# X axioms .

1. Aug 15, 2005

### MathematicalPhysicist

X axioms.....

lets assume we have a consistent system which have X axioms/definitions, can we infer (or deduce) somehow from this given, how many theorems/lemmas are there in this system? (or deduce the maximal theorems/lemmas that could be proved in this this system).

my initial answer would be no, but i think this question is a metamathematical and perhaps have an answer in fields im not aware of.

2. Aug 15, 2005

### AKG

There could easily be infinitely many theorems. Assuming there is something like --> in this system, then for any sentence A of the language, we'd have A --> A, and there could be infinitely many strings that are proper sentences of the language. What's more, we'd also have:

A --> (A --> A)
A --> (A --> (A --> A))
...
etc.

3. Aug 15, 2005

### MathematicalPhysicist

besides sentences which are considered tautologies, such as what you have mentioned.

4. Aug 15, 2005

### AKG

Do you know the difference between a theorem and a tautology? In standard propositional logic, the things I've stated are both theorems and tautologies. A theorem is anything derivable from the set of axioms of the system using the rules of inference of the system, and a tautology is something that is true on every possible valuation (e.g. on every truth-value assignment of a sentence of propositional logic), if I recall correctly.

5. Aug 15, 2005

### MathematicalPhysicist

yes i do, and if you valuate A->A
A-T(true)
the inference is also true.
A-F(false)
the inference is true again.
am i wrong here, or what?

6. Aug 15, 2005

### AKG

(A --> A) is a tautology of propositional logic because on every truth-value assignment of it's atomic component(s), the compound sentence is true. (A --> A) is a theorem of propositional logic because it can be derived using the derivation system of propositional logic from the set of axioms of propositional logic, which happens to be empty. If I recall correctly, in propositional logic, every theorem is a tautology, and vice versa, and predicate logic, this is not the case. For some logics, every theorem is a tautology, and for some logic, every tautology is a theorem (and of course, for some logics, both are the case). One of these conditions is called consistency, the other completeness, although I can't remember which way is which. Godel's completeness and incompleteness theorems were about showing which logics were complete and which weren't, roughly speaking, although again I might be off in this.

7. Aug 15, 2005

### honestrosewater

which I think agrees with what AKG is saying.
The thing that might cause some confusion is that you usually don't use axioms but axiom schema, i.e., you use syntactic variables that range over whatever atomic symbols you have, because your set(s) of atomic symbols is (are) usually infinite. I'll give this some more thought when I'm fully awake.
My first guess is that you may be able to tell from your axioms&rules whether the set of theorems is empty, finite, infinite, how infinite, etc. but not get an exact number. But that's just a first guess. Also, axioms are theorems, so that gives you a start.

Last edited: Aug 15, 2005
8. Aug 16, 2005

### MathematicalPhysicist

i think you need to sleep a little bit more.
how can an axiom be regarded as a theorem? axioms aren't derived from other sentences like theorems.

9. Aug 16, 2005

### honestrosewater

Based only on the number of axioms or axiom schema, no, you cannot infer the number of theorems.

For instance, if you have no inference rules (rules, for short), the number of theorems will just be the number of axioms (without rules, you have no way to generate any more theorems). However, if you have an non-empty set of axioms and, say, one rule that given P you can infer ~~P, where P is any formula, you have an infinite number of theorems (p, ~~p, ~~~~p, etc.). So 1 axiom and 0 rules gives you 1 theorem, while 1 axiom and 1 rule can give you an infinite number of theorems, and so on.

If you have no rules and a set of axiom schema, your theorems will depend on how many instances of those schema exist, which could be finite or infinite.

Also, the same system can have different axiomatizations. For instance, propositional logic has axiomatizations with no axioms or schema and a handful of rules. Obviously, keeping those same rules, you can just adopt however many theorems as axioms and still end up with the same set of theorems. So the same set of rules combined with any number of axioms or schema can generate the exact same set of theorems.

There are also axiomatizations with one schema and one rule, five schemas and one rule, four schema and five rules, and so on. You can pretty much come up with any combination you want.*

*There may be a limit on the number of rules you can have. Depending on how 'well-behaved' your system is, you may be able to change theorems to rules. For instance, say (P -> P) is a theorem. You can change (P -> P) to the rule 'Given P, infer P'. You can do this, for instance, in propositional logic. You can also change rules to theorems in a similar way.

So numbers by themselves don't tell seem to tell you anything.

You may think there's a way to count theorems by grouping them thusly: The theorems that are instances of the axioms; theorems that can be proven from the axioms; theorems that can be proven from the previous theorems; and so on. But there may be different ways to prove the same theorem, so you could end up counting the same theorem more than once.
The most obvious way this happens is by just adding your conclusion to your set of premises: You can infer P from (P) and from (P & Q) and from (P & (Q v ~R) and so on. But here's another example.
Axiom schema:
i) a -> (b -> a)
ii) a -> a
Inference rule:
Modus Ponens - Given a and a -> b, infer b
(p -> (p -> p)) -> (p -> (p -> p)) is an instance of (ii). But it can also be proven from (i):

1) (p -> (p -> p)) -> ((p -> (p -> p)) -> (p -> (p -> p))) [instance of i]
2) p -> (p -> p) [instance of i]
3) (p -> (p -> p)) -> (p -> (p -> p)) [1, 2, Modus Ponens]

So I don't see a way to count theorems this way either.

On the bright side, all of your theorems will be formulas (the 'grammatical sentences' of the language). So there is at least a limit on the number of theorems. You can reduce this number further, for instance, if you know that P and ~P are not both theorems, then the number of theorems is < half the number of formulas.

10. Aug 16, 2005

### honestrosewater

You don't have to; It's just easier to define them that way. You want to say that P is a theorem if there is a proof of P in your system. The way you define proofs, an axiom is a proof of itself. So axioms are theorems, albeit special kinds of theorems.

11. Aug 16, 2005

### AKG

Well, I asked if you knew the difference between a tautology and a theorem, but it appears you don't. A theorem is something that can be derived from the axioms. Any reasonable logic will allow you to derive P from P, so you can derive any axiom from the axioms, hence every axiom is a theorem.

12. Aug 16, 2005

### EnumaElish

I think it should be possible to deduct the minimum number of non-trivial (meant more as a lay concept than a strict logical concept) axioms necessary for a system being internally consistent. The easiest practical method I can think of is asking "how many plugs are needed for the system to hold water, so to speak?"

Neoclassical economists spent a lot of time to find out the minimum number of axioms (assumptions) necessary to prove that a competitive equilibrium exists in a market (free exchange) economy. The concise proof can be found in the 1983 Economics Nobel prize winner Gerard Debreu's seminal Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium.

P.S. Oh, sorry! I completely reversed the original question! I think I need some more sleep (or coffee). If you knew the number of axioms, could you have deduced the number of non-trivial (again, a lay concept) theorems? It should be possible to go the other way in the example I gave and ask "starting from these axioms, what is the minimum number of theorems needed to prove that a competitive equilibrium exists?" I reserve the right to modify this as more coffee becomes available to the system

Last edited: Aug 16, 2005
13. Aug 16, 2005

Staff Emeritus
Well set theory has a finite number of axioms, and from it you can derive all the theorems of arithmetic (of course some of those theorems are undecidable, but you CAN derive them!). It seems likeliy that the distinct theorems of arithmetic are infinite, given the least noninteresting number theorem:

There are no noninteresting whole numbers. Proof by contradiction: if there were noninteresting numbers, then since the numbers are linearly ordered, there would be a least one. But the least noninteresting number is interesting just for that property itself! Contradiction. Q.E.D.

Here a number is said to be interesting if it has some property, other than its value, that distinguishes it from all other numbers.

14. Aug 16, 2005

### EnumaElish

But there should be an answer to the (more modest) question "what is the minimum number of theorems needed to prove the non-trivial statement XYZ starting from the set of axioms ABC?", shouldn't there? ("Non-trivial" meant as a layperson concept.) Sort of like finding the shortest route from point A to point X? (This may be a forced analogy, BTW. I haven't the clue for what kind of a metric can be used in a space in which points are statements.)

P.S. I realize that is not what the OP asked, but that question is settled by your (selfAdjoint's) post.

Last edited: Aug 16, 2005
15. Aug 16, 2005

### AKG

You might ask what the fewest number of lines is required to prove sentence P from the set of sentences S, but otherwise, assuming P can be proven from S, the minimum number of theorems is 0.

16. Aug 16, 2005

### EnumaElish

So assuming a metric can be defined, what you are saying is "P is provable from S" means zero distance, so P = S in that "metric" space, is that even close?

17. Aug 16, 2005

### AKG

No, I mean "the number of theorems required" does not provide a good metric, and is barely meaningful. In fact, I don't think the idea of a metric is a suitable one. For one, statements are proven from sets of statements, so our "metric" would tell us the distance between points and sets of points, which is not right. Moreover, our metric would not be symmetric because even if we can prove P from Q, that does not mean we can prove Q from P. There's also no guarantee that we can prove P from Q or vice versa, so the metric could not even be defined, even if you defined the distance from P to Q to be the distance from either P to Q (if Q follows from P) or Q to P (if P follows from Q).

The problem with "the number of theorems needed" is that if you have a proof that uses theorem T, it's no different from proving theorem T within your proof, so you could always say you didn't need that theorem. Also, every line of your proof (that occurs in the scope of the primary assumptions, i.e. the axioms) would technically count as a theorem, so it's better just to count lines anyways.

Still, it's not a good metric for most of the same reasons above (it would give a distance from a set to a point, and it wouldn't be symmetric).

18. Aug 16, 2005

### EnumaElish

It doesn't have to; if each statement is a point then you might have statements x, y, and z that can be proven using statements a, b and c. Formally, that's just like a vector space.
I am not sure whether a metric has to be symmetric. If it does, then you are right, a metric cannot be defined. But you may still have a space ordered by "needed to prove" relation: define relation "$\prec$" such that if a set of statements A = {a1,...,ak} is needed to prove the set of statements X = {x1,...,xk} then one writes A $\prec$ X.
Yes, that means that the this ordering is incomplete. Alternatively, you could restrict it to the subspace of statements that are known to be provable. On that subspace, the ordering is complete.
That depends on definition. Let's say that if either T itself or a proof of T is needed in proving U then by definition T $\prec$ U.

19. Aug 16, 2005

### AKG

I'm not exactly sure what you're saying. Are you saying that if you can derive x from {a, b, c} in n lines (say that's our "metric") then d(x,a) = d(x,b) = d(x,c) = n? Well if you can derive x from {a, b, c} in n lines, then you can derive x from {a, b, c} U S in at most n lines for any set of statements S. In fact, since you can derive x from {x} in 1 line (or perhaps we should say 0 lines to get this looking more like a metric), you can derive x from {x, a, b, c} in 0 lines, so d(x, y) = 0 for all sentences x, y.
What makes a set A a necessary set to prove X? Is it that all the sentences of A occur in the scope of the primary assumptions of the derivations of all the sentences of X?
I'm not sure what you mean by complete or incomplete orderings.
Well, this is a different issue. That's fine for an ordering relation, but if you want a metric, it's still better to count lines.

20. Aug 16, 2005

### Hurkyl

Staff Emeritus
Zero.

If a collection of axioms is consistent, then so is any subcollection.

If it's not a tautology, then you only need one axiom. I'll give you one guess as to a good choice for that axiom.

One: the theorem that a competetive equilibrium exists. :tongue2: (Assuming that a proof exists, of course)

If it's a theorem, then it can't be undecidable, because you have a proof of it. :tongue2:

I don't think the idea of "needed to prove" makes any sense at all. I can prove the set of statements {R} from the set of statements {R}. I can also prove it from the set of statements {~~R}.