Can a Bounded Random Variable Be Found for Almost Equal Random Variables?

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The discussion focuses on the existence of a bounded random variable Y that approximates another random variable X with a specified probability. It is established that for any epsilon > 0, a measurable set can be defined where Y differs from X within a probability of less than epsilon. The approach involves defining Y as equal to X within a specific interval and zero outside, ensuring that the probability condition is met. The existence of a suitable threshold, λ, is necessary to achieve the desired approximation. The conclusion emphasizes that by selecting an appropriate m, the probability condition can be satisfied.
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I've been trying to solve the following question: Let X be a random variable s.t. Pr[|X|<+\infty]=1. Then for every epsilon>0 there exists a bounded random variable Y such that P[X\neq Y]<epsilon.

The ideia here would be to find a set of epsilon measure so Y would be different than X in that set. However, it is not clear even that such a measurable set exists...

Any help?
 
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To show there is some interval (-a, a) such that \int_{-a}^a f(x) dx &gt; 1-\epsilon, apply the definition of an improper integral to \int_{-\infty}^\infty f(x) dx = 1. Have Y=X over (-a,a).
 
For a large positive number \lambda, define Y = X on the set \{|X| \le \lambda\} and Y=0 on the remaining part of the sample space. Now all you have to do is choose \lambda large enough to get the conclusion you want.
 
It would remain to show that such $\lambda$ exists. We can definte the sets A_n=\{\omega\in \Omega: |X(\omega)|<n\}. Since A_n is measurable, as X is a random variable, and A_n \uparrow \{\omega: |X|<+\infty}, we have that \lim P(A_n) = P(\{\omega: |X|<+\infty}. Therefore, for all \epsilon, there is $m$ large enough so that P(A_n)>1-\epsilon. Then we can define Y=X in A_m and Y=0 otherwise.

Thanks!
 
I'm taking a look at intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL). Basically it exclude Double Negation Elimination (DNE) from the set of axiom schemas replacing it with Ex falso quodlibet: ⊥ → p for any proposition p (including both atomic and composite propositions). In IPL, for instance, the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) p ∨ ¬p is no longer a theorem. My question: aside from the logic formal perspective, is IPL supposed to model/address some specific "kind of world" ? Thanks.
I was reading a Bachelor thesis on Peano Arithmetic (PA). PA has the following axioms (not including the induction schema): $$\begin{align} & (A1) ~~~~ \forall x \neg (x + 1 = 0) \nonumber \\ & (A2) ~~~~ \forall xy (x + 1 =y + 1 \to x = y) \nonumber \\ & (A3) ~~~~ \forall x (x + 0 = x) \nonumber \\ & (A4) ~~~~ \forall xy (x + (y +1) = (x + y ) + 1) \nonumber \\ & (A5) ~~~~ \forall x (x \cdot 0 = 0) \nonumber \\ & (A6) ~~~~ \forall xy (x \cdot (y + 1) = (x \cdot y) + x) \nonumber...

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