on our limited models of reality.

More interesting facts that are relevant to the discussion might be that (under classical models of computation) it is possible for a system to simulate itself, but not without an increase in time complexity. That is, supposing somehow we can get around all of the other obstacles and simulate our reality, we could not use it to predict the future, because the predictions will always come later and the system is open (we need the whole state to do the prediction). We could do a hypothetical simulation far in advance (assuming we have all of this power), but then it would still be impossible to know when/if a general hypothetical situation will ever arise. And all of this is true even if we are talking about systems with finite unbounded states. Again, I'm not sure to what extent quantum weirdness could changes these things. But it also is an interesting fact under-looked in the simulation hypothesis (which I won't go into because its off subject).

My main thought is that we cannot in general make assumption proof claims about reality (and what is really going on with photons and electrons and so forth). It's just a mystery. Perhaps, it will be possible to whittle away at what we see as randomness, through new models and assumptions, indirect measurements, logical deduction, and so forth, but (notwithstanding big big surprises) we will never be able to reach the bottom with any predictive model, and this is an issue that is independent of whether or not our perceived randomness is actually deterministic or not. Even supposing we could measure outcomes perfectly, and something seemed perfectly random, it would still be infeasible to tell the difference between randomness and deterministic chaos. At some point further intellectual inquiry into the matter isn't physics anymore.

 

[vanhees71]

Of course, you are right in saying that nature provides the "random numbers", not the theory. What I meant to say is that according to today's knowledge, formulated as QT, my example provides "true random numbers", i.e., the polarization states are really indetermined and don't take definite values which we don't know in lack of information about "hidden variables".

You are also right that FAPP "deterministic chaos" provides "random numbers", but they are not "true random numbers" in the sense that in classical physics they are in fact determined, though lacking the precise initial conditions we cannot predict them.

I'd not say "Newton's laws" are "non-truths". We only know today that they have a limited realm of validity. They are still very good descriptions of phenomena, where they are applicable. 50 years ago NASA brought men to the moon, successfully using it!

That said, it's of course also true that it may well be that QT is not the final word on the description of nature. Maybe one day some empirical fact will tell us that it has also its limited realm of validity, and maybe we find a more comprehensive theory revealing the successful QT as some of its approximately valid cases under certain special circumstances, such as Newtonian mechanics applies in the limit of small speeds and accelerations (as an approximation of relativity) and macroscopic objects (as coarse grained descriptions of relevant collective observables as averages over many microscopic degrees of freedom as an approximation of QT).

 

[FactChecker]

An interesting example:
One man's random is not another man's random. In a recent test of entanglement at a distance, the light from two distant galaxies was used. They were not just any distant galaxies -- they had to be two galaxies in opposite sides of the visible universe!

 

[vanhees71]

I know this experiment, but what has it to do with your claim that "one man's random is not another man's random"?

 

[FactChecker]

I know this experiment, but what has it to do with your claim that "one man's random is not another man's random"?

I should have said that "one man's 'independent' is not another man's 'independent'". Meaning that some people find it necessary to go to great extremes to guarantee that two sources of numbers are independent.