Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

[dave2004]

Considering residual heat loads for reactors and published heat loads for SFP then there is enough energy to boil about 400m3 of water per day

With all the leaks they need a lot more

Does the US army not have transportable desalination units? A quick google search turns up there are units for flatbeds that have capacities of 140'000 GPD which I assume to be gallons per day and should be able to cope with generating enough water.

 

[Reno Deano]

I wanted to mention some important details in the last french IRSN report from this morning (source: http://www.irsn.fr/FR/Actualites_presse/Actualites/Pages/201103_situation_au_japon.aspx#1 ).

They are giving infos on the levels of water found in the basement of reactor n°2 and N°3, and the levels are much higher than what i have seen reported so far. They are talking about 1 m of water in the basement of turbine building at N°2 and 1,5m in the basement of turbine building at N°3! Until now i was staying with numbers like 15 or 30 cms of water in N°3 (when the 3 workers were injured walking in this water)...

Does it mean that this level has dramatically increased in between?

Something else, IRSN is reporting that they found also contaminated water in several "wells" outside of buildings of reactors N°2 and 3.

I see that has been reported (in other recent sources) contaminated water in a trench outside of these reactors, maybe is it the same info or a related info.

--------------------
I assume all of you posters are aware that they (TEPCO) tried to and succeeded in adding copious quantities of seawater to the 4 reactors and spent fuel pools, after significant explosions damaged upper portions (and possibly seals on the primary containment-not RPV). They did this during a station blackout and probably had to rely on analog guages, if that, to determine flows and pressures. Also, the unit(s) radwaste systems collect water from floor drains throughout the plants, including the Turbine buildings. The radwaste systems have a finite limit on their capacity. To protect the radwaste tanks, there are overflows to other areas where the water can be collected or disposed of, but not in a controlled manner. Now with all the water being washed over the spent fuel pools and out of the RPV, there is a chance much radioactivity was also washed over and out of the reactor building. Also, there were deliberate discharges from the RPVs to keep them from going solid with water and bursting from hydraulic effects. When ever they stopped pumping water into the RPV or Primary Containment there was the inevitable back flow of fluids due to increased RPV pressure or via the vent path. During normal operations connecting piping systems and hoses can involve less than leak tight fittings, even under the most favorable of working conditions. The reactor radwaste systems are inter-connected with the Turbine Building since there is also contaminated water to be collected from the Turbine Building. Under the best of conditions such a large piping system is fraught with leaks and failed valves, including check valves. Now the magnitude of the assault on the Japanese plants, I would expect many piping systems designed for normal operation to not perform as designed. Water, water everywhere and not a drop fit to drink or step in!

Let me tell you, things happening at the plants are totally new to the workers and managers and the high radiation levels significantly hamper making insitu observations and corrective actions in timely manner. Insitu photos/videos and observations, radiochemistry and radiation measurements, stablizing reactor pressures and temperatures, and getting reactor plant system guages back on line; are the only way to accurately determine the damage and future recovery actions. Speculations based on views of the exterior of the Reactor Buildings is welcomed fodder for the uniformed masses.

 

[Borek]

2. How much thermal energy does it take to evaporate 7 tons of cold water?

About 18-19 GJ, depending on the initial temperature.

Unless I am wrong.

 

[divmstr95]

Are the daily updates still coming out from TEPCO re. reactor temperatures, CAMS and containment pressures?

I haven't seen any new data for a while.

Use this website:

http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/

 

[jlduh]

Again, every day that passes amazes me to see how weak and improvised is the response on the ground to control the consequences of this catastroph. I understand that Japan is fighting the consequences of a terrible earthquake and tsunami in addition to this nuclear crisis, but it seems that the autorities are continuing to put the responsability on Tepco shoulders to control the situation, and try to keep up with what's going (and regularly when a mistake is done, they say: "i urge you to improve your safe safety management for workers",or "I urge you to be careful when you transmit wrong measurements". It's like a scenario where a private company deals with regulation autorities and these ones tell them: "this is your responsability to manage this mess, and please do it in accordance with regulation standards and requirements")

We will have maybe the first Iso 14000 certified nuclear catastroph in Fukushima (in words, not in facts of course!)?

ok I'm a little bit sarcastic, but...

This is no more a tepco problem, this is 1) a Japan problem and even more 2) an international problem! Is the Japan state so weak to take the lead around this mess? Of course Tepco knows more about the plant than Japan autorities but again this is a different subject. Where are military resources from Japan? Two weeks after the beginning of the crisis we talk about a barge with 2000 m3 of fresh water coming to rescue, and this is from US troops? That's almost a joke to me...

This is a situation of great exception, and a lot of people in the world are waiting for an international response to this crisis, I'm not even sure we can talk of a Japan response until now based on what we saw in the last 2 weeks. I don't know what is going on with international experts and resources on the ground, but if this is a (long and difficult) battle against this damn nuclear plan that is going on (like the BATTLE of tchernobyl has been called), then when will this battle get large adequate exception means to be won?

I've always been impressed with the vocabulary used in civil nuclear industry (for example, the protection enveloppes are called "lines of defense", Reno DEANO just above is talking about the "assault on the japanese plant" ;o)) and this is related with the fact that civil nuclear has been historically a direct "byproduct" or sister of military nuclear (to make bombs plutonium was required). For the russians in Tchernobyl, from day one it was clear: this is a state and military problem with state and military -huge- ressources and management to cope with the accident (of course no war is clean in reality even if some use a vocabulary like "chirurgical weapons" to create the impression it can be: the tchernobyl battle was also a "dirty" battle from environment and human standpoint of course).

I don't know if i express well the point that i saw several times expressed in one way or another on this forum but clearly, i see a huge difference in scale between the problem and the "solutions". Like if everybody was willing to underscale the response in order to underscale the problem... I really don't think that now that the "toothpaste went outside of the tube", a private company can handle the crisis (even if from the juridic standpoint they are probably responsible), the scale has to be upgraded to one or two levels concerning the strategical leadership.

I'm talking about Leadership. Time is critical and involves some leadership decisions to be made. The inertia from this standpoint is blatant.

EDIT: an other example of the weak and confusing leadership from the state standpoint (i already mentioned earlier on this thread this problem citing an interview of the Minamisoma's mayor who was upset with unclear decisions from government): More evacuees return to homes near nuclear plant!

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/28_14.html

How hell can peole there understand something to the misleading communication of authorities and unclear leadership scale of the current problem? "No evacuation order between 20 and 30kms (just "advice" to leave on a volunteer basis) for the two first weeks must mean that it is not so serious, this is a plant problem and the autorities are not even steeping into take the leadership on the site, this is a sign that the situation is not so serious": isn't this that a lot of japan folks not knowledgeable of the details can think and spread around?

 

[Joe Neubarth]

Considering residual heat loads for reactors and published heat loads for SFP then there is enough energy to boil about 400m3 of water per day

With all the leaks they need a lot more

Unless they are trucking it off site, they will eventually run out of space to store the contaminated water. All of the concrete basement structures will eventually adsorb tremendous amounts of radiation that can only be eliminated by carting the cement away. (Not Practical, and it would add to air particulate radiation), so they need to cap those highly radioactive spots once they figure out what to do with the Reactor cores/Lava flow (depending upon what you believe is happening.)

They have got an environmental mess there that they will be tending to for a great, great many years.

 

[Joe Neubarth]

Again, every day that passes amazes me to see how weak and improvised is the response on the ground to control the consequences of this catastroph. I understand that Japan is fighting the consequences of a terrible earthquake and tsunami in addition to this nuclear crisis, but it seems that the autorities are continuing to put the responsability on Tepco shoulders to control the situation, and try to keep up with what's going (and regularly when a mistake is done, they say: "i urge you to improve your safe safety management for workers",or "I urge you to be careful when you transmit wrong measurements". It's like a scenario where a private company deals with regulation autorities and these ones tell them: "this is your responsability to manage this mess, and please do it in accordance with regulation standards and requirements")

We will have maybe the first Iso 14000 certified nuclear catastroph in Fukushima...

This is no more a tepco problem, this is 1) a Japan problem and even more 2) an international problem! Is the Japan state so weak to take the lead around this mess? Of course Tepco knows more about the plant than Japan autorities but again this is a different subject. Where are military resources from Japan? Two weeks after the beginning of the crisis we talk about a barge with 2000 m3 of fresh water coming to rescue, and this is from US troops? That's almost a joke to me...

This is a situation of great exception, and a lot of people in the world are waiting for an international response to this crisis, I'm not even sure we can talk of a Japan response until now based on what we saw in the last 2 weeks. I don't know what is going on with international experts and resources on the ground, but if this is a (long and difficult) battle against this damn nuclear plan that is going on (like the BATTLE of tchernobyl has been called), then when will this battle get large adequate exception means to be won?

I've always been impressed with the vocabulary used in civil nuclear industry (for example, the protection enveloppes are called "lines of defense", Reno DEANO just above is talking about the "assault on the japanese plant" ;o)) and this is related with the fact that civil nuclear has been historically a direct "byproduct" or sister of military nuclear (to make bombs plutonium was required). For the russians in Tchernobyl, from day one it was clear: this is a state and military problem with state and military -huge- ressources and management to cope with the accident (of course no war is clean in reality even if some use a vocabulary like "chirurgical weapons" to create the impression it can be: the tchernobyl battle was also a "dirty" battle from environment and human standpoint of course).

I don't know if i express well the point that i saw several times expressed in one way or another on this forum but clearly, i see a huge difference in scale between the problem and the "solutions". Like if everybody was willing to underscale the response in order to underscale the problem... I really don't think that now that the "toothpaste went outside of the tube", a private company can handle the crisis (even if from the juridic standpoint they are probably responsible), the scale has to be upgraded to one or two levels concerning the strategical leadership.

I'm talking about Leadership. Time is critical and involves some leadership decisions to be made. The inertia from this standpoint is blatant.

We can always do what our dear sister Angela is doing in Germany and that is say, "No More Nukes!" I feel that this is impractical and will never be the solution globally. Nuclear Power is here to stay even if isolated to certain regions of the globe. We just have to design our plants better. From an engineering standpoint there are many questions about the design of Fukushima with respect to the region it was built, and many questions about their preparation for multiple emergencies. When you see statements like, "The plug did not fit." you know somebody did not do their homework on disaster preparedness. That is water over the dam now. What do we need to recover from this mess is the operative question now.

 

[Joe Neubarth]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/28_h28.html

"pumping in 16 tons of water every hour in #2, might cut down to the 7 tons that are evaporated every hour".

1. What happens to the 9 tons that doesn't evaporate?
2. How much thermal energy does it take to evaporate 7 tons of cold water?
3. Where does all this steam go?

1. Sits in pools and where possible leaks into the ground as all water does.
2. I think somebody answered this.
3. In this situation that which does not condense (Where designed, or on walls, steel girders and such) escapes to the winds.

 

[jlduh]

What do we need to recover from this mess is the operative question now.

Yes Joe, and my point was on this subject: leadership on the operative question.

I was not even talking about nuclear necessity of whatever related to this, i was saying: when the mess is spread around in a similar scenario that was not even foreseen in the worst case scenarios (which explains the unplanned actions: i remember everybody that US experts said quickly that using seawater to cool the cores like that was a desesperate decision -even if the only one!) , this becomes a state or international problem, and the leadership has to REFLECT this fact.

This is the limit of private companies in this matter i think, because they just can't handle it as fast and as strong as it should be. A nuclear plant which is in this situation of large and fast evoluting mess induces an exception state which a company cannot, "by design", handle...

Like it or not, but I'm afraid it's true, and will become more and more obvious as days will go...

 

[Reno Deano]

Again, every day that passes amazes me to see how weak and improvised is the response on the ground to control the consequences of this catastrophe. I understand that Japan is fighting the consequences of a terrible earthquake and tsunami in addition to this nuclear crisis, but it seems that the authorities are continuing to put the responsibility on TEPCO shoulders to control the situation, and try to keep up with what's going (and regularly when a mistake is done, they say: "i urge you to improve your safe safety management for workers",or "I urge you to be careful when you transmit wrong measurements". It's like a scenario where a private company deals with regulation authorities and these ones tell them: "this is your responsibility to manage this mess, and please do it in accordance with regulation standards and requirements")

You have no idea of the level of stress the Accident managers, workers, and Government is under during the unprecedented multiple reactor accidents. Confusion and indecisiveness is rampant in the Emergency Ops Center, Government (which is dealing with a more larger deadly crisis outside of the reactor plant grounds) and assist organizations. Combine this with the assistance from the World nuclear experts, which have never seen this type of situation to even one reactor, and are faced with three reactors and spent fuel pools with different levels of catastrophic damage. Due to the resultant Station Blackout, explosions, and emergency equipment failures, they were not allowed the grace of moving from one problem to another in an orderly fashion.

Yes, we all want timely and accurate data, but that is not the real world during a catastrophic nuclear emergency, or even a lesser one, believe me.

Do not condemn until you have walked in their shoes.

We will gain invaluable information and lessons learned from their mistakes and miscues, but during the next catastrophic reactor accident similar mistakes and miscue's will also be made.

Dean Chaney, CHP
37 Years in the Nuclear Reactor Industry

 

[|Fred]

I fear this is getting off topic to political issue. I guess on Kiefer Sutherland's 24 the US army was a lot more involved and they only need the tech operator to look clueless, while Military will solve everything did it's thingy.

The SDF are working at the Fukushima plant, it's the closest thing to an army that Japan has, since WW2 Japan kind of made a point in not having an army (per say).
Those are the one putting water into the plant for the past days.

 

[Bodge]

And there it is: Pu-238,239,240

In soil samples, more info here:

http://plixi.com/p/87602186

[Sampled 22nd]

 

[TCups]

BEWARE concerning the picture you posted FRED on the internal top floor layout: This is a picture i previously posted here i think three days ago (i did only a print screen capture of the video of Mr Tanaka's conference) and i mentionned that IT WAS PRESENTED BY TANAKA AS THE INTERIOR OF TOP FLOOR OF REACTOR N°6 WHICH IS A DIFFERENT GENERATION OF BWR REACTOR (i mentionned that the building is square from the top, the other ones 1 to 5 are rectangular). He presented this because he wanted to show the various parts of a reactor fully opened with the reactor's cover, the containement vessel's cover and the pool. But the actual layout and position from a geographical standpoint are probably different in reactors 1 to 5.

So this picture can be misleading if used to describe damaged reactors.

I didn't find until now actual pictures of the damaged reactors previously taken before the accident.

Understand. I could not find an exact floor plan of the top floors of units 3 or 4, but it has been confirmed, I believe, that the SPF's are in the SE corner. Here is a wider angle view of the damaged Unit 3.

http://i306.photobucket.com/albums/nn270/tcups/Picture8.png

 

[artax]

I fear this is getting off topic to political issue. I guess on Kiefer Sutherland's 24 the US army was a lot more involved and they only need the tech operator to look clueless, while Military will solve everything did it's thingy.

The SDF are working at the Fukushima plant, it's the closest thing to an army that Japan has, since WW2 Japan kind of made a point in not having an army (per say).
Those are the one putting water into the plant for the past days.

Probably due to the lack of new information.
We're bored 'cos there's nothing new to work on!
I think if they gave the truth out to all concerned they'd get answers, not panic... OK they feel embarrased, but mistakes happen... we only learn something REALLY when we make a mistake so swallow your pride, and tell us what happening!

 

[divmstr95]

And there it is: Pu-238,239,240

In soil samples, more info here:

http://plixi.com/p/87602186

[Sampled 22nd]

Any idea where these samples were taken? I see the distances. Do you know what they are in relation to?

Sorry, my knowledge of Kanji is pretty poor.

 

[Bodge]

...If the fuel material was washed out, then the core is less likely to become critical, because the fuel material would end up in the water, which is at the bottom of the core or in the plenum underneath the core, where there is a lot of hardware...

Is it even possible to 'wash out' the reactors and distribute fuel wherever the water goes?

Have they had the available water pressure to move out broken/melted fuel rods; I'm assuming the fuel is pretty dense..

Or, is that exactly what they've been doing for 10 days: flushing out the cores to prevent further explosions?

If so, the groundwater and the pacific will get a battering.

 

[Bodge]

Any idea where these samples were taken? I see the distances. Do you know what they are in relation to?

Sorry, my knowledge of Kanji is pretty poor.

http://plixi.com/p/87602186

 

[Joe Neubarth]

Plutonium detected in soil at Fukushima nuke plant: TEPCO

TOKYO, March 28, Kyodo

Plutonium has been detected in soil at five locations at the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, Tokyo Electric Power Co. said Monday.

The operator of the nuclear complex said that the plutonium is believed to have been discharged from nuclear fuel at the plant, which was damaged by the March 11 earthquake and tsunami.

==Kyodo

http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/03/81589.html

I see the earlier posts. This news release is officially from Tepco. Now we can continue.

 

[Borek]

Do not condemn until you have walked in their shoes.

Amen to that.

 

[Bodge]

Must point out, the activity from Pu, quoted per kg of soil is very small..

However, the half-lives of these isotopes is very long.

Will there be more at other locations I wonder?

 

[Joe Neubarth]

Is it even possible to 'wash out' the reactors and distribute fuel wherever the water goes?

Have they had the available water pressure to move out broken/melted fuel rods; I'm assuming the fuel is pretty dense..

Or, is that exactly what they've been doing for 10 days: flushing out the cores to prevent further explosions?

If so, the groundwater and the pacific will get a battering.

If the radioactive water is left standing in cement ponds, like the Turbine Building floor, most of it will be fitered out by the concrete as the water seeps through it. That happened at Three Mile Island.

 

[jlduh]

I need some clarification (promised, this is not political ) related to the hypothesis that it seems there is now some plutonium in the environment of the plant: when we talk about "millisieverts" for example, this is a measure of the dose equivalent radiation, which tries to quantitatively evaluate the biological effects of ionizing radiation.

The equivalent dose to a person is equalled to the absorbed dose, in gray, multiplied by a weighting factor. The weighting factor is determined by a combination of the radiation type, the tissue absorbing the radiation, and some other factors.

So my question is the following one: does the dose equivalent take into account the presence of very toxic elements like plutonium even in small quantities, and if yes, how is it measured by the equipments and integrated in the measurement in millisieverts for example?

In other words, can measurements in millisieverts still be compared to "safe limits" of doses per 24h, or per year for example (in fact i know that it's more a probabilist approach: one dose creates an excess risk of cancers of X/million people) EVEN IF THERE IS SOME ELEMENTS LIKE PLUTONIUM AROUND?

See, this is not political, hey!

 

[divmstr95]

http://plixi.com/p/87602186

Got the other survey map. That is what I was looking for.

Thanks.

 

[Bodge]

So most of the waterborne contaminants will end up locked in the concrete Joe?

 

[Reno Deano]

So most of the waterborne contaminants will end up locked in the concrete Joe?

Bad speculation: it will be deposited there, but released bit by bit over time due to enviornmental conditions. Radiation levels will be basically the same due to the surface deposition of the radioactivity and continual release due to temperature and humidity on the exposed surfaces. Concrete sweats.

 

[Astronuc]

Is it even possible to 'wash out' the reactors and distribute fuel wherever the water goes?

Have they had the available water pressure to move out broken/melted fuel rods; I'm assuming the fuel is pretty dense..

Or, is that exactly what they've been doing for 10 days: flushing out the cores to prevent further explosions?

If so, the groundwater and the pacific will get a battering.

Fuel washout is possible when the cladding is breached and the opening is relatively large - several mils or mm. Grain size of the ceramic is on the order of 10 microns, but there is usually a sized distribution, from ~1 - 20 microns. On the surface, there is some restructuring as a function of burnup, and the fuel subgrain structure forms with sizes on the order of 10's of nm.

If the fuel grains wash out, they go with the flow. If there is no flow, then they would settle toward the bottom of the core, or down through the plenum under the core plate.

Now, with the seawater, I have to wonder if some of the fuel particles will actually dissolve, in which one then has a solution, e.g., uranyl chloride. I don't know of any research into the chemical behavior of spent fuel in seawater.

Any solution could flow through any opening in the system, and possibly to the torus or plant discharge. If they are detecting fission products in the discharge to the sea, then it's either fuel particles or fuel and fission products in solution.

I think the main focus has been on cooling the remaining fuel. I am concerned about the use of seawater though.

Update: Contaminated pools to be drained (where the water seems to be going)
27 March 2011
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Contaminated_pools_to_the_drained_2703111.html

 

[Passionflower]

How can people argue this incident is far less severe than Chernobyl?

According to calculations published by Austria's Central Institute for Meteorology and Geodynamics:

" the iodine released from Fukushima in the first three-four days was about 20 percent of that released from Chernobyl during a ten-day period. For Caesium-137, the figure could amount to some 50 percent."

And now plutonium is spotted as well.

The radiation of Iodine is very short lived but for Caesium- 137 it does not go away in one generation. Plutonium radiation will practically speaking never go away.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/23/us-japan-quake-radiation-chernobyl-idUSTRE72M6OV20110323

 

[TCups]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/28_h28.html

"pumping in 16 tons of water every hour in #2, might cut down to the 7 tons that are evaporated every hour".

1. What happens to the 9 tons that doesn't evaporate?
2. How much thermal energy does it take to evaporate 7 tons of cold water?
3. Where does all this steam go?

You pump 16 tons and whaddya get?
7 tons lighter and fuel that's still wet?
St. Peter don't come knockin' at my door
'cause Fukushima needs me at units 1-4.

 

[Bodge]

Thanks very much for the full answer Astronuc.

 

[Reno Deano]

You pump 16 tons and whaddya get?
7 tons lighter and fuel that's still wet
St. Peter don't come knockin' at my door
'cause Fukushima needs me at units 1-4.

Love it.

 

[TCups]

Love it.

If Bodge can inject light humor, so can I, I guess.

 

[jlduh]

How can people argue this incident is far less severe than Chernobyl?

Only official numbers ONCE THE ACCIDENT IS FINISHED will tell the final level of notation. Don't preclude to quickly, because anyway this is going to last for looooooooooong time!

In other words, "don't be political" (ok, maybe 1% of sarcasm inside my answer? :shy: Hope you understand it! )

 

[jlduh]

http://plixi.com/p/87601856

Are those leaked (no joke) documents or are these official releases? These scanned or Xeroxed documents always look like leaked ones (don't they use word or excel files for generating docs and releasing them officially?)

 

[|Fred]

How can people argue this incident is far less severe than Chernobyl? According to

According to the same article those 20 to 50% might as well be 10% when the French do the math. (assuming it's math they are doing)

Any how , make your mind by your self !
I'll leave it to you to judge of the merit of the claim (speculation really) from the Austrian Weather channel http://www.zamg.ac.at (that's the expert)
(and may be blame the journalist...)

Weather in the crisis region
The weather front that crossed the crisis region meanwhile went out. Rain in Fukushima and Tokyo stopped. The winds are weak, mostly from northerly to easterly directions. Air from the reactors can thus be blown inland.
Tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, winds from westerly directions predominate. Air is thus mostly transported towards the Pacific.
On Friday, a new disturbance is expected to cross the region. There is again potential transport of radioactivity inland.
First emission estimates
In the phase of March 12 to 13, the Fukushima emissions were mostly transported to the Pacific, eventually hitting the CTBTO station in Sacramento/California. In the phase March 14 to 15, on the other hand, most of the emissions were transported inland, hitting the CTBTO station in Takasaki, Japan. Based on simulated dilution factors and measurements, we were able to have a first rough source estimate.
Regarding Iodine-131, the picture is relatively homogeneous. A source term of 1017 Bq per day would explain the measurements in Takasaki as well as Sacramento. The total 4-day emission of 4 1017 Bq is on the order of 20% of the total emissions of Iodine-131 that occurred during the Chernobyl accident. Regarding Cesium-137, the situation is a bit different. In the cloud eventually propagating to the United States, the ratio of Iodine-131 to Cesium-137 was about 30. This is similar to the Chernobyl accident. In Takasaki, however, this ratio was four. This would indicate a much larger Cesium-137 release in the second two-day period after the accident. Taking this together, the source terms would be about 3 1015 Bq during the first two days, and 3 1016 during the second two-day period. In sum, this could amount to about 50% of the Chernobyl source term of Cesium-137.

 

[|Fred]

Are those leaked (no joke) documents or are these official releases? These scanned or Xeroxed documents always look like leaked ones (don't they use word or excel files for generating docs and releasing them officially?)

Those are papers coming from Tepco press conference, from the past 2 weeks those press conference were held live and document uploaded live by Japanese journalists, as soon as they were handled.. usually takes a few hours for NISA to clean them up and put the pdf online and again a few hours or a day to have them in english ..

I gave link to the live streaming... it's a shame we don't have some one to translate them

http://www.ustream.tv/channel/iwakamiyasumi

 

[liamdavis]

First I want to thank the many contributors to this forum especially the moderators/mentors. I have read it all from the beginning and understood more than I would have thought. Thanks for the clear and concise explanations. Keeping up with it has been a bit like chasing the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow though.

As a teen I worked on the construction of the Pilgrim 1 plant in Plymouth, Mass (1970). I had the run of the place and recognize the Daiichi 1-4 designs. I later worked building construction and as an aircraft mechanic for a major airline. Part of the time with the airline, ~Y2K, was in the department that maintained the physical plant; emergency generators, boilers, fire suppression, electrical, plumbing, lighting, PLC’s, etc. The focus then was contingency planning and mitigation.

What I will contribute will be from a practical experience perspective. This will be long, typed with two fingers, copied and pasted and will cover some areas already addressed so skip it unless or until you have the time or interest to read it.

Emergency diesel generators in this application range from 1-25Mw and even in the smaller end http://www.fairbanksmorsenuclear.com/engine_alco_251f.php range from 26-43 tons. As part of the earthquake design specification of the original plant they would have to have been anchored to the concrete floor of the building designed to hold such weight in the specified earthquake. Without witnessing it I have high confidence that they are still where they were installed (allowing for the fact of the whole nation moving a few meters). With the air intakes near the top of the (3+ meters, see dimensions) generators, inside an intact building 10-13meters above sea level I am confident that they did not draw water into the intakes and liquid lock. In addition the basements of the T/B and R/B remained dry until ~ 24 March after the tsunami and after much seawater had been pumped into the building and the generators ran ~30 min which is 20 min past the arrival of the after the tsunami.



I believe we will eventually find that the diesel generator problem originated with the fuel supply. The fuel tanks are outside of the buildings on a concrete pad separate from the building itself. Five minutes of earthquake shaking independent of the building, with fuel sloshing and adding to the forces on the tank/foundation, would stress the fuel supply lines and connections. If the break happened low enough to draw in water it would result in damage to filters, injector pumps and injectors that would consume more time than the golden 8 hours http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/6124656-R8y05j/6124656.pdf might allow even if materials were available on site and undamaged. This fits with the ~30 min run time as generators installed inside of buildings typically have a small “day tank” that they actually run from. The tank calls for replenishment from the main fuel source as it draws down and holds a small amount of fuel. If a break drew in air the generators would run out of fuel and the fuel system would have to be purged of air which requires climbing all over a large engine. It is not as simple as filling your empty car.

Adding to the problem is the probability that emergency generator maintenance is probably done by an outside company on a contract basis. It is unlikely they would have had someone on site, and they would have needed mere than one. This is not a criticism. Elevator maintenance and air conditioning (HVAC) are also specialty occupations that are required only on an intermittent basis and not part of the skill sets needed to run a reactor.

As the NRC recognizes the critical nature of backup power many plants now have more than the minimum two generators in order to comply with new regulations. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0063.html

I will add my opinion to the excellent suggestions already offered here in hindsight. Also, because I have just pointed out problems, it will make more sense to offer the solutions now.
In a tsunami risk area at least one new diesel generator needs to be placed in an elevated area outside of the risk zone. It should supply an electrical buss available to all reactor plants at its installation. All new or existing diesel generators at nuke plants should supply an electrical buss available to each plant in its location. All existing diesel generators in seismically active areas should be retrofitted with flexible fuel supply lines between the main fuel supply and the generator building. (Existing aircraft jet engine flexible fuel lines should easily gain approval for this application.) New construction of emergency power generation for nuclear power plants in seismically active areas should have the main fuel supply tank foundation integral with that of the generator building to minimize independent movement. The size of the day tanks inside the building should be increased to allow several hours use set to maintain 2/3 to 3/4 full and alarmed for any level below 1/2. This may require a waiver and additional fire suppression equipment. It will buy time however.



Daiichi 4 fires explosions while in maintenance shutdown have been difficult for some to understand. After all it was shut down safely. However it was not in its normal configuration due to it undergoing maintenance. This does not mean that it was in an unsafe condition. Just that the process of undergoing maintenance is not a normal configuration. By design, the systems that must be shut off and locked out, disassembled, removed for replacement or repair are placed in a condition that is not normal for operation. They are brought to this state by a safe, prescribed process. But there still remains a great deal of stored energy. The spent fuel storage heat for example. All tools, parts and assemblies at any vertical height have stored kinetic energy and are potential sources of sparks if they fall. Five minutes of earthquake, tsunami and aftershocks may account for fire origination. There may have been hot tools or torches in use at the time of the earthquake and flammable materials, like boxes containing new parts and supplies present that normally would not be present. Oxy/acetylene is commonly used in maintenance and presents the potential for another source of flammable gas before hydrogen might have become present. Portable, as well as normal, lighting present a potential heat source to flammable materials not normally present. If the spent fuel pond, or its piping, were to leak the potential for hydrogen formation in falling water levels has been well addressed by others. I think this is a sufficient, if not complete, list of potential sources of trouble for a shut down reactor going thru an earthquake. It may be a long time, if ever, before we know cause exactly. The information may not be worth the danger it presents to persons trying to discern it.


I have great admiration for those present at the Fukushima plants. They endured an earthquake, a tsunami, knew that their families (most are reported to have lived nearby) were in danger or worse, had their plants lose all electrical sources, were in a location inaccessible to rescue, relief or re-supply, lost heat, faced winter conditions outside and had limited food and water. Afterwards, things got bad as aftershocks continued, explosions and fires occurred, tsunami warnings repeated while they were trying to get a grip on things and then the batteries ran down leaving them with no instruments to tell them how bad things were becoming. They knew that the people and families nearby would be affected by what they did to control their plants at the same time that they continually had fewer and fewer tools to do anything about their deteriorating situation. The situation became different as well with each passing event (tsunami, aftershock, explosion, power loss).


I have fewer good feelings toward the utility management outside of the area. They also had loss and stress and fear but they also had distance from the immediate danger. They had greater means and responsibility to mitigate the damage that was sure to come. It seems that there was no one with a voice in the back of their head saying “autodestruct engaged, autodestruct will commence in eight hours” and then repeating with diminished time periods. The absence of practical actions taken is not in keeping with my understanding of the Japanese character. I do not know what the source of the inertia was. Perhaps in another thread when we have some facts.

 

[Reno Deano]

Those are papers coming from Tepco press conference, from the past 2 weeks those press conference were held live and document uploaded live by Japanese journalists, as soon as they were handled.. usually takes a few hours for NISA to clean them up and put the pdf online and again a few hours or a day to have them in english ..

I gave link to the live streaming... it's a shame we don't have some one to translate them

http://www.ustream.tv/channel/iwakamiyasumi

BTW, IAEA must have taken the day off!

 

[Bodge]

According to the same article those 20 to 50% might as well be 10% when the French do the math. (assuming it's math they are doing)

Any how , make your mind by your self !
I'll leave it to you to judge of the merit of the claim (speculation really) from the Austrian Weather channel http://www.zamg.ac.at (that's the expert)
(and may be blame the journalist...)

The IAEA are making some pretty worrying measurements 30+ km from the site:

Upto 4.9 megabecquerels of "beta/gamma" contamination per square metre of soil

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/fukushima240311.html

I for one would like to see the raw numbers collected by The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

 

[Bodge]

BTW, IAEA must have taken the day off!

Silence from the IAEA for 30 hours. Unusual, as they have updated several times a day most days.

 

[AntonL]

Are those leaked (no joke) documents or are these official releases? These scanned or Xeroxed documents always look like leaked ones (don't they use word or excel files for generating docs and releasing them officially?)

By the looks (and by experiece of photographing documents) they seem to be photographed documents. Please note the Pu sampling report id from the 22nd today is the 28th and Tepco only made official statement on 28th - why not on 22 or 23rd

I posted this earlier

Edano said he has received a report that the radioactive substances are assumed to be either condensed steam from the reactor containment vessel or radioactive substances diluted by the water released into those facilities as part of cooling efforts

indicates very much like receiving information from non Tepco source
and what does "released into those facilities as part of cooling effort" mean

 

[Astronuc]

Precipitating event:

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2011/usc0001xgp/
Magnitude 9.0 (upgraded from 8.9)
Date-Time:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 05:46:23 UTC
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 02:46:23 PM at epicenter

Location: 38.322°N, 142.369°E
Depth: 32 km (19.9 miles) set by location program

Distances:
129 km (80 miles) E of Sendai, Honshu, Japan
177 km (109 miles) E of Yamagata, Honshu, Japan
177 km (109 miles) ENE of Fukushima, Honshu, Japan
373 km (231 miles) NE of TOKYO, Japan

Tsunami information -
http://iisee.kenken.go.jp/staff/fujii/OffTohokuPacific2011/tsunami_prop.html


Summary of Fukushima Daiichi I, Units 1-4.
Ref: http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11032810-e.html

Unit 1(Shut down)
-Explosive sound and white smoke were confirmed after the big quake occurred at 3:36 pm Mar 12th. It was assumed to be hydrogen explosion.
-At approximately 2:30 am on March 23rd, seawater injection to the nuclear reactor through the feed water system was initiated.
-At approximately 10:50 am on March 24th, white fog-like steam arising from the roof part of the reactor building was observed.
-At approximately 11:30 am on March 24th, lights in the main control room was restored.
-We had been injecting seawater into the reactor, but from 3:37 pm on March 25th, we started injecting freshwater.

Unit 2(Shut down)
-At approximately 6:00 am on March 15th, an abnormal noise began emanating from nearby Pressure Suppression Chamber and the pressure within the chamber decreased.
-At 6:20 pm on March 21st, white smoke was confirmed arising from the top of the reactor building. As of 7:11 am on March 22nd, smoke decreased to the level to nearly non-existent.
-We have been injecting seawater into the reactor, but from 10:10 am on March 26th, we started injecting fresh water (with boric acid).
-At approximately 4:46 pm on March 26th, the light in the main control room was restored.
-We had been injecting fresh water into the reactor utilizing fire pump, however, we switched over to utilizing temporary electrical pump from
6:31 pm on March 27th.

Unit 3(Shut down)
-Explosive sound and white smoke were confirmed at 11:01am March 4th. It was assumed to be hydrogen explosion.
-At 8:30am on March 16th, fog like steam was confirmed arising from the reactor building.
-At approximately 6:15 am on March 17th the pressure of the Suppression Chamber has temporarily increased. We were preparing to implement measures to reduce the pressure of the reactor containment vessel (partial discharge of air containing radioactive material to outside) in order to fully secure safety. However, at present, it is not a situation to immediately implement measures and discharge air containing radioactive material to outside. We will continue to monitor the status of the pressure of the reactor containment vessel.
-At approximately 4:00 pm, March 21st, light gray smoke was confirmed arising from the floor roof of the Unit 3 building. On March 22nd, the color of smoke changed to somewhat white and it is slowly dissipating.
-At approximately 10:45 pm on March 22nd, the light in the main control room was turned on.
-At around 4:20 pm on March 23rd, our staff confirmed light black smoke belching from the Unit 3 building. At approximately 11:30 pm on March 23rd and 4:50 am on March 24th, our employee found no signs of smoke.
-We had been injecting sea water into the reactor pressure vessel, but from 6:02 pm on March 25th, we started injecting freshwater.
-We had been injecting fresh water into the reactor utilizing fire pump, however, we switched over to utilizing temporary electrical pump from 8:30 pm on March 28th.

Unit 4 (outage due to regular inspection)
-At approximately 6 am on March 15th, we confirmed the explosive sound and the sustained damage around the 5th floor rooftop area of the Nuclear Reactor Building.
-On March 15th and 16th, we respectively confirmed the outbreak of fire at the 4th floor of the northwestern part of the Nuclear Reactor Building. We immediately reported this matter to the fire department and the related authorities. TEPCO employees confirmed that each fire had already died down by itself.
-At this moment, we do not consider any reactor coolant leakage inside the reactor happened.


I assume and expect that fresh water is borated in order to prevent to ensure the cores and SFPs remain subcritical.

First I want to thank the many contributors to this forum especially the moderators/mentors. I have read it all from the beginning and understood more than I would have thought. Thanks for the clear and concise explanations. Keeping up with it has been a bit like chasing the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow though.

Thanks for that, Liam. Good stuff!

 

[AntonL]

Silence from the IAEA for 30 hours. Unusual, as they have updated several times a day most days.

So much happened in the last 24 hours - I think they are pressing for real explanations
the IAEA cannot afford to put wrong information out - just my opinion.

 

[|Fred]

By the looks (and by experiece of photographing documents) they seem to be photographed documents and I suspect leaked. Please note the Pu sampling report id from the 22nd today is the 28th and Tepco only made official statement on 28th - why not on 22 or 23rd

Yes those sample were taken on the 22 and the 23 only released today (2 hours ago)and journalist were pissed.. same for the trench with water they were tested yesterday and they only released info today..

Again as explained if you watch those Press Conference on the right inside you have a social chat and the journalist upload the document as soon as they are handled... its media 2.0 if you like.

 

[ivars]

http://saposjoint.net/Forum/viewtopic.php?f=66&t=2657&p=31435#p31435"

 

[georgiworld]

Yes those sample were taken on the 22 and the 23 only released today (2 hours ago)and journalist were pissed.. same for the trench with water they were tested yesterday and they only released info today..

Again as explained if you watch those Press Conference on the right inside you have a social chat and the journalist upload the document as soon as they are handled... its media 2.0 if you like.

I would like to know if Tepco released the PU results only after learning that it had been leaked. The timing seems too coincidental.

I would also like to know if there is any other way PU could get into the soil if fission is not ongoing.

 

[AntonL]

http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1301313213P.pdf

Dr. Sekimura of Tokyo university pointed out the possibility of damage to
the fuel in the spent fuel pool of unit-3 since it would appear that the heavy
crane have dropped into the fuel pool in this movie. (05:40, March 28)

 

[razzz]

http://saposjoint.net/Forum/viewtopic.php?f=66&t=2657&p=31435#p31435"

I think the 'I'm a Little Teapot' song is more appropriate than 'Sixteen Tons' hopefully the teapot(s) don't boil dry.

I'm a special teapot,
Yes, it's true,
Here's an example of what I can do,
I can turn my handle into a spout,
Tip me over and pour me out!,

 

[TCups]

http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1301313213P.pdf

In part, from above reference:

"Dr. Sekimura of Tokyo university pointed out the possibility of damage to the fuel in the spent fuel pool of unit-3 since it would appear that the heavy crane have dropped into the fuel pool in this movie. (05:40, March 28)"

[STRIKE]I wonder if this makes sense:

1) vertical shaft
2) SFP3
3) Fuel rod handling equipment in SFP3
4) Region of the transfer chute and gate[/STRIKE]

CORRECTION:

The photo originally annotated is a photo detailing the north end of the top floor of building 3. The pool pictured, therefore, has to be the equipment pool, not the spent fuel pool of unit 3. I have deleted it to avoid any confusion.

 

[|Fred]

I would like to know if Tepco released the PU results only after learning that it had been leaked. The timing seems too coincidental.

once again and for the last time those are not leaked doc.
Tepco do Press Point every day several time a day. During those P.P they hand out Xerox to the press. Some of the Press upload an tweet those document as they get them.. Just watch the web stream..

@Reno Deano
Yes well one could expect that AIEA has a crisis head quarter with people watching 247 despite the 7-8 hour difference and updating everything in real time .
But as I picture it , there might be some lag: people watching and getting report from tepco in real time, getting those report to the annalists knowledge to understand and study them the next morning, and will eventually ask some confirmation of follow up to tepco, before they post anything.. etc etc

 

[AntonL]

We discussed a view days back about international teams working hard to help solve this problem.

Only today it is confirmed that Tepco is seeking actively help, a bit late it seems

TEPCO seeks French help to resolve nuclear plant crisis
PARIS, March 28, Kyodo

Embattled Tokyo Electric Power Co. has asked nuclear power-related concerns in France for support in resolving the crisis at its crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, the French industry and energy minister said Monday.

TEPCO sought support from such concerns as Electricite de France SA, Areva SA and the Nuclear Energy Agency, Eric Besson said during a radio program. The country's public radio said the details of the Japanese utility's calls remain unknown.

EDF announced a set of relief measures March 18, including the dispatch of experts and robots to the Fukushima plant in the wake of radiation leaks following a magnitude-9.0 earthquake and tsunami. But a media officer for Besson said the package is separate from TEPCO's request for support.

==Kyodo