Are Qualia Real? Debate & Discussion

[Faust]

Sorry, I hadn't seen this post until Fliption mentioned it.

I elaborated on it somewhat to DoctorDick in my last post. Qualia are qualities associated with subjectivity. You could stick a device into an orange, for example, and have it measure temperature, acidity, sweetness, etc. But would that measuring device say "I liked that orange"? It does not appreciate, one way or another, any of the qualities it detects -- it just senses them.

Well, for one thing it's possible to program the sensor to say "I like it" when it senses a certain combination of parameters. I know what you're saying, I just wanted to point out that if verbal descriptions have nothing to do with consciousness, then the fact that we can report on conscious experiences has nothing to do with consciousness either. But you probably knew that already.

There are things we sense but don't pay attention to, such as ambient noise while we are working. If I try really hard, I can recall some of that, the fact that birds were chirping all morning, for example. So it seems to me sensation can occur to my being without associated qualia, and that my attentiveness to sensation is required for the subjective experience.

That seems like a good reason to think of qualia as different from sensation, but then a question pops in my mind: can we have unconscious qualia? It would seem so, because there is something it's like to be someone not paying attention to a sensory experience. Notice that not paying attention to an experience is not the same thing as not having it. Many times during the winter I feel immense relief when the fan in my furnace shuts off, even though I wasn't aware of its annoying hum in the first place. So there's definitely something it's like to be "me not listening to the sound of a fan" when the sound is there. Doesn't that complicate things?

The functionalist claim that there is no subjective experience in human beings, that we are just a collection of sensations and thoughts, doesn't make sense. I've pointed out many times that I know it's possible to completely still the mind through meditation (even it only temporarily). If subjectivity is nothing but collections of sensations and thoughts, then what is it that remains conscious in that stillness?

Have you considered the possibility that you were actually conscious of something but you can't find words for it? It wouldn't be different from the furnace fan: there is a state in which I don't hear any sound even though the sound is there. My perception that there was no sound was, so to speak, an illusion. Couldn't the perception of an empty mind likewise be an illusion?

 

[Fliption]

Sure enough, but still one has to accept such a thing exists. If one believes the mind can be reduced to neural processes, then qualia thus defined cannot possibly exist. Indeed, notice how functionalists will often argue that the perception of qualia is an illusion. (which usually raises eyebrows from people who don't understand exactly what is meant by "illusion" in that context - but that is another subject)

I'm not entirely sure I understand this post. Perhaps I am one of those people who don't understand exactly what is meant by "illusion" because claiming qualia is an illusion doesn't make the problem go away. What does it mean to say that qualia don't really exists but the illusion of them do?

 

[Faust]

Perhaps I am one of those people who don't understand exactly what is meant by "illusion" because claiming qualia is an illusion doesn't make the problem go away.

It doesn't make the problem go away only for people who believe there is a problem to start with. If you don't believe qualia exists, then you don't have to explain why it exists, you only have to explain why people claim it does.

As an example, if you don't believe in ghosts, do you feel you need to explain why ghosts don't exist, otherwise you can't sustain your point of view? The whole issue would be nonsense to you, wouldn't it? And the fact that the world is full of people who claim to have seen ghosts wouldn't impress you in the least. I think that's how functionalists see this whole qualia thing: nonsense not worth their time.

What does it mean to say that qualia don't really exists but the illusion of them do?

Similar to saying that ghosts don't exist but people can still see them. In fact, there are many similarities between ghosts and subjective perception.

By the way, I happen to believe that ghosts are not an illusion. Just to make my position clear.

 

[Fliption]

It doesn't make the problem go away only for people who believe there is a problem to start with. If you don't believe qualia exists, then you don't have to explain why it exists, you only have to explain why people claim it does.

And this relates right back to my question "What does it mean to say qualia doesn't exists yet the illusion of them does?" The problem of explaining the illusion of qualia is as problematic as the problem of qualia itself. In fact, it is the exact same problem because the illusion that we are trying to explain is presented to us through qualia. So we have an illusion of an illusion. And who is it that is experiencing the illusion? Another Illusion? This is very much not analogous to ghosts.

Also, I don't think that too many people deny the existence of qualia. People who deny the problem of qualia don't deny its existence. They simply think that qualia can eventually be explained by neurology. Not many good reasons are given as to why this is the case except to appeal to faith and claim "we will figure it out one day".

 

[selfAdjoint]

Also, I don't think that too many people deny the existence of qualia. People who deny the problem of qualia don't deny its existence. They simply think that qualia can eventually be explained by neurology. Not many good reasons are given as to why this is the case except to appeal to faith and claim "we will figure it out one day".

Well I don't believe in qualia. I don't agree that as defined they constitute an illusion; I think they are merely a word game.

 

[Fliption]

Well I don't believe in qualia. I don't agree that as defined they constitute an illusion; I think they are merely a word game.

That's why I said "not too many people" believe that. I realize their are some extremist.

Word games can only be played when there are two or more people trying to communicate with one another. I don't require a conversation with anyone to know what I observe. I observe something that I cannot reconcile with what I understand to be physicalism. Call it whatever you want.

However, my understanding of physicalism does indeed come from others. So this is the only area where word games may lie. It is entirely possible that what you and I understand physicalism to be is entirely different. Not likely, but possible.

 

[Tournesol]

Some word games are deadly serious...

 

[selfAdjoint]

Some word games are deadly serious...

Only to those who take them seriously. History is littered with
word games that smart people took so seriously they killed each other over them. Those ideas and causes are now one with Ozymandias. Who now cares about the difference between homousian and homoiusian?

 

[Faust]

And this relates right back to my question "What does it mean to say qualia doesn't exists yet the illusion of them does?"

I can't tell you what the sentence means, I can only give you more sentences. Figuring out the meaning is entirely up to you. The best I can do is tell you there are perspectives from which the sentence seems true, and there are perspectives from which the sentence seems false. Now what would you call a proposition whose truth value cannot be established?

The problem of explaining the illusion of qualia is as problematic as the problem of qualia itself. In fact, it is the exact same problem because the illusion that we are trying to explain is presented to us through qualia. So we have an illusion of an illusion. And who is it that is experiencing the illusion? Another Illusion?

I can tell you this much: your reasoning above is not valid. David Chalmers has a paper on his website that deals with the fact that zombies also have a "problem of qualia", even though they don't have qualia. You don't need qualia to have the illusion that you do.

Now you may raise the objection that when zombies talk about qualia they don't know what they are talking about, whereas we do. The only answer I have for that objection is that I myself don't know what qualia is (that is, I don't know what the word means), and I'm talking about it here, therefore I must be a zombie.

This is very much not analogous to ghosts.

It is far more analogous to ghosts than you might realize. When someone claims there's a "perceiver" inside their body which is not the body itself, aren't they saying there's a ghost in the machine? The machine can be explained by physical laws, the ghost cannot. I see no difference whatsoever, which is why I said I believe in ghosts. I don't agree with the functionalists, but I know my position cannot be intellectually defended.

Also, I don't think that too many people deny the existence of qualia. People who deny the problem of qualia don't deny its existence.

I deny the existence of qualia, and I think the "problem of qualia" is a problem of semantics, nothing more. Seems I'm not alone.

They simply think that qualia can eventually be explained by neurology.

That is not my position, and I don't even think it's the position of the functionalists, as the only problem from a functionalist perspective is to find out the neurological mechanisms that cause a person to believe they have qualia. For a functionalist, explaining qualia is as trivial as explaining why people believe in false ideas. But I must point out I'm not a functionalist so I may be misrepresenting their position.

Not many good reasons are given as to why this is the case except to appeal to faith and claim "we will figure it out one day".

It seems everyone who fails to understand an antagonic position feels tempted to claim the antagonists are acting out of faith. That is rather ironic, as you can't really know what the antagonist is thinking; it is an appeal to faith to claim that people can only disagree with you by being irrational. So I think anyway.

 

[Faust]

History is littered with word games that smart people took so seriously they killed each other over them. Those ideas and causes are now one with Ozymandias. Who now cares about the difference between homousian and homoiousian?

Great post! It's funny to see how, throughout history, those debates don't settle as much as they slowly slide into eternal oblivion. Which is quite ironic considering the passions they stir.

 

[Tournesol]

Some word games are deadly serious...

Only to those who take them seriously. History is littered with
word games that smart people took so seriously they killed each other over them. Those ideas and causes are now one with Ozymandias. Who now cares about the difference between homousian and homoiusian?

An example of a word game that is still serious is the procedings in a court-case. Wittgenstein's term "language game" was never meant to be sweepingly dismissive. As such, the burden is on you to explain why
"qualia" is a silly language-game, and (eg) "string" a sensible one.

 

[Tournesol]

Great post! It's funny to see how, throughout history, those debates don't settle as much as they slowly slide into eternal oblivion. Which is quite ironic considering the passions they stir.

People have never stopped debating "where did it all come from" and "how should I live my life"

 

[Tournesol]

I can't tell you what the sentence means, I can only give you more sentences.

No-one can ever offer an explanation which is not itself another bunch of words. False dichotomy.

Figuring out the meaning is entirely up to you. The best I can do is tell you there are perspectives from which the sentence seems true, and there are perspectives from which the sentence seems false.

maybe some of those perspectives are just plain wrong.

Now what would you call a proposition whose truth value cannot be established?

there is no inference from "there is more than 1 opinion on this topic" to "no-one could ppssibly answer this question".

I can tell you this much: your reasoning above is not valid. David Chalmers has a paper on his website that deals with the fact that zombies also have a "problem of qualia", even though they don't have qualia. You don't need qualia to have the illusion that you do.

You don't need to have qualia to have a problem of qualia -- which, in the case of zombies, is purely a matter of belief, and not of perception or sensation , and not therefore of *illusion*. And the fact that we could have a mistaken belief in qualia does not shot that we actually do -- Chalmers would certainly not draw that conclusion.

Now you may raise the objection that when zombies talk about qualia they don't know what they are talking about, whereas we do. The only answer I have for that objection is that I myself don't know what qualia is (that is, I don't know what the word means), and I'm talking about it here, therefore I must be a zombie.

You "know" qualia are illusions, don't you ?

It is far more analogous to ghosts than you might realize. When someone claims there's a "perceiver" inside their body which is not the body itself, aren't they saying there's a ghost in the machine? The machine can be explained by physical laws, the ghost cannot. I see no difference whatsoever, which is why I said I believe in ghosts. I don't agree with the functionalists, but I know my position cannot be intellectually defended.

Qualia do not require homunculi.

I deny the existence of qualia, and I think the "problem of qualia" is a problem of semantics, nothing more. Seems I'm not alone.

How can you deny their existence when yo don't know what the word means ITFP? make your mind up!

That is not my position, and I don't even think it's the position of the functionalists, as the only problem from a functionalist perspective is to find out the neurological mechanisms that cause a person to believe they have qualia.

There's a neurological mechanism that makes people believe in giraffes...

 

[selfAdjoint]

An example of a word game that is still serious is the procedings in a court-case. Wittgenstein's term "language game" was never meant to be sweepingly dismissive. As such, the burden is on you to explain why
"qualia" is a silly language-game, and (eg) "string" a sensible one.

i.e. I'm constrained to play your word game by your rules? No thanks.

The power of legal argument in court comes from an agreed upon authority that sanctions the form and enforces the consequences. You have no authority for your word game except your ability to persuade suck... er, students to accept yours.

 

[Faust]

No-one can ever offer an explanation which is not itself another bunch of words

Huh? What about pictures, diagrams, animations?

maybe some of those perspectives are just plain wrong.

This is a bit misleading. Perspectives cannot be right or wrong; the most you can expect from a perspective is a degree of consistency.

there is no inference from "there is more than 1 opinion on this topic" to "no-one could ppssibly answer this question".

If the question can only be answered by opinions, then it cannot be answered to everyone's satisfaction. That is clearly the case here.

You don't need to have qualia to have a problem of qualia -- which, in the case of zombies, is purely a matter of belief, and not of perception or sensation , and not therefore of *illusion*.

According to any dictionary definition, "illusion" can also mean "false beliefs".

Now does anyone think functionalists are foolish enough to argue that people have the subjective illusion that they have subjectivity? That would be foolish beyond belief. Surely they must mean something else.

You "know" qualia are illusions, don't you ?

I know nothing, I just happen to look at things from a perspective in which subjectivity and objectivity are the same thing, and the notion that they are different is a false belief (that is, an illusion). I'm one of the few people I know of who disagree with both Chalmers and Dennett at the same time, while also agreeing with both to a limited extent.

How can you deny their existence when yo don't know what the word means ITFP? make your mind up!

I deny its existence based on the fact that I don't need to know what the concept means to understand my own mind. That is because I have a personal account of my own mind which has no room for more concepts, whatever name they happen to have.

There's a neurological mechanism that makes people believe in giraffes...

Surely. That mechanism is called "seeing a giraffe". Has anyone seen qualia yet?

 

[Fliption]

I can tell you this much: your reasoning above is not valid. David Chalmers has a paper on his website that deals with the fact that zombies also have a "problem of qualia", even though they don't have qualia. You don't need qualia to have the illusion that you do.

Chalmers zombies are used as an illustration of the epistomological problems of consciousness. They don't really exist. But I think we are using different terms of the word illusion. You think it means "a false belief". If I use this meaning then I would agree that zombies have the illusion of qualia and, in theory, this can be explained by neuorology. By using this term in this way and also claiming that you don't believe qualia exists, you are basically saying that we are all nothing but zombies. There is no difference between you and Chalmers zombie. This is a cop-out to me.

The way I use the term illusion, it means

1)a misleading image presented as a visual stimulus or
2 a perception of something objectively existing in such a way as to cause misinterpretation of its actual nature;

Note that this is not simply a false belief. It actually requires a stimulis that is likely misleading in nature. Anyway, I think this is the culprit for why I had trouble understanding you.

Now you may raise the objection that when zombies talk about qualia they don't know what they are talking about, whereas we do. The only answer I have for that objection is that I myself don't know what qualia is (that is, I don't know what the word means), and I'm talking about it here, therefore I must be a zombie.

As I said above... this is a cop out and even just a little investigation will show this is definitely a minority position.

I deny the existence of qualia, and I think the "problem of qualia" is a problem of semantics, nothing more. Seems I'm not alone.

Another cop out. Don't get me wrong. It could be true. The problem is that everyone who ever claims this, always ends their post with this statement. No one ever explains how this is the case. Even though it may allow one to keep their world view intact, claiming it is so doesn't make it so.

Also, how do you know it doesn't exists if you don't know what it is?

That is not my position, and I don't even think it's the position of the functionalists, as the only problem from a functionalist perspective is to find out the neurological mechanisms that cause a person to believe they have qualia. For a functionalist, explaining qualia is as trivial as explaining why people believe in false ideas. But I must point out I'm not a functionalist so I may be misrepresenting their position.

This again is because you define illusion differently. I don't have any sources at the moment but I really don't think what you're saying here is accurate. I've never been under the impression that all functionalists think we are no different from Chalmers zombies.

It seems everyone who fails to understand an antagonic position feels tempted to claim the antagonists are acting out of faith. That is rather ironic, as you can't really know what the antagonist is thinking; it is an appeal to faith to claim that people can only disagree with you by being irrational. So I think anyway.

I'm not trying to read minds here. I'm participating in a discussion in a philosophy forum. I judge the "antagonist" by the arguments laid out here. Am I not justified in concluding that a post written here is not a good argument? Even if the post just makes generally claims without any supporting arguments? I think so.

 

[Fliption]

According to any dictionary definition, "illusion" can also mean "false beliefs".

Now does anyone think functionalists are foolish enough to argue that people have the subjective illusion that they have subjectivity? That would be foolish beyond belief. Surely they must mean something else.

You would think. But this is exactly the position many seem to take.

I know nothing, I just happen to look at things from a perspective in which subjectivity and objectivity are the same thing, and the notion that they are different is a false belief (that is, an illusion).

So are you saying that there is a way to prove that the way you see the color blue is the same way I see the color blue?

Also, another question. Does claiming that something is a false belief mean that you no longer have to explain it? I see no end to the usefulness of this ploy if it does. We could probably explain everything in the universe simply by explaining how neurology presents it to us as such. Surely this seems like a cop out to you?

I deny its existence based on the fact that I don't need to know what the concept means to understand my own mind. That is because I have a personal account of my own mind which has no room for more concepts, whatever name they happen to have.

I agree with this. I also have an accounting of my own mind. And I use the word qualia to label a feature of it. This feature is not consistent with what I understand "functionalism" to be. The inconsistency may be due to an incorrect understanding of functionalism. This is much more likely than claiming my own accounting of qualia is an illusion.

Surely. That mechanism is called "seeing a giraffe". Has anyone seen qualia yet?

I have.

 

[Les Sleeth]

(I'm going to have to reply to you in two posts.)

It seems everyone who fails to understand an antagonic position feels tempted to claim the antagonists are acting out of faith. That is rather ironic, as you can't really know what the antagonist is thinking; it is an appeal to faith to claim that people can only disagree with you by being irrational.

I don’t think you can ever automatically assume someone doesn’t understand another’s position, antagonistic or otherwise. We can know something about what someone is thinking when they state it outright. If there is such a thing as irrationality, then it is possible for someone to be that way. So just the act of labeling an opponent’s argument “irrational” doesn’t mean that it must be merely a knee-jerk reaction to disagreement as you seem to suggest.

I can tell you this much: your reasoning above is not valid. David Chalmers has a paper on his website that deals with the fact that zombies also have a "problem of qualia", even though they don't have qualia. You don't need qualia to have the illusion that you do.

I have to again disagree with you. You do need qualia to have an illusion. A zombie cannot have an illusion. A zombie can only behave. To have an illusion you have to be conscious in the first place.

Let’s say you program a robot to recognize cat urine, and then sound an alarm when it does. While you are washing windows the robot mistakes the ammonia in your cleaning solution as cat urine and sounds the alarm. Has the robot experienced an illusion?

If you say yes, then what you are calling an illusion is the machine lacking the proper programming to distinguish things properly. It has nothing to do with subjective belief. Illusion happens because the subjective aspect believes something that isn’t so, it isn’t just behaving contrary to programming, it’s the conscious part that has an illusion.

That part of us which incessantly goes “I believe, I feel, I know, I love, I hate -- I, Me, Mine -- are what we can’t explain mechanistically, or with programming.

If behavior and response to the environment are all that we are, as some physicalists say, then why the heck is there subjectivity? It’s just going to get in the way of a straightforward response. If someone is so determined to define all of reality as purely physical, then one of the strategies is to claim what can’t be explained physically is an illusion.

To get so caught up in having to believe reality is only physical that one can’t recognize the reality of one’s own being, something every moment we live within, work through, understand by, enjoy and love with . . . then if you ask me that’s the one suffering the illusion, not the rest of us who know to feel ourselves and accept the reality of our own existence. In fact, the illusion is being caused by those trying to think it, rather than feel and appreciate it.

Now you may raise the objection that when zombies talk about qualia they don't know what they are talking about, whereas we do.

But see, the “objection” you are talking about is the very point of qualia. My PDR tells me when my appointments are, etc. A rubber doll can be made to cry like a baby. So what? Without self knowledge, there is no consciousness. That’s the whole point the qualia concept is trying to make.

The only answer I have for that objection is that I myself don't know what qualia is (that is, I don't know what the word means), and I'm talking about it here, therefore I must be a zombie.

That argument is non sequitur. Whether you know what you are talking about or not, there is still a “you” there which is experiencing your participation in this discussion. You don’t have to know what your are talking about to be self aware.

However, I would agree that humans often behave as zombies when they blindly submit to conditioning instead of making conscious choices. Also, I’d say that there are useful zombie-isms, such as learning to type without having to think about each finger action. But just because there is a programmable part to us doesn’t mean that’s ALL there is. This is what I see wrong with physicalist/functionalist/AI models of consciousness. They all focus on something that really is there, but then ignore or “dismiss” as an illusion, everything they can’t explain with their particular one-dimensional model.

That is not my position, and I don't even think it's the position of the functionalists, as the only problem from a functionalist perspective is to find out the neurological mechanisms that cause a person to believe they have qualia. For a functionalist, explaining qualia is as trivial as explaining why people believe in false ideas. But I must point out I'm not a functionalist so I may be misrepresenting their position.

I am pretty sure Fliption is correct to say all but the most extreme functionalists (such as those suggesting epiphenomenalism) acknowledge the qualia problem. Even Chalmer’s archrival, Dennett, has said it’s just a matter of time before qualia are accounted for (i.e., indicating he accepts them).

I believe the qualia concept was specifically designed as a way to avoid Cartesianism and still bring the idea of subjectivity into a modern debate. If I am wrong about the following, someone correct me, but my studies of how qualia came into being is that it stemmed from condemnations of the homuncular model of subjectivity. It was criticized as leading to infinite regress. If some being is inside the body making all the decisions, then what is directing that being? Is it another little being inside him? If so, what is running that little being -- yet another tiny being?

Yet something is controlling things, whether we say it’s subjectivity or the ability of the physical body to respond in certain ways. I outlined Dennett’s answer to the problem in an earlier thread of mine. Quoting a reviewer of Dennett’s book:

“Who, or what, is reading the neurological archives? The self? The ego? The soul? For want of a theory of consciousness, it is easy to fall back on the image of a little person -- a homunculus, the philosophers call it -- who sits in the cranial control room monitoring a console of gauges and pulling the right strings. But then, of course, we're stuck with explaining the inner workings of this engineer-marionette. Does it too have a little creature inside it? If so, we fall into an infinite regress, with homunculi embedded in homunculi like an image ricocheting between mirrors. . . .
As Mr. Dennett explained . . . the reason we get the regress is that at each level we are assuming a single homunculus with powers and abilities equal to those of its host. Suppose instead that there are in the brain a horde of very stupid homunculi, each utterly dependent on the others. Make the homunculi stupid enough and it's easy to imagine that each can be replaced by a machine -- a circuit made of neurons. But from the collective behavior of all these neurological devices, consciousness emerges -- a qualitative leap no more magical than the one that occurs when wetness arises from the jostling of hydrogen and oxygen atoms. . . .
To avoid the problem of infinite regress, he [Mr. Dennett] hypothesizes that this master controller is not a fully cognizant marionette but a ‘virtual machine,’ created on the fly from temporary coalitions of stupid homunculi. It is because of this mental software, he proposes, that we can not only think but reflect on our own thinking, as we engage in the step-by-step deliberations that occupy us when we are most aware of the plodding of our minds.”

It was to this theory that I made my point that if anyone could stop the busy mind, then according to Dennett we should immediately lose consciousness. Lots of people have learned to do still mentality, and all report it makes them more conscious, not less. But there is more wrong with Dennett’s model. He doesn’t account for all aspects of consciousness with it.

For example, how can anyone deny there is something about us that is indivisible? You can’t take apart “I” in consciousness, reduce it to parts. Even people who lose touch with that, such in multiple personality disorders, discover when healing the same center served all the personalities. What is that center? That’s were we know, be, and control. Is it static? No, because we can learn to know, be and control more deeply.

So infinite regress isn’t a necessary outcome of having a central being, knower, and controller if that central aspect integrates all new information into a general base which serves as subjectivity and consequently evolves as a sort of “oneness.”

 

[Les Sleeth]

That seems like a good reason to think of qualia as different from sensation, but then a question pops in my mind: can we have unconscious qualia? It would seem so, because there is something it's like to be someone not paying attention to a sensory experience. Notice that not paying attention to an experience is not the same thing as not having it. Many times during the winter I feel immense relief when the fan in my furnace shuts off, even though I wasn't aware of its annoying hum in the first place. So there's definitely something it's like to be "me not listening to the sound of a fan" when the sound is there. Doesn't that complicate things?

I think physical factors, such as the furnace fan, can exert stress on the biological/psychological system without subjective participation. We’d say our detection was unconscious, whereas the very definition of consciousness is subjective experience, and qualia is a concept being used to help define subjective experience. So I’d say no to the possibility of “unconscious qualia” because the terms are contradictory.

Have you considered the possibility that you were actually conscious of something but you can't find words for it?

I certainly am conscious of something, and if I wanted to talk about it, I could find words for it. The words couldn’t represent it properly, but I don’t have a problem finding words to produce descriptions. But the experience of stillness is absolutely nothing like your furnace fan example. I’m not sure why you think I’d be unconscious of things. Did I give that impression?

Let’s try an example. What if one night we crash landed in an area of India where man-eating tigers are known to frequent. We build a camp fire, and are tending our wounds. Suddenly I think I hear a deep throated growl in the forest. You are talking, I say “wait, listen, I think it might be a tiger.” You go on super alert, straining, listening . . .

Now, in that state of consciousness, can you imagine having a silent mind? That is, fear and the instinct to survive combine to give you the strength to stop all mental operations so you can become one big listening experience for a bit.

Think about something more familiar. What is appreciation? I have friends who only listen to music while they are doing other things. I cook for friends (though not often) who wolf down my gourmet meals. To some people making love is a climb on, get it over with kind of thing.

Then there are those who develop the conscious trait of appreciation. We don’t need that trait to be conscious, or to survive. But for some of us, that trait is what has made life meaningful, and enjoyable. I have to eat to survive, so I have learned how to eat slowly, attentively, 100% absorbed into what I am doing so I can experience it as fully as possible. I don’t think about things, I don’t do other things. I sit down and enjoy. Before that, I cook the same way, to make sure I have the kind of meal that can be enjoyed in that manner.

It is the same for listening to music. I never have it on if I am doing other things. When I listen, that is all I do so I can achieve the deepest experience of appreciation possible. When I fool around with my wife . . . well, you can ask her how much more fun it became when we made appreciation the goal.

What is love but a type of appreciation. What is interest but the effort to appreciate something mentally. If you look around this world, you will see the happiest people are appreciators, and often they are also the finest creators, thinkers, and achievers because they love the things they do.

But what exactly is appreciation? How does it fit into the mechanistic equation? I say, appreciation and qualia are intimately linked. We can be a zombie if we choose, or nearly so, or we can get into what things “are like.” We can learn to choose things which produce the best “likes” in us so that we delve even more fully into them; or we can be lazy and just let conditioning and instinct take us down whatever road they happen to be going, dragging us cynical and unfulfilled right along with them.

It wouldn't be different from the furnace fan: there is a state in which I don't hear any sound even though the sound is there. My perception that there was no sound was, so to speak, an illusion. Couldn't the perception of an empty mind likewise be an illusion?

When I say a still mind, I don’t mean one is not perceiving anything, I mean one isn’t thinking, and instead is alert, and present in the moment without the constant internal dialogue the brain normally subjects one to. One can practice silencing the mind, and how to do it calmly (i.e., instead of the hyper-alert experience fear causes). I have practiced it faithfully for decades, so no, I don’t think it’s an “illusion.”

Besides, it’s easy to recognize. It’s like watching a rain drop hit a still puddle of water. How hard is it to see that? Once you still your mind, you can easily see what thinking does to it . . . it produces ripples. Now, what do you think the effect of never stopping thinking does? Will you ever see anything but ripples? Will you ever recognize what’s underneath which is being made to ripple? I don’t think so.

I see most of the debate here as ripples talking. I don’t see how we can see what we are rising up out of until we experience what “it’s like” to allow all that rippling to return to the serenity of its originating pool. That might be called the qualia of true self.

 

[learningphysics]

I believe the qualia concept was specifically designed as a way to avoid Cartesianism and still bring the idea of subjectivity into a modern debate. If I am wrong about the following, someone correct me, but my studies of how qualia came into being is that it stemmed from condemnations of the homuncular model of subjectivity. It was criticized as leading to infinite regress. If some being is inside the body making all the decisions, then what is directing that being? Is it another little being inside him? If so, what is running that little being -- yet another tiny being?

Not disagreeing with anything you said. I just wanted to add a little something about having a little being inside the body.

We can have subjectivity without the need for the subject being a controller. The subject can be a passive receipient of sensations feelings that correspond to physical changes in the body... This infinite regress problem gives the illusion that the Cartesian subject idea was introduced because Descartes thought that a physical body "needs" something controlling its actions. This is not true (correct me if I'm wrong). The existence of an indivisible I (cogito ergo sum) is the reason Descartes' dualism was introduced. It seems to me that the "physical body" has certain limitations that make it impossible for it to be the "I", so a Cartesian subject or "soul" is brought in. But there is no need to bring in the "I" as a controller of the body... Without the "I" as a controller, there's no infinite regress problem.

 

[Faust]

I think we are using different terms of the word illusion. You think it means "a false belief".

I don't "think it means", it's one of the definitions given in most dictionaries.

Another cop out. Don't get me wrong. It could be true. The problem is that everyone who ever claims this, always ends their post with this statement. No one ever explains how this is the case.

At this point you mentioned "cop-out" three times. If you keep accusing people of copping-out, it's no surprise they don't bother explaining things to you.

Also, how do you know it doesn't exists if you don't know what it is?

Because "qualia" is supposed to exist inside my mind. Trust me, I know what's in there, and there's no "qualia" to be seen anywhere. Unless "qualia" means something I already know by another name.

This again is because you define illusion differently.

I didn't define illusion, I just mentioned the word has two slightly different meanings. I didn't make it up, it's in the dictionary. So when a person uses the word, it can be hard to know which meaning they are referring to. That's all I said, everything else you read was not there.

So are you saying that there is a way to prove that the way you see the color blue is the same way I see the color blue?

Yes, there is, but the explanation is a bit complex. But I'm sure this will sound as a cop-out to you.

Does claiming that something is a false belief mean that you no longer have to explain it?

No, but you can always claim that people assert false beliefs as a cop-out. That is satisfying enough as you certainly know.

I see no end to the usefulness of this ploy if it does.

Indeed.

We could probably explain everything in the universe simply by explaining how neurology presents it to us as such. Surely this seems like a cop out to you?

"Can everything be reduced to pure neurology". I see the beginnings of a thread there...

I have [seen qualia].

So how does it look like? Can you describe it to me? I have a strong suspicion that it looks a lot like something I refer to as "the world". But I may be mistaken.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Not disagreeing with anything you said. I just wanted to add a little something about having a little being inside the body.

We can have subjectivity without the need for the subject being a controller. The subject can be a passive receipient of sensations feelings that correspond to physical changes in the body... This infinite regress problem gives the illusion that the Cartesian subject idea was introduced because Descartes thought that a physical body "needs" something controlling its actions. This is not true (correct me if I'm wrong). The existence of an indivisible I (cogito ergo sum) is the reason Descartes' dualism was introduced. It seems to me that the "physical body" has certain limitations that make it impossible for it to be the "I", so a Cartesian subject or "soul" is brought in. But there is no need to bring in the "I" as a controller of the body... Without the "I" as a controller, there's no infinite regress problem.

That is true of course, but I believe it creates a bigger problem.

First, let me define and limit the meaning of "control the body" using an analogy I've used before.

Do you remember in the movie "Aliens" how Sigourney Weaver fought off the big momma critter from inside a giant fork lift? Now, would it be proper to say she controlled that machine? Most would probably say yes, but an argument could be made that the role of hydraulics and other mechanics are actually in control since removing even a small part in the right place could disable the vehicle. If that happened, there'd be Sigourney, strapped in as before, pushing buttons and pulling levers as before, but no external action would be observed.

Back to your solution. If I am not in control, then we need an explanation for why it appears I am in control which is more plausible than the simple conclusion that I actually am in control just like it appears I am.

Is the option that it is all an illusion more plausible? No way, it is a far less plausible theory since there's no evidence it is an illusion. When I will my arm to move, it moves. If it doesn't, it's because I have lost contact with that part of my brain that responds to my will. That is what the vast majority of evidence indicates.

So why are illusion and epiphenomenalism being argued? It's because of those who have decided a priori that a human must be physical, and if that takes an implausible theory to make physicalism true, then that's that.

All observed behavior can be interpreted similar to the Aliens analogy (including Libet's half-second delay . . . rather easily, in fact). That is, the body is a powered system and the brain is control center. Consciousness has enough focus power to trigger body movement through stimulating the brain in certain places. Because brain entwinement is all we've known since before birth, we are totally dependent on the brain as long as we are participating in biology, just like Weaver would be dependent on her machine as long as she is strapped in.

Now, is a consciousness inhabiting the physical CSN dualistic? Not necessarily if we understand that both physicalness and consciousness are actually specific forms of something even more basic/general, such as a common essence both of them share. In that case, consciousness is one form of this existential "stuff," and physicalness is another form of it. That's why they can mix, interact, and then go their separate ways when they are through with each other.

 

[Les Sleeth]

So how does it look like? Can you describe it to me? I have a strong suspicion that it looks a lot like something I refer to as "the world". But I may be mistaken.

I don't think he literally means "see" like with the eyes. If you read through this thread you will hear it described many times. Everyone admits they cannot observe someone else's qualia, only their own. So if you want to "see" your own qualia, it should be simple.

Everything you are aware of that you do has that. Why get hung up on the word qualia? It is just a way to talk about self awareness. The whole time you are eating an apple, something is there beyond teeth chewing, taste buds going off, food heading toward the stomach, etc. If that extra singular something wasn't there when the different sensations occurred,then you could not say all these things happened to "me." A report could be made possibly that all these things happened, but to no one!

No matter how anyone tries to get away from it, if you question the billions of people on the planet and ask if they observe some more central part of them that experiences the various sensations, the vast majority report they do. This really is the only evidence we have since that experience cannot be externalized for observation. But as I pointed out to Learningphysics, all those reports are a lot more evidence subjectivity is the heart of consciousness than the almost entirely unsubstantiated illusion theory of subjectivity.

 

[loseyourname]

Not disagreeing with anything you said. I just wanted to add a little something about having a little being inside the body.

We can have subjectivity without the need for the subject being a controller. The subject can be a passive receipient of sensations feelings that correspond to physical changes in the body... This infinite regress problem gives the illusion that the Cartesian subject idea was introduced because Descartes thought that a physical body "needs" something controlling its actions. This is not true (correct me if I'm wrong). The existence of an indivisible I (cogito ergo sum) is the reason Descartes' dualism was introduced. It seems to me that the "physical body" has certain limitations that make it impossible for it to be the "I", so a Cartesian subject or "soul" is brought in. But there is no need to bring in the "I" as a controller of the body... Without the "I" as a controller, there's no infinite regress problem.

There's still a regress problem, learning, and you've been told that many times now. Even if you simply postulate the homunculus as perceiver and not as controller, nothing is changed. If the human body needs a 'little man' inside of it to perceive, then that little man runs into the same problem. He needs a little man, and so on ad infinitum. I really cannot believe that you are still pushing a homunculus theory. This is getting to be analagous to the people claiming to know how to build antigravity devices in the Engineering forums or people disproving relativity in the Physics forums. Move beyond it already and just advocate the only thing you really want anyway - mental substance, distinct from physical substance. There is nothing self-defeating in the theory of mental substance.

 

[learningphysics]

There's still a regress problem, learning, and you've been told that many times now.

Yes... I've been told so religiously... dogmatically... With no reasoning whatsoever. The number of times you say it doesn't matter. Just demonstrate the regress. Until then, I won't see any regress.

I've told you previously that my reasoning is as follows: The physical body possesses certain limitations that prevent it from being the singular "I"... We've gone through all of this. It is because of these limitations that I'm saying there is a "little man" or whatever you call it. Now why should I need to repeat the step and say that this "little man" needs to have another "little man" inside him, if the first "little man" inside does not have the same limitations as the physical body?

If you wish to argue that the physical body can be the singular "I" then fine. That's what you should be discussing. Don't keep accusing me of creating an infinite regress unless you can clearly demonstrate how it happens.

Even if you simply postulate the homunculus as perceiver and not as controller, nothing is changed. If the human body needs a 'little man' inside of it to perceive, then that little man runs into the same problem. He needs a little man, and so on ad infinitum.

No that 'little man' doesn't run into the same problem. You just keep saying it does. Until you explain why, you've gotten nowhere. As I've said before, my reasoning is that the "physical body" has certain limitations...and because of these limitations it can't be the "I" (the experiencer maintaining its identity). The "little man", "mental substance", "soul"... needn't have the limitations that the "physical body" has. So there is no regress.

Move beyond it already and just advocate the only thing you really want anyway - mental substance, distinct from physical substance. There is nothing self-defeating in the theory of mental substance

So "mental substance" is ok? How does a homunculus differ from mental substance?

I'm not pushing anything. It was relevant to the discussion at hand. Les Sleeth mentioned the infinite regress problem, and I thought had something relevant to say. What is the problem?

Please ignore my comments if you wish. Nobody else is complaining about my posts.

 

[Les Sleeth]

That's what you should be discussing. Don't keep accusing me of creating an infinite regress unless you can clearly demonstrate how it happens.

Don't worry about it. In my opinion, the reason he isn't explaining is because he read somewhere about the infinite regress objection and doesn't really understand it. If he really understood it, he would have defended it in relation to your assertions, point by point, a long time ago.

I disagree with your model for another reason, which I've already detailed. But actually I do think the homucular model, with two major adjustments, has the most potential for explaining things.

If Loseyourname wants to debate the issue WITH REASONS, I'd be more than happy to defend the model. Afterall, I would hate to be someone who just drops into make others feel like I am superior by labeling them crackpots.

 

[Faust]

I don't think he literally means "see" like with the eyes.

Of course not. Do you think I'm that naive?

Everyone admits they cannot observe someone else's qualia, only their own. So if you want to "see" your own qualia, it should be simple.

You will think this is sophistry, but I cannot observe my own qualia the way the concept is explained to me. The best I can make of the claim that qualia can be observed is that people are misinterpreting what they observe. They observe one thing and make verbal report that are not consistent. It's as if they see four objects and claim that "four" and "objects" are separate aspects of their experience. That to me is nonsense; you can't see objects without seeing how many of them there are, and you can't see "how many" without seeing how many "what".

Everything you are aware of that you do has that.

To me all you are saying above is that I am aware of everything I am aware of. Why in the world does a tautology matter?

Why get hung up on the word qualia?

Because I interpret any statement with the word qualia as being essentially tautological.

It is just a way to talk about self awareness.

Indeed, which is why we should use "self-awareness", to avoid falling prey to word games we invent for ourselves.

The whole time you are eating an apple, something is there beyond teeth chewing, taste buds going off, food heading toward the stomach, etc. If that extra singular something wasn't there when the different sensations occurred,then you could not say all these things happened to "me."

It's often said that fish have a hard time understanding what water is for being immersed in it. Humans certainly have trouble understanding what language is, for precisely the same reason. Let me show you how your claim above can be interpreted:

" The whole time it is raining, something is there beyond the rain. If that extra singular something wasn't there the whole time while the rain falls, then you could not say rain comes from 'it' "

"It is raining" is a perfect example of how language forces us to assign a subject to a phenomenon even when one doesn't exist. "It" certainly doesn't "rain", but we have to use the indefinite subject to account for the rules of grammar, not for the phenomenon of rain itself.

The similarity with some verbal descriptions of conscious processes should be obvious enough, but it does elude quite a lot of people. The point is that you must conceive of a self that is separate from its perceptions even if you don't have one, because language forces you to think that way.

A report could be made possibly that all these things happened, but to no one!

Indeed. Instead of "it is raining", you could say "drops of water are condensing and falling", which keeps the grammar intact while also removing the illusion that there must be an "it" which "rains".

I'm talking about a paradigm shift here, but people do not like shifting their paradigms about the mind as they think they won't be able to preserve their self-image. That is true of physicalists as well.

No matter how anyone tries to get away from it, if you question the billions of people on the planet and ask if they observe some more central part of them that experiences the various sensations, the vast majority report they do.

And that is proof of exactly what? Are we to trust that people fully understand themselves and talk about the mind in the best terms possible?

Sounds like nonsense to me.

This really is the only evidence we have since that experience cannot be externalized for observation.

You mean, verbal reports are evidence for the existence of something real? I can't possibly comprehend the philosophy behind that statement.

all those reports are a lot more evidence subjectivity is the heart of consciousness than the almost entirely unsubstantiated illusion theory of subjectivity.

I take those verbal reports to mean that subjectivity is at the heart of language, since you can't possibly make a meaningful statement about anything without referring to subject, object, and a relationship between them.

And for the record, I don't think subjectivity is an illusion, I think the illusion is the notion that it is a thing completely independent and separate from objectivity. I have seen the workings of that illusion as clearly as you claim you see the workings of your consciosness through meditation. And it is not a physicalist position as it implies that objectivity cannot exist without subjectivity, a notion any physicalist will scoff at.

 

[Faust]

The physical body possesses certain limitations that prevent it from being the singular "I"... We've gone through all of this. It is because of these limitations that I'm saying there is a "little man" or whatever you call it. Now why should I need to repeat the step and say that this "little man" needs to have another "little man" inside him, if the first "little man" inside does not have the same limitations as the physical body?

I think there's a better way to make the case for the "little man" without running into problems. We can think of the homunculus not as something inside the body, but as something complementary to it, so that what happens to one has the opposite effect on the other. In that way, we can say that what happens to the body affects the homunculus, and vice-versa, while at the same time maintaining that they are not the same thing.

One simple way to envision this is to think of the homunculus as the empty space between the atoms in the body. I know empty space is not supposed to be conscious, but then neither are atoms, so there really isn't much of a problem here. So when you start to think of empty space as a substance, similar to matter in some ways, and the opposite of it is other ways, it becomes easier to envision the interplay between the mind and the body as the interplay between space and matter.

There is of course more to it, but that's how it starts.

If you wish to argue that the physical body can be the singular "I" then fine.

The physical body can't have unity, as we all know it gets entirely replaced every seven years or so. If we think our sense of identity comes from our bodies, we must be ready to accept that we are flushing it down the toilet on a daily basis. If, on the other hand, the sense of identity comes from empty space, then there is no problem at all.

I wonder how difficult it really is to accept that empty space may be the source of consciousness. I particularly see no reason to object, as the claim that atoms can be conscious is just as counterintuitive.

 

[Les Sleeth]

You will think this is sophistry, but I cannot observe my own qualia the way the concept is explained to me. The best I can make of the claim that qualia can be observed is that people are misinterpreting what they observe. They observe one thing and make verbal report that are not consistent. It's as if they see four objects and claim that "four" and "objects" are separate aspects of their experience. That to me is nonsense; you can't see objects without seeing how many of them there are, and you can't see "how many" without seeing how many "what".

I don’t think you are naïve or offering up sophistry, but I’m not offering you mere tautologies either. I’ve said many times myself that I think the qualia concept is awkward. My comment about not being able to “see” qualia was an attempt to explain that you can’t look at qualia as objects. From your above and earlier comments, it seems you’ve assumed you can. When Fliption said he could observe them, I interpreted that to mean he was aware if them when they occur, not that he could actually look straight at them within his consciousness.

The whole attempt to avoid the homunular thing has created this mess, and I believe it’s totally unnecessary. Let me see if I can give a rational explanation that fits the facts. I just took a break from answering you to make my wife and I cappuccinos. While I steamed the milk I examined my experience, looking for qualia. Here’s my report.

I am acutely aware in the central part of me. That aspect of my consciousness seems to be relatively constant to a more peripheral part of my consciousness which is detecting things. I’ll label them central and peripheral awarenesses for now.

I said central awareness is more constant because it holds steady while peripheral awareness hears the sounds of frothing, see milk bubbling, feels the heat from the steam, smells the espresso waiting off to the side . . .

Further, my central awareness very clearly appears to be directing my peripheral awareness to detect in certain directions, to watch the tip of the steaming wand, for instance, so it doesn’t dip below the surface of the milk.

Let me give a little more information before getting to qualia. Looking back in time, I can remember when I first started making espresso with inexpensive machines, graduating eventually to a professional unit, reading books to learn espresso chemistry (there was actually an article in Scientific American about it), learning how to roast my own coffee, buying quality grinders, etc.

I can see how all that information became more embedded in me over time. Some of it, the things I did repeatedly, seems to have embedded more deeply and actually integrated itself into my consciousness so that I can do it without having to think about it. Other stuff I do only occasionally, such as cleaning the grinding burrs, I have to recall and think about, so they don’t seem integrated as much into my consciousness.

The more and less integrated aspects seem parallel to central and peripheral awarenesses. That is, (again examining my own consciousness at this moment) it seems like the more often I experience something, the more it moves toward central awareness; the more it moves toward central awareness, the more strongly it becomes integrated into my consciousness.

I’ve concluded (quite awhile back) that subjectivity is the result of that which is most deeply integrated into consciousness. While peripheral consciousness changes with everything it detects (after all, that’s where sense perception and short term memory take place), the central aspect is much harder to change. That central aspect we refer to as “me” because it is so constant relative to the periphery; but “me” can learn too, it just that it takes a lot more experience to notice change there than in the peripheral aspect.

You can see that with this model, the horrors of homuncular regress are thwarted. It’s all about the degree of integration. At the absolute center (imagine consciousness as basically spherical) is where the highest degree of integration is possible. Since there is nowhere to go, convergently speaking, after dead center, that’s where regression ends. So what we have is a sphere of consciousness in varying degrees of integration. On the surface, information is passing barely noticed, such as ambient noise. A little deeper in we are retaining information longer, as memory. Still deeper we are learning. Deeper still we are understanding. Deeper yet we are knowing and loving.

Okay, with that model let’s look at where qualia fits in. I’d say the qualia concept is a way to describe the experience of the constancy of the center in relation to the continuous change on the periphery. In other words, sensations are always coming and going (i.e., continuous peripheral change), but the center is relatively still and so experiences that contrast. Qualia are what those changes feel “like” to that particular center, which is totally distinctive from any other conscious center because each being has been shaped by unique circumstances.

So the peripheral detection of red, when my center becomes aware of it, has a unique feel to me because of how I’ve uniquely developed, and it will have a unique feel to you as well. Both of us might actually experience the same color visually, yet have a different take on its feel in our respective centers.

Like you, I prefer to simply call it self awareness, but all the philosophers who mistakenly believe consciousness is primarily the result of our ability to think imagine that thinking is what’s regressing. If thinking is what’s regressing, then there must be a thinker regressing too. That is the silly model they are so afraid of getting caught proposing, and why we have to put up with the cumbersome qualia concept.

As I said before, it’s too bad those philosophers don’t take Socrates advice and get know themselves better. If consciousness were the result of thinking, then it would cease to exist if someone stopped thinking. Well, I can personally state, as well as refer to the numerous people who’ve achieved the still mind, and we all report instead the experience of heightened consciousness in stillness. So the thinking-creates-consciousness theory doesn’t hold water, and the homuncular fear is unwarrented.

 

[Faust]

I’ve said many times myself that I think the qualia concept is awkward.

I'm glad to hear that. It means there isn't much disagreement between us after all.

My comment about not being able to “see” qualia was an attempt to explain that you can’t look at qualia as objects.

I knew that, but I was trying to make the point that "qualia" is an abstraction, a concept made up to stand for something more fundamental, more real. If qualia is abstract then you can't perceive it, you can only think about it.

I just took a break from answering you to make my wife and I cappuccinos. While I steamed the milk I examined my experience, looking for qualia.

A sure sign one cares too much about philosophy is when they find great truths in a cup of coffee. Trust me, I know the feeling

I said central awareness is more constant because it holds steady while peripheral awareness hears the sounds of frothing, see milk bubbling, feels the heat from the steam, smells the espresso waiting off to the side . . .

Hmmm... yummy! You got my mouth watering - I love espresso!

OK, coffee break over. Now seriously.

I’ve concluded (quite awhile back) that subjectivity is the result of that which is most deeply integrated into consciousness. While peripheral consciousness changes with everything it detects (after all, that’s where sense perception and short term memory take place), the central aspect is much harder to change.

I do not deny that when it comes to thinking or talking about one's own experience, it's impossible to avoid subject-object dualism, but from my perspective that is an illusion created by giving primacy to language in our thoughts.

Let me ask you a somewhat difficult question: what happens if you try to understand the world without using language? Do you think it is possible, and if it is, do you think you would still perceive yourself as separate from the world?

I do realize it's a difficult question and not everyone even knows what it means, let alone answer it.

I’d say the qualia concept is a way to describe the experience of the constancy of the center in relation to the continuous change on the periphery.

I certainly don't see it that way. To begin with, the central consciousness you talk about depends heavily on your ability to recall the past. Without memory there's no integrated self, just an identityless individual. But that identityless individual can still have experience. It seems to me qualia is just the activity of a conscious mind when it perceives the world; it has nothing to do with how the subject relates to it.

If consciousness were the result of thinking, then it would cease to exist if someone stopped thinking.

If you don't think the question is beside the point (I think it has everything to do with it but I realize it's not obvious), why is it that we can't remember anything that happened before a certain age, despite the fact that we were conscious then? What is the exact reason we have this huge blank in our personal histories?

The best explanation I can think of is that we are not really conscious, only proto-conscious. Fully consciousness only arrives once you master language, which curiously enough happens around the same age when we form our first memories. Curious, isn't it?

Well, I can personally state, as well as refer to the numerous people who’ve achieved the still mind, and we all report instead the experience of heightened consciousness in stillness. So the thinking-creates-consciousness theory doesn’t hold water

I think it holds some water in the sense that by the time you start practicing meditation, you have already learned to think. So it's not the act of thinking that creates consciousness, but your ability to think. You don't have to think to be conscious, but you have to be able to think.

 

[Doctordick]

Hi Les,

Sorry about the great delay in this response though I have many excuses: it's spring and the house needs paint, it's spring and when I can't paint, storms are either taking out my ISP or the power to my house, it's spring and, when I have nothing else to do, my wife finds lots of things which need doing. So it's spring and I can't get here as often as I can in the winter! At any rate, a lot of posts lie between your answer to me and this post; I appologize.

I’ll focus on the points where either I think I have something to add, or where I disagree.

When I perused your post, I didn't see any disagreement but I will comment if I come across something which appears to be disagreement when I analyze it with care.

I would just make a small distinction here to ensure we are talking about the same things. Red, as a label, can be attached in two different ways. One could be the mere recognition of red as a particular wave length of EM. That’s something a computer or the hypothetical zombie could do. In other words, the ability to label something red doesn’t have to mean a quale has occurred.

What I am talking about is whatever it is that you yourself are thinking of when you use the word (as you say, what red "is like" to you): what I am trying to understand (that is, the problem of understanding itself) is how to relate your experience of the universe to my experience of the universe. The only things I have to go on are the thoughts which your attempts to communicate generate in my mind. What I am trying to express in my reaction expressed here is the fact that "red as a particular wave length of EM" is fundamentally a proposed solution to the problem: i.e., it is an expression of belief in a particular physicalist explanation of reality (his conclusion as to what you mean when you use the word red). As many have said, that perspective seems to be lacking some important aspects of reality.

A computer[/color] or zombie doesn’t have this second level of awareness, it only has the first.

I won't argue with you with regard to a "zombie" as that is how a zombie is defined; however, the statement that a computer will never "experience qualia" is an unsupported assertion which is certainly not settle-able at this moment.

It is awkward and difficult for people to grasp. I think a better way to describe consciousness is to say some more central part of us is aware of sensations that take place in a more peripheral part of us.

Lot's of things are difficult for people to grasp, particularly new concepts, and one needs all the help one can find. Your phrase "some more central part of us is aware of sensations that take place in a more peripheral part of us" certainly once again reflects acceptance of some aspects of the physicalist explanation. The acceptance that the spatial references are undoubtedly valid representations are, in themselves, a proposed solution to fundamental aspects of the problem. Physicalists don't offer to defend these solutions beyond laughing at anyone who would suggest they need defense.

As far as I can tell, the main reason for the qualia approach was to avoid the philosopher’s paranoia of being attacked for homuncular regress. That is, if there is something aware of being aware, then there must be something more central to that which is aware of being aware of being aware . . . ad infinitum.

Again, you are bringing up issues which are, to me, unimportant. All I have in mind is a problem I have solved: my problem was "how is a solution to be arrived at?" I needed a starting point as a basis for a logical analysis. After considerable thought, I came to the conclusion that there was only one valid starting point. One must begin with totally undefined representation of the information one has to work with. For forty years, I have been unable to communicate that simplistic concept to anyone. At the moment the concept of qualia (as understood by others) seem to possesses some of the critical properties of my starting point. And I have hopes (slim I will admit) that I might be able to communicate some of my thoughts to another. Three of those critical properties are; first, whatever they actually are on a fundamental basis is undefined (that is, qualia seem to be a sufficiently vague concept to be thought of as undefined in a fundamental sense); second, they seem to qualify as playing the roll of the source of the information one has to work with (at least that part which is real and not a figment of our imagination); and third, there exists no way to prove that a label being used in communication makes any guarantee that the quale being referred to is exactly the same for the two communicating individuals (that is, no communications exist which are not based upon some solution to the problem of understanding what one is dealing with). This may not be the purpose for which qualia were invented but, it seems to me, the term provides a lever to get my perspective into another mind. (As I have said many times, I think communication itself is the real fundamental problem here.)

Experience is like that. It is a sort of conscious singularity which cannot be disintegrated without losing it. That’s why, IMO, we have difficulty communicating our experiences.

From my perspective, I don't think it is possible to communicate our experiences; what we do communicate are the relationships between those labels we have invented to represent our experiences in the hope that the other individual possesses a similar collection of experiences and can relate (which I think is exactly what you are saying a little further on). I think our successes appear to be astounding and that success needs an explanation. Others seem to think the success is a trivial issue, or is beyond human comprehension or is simply not worth thinking about (or uninteresting as some have said)[/color]. Any half way decent reason not to think about it seems to serve the purpose.

So if you ask me, the better definition of consciousness is that is the awareness of being aware.

I would put forth the idea that the issue is really somewhat immaterial. As far as I am aware (used in the colloquial sense) I cannot be absolutely sure that any particular entity is or is not "aware". To me it is just another "squirrel" concept offered up by my intuitive side without logical defense. Another unsupported solution to that fundamental problem we were all faced with.

Yes, that is pretty much what most qualia advocates are saying. There is a personal, inner realm to consciousness. The accumulation of each of our experiences is what creates the “me” of consciousness.

As Paul would say, the thinker exists. Yes, I would agree with that; however, I have a slightly different perspective on it. Behind any explanation of anything there is something which must be accepted without support. That aspect of the situation can never be argued away; what we want to do is to minimize what must be taken on faith. I am willing to accept the fact that I exist and I will also accept the fact that I can imagine things. I will even go a little further: I am willing to accept the idea that there is something else that is not "me" and not imagined by me (other things and other minds). These things I accept on faith and consider basic to any argument about anything. Any attempt to "prove" these things need to be proved is "without foundation" to use a hackneyed phrase.

Yes, but just because qualia are the means for my contact with reality doesn’t mean they are all of reality, except for me.

True; but think about that for a moment. If you include (in your definition of qualia) the qualia you have not experienced (those experienced by others which may or may not be experienced by you together with qualia you might come to experience) then how can you claim the concept omits some aspect of reality. Think of these "quale" as elements of the abstract set which I refer to as "A". Then "B" (a finite collection of elements taken from "A") is a collection of qualia and can be seen as "an experience" without making any commitment as to exactly what those quale are. And finally "C" (a finite collection of "B"s) becomes the collection of all your experiences (the fundamental basis of any argument or explanation of anything). The existence of the elements of "A" are the foundation itself and include the quale of "being aware", "imagining things" and billions upon billions of other things. Specifing what these things are is exactly what constitutes that solution we are searching for.

Some of my friends and I have had that old debate about if there is one reality or many realities. My opinion of anyone who says there are many realities is that they are being too subjective. Reality is what is real, and what is real is what exists or can exist. It has nothing to do with me except I am one small part of the whole of existence.

What you are trying to do is to express a solution to a problem you have not carefully set forth. What I am trying to do is to set the problem forth in an exact manner so that we can discuss the relevant issues intelligently.

Now if you were to say qualia are the means by which I, as consciousness, know reality, and therefore to ME qualia “constitute” my sole link to reality . . . then yes, I could agree to that.

That is all I am asking! That and a little willingness to see things from an abstract perspective so that we can discuss these quale without making assertions as to exactly what they are. As soon as we begin to make assertions, we are essentially proposing a solution and not simply refining or clarifying the problem. Again, I don't think I am disagreeing with anything you say, I am simply trying to state the fundamental starting point as clearly as possible without making any assumptions as to what the solution might be. This is the essence of abstract thought. We have to be able to work in the abstract or we can't comprehend the problem. Too many people are indifferent to the problem; all they want is the answer (which by the way, we all know is 42 ). As you say, "Introspectionists should make sense", suppose we see if we can do that.

And then, some comments on all the stuff in between:

Unlike the word sensation, qualia is specifically designed to refer to an aspect that cannot be attributed to neural processing.

Attributing anything to "neural processing" amounts to acceptance of the solution from whense the concept of "neural processing" arrises.

Let me ask you a somewhat difficult question: what happens if you try to understand the world without using language?

Everyone on this forum thinks they understand things (though it is certainly possible some might be in error ) and, however we got here, I am pretty sure most of us began without "language". So, what happens "if you try to understand the world without using language?" Most of us seem to have been able to do it (or at least we think we have). My point is that it has to be a solveable problem as most everyone has managed to solve it in some respect or another. What I cannot understand is the universal opinion that the problem cannot be solved when so many have solved it!

I do realize it's a difficult question and not everyone even knows what it means, let alone answer it.

Well, I think I know exactly what it means and I have an answer I would like to talk to someone about; but I cannot communicate that answer without a language and some subtle concepts not in common usage. The answer requires one be able to think about the problem in the abstract and I feel "qualia" provides a usefull reference label for the foundation elements (that which comprises the set "A" from whense our experiences, set "C", arises).

It seems to me qualia is just the activity of a conscious mind when it perceives the world; it has nothing to do with how the subject relates to it.

I would say that "how the subject relates to it" is the subject's personal solution to "understanding the world". What I want to show people is an analytical solution to the problem, but, before I can start, I need to communicate to them an abstract way of seeing the problem in the absense of language. I need language to do that and I need the concept of "things unidentified by language". If "qualia" fit the bill, so be it.

What is the exact reason we have this huge blank in our personal histories?

I would say that it is due to the fact that we had no "understanding of the world" to relate to (or rather, we had no "understanding of the world" we have bothered to remember). The onset of language is the first indicator that we have discovered usefull relationships internal to the "qualia" which constitute our experiences (we are discovering a solution to the problem of understanding the world).

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Faust]

Everyone on this forum thinks they understand things (though it is certainly possible some might be in error )

I do realize it's a difficult question and not everyone even knows what it means, let alone answer it.

Well, I think I know exactly what it means and I have an answer

Well, it is certainly possible you might be in error

 

[Les Sleeth]

I don't think I have much more to add to this debate. My last response to Faust using the "integration" model of consciousness is pretty much where I stand. It stems from me observing my own consciousness, how it works for me day to day, and what I experience when my mind becomes still in meditation. So I have just two comments on your post.

I won't argue with you with regard to a "zombie" as that is how a zombie is defined; however, the statement that a computer will never "experience qualia" is an unsupported assertion which is certainly not settle-able at this moment.

I didn't say a computer will "never" experience. I simply said it doesn't now. But if you ask me I'd say it never will because I don't think consciousness is the result of neural or any other kind of complexity. Consciousness is the background awareness. How do I know that? Well, I practice experiencing it every day. It is simple, unified, whole and consequently it has to "absorb" things, the way an ocean absorbs a drop of rain, to receive information. And just the way that drop in the ocean contributes, so too is information generalized into consciousness, which is why it changes and learns only very gradually.

However, the intellect is not consciousness, it is a tool of consciousness. While consciousness has to stay "whole," the intellect can be used multifacetedly. You don't need an intellect to be conscious, you need it to calculate, to analyze, to formulate language, to communicate. If you threw out the intellect, you would still be conscious, just not smart.

What I've learned is, if you want to be more happy, sensitive, loving, alert . . . then learn the secret of how to be more conscious. If you want to be smarter . . . then develop intellectual skills. Two different things totally.

Your phrase "some more central part of us is aware of sensations that take place in a more peripheral part of us" certainly once again reflects acceptance of some aspects of the physicalist explanation. The acceptance that the spatial references are undoubtedly valid representations are, in themselves, a proposed solution to fundamental aspects of the problem.

Not necessarily. I don't agree that just because something is part of physicalness, is can't be part of something nonphysical. I don't know how familiar you are with the theories of substance monism, but one idea is that all that exists is a form of some most basic and highly mutable existential "stuff" that has always existed and always will.

So consciousness would be a form of it and so would physicalness; they would be described, in this theory, as exactly the same existential stuff, but subject to different conditions. For example, physicalness might be the result of highly compressed existential stuff, and possibly consciousness could be the result of a quantity of oscillating, peripherally polarized, centrally evolving existential stuff. Same stuff, different conditions.

Anyway, since this stuff is supposed to abide in an infinitely extended continum, spatial characteristics are part of the very foundation of all existence. There's no need to insist that traits they have in common makes them both physical since the common traits might reflect something even more basic.

 

[Doctordick]

Well, it is certainly possible you might be in error

Isn't that what I just said? If it is so, I would love to have someone point out my error.

And Les, I am sorry but I don't think you understood anything I said. Maybe I confused you by talking about issues that had nothing to do with what I was trying to communicate.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Fliption]

I don't "think it means", it's one of the definitions given in most dictionaries.

I wasn't implying anything by pointing out the difference in definitions. I was just pointing out the difference as the major factor for why I wasn't following what you were saying. How many dictionaries your definition is in isn't relevant to me.

I didn't define illusion, I just mentioned the word has two slightly different meanings. I didn't make it up, it's in the dictionary. So when a person uses the word, it can be hard to know which meaning they are referring to. That's all I said, everything else you read was not there.

You were saying that to a neurologist explaining qualia was no different than explaining a false belief. I am claiming that you say this because you define illusion to mean false belief. If we don't define illusion that way, then the statement you made about neurologists can no longer be made.

At this point you mentioned "cop-out" three times. If you keep accusing people of copping-out, it's no surprise they don't bother explaining things to you.

I don't use the term to be offensive. My apologies if you took it that way. I'm simply using it as a term to mean the position doesn't address the issue. I don't intend to imply that you do this on purpose.

Because "qualia" is supposed to exist inside my mind. Trust me, I know what's in there, and there's no "qualia" to be seen anywhere. Unless "qualia" means something I already know by another name.

Yes, you likely call it something else.

Yes, there is, but the explanation is a bit complex. But I'm sure this will sound as a cop-out to you.

Well, since I consider myself to be a reasonably intelligent and open minded person, the reasons for your statement being true would either be

1) It really is a cop out. or
2) You don't know how to explain it.

Since I give most people the benefit of the doubt on their ability to explain their positions, I am left with number 1 most everytime. But I would love to hear how you can do this.

No, but you can always claim that people assert false beliefs as a cop-out. That is satisfying enough as you certainly know.

But asserting it and backing up that assertion with sound reasoning are two different things. I believe I can do the latter.

"Can everything be reduced to pure neurology". I see the beginnings of a thread there...

You could say yes but you'd have no way to explain how.

So how does it look like? Can you describe it to me? I have a strong suspicion that it looks a lot like something I refer to as "the world". But I may be mistaken.

The world? Yes, qualia is part of the world. I think that too!

Having this discussion is fruitless until we get past one of the previous points that I commented on. If you believe that you can actually see what I see when I see blue then you obviously know something that know one else in the world knows. Until I understand this, I don't think trying to describe qualia is going to go very far.

 

[Fliption]

You will think this is sophistry, but I cannot observe my own qualia the way the concept is explained to me. The best I can make of the claim that qualia can be observed is that people are misinterpreting what they observe. They observe one thing and make verbal report that are not consistent. It's as if they see four objects and claim that "four" and "objects" are separate aspects of their experience. That to me is nonsense; you can't see objects without seeing how many of them there are, and you can't see "how many" without seeing how many "what".

Les commented on this and I just wanted to confirm that as being correct. I understand what you're saying... "four" cannot be seen. Yet you agree it is a useful concept to use in a sentence like "I see four of them" don't you? Likewise, I am simply using the word qualia to refer to a feature of the world that I observe.

"It is raining" is a perfect example of how language forces us to assign a subject to a phenomenon even when one doesn't exist. "It" certainly doesn't "rain", but we have to use the indefinite subject to account for the rules of grammar, not for the phenomenon of rain itself.

So you think that lanagauge has universal rules that humans simply discovered? Or does it make more sense to say that the awareness of a subject, the perception of an "I", is what drove the rules of language to be what they are?

Seems more reasonable to chose the latter.

If you don't think the question is beside the point (I think it has everything to do with it but I realize it's not obvious), why is it that we can't remember anything that happened before a certain age, despite the fact that we were conscious then? What is the exact reason we have this huge blank in our personal histories?

The best explanation I can think of is that we are not really conscious, only proto-conscious. Fully consciousness only arrives once you master language, which curiously enough happens around the same age when we form our first memories. Curious, isn't it?

I don't think it has anything to do with language. Are you suggesting that language was invented by unconsciousness zombies? How did language ever get started if not by a consciousness person who required verbal tags to label experienced objects?

What makes more sense to me is that the brain develops it's ability to sort through and categorize it's experiences(and therefore memorize and have the ability to reference it) at the same time the brain develops it's ability to think. The idea that the brain's ability to memorize is correlated with it's ability to think shouldn't be that radical of an idea should it?

 

[Tournesol]

i.e. I'm constrained to play your word game by your rules? No thanks.

The power of legal argument in court comes from an agreed upon authority that sanctions the form and enforces the consequences. You have no authority for your word game except your ability to persuade suck... er, students to accept yours.

*We* are playing the same word game...philosophical debate.

 

[Tournesol]

No-one can ever offer an explanation which is not itself another bunch of words

Huh? What about pictures, diagrams, animations?

*you* said

"I can't tell you what the sentence means, I can only give you more sentences."

as though sentences (or , trivially diagrams) were different from meanings.

This is a bit misleading. Perspectives cannot be right or wrong; the most you can expect from a perspective is a degree of consistency.

And a completely inconsitent perspective can still be right ?

If the question can only be answered by opinions, then it cannot be answered to everyone's satisfaction. That is clearly the case here.

No, it is your unsupported assertion that it is all a matter of opinion, perspective, etc.

I can tell you this much: your reasoning above is not valid. David Chalmers has a paper on his website that deals with the fact that zombies also have a "problem of qualia", even though they don't have qualia. You don't need qualia to have the illusion that you do

Quote:
You don't need to have qualia to have a problem of qualia -- which, in the case of zombies, is purely a matter of belief, and not of perception or sensation , and not therefore of *illusion*.

According to any dictionary definition, "illusion" can also mean "false beliefs".

I don't think David Copperfield is paid to induce false beliefs in people...

Anyway, perhaps you explain the difference between

a) learning about giraffes fro the first time by seeing one in a zoo

b) learing about giraffes for the first time by being told about them

as far as I can see, you are committed to saying that a) and b) are
both cognitive and non-phenomenal, but (a) is accompanied by a false
cognitive belief that there *is* something phenomenal going on
(inasmuch as you are not committed to saying it is all a matter of opinion).

Now does anyone think functionalists are foolish enough to argue that people have the subjective illusion that they have subjectivity? That would be foolish beyond belief. Surely they must mean something else.

Don't ask me, I've neve seen a concincing version of functionalism. Pehpas it just is a rubbish philosophy.

You "know" qualia are illusions, don't you ?

I know nothing, I just happen to look at things from a perspective in which subjectivity and objectivity are the same thing, and the notion that they are different is a false belief (that is, an illusion). I'm one of the few people I know of who disagree with both Chalmers and Dennett at the same time, while also agreeing with both to a limited extent.

I am not sure that is even coherent.

How can you deny their existence when yo don't know what the word means ITFP? make your mind up!

I deny its existence based on the fact that I don't need to know what the concept means to understand my own mind. That is because I have a personal account of my own mind which has no room for more concepts, whatever name they happen to have.

How can you refute the possibility that "qualia" is an unfamiliar way
of expressing a concept you already employ ?

There's a neurological mechanism that makes people believe in giraffes...

Surely. That mechanism is called "seeing a giraffe". Has anyone seen qualia yet?

Since qualia are defined as "the way things seem to us", everything you have ever seen, heard, etc has been accompanied by qualia.
Loosely speaking, it could be said that you have never seen anything else !

 

[Faust]

Well, since I consider myself to be a reasonably intelligent and open minded person, the reasons for your statement being true would either be

1) It really is a cop out. or
2) You don't know how to explain it.

In other words, heads you win, tails I lose, right?

Having this discussion is fruitless until we get past one of the previous points that I commented on. If you believe that you can actually see what I see when I see blue then you obviously know something that no one else in the world knows.

Heads you win, tails I lose, again. From your perspective, I can only answer your question by claiming to know something no one else in the world knows, which would be a confession of lunacy on my part. But if instead I choose to represent the perspective of people with whom you disagree with, then I'll be simply "copping out".

The best I can tell you at this point is, your perspective is bogus because it leads nowhere worth going. Let's turn the game around and give you a chance to make your case. Suppose I agree with you that I cannot see what you see; I don't agree, but let's say so for sake of argument. What's next now? Enlighten me, please. Tell me some great discovery that can be made based on the notion that I cannot see what you see.

 

[Tournesol]

The falsehood of most versions of physicalism ?

 

[Tournesol]

I deny the existence of qualia, and I think the "problem of qualia" is a problem of semantics, nothing more. Seems I'm not alone.

Another cop out. Don't get me wrong. It could be true. The problem is that everyone who ever claims this, always ends their post with this statement. No one ever explains how this is the case. Even though it may allow one to keep their world view intact, claiming it is so doesn't make it so.
QUOTE]

how true

 

[Faust]

*you* said "I can't tell you what the sentence means, I can only give you more sentences." as though sentences (or , trivially diagrams) were different from meanings.

And you think they are not? You think the meaning of sentences is just a bunch of other sentences?

And a completely inconsitent perspective can still be right ?

Consistency is in the eye of the beholder. Certainly people who hold a perspective fail to see glaring inconsistencies.

your unsupported assertion that it is all a matter of opinion, perspective, etc.

I didn't say it's all a matter of opinion, but I would say it's all a matter of perspective.

I don't think David Copperfield is paid to induce false beliefs in people...

Look, I'm tired of discussing what the word "illusion" means. If you don't like what the dictionary says, take it up with the publishers. I certainly don't have any authority over the English language and I can't be blamed for the confusion it creates.

Anyway, perhaps you explain the difference between

a) learning about giraffes fro the first time by seeing one in a zoo

b) learing about giraffes for the first time by being told about them

as far as I can see, you are committed to saying that a) and b) are
both cognitive and non-phenomenal, but (a) is accompanied by a false
cognitive belief that there *is* something phenomenal going on
(inasmuch as you are not committed to saying it is all a matter of opinion).

This is so far removed from what I said, I don't even know how to comment.

Don't ask me, I've neve seen a concincing version of functionalism. Pehpas it just is a rubbish philosophy.

Every philosophy is rubbish, except our own. And I'm not arguing for functionalism, only saying you can't prove functionalism is wrong from a phenomenalist perspective. You can't make a chess movement in a game of checkers and claim your opponent's piece.

How can you refute the possibility that "qualia" is an unfamiliar way of expressing a concept you already employ ?

Sorry, I don't know what your question means.

Since a qualia are defined as "the way things seem to us", everything you have ever seen, heard, etc has been accompanied b qualia.
Loosely

If there is no "way things seem to us", then qualia doesn't exist. Can you prove there is a way things seem to us? I'm inclined to believe there are only two things: "the way things are" and "errors of perception". You could perhaps make a case that qualia is what allows errors of perception to occur, but this is opening a can of worms. If you want to open it, I can certainly help the worms come out

 

[Tournesol]

You will think this is sophistry, but I cannot observe my own qualia the way the concept is explained to me. The best I can make of the claim that qualia can be observed is that people are misinterpreting what they observe. They observe one thing and make verbal report that are not consistent. It's as if they see four objects and claim that "four" and "objects" are separate aspects of their experience. That to me is nonsense; you can't see objects without seeing how many of them there are, and you can't see "how many" without seeing how many "what".

We can conceive of "how many" separately from "what" , likewise we can
conceive of "how it seems" from "what it is". Abstraction are aspects of things
which can be conceived seapately, even thought they cannot be separated in reality. All you have shown is that qualia are abstractions, and as such no more invalid than numbers.

To me all you are saying above is that I am aware of everything I am aware of. Why in the world does a tautology matter?

Say what you like about tautologies , they are always true.

Because I interpret any statement with the word qualia as being essentially tautological.

Including
"qualia exist"
"qualia don't exist"
"qualia dream uneasily"

I really fail to see how your statement could be anything but nonsense.

 

[Faust]

Say what you like about tautologies , they are always true.

Now this is true sophistry. I define God as "that which exists", then say "God exists", and claim it's absolutely true that God exists, end of story.

Are we really having this conversation?

I really fail to see how your statement could be anything but nonsense.

Well, you have two options: keep trying, or claim it's a cop-out. Let me know what you decide, although I think I already know.

 

[Tournesol]

How can you refute the possibility that "qualia" is an unfamiliar way of expressing a concept you already employ ?

Sorry, I don't know what your question means.

It is another way of saying what *you* said in #321:

Unless "qualia" means something I already know by another name.

 

[Faust]

It is another way of saying what *you* said in #321:

So we're just going round and round in circles. I first asked what makes "qualia" different from "sensory perception". I was given the answer that philosophers invented "qualia" just so they can talk about the aspect of sensory perceptions physicalism can't account for. Now you're saying qualia and sensory perception are the same thing. What can I conclude other than someone is playing word games here?

This discussion is really getting nowhere.

 

[Fliption]

In other words, heads you win, tails I lose, right?

If a person clings to an unreasonable position or a position they cannot defend then what other option does that person allow themselves to have other than "heads you win, tails I lose?" I'd really be interested to hear how anything else is justified.

Heads you win, tails I lose, again. From your perspective, I can only answer your question by claiming to know something no one else in the world knows, which would be a confession of lunacy on my part. But if instead I choose to represent the perspective of people with whom you disagree with, then I'll be simply "copping out".

This is just propaganda that doesn't help us at all. I haven't claimed anything you've said is a cop out. I have only said that in the past, theories like the one you are proposing have been cop-outs because the people have always espoused them but then never explained how they can be true. It's like claiming that GOD exists to explain black holes and then not having to explain anything else. Don't you think this is a cop-out? It's meaningless. And as of now, you haven't laid out any reasoning to defend your position either. You did mention a few things about memory earlier and I responded to those but you have ignored those responses and instead chosen to post highlevel propaganda comments.

The best I can tell you at this point is, your perspective is bogus because it leads nowhere worth going. Let's turn the game around and give you a chance to make your case. Suppose I agree with you that I cannot see what you see; I don't agree, but let's say so for sake of argument. What's next now? Enlighten me, please. Tell me some great discovery that can be made based on the notion that I cannot see what you see.

I did not mean to imply that you and I aren't seeing the same blue. The point is that you can never know that I am seeing the same thing as you. It is a point of epistomology, not ontology. The implication of this fact is that the physicalist's objective view of the world cannot explain the existence of information that cannot be shared. The existence of subjectivity is a problem for that worldview. The implications of this topic is basic philosophy.

 

[Tournesol]

Now you're saying qualia and sensory perception are the same thing.

I did not say they were. I asked you how you could be sure that you were not aready recognising qualia, but under a different name.

Inasmuch as you still haven't answered that question (or the giraffe question) you seem to be evading the whole issue of accounting for your
own experience.

 

[Tournesol]

Now this is true sophistry. I define God as "that which exists", then say "God exists", and claim it's absolutely true that God exists, end of story.

Are we really having this conversation?

Ontological arguments may aspire to be tautologies, (and they may fail
since "that which exists" may be an idiosyncratic definition of God),
bu that doesn't mean there is anything wrong with tautologies.

Well, you have two options: keep trying, or claim it's a cop-out. Let me know what you decide, although I think I already know.

Actually, I don't think you understand what "tautology" means.

 

[Faust]

The implication of this fact is that the physicalist's objective view of the world cannot explain the existence of information that cannot be shared

Do you think a physicalist would agree with you on that?

Oh, I forget, they don't agree because they cop out.