Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

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Discussion Overview

The discussion revolves around the technical aspects and current status of the nuclear plants at Fukushima Daiichi following the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Participants are seeking reliable information regarding the operational conditions, safety measures, and potential risks associated with the nuclear reactors in the aftermath of the disaster.

Discussion Character

  • Exploratory
  • Technical explanation
  • Debate/contested

Main Points Raised

  • Some participants express skepticism about the reliability of media reports and emphasize the need for technical information from official sources like TEPCO and METI.
  • There are concerns regarding the reactor pressure levels, with reports suggesting that pressure may have exceeded safe limits, which some participants describe as a significant issue.
  • Questions are raised about the likelihood of a meltdown, with differing opinions on whether this is a realistic concern or media exaggeration.
  • One participant explains the role of coolant in a nuclear power plant, noting that it is essential for cooling the reactor and managing decay heat after shutdown.
  • There is discussion about the reactor's ability to be scrammed (shut down) and the implications of losing coolant, with some participants clarifying that decay heat continues to be produced even after shutdown.
  • Concerns are raised about the explosion of the containment building and its implications for safety, with speculation about the potential release of radioactive materials.
  • Participants discuss the wind direction at the time of the explosion and its potential impact on the dispersion of any radioactive materials released.

Areas of Agreement / Disagreement

Participants do not reach a consensus on the likelihood of a meltdown or the implications of the current situation at Fukushima Daiichi. There are multiple competing views regarding the severity of the situation and the reliability of information being reported.

Contextual Notes

Participants note the limitations of available information, including the reliance on second-hand reports and the challenges in verifying the status of the reactors and containment structures. There are also unresolved questions regarding the operational status of safety systems and the exact nature of the explosion.

  • #361
uart said:
I think the point is that the height of the tsunami couldn't have been be estimated when they built the plant, so more safety margin should have been allowed.

Everything else in the design seem to have safety margin and redundancy built in, but the elevation to protect from potential tsunami seems to have little safety margin. Six meters seems a bit like, "oh what's that biggest tsunami we've had in the last 100 years or so, yeah that will do, no need for any safety margin". The tsunami risk on the Pacific coast of Japan has been known to the Japanese for centuries. Even just restricting to the era of modern history, tsunamis bigger than 6m had been recorded.

Yes I know it's 20/20 hindsight, but this issue of site placement just seems like the biggest weakness in the whole design. Zero safety margin when compared to tsunamis from just the era of modern history. This surprises me since more elevation doesn't seem as if it would have been difficult problem.

15m is a huge height though. It seems relatively little to think about as it is so easily walkable. Going up though it is around 5 storeys. IIRC the tallest waves produced by the 2004 tsunami were 90ft (27m) high and that was the third largest earthquake ever recorded.

It's not just immediate hindsight with this situation, we have the benefit of 40 years of hindsight from when these plants were first built, probably nearer 50 from when they were first conceived and designed.
 
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  • #362
uart said:
I think the point is that the height of the tsunami couldn't have been be estimated when they built the plant, so more safety margin should have been allowed.

Everything else in the design seem to have safety margin and redundancy built in, but the elevation to protect from potential tsunami seems to have little safety margin. Six meters seems a bit like, "oh what's that biggest tsunami we've had in the last 100 years or so, yeah that will do, no need for any safety margin". The tsunami risk on the Pacific coast of Japan has been known to the Japanese for centuries. Even just restricting to the era of modern history, tsunamis bigger than 6m had been recorded.

Yes I know it's 20/20 hindsight, but this issue of site placement just seems like the biggest weakness in the whole design. Zero safety margin when compared to tsunamis from just the era of modern history. This surprises me since more elevation doesn't seem as if it would have been difficult problem.
We've learned a lot about simulation and the geodynamics in 40 years.

I've put together a database of mag 8+, and mag 7-9 earthquakes around the world and around Japan since 1990. I got some interesting results!

There has been a significant tsunami in Alaska, in 1964 - at the time these plants were being designed.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964_Alaska_earthquake
Mag 9.2, tsunami: A 27-foot (8.2 m) tsunami destroyed the village of Chenega!

If they had bother to design to that, then . . . .

Somehow the designers rationalized a lower tsunami that the one that took out the EDGs.

In the interim, 40+ years, there have been mag 8+ earthquakes, including one off Chilean coast last year.
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010tfan/#details
That should have prompt a site review, but . . . .
 
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  • #363
image-193170-galleryV9-njkp.jpg

Reactor 4

image-193230-galleryV9-ovfc.jpg

Reactor 4

image-193255-galleryV9-wbmd.jpg

Reactor 4


image-193165-galleryV9-kzvg.jpg

Reactor 3

image-193254-galleryV9-gmmj.jpg

Reactor 1
 
  • #364
Meanwhile - Progress by on-site workers
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Progress_by_on-site_workers_1703111.html
17 March 2011
FIRST PUBLISHED: 4.56pm
UPDATE 1: 5.22pm

The high levels of radiation braved by workers at the scene in Fukushima Daiichi appear to have reduced after the expansion of the workforce and announcements of infrastructure improvements to come.

In recent days emergency managers were faced with an extremely complicated task to prioritise jobs across all four struggling reactor units in the main part of the site, while a skeleton operating crew maintained the status of units 5 and 6 about two hundred metres away.

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Attempts_to_refill_fuel_ponds_1703111.html
 
  • #365
Astronuc said:
The high levels of radiation braved by workers at the scene in Fukushima Daiichi appear to have reduced after the expansion of the workforce and announcements of infrastructure improvements to come.

image-192946-galleryV9-pakh.jpg

time scale of measured radiation (sorry labelling is in German) source is Tepco
 
  • #366
Zeitpunkt = Time point = Time, der Messung = of the measurement.
Dosisleistung = Dose rate
 
  • #367
Stills from this video showed some interesting green emissions (30 second mark):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBXqiw6EJUk"

Could this be chlorine vapor, or some kind of radioactive emission showing up on the CCD of the camera not visible to the naked eye?
 

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  • #368
AntonL said:
image-193170-galleryV9-njkp.jpg

Reactor 4

image-193230-galleryV9-ovfc.jpg

Reactor 4

image-193255-galleryV9-wbmd.jpg

Reactor 4


image-193165-galleryV9-kzvg.jpg

Reactor 3

image-193254-galleryV9-gmmj.jpg

Reactor 1

YIKES!
The damage at unit 4 is much more extensive than apparent on the earlier photo. It would seem the single gaping hole on the far side (next to the tower) with the "tongue" of stuff hanging out the hole is the least damaged portion of the building.

The green metal structure is the crane, I suspect. If so, and if it is over the SFP, then the SFP is indeed on the opposite side of the building from the picture of the first gaping hole and "tongue" of insulation.

All that said, it certainly doesn't look promising.
 
  • #369
TCups said:
YIKES!
The damage at unit 4 is much more extensive than apparent on the earlier photo. It would seem the single gaping hole on the far side (next to the tower) with the "tongue" of stuff hanging out the hole is the least damaged portion of the building.

The green metal structure is the crane, I suspect. If so, and if it is over the SFP, then the SFP is indeed on the opposite side of the building from the picture of the first gaping hole and "tongue" of insulation.

All that said, it certainly doesn't look promising.
The green structure could be the refueling or fuel-handling machine, which could be over the core, or the spent fuel pool. SFP is obviously to either side of the core, but we don't know which side without a schematic.
 
  • #370
Astronuc said:
The green structure could be the refueling or fuel-handling machine, which could be over the core, or the spent fuel pool. SFP is obviously to either side of the core, but we don't know which side without a schematic.

It looked like on the earlier schematic that the fuel-handling machine only went over the core or the pool, not on both sides of the pool. That said, it also looked as if there might be a second pool on the opposite side. Not a detailed enough drawing for me to know. What is encouraging is the apparent integrity of the concrete walls beneath the fuel-handling machine. Is is a safe assumption that the rising smoke is coming from the pool and fuel rods? I think probably so.

Here's the schematic again.

DrywellTorus.jpg


Is the overhead crane (2) that is orange perhaps a completely different structure than the yellow fuel-handling machine under it? The overhead crane rails do traverse the entire length of the building. The fuel-handling machine's tracks on the floor only go as far as the access to the core. And there does look to be a second pool of some sort on both sides of the core containment (3), (4).
 
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  • #371
My analysis of https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3193827&postcount=363"

Reactor 1 to 3 are concrete frame with metal framed roof top. In reactor 4 the metal framed rooftop has been replaced by concrete construction thus a much stronger building. With H2 explosion 1 and 3 destroyed the metal frame rooftop leaving concrete structure much intact, a sort of a vent. However, in unit 4 when H2 exploded it had no vent thus destroying much of the concrete structure.
 
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  • #372
AntonL said:
My analysis of new photos

Reactor 1 to 3 are concrete frame with metal framed roof top. In reactor 4 the metal framed rooftop has been replaced by concrete construction thus a much stronger building. With H2 explosion 1 and 3 destroyed the metal frame rooftop leaving concrete structure much intact, a sort of a vent. However, in unit 4 when H2 exploded it had no vent thus destroying much of the concrete structure.

Good eye, Anton. And as I look closer, Astronuc is exactly right, as usual. The more apparent green structure is the fuel-handling machine. There is a much heavier overhead crane above it.

Interesting that image 193230 seems to have been cropped, perhaps right above where the contents of the pool might have been visible in the shot. Hmmm.
 
  • #373
TCups said:
Interesting that image 193230 seems to have been cropped, perhaps right above where the contents of the pool might have been visible in the shot. Hmmm.

Hmmm, we have not seen any photos in possession of US government of todays surveillance flight by drone, which USA have passed to Japan. I just read that USA will reimburse 20000 US citizens their flight home Hmmm they seem to know more than they willing to tell
 
  • #374
AntonL said:
time scale of measured radiation (sorry labelling is in German) source is Tepco

This is interesting. It seems that the emission of radioactive material only happened in "discrete" events. After each event an exponential decay can be observed, as expected if the radioactive material is not replenished.
So a slow burn or oxidation or whatever of the possibly bare fuel rods in the SFPs seems unlikely as this would lead to a continuous emission.
So would it be reasonable to assume, that the radioactive material is emitted from a slightly damaged containment?

Btw: The last picture in your earlier post also depicts reactor 3 (not 1).
 
  • #375
AntonL said:
Hmmm, we have not seen any photos in possession of US government of todays surveillance flight by drone, which USA have passed to Japan. I just read that USA will reimburse 20000 US citizens their flight home Hmmm they seem to know more than they willing to tell

Seems there's no indication at present that photos will be released for public scrutiny.
 
  • #376
TCups said:
It looked like on the earlier schematic that the fuel-handling machine only went over the core or the pool, not on both sides of the pool. That said, it also looked as if there might be a second pool on the opposite side. Not a detailed enough drawing for me to know. What is encouraging is the apparent integrity of the concrete walls beneath the fuel-handling machine. Is is a safe assumption that the rising smoke is coming from the pool and fuel rods? I think probably so.

Is the overhead crane (2) that is orange perhaps a completely different structure than the yellow fuel-handling machine under it? The overhead crane rails do traverse the entire length of the building. The fuel-handling machine's tracks on the floor only go as far as the access to the core. And there does look to be a second pool of some sort on both sides of the core containment (3), (4).
The overhead crane is used to lift the heavy plug and upper equipment of the top of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The plug can be set aside on the floor (I'm not entirely familiar with specific practices). The RPV head and internals, e.g., steam dryers, would be placed in an equipment pool (4) for shielding.

The refueling machine handles the fuel between the SFP (3) and core. There should be a transfer canal between the reactor cavity and SFP. When the core is being unloaded or loaded, the irradiated fuel is transferred underwater which shields the workers from the radiation.

Some wonder if the any of the SFPs or the transfer canal area, particualy in Unit 4, were damaged by the quakes. If so, there could be a leak - which compounds the problem of water loss from the SFP. BUT - we don't have that information.
 
  • #377
What is the volume of SFP's in Daiichi reactors 3 and 4?
 
  • #378
Does anyone understand why the Grid supply from the Japanese nuclear plants cannot be simply back fed to supply electricity to the cooling pumps.

Relying on diesel generators at all nuclear plants seems a little hit and miss.
 
  • #379
rjb100 said:
Does anyone understand why the Grid supply from the Japanese nuclear plants cannot be simply back fed to supply electricity to the cooling pumps.

Relying on diesel generators at all nuclear plants seems a little hit and miss.

You mean from other plants that were unaffected? Or you mean from the Fukushima plant?
 
  • #380
rjb100 said:
Does anyone understand why the Grid supply from the Japanese nuclear plants cannot be simply back fed to supply electricity to the cooling pumps.
It appears that the transmission and distribution system in the area was damaged or destroyed by the quake, and parts by the tsunami. TEPCO is attempting to put in a 1 mi/1.6 km line ASAP - and I expect they have been working very hard to restore grid connection.

Relying on diesel generators at all nuclear plants seems a little hit and miss.
The EDGs are there precisely to provide power when there is loss of offsite power - loss of connection to the grid.
 
  • #381
TCups said:
Perhaps. But as a radiologist, I make my living with my eyes, interpreting what I see. Here is a picture from the net of the Fukushima (nomen, omen?) of units 3 and 4, dated October 3, 2008. Note the location of the berm (X).

Unit3and4.jpg


another view, after unit 3 has exploded, but before the explosion and fire at unit 4:

http://media.kansas.com/smedia/2011/03/14/20/495Japan_Earthquake.sff.slideshow_main.prod_affiliate.80.jpg

Some brave soul peeked out from behind that berm (X) in the first photo to take this picture (annotated with my personal interpretations).

r735227_5964756.jpg


Presuming the access tunnel (1) in the diagram below is coming from the building next to the reactor in the first photo, which seems reasonable, that square hole in the side of unit 4 is, in fact, precisely where the diagram puts the SFP's location (3).

DrywellTorus.jpg


Do you think the roof of the Unit 4 building still looks intact? If there is still (boiling?) water in the SFP, where is the steam? Instead, I see a faint cloud of dark, sooty smoke wafting from the square hole with the red dots inside at an angle across the tower to the right, in the last photo. I hope I am wrong, but my eyes tell me something different from the official reports you quote.

vlcsnap-2011-03-17-22h05m18s147-1.png


I looked at the helicopter video frame by frame. There are a few frames in it showing the side of reactor building 4 with the supposed SFP hole in it.

The angle is only visible for a few frames before the tower obscures the view at 00:57. The copter is moving from this location showing reactor 4 towards the bottom left and reactor buildings 3, 2 and 1 are shown in succession in this fly-by.

Curiously, I think there should have been a much better view of this side of reactor building 4 earlier in the video, as the helicopter was flying the other way. But this part of the video is missing (I would assume it has been cut out?).

See the video for yourself on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBXqiw6EJUk".
 
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  • #382
Surely, it is not necessary to rely on hand-held video taken from a helicopter trying to stay out of a dangerous or fatal radiation zone. We have a carrier group off-shore that likely has remote surveillance drones. Decent hi-rez stuff (with IR sensors as well, possibly) that could show us in great detail what is going on there without risking human exposure.
 
  • #383
Worker at Japanese nuclear plant: We’re putting our lives on the line

http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_thelookout/20110317/us_yblog_thelookout/worker-at-japanese-nuclear-plant-were-putting-our-lives-on-the-line

The sprayed water like they were fighting a fire, not filling a pool with water. :rolleyes:
 
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  • #384
Astronuc said:
Worker at Japanese nuclear plant: We’re putting our lives on the line

http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_thelookout/20110317/us_yblog_thelookout/worker-at-japanese-nuclear-plant-were-putting-our-lives-on-the-line

The sprayed water like they were fighting a fire, not filling a pool with water. :rolleyes:
Yep. Air-dropping water from a bucket made for fighting forest fires is not too effective. To replace half of the water in a 40x40x40 SFP would require 992 tons of water, accurately delivered. Earlier reports that 30 (IIR) tons of water had been dumped from 'copters seem like a drop in the bucket, especially when looking at that image, because the water is essentially going about everywhere and is not targeted.

For fire-suppression in a brushy place, those drops might be effective, but not here.
 
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  • #385
turbo-1 said:
Yep. Air-dropping water from a bucket made for fighting forest fires is not too effective. To replace half of the water in a 40x40x40 SFP would require 992 tons of water, accurately delivered. Earlier reports that 30 (IIR) tons of water had been dumped from 'copters seem like a drop in the bucket, especially when looking at that image, because the water is essentially going about everywhere and is not targeted.

For fire-suppression in a brushy place, those drops might be effective, but not here.

I am wondering if there isn't some place they could scoop up lots of snow and drop that. Per volume, the weight wouldn't be different. Snow would be less dense than water, but big snow ball might be easier to drop precisely on target, and the heat of transition of the ice would provide an additional 880Kcal/M of cooling as it melted to water to fill the SFP.
 
  • #388
Polish media reports electric line is ready.
 
  • #389
Borek said:
Polish media reports electric line is ready.
NBC nightly news, too. Now, let's hope pumps, valves, etc work.
 
  • #390
What I'm most curious about are the spent fuel ponds. Would the reinstatement of power in the facility allow the ponds to be cooled without having to pump in a continuous stream of fresh water? I'm just fuzzy on whether or not there's an actual cooling system for the spent fuel ponds, or if they just replace the water as it boils off.
 

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