Causality in the subjective world

[PIT2]

I was thinking that there are all these laws of nature that describe physical systems, and our senses receive input from these systems. However, once the input has been delivered, it dissappears into the black hole of our consciousness, where it is manipulated by some unknown principle. Once this principle is done with the input, it produces the output (our actions), which therefore cannot be predicted with any known law of nature.

That these laws do not rule over causality in a subjective world can be understood when one asks if the number 9 is pulled down by gravity, or when one hears someone tell about his experience of flying around and morphing objects in a lucid dream, or when one anticipates an event 2 weeks down the subjectively simulated road and let's it influence an event 10 minutes down the road.

So how does causality work in a subjective world, if not by the known laws of nature?
Or am i mistaken and do these laws still apply?

 

[Canute]

The laws of psychology/computation/cognition are, in principle, supposed to follow on directly from the laws of physics. The idea is that our thoughts obey the rules that govern our brains. Thus, the functional processes of our brains are physically caused in the same way as the orbits of the planets. Not everyone agrees about this, expecially in light of the extraordinary plasticity of our brains, but many researchers believe that the functional processes connected with thinking are entirely explicable in terms of physical causation.

Of course, this begs the question of whether physical laws arise from the laws of reasoning or vice versa, but generally we automatically assume the latter. Personally, I find it more likely that the laws of reason are prior to the laws of physics.

According to many people there is similar set of laws that govern the evolution of our consciousness, namely the laws of karma. These are just as detirministic but operate on another plane. Perhaps, using David Bohm's terms, one could say that one set of laws work in the explicate (psychophysical) dimension, the other set in the implicate (phenomenal) dimension.

Regards
Canute

 

[PIT2]

The laws of psychology/computation/cognition are, in principle, supposed to follow on directly from the laws of physics.

Is this just in principle or has any of it been demonstrated?
Im not exactly familiar with laws of computation or how they relate to our subjective world.

The idea is that our thoughts obey the rules that govern our brains. Thus, the functional processes of our brains are physically caused in the same way as the orbits of the planets. Not everyone agrees about this, expecially in light of the extraordinary plasticity of our brains, but many researchers believe that the functional processes connected with thinking are entirely explicable in terms of physical causation.

Experiences may or may not be physically caused, but we do know they are completely different from the physical. So if they interact with each other in this completely different form (the subjective influencing the subjective), then even in principle the physical laws would not rule over this interaction (at least that's how it seems to me).

According to many people there is similar set of laws that govern the evolution of our consciousness, namely the laws of karma. These are just as detirministic but operate on another plane. Perhaps, using David Bohm's terms, one could say that one set of laws work in the explicate (psychophysical) dimension, the other set in the implicate (phenomenal) dimension.

That last part about implicate dimension sounds like what I am talking about. I had read a tiny bit about it before (implicate order) but not realized its was about phenomenal laws.

 

[moving finger]

Imho it’s a mistake to think that nature “obeys” what we call the “laws” of nature or the “laws” of physics. We fall into this way of thinking because we are conditioned to think of laws as being prescriptive. Initially the word 'law' was used in connection with prescriptive moral rules such as those promulgated in the Bible (such as 'Thou shalt not murder', 'Thou shalt not lie', and so on). It is also used in connection with the prescriptive laws that regulate society such as 'Drive only on the left-hand side of the road', 'A passport is required for international travel' and the like. And there are also prescriptive laws passed by Parliament, and enforced by Law Courts, concerning a host of matters. One thing that all of these laws have in common is that they are intended to describe how we should behave, and not necessarily how we do behave. Clearly people can, and do, break such prescriptive laws.

The idea that there are additional prescriptive natural laws was likely an extension to the idea of prescriptive moral, social and legal laws. God, it was argued, also gave nature its 'natural laws' to obey. But though people can break moral and legal laws, it is not open to nature to break the laws of nature. There seemed to be a kind of “necessity” to the laws of nature that prevented nature from breaking its own laws. Ever since, we have been left with the anarchic intuition that natural laws are both prescriptive and necessary.

The basic idea of a law of nature is that of a perfectly regular sequence of kinds of happenings that occur without exception. The observed natural world might itself appear to us to be highly irregular, and even somewhat chaotic (think of the weather!). But it was known even to primitive peoples that underneath all the appearance of irregularity there are at least some quite simple and quite general natural laws which somehow “govern” what happens (eg the cycle of day and night, phases of the moon, the tides, the seasons).

Then Newton managed to show that motions of bodies, including the heavenly bodies, seem to “obey” a small number of perfectly general laws of motion. Bodies behave in a large variety of ways when heated; but in thermodynamics it can be shown that all these happenings “obey” a few, quite general, laws of thermodynamics. Again light exhibits a wide variety of phenomena, such as refraction causing rainbows, polarisation, etc. But all these phenomena can be shown to “obey” a small number of laws governing light such as those of reflection and refraction. The detailed and methodical investigation of the natural world had revealed some of the more fundamental rules and relationships which seemed to apply to material things. The idea of scientific, as opposed to natural, laws had been born.

Where our intuitions fail us is in thinking that scientific laws somehow mandate or force events to be a particular way. It is not uncommon to find modern texts suggesting that there is a kind of “inescapability” or “necessity” about the laws of nature, of the form : “If Einstein and Newton are right, then of necessity no body can travel faster than c (that is, it cannot but do this); or of necessity all bodies gravitate towards one another according to the law of universal gravitation (i.e., they cannot but behave this way); and so on.”

Of course we can imagine a world where bodies might travel faster than light; there is no logical contradiction in this. And we can imagine a world where bodies gravitate towards one another according to the inverse of the distance, or the inverse cube, and so on. Newton in fact did envisage these possibilities since there is no logical contradiction in assuming any of them. It is just that our world does not work in any of these ways.

What the above shows is that there is often an intuition of a certain kind of "necessity" about the laws of nature as they operate in this world. Nature it seems is inescapably committed to behaving in accordance with its laws and cannot behave otherwise. But is this a correct view of the laws of nature?

Best Regards

 

[Canute]

Nice post. I agree that we tend to think of laws in the wrong way, as if there were a rule book somewhere that had to be consulted before an effect could follow a cause. But I think the question was more about where physical causation ended and 'mental' causation begins, or whether there is a difference between them.

Is this just in principle or has any of it been demonstrated?
Im not exactly familiar with laws of computation or how they relate to our subjective world.

It is probably the most orthodox assumption in physics and consciousness studies. It is, however, no more than an assumption.

Experiences may or may not be physically caused, but we do know they are completely different from the physical.

Whoa. Some people think they are not different. I don't, and obviously you don't, but it's an open question in science as to who is right. You can say "I know that experience is completely different from the physical" but not "we know ...".

So if they interact with each other in this completely different form (the subjective influencing the subjective), then even in principle the physical laws would not rule over this interaction (at least that's how it seems to me).

To me also. The problems only begin when we start to wonder if they interact with each other.

That last part about implicate dimension sounds like what I am talking about. I had read a tiny bit about it before (implicate order) but not realized its was about phenomenal laws.

There may be different ways to interpret Bohm's idea and perhaps mine is not correct. However, he is a friend of the Dalai Lama so I assume 'the implicate level of order' corresponds with the phenomenal as opposed to the psychophysical, which would be the explicate level. Don't take my word for it though.

Cheers
Canute

 

[Doctordick]

Of course we can imagine a world where bodies might travel faster than light; there is no logical contradiction in this[/color]. And we can imagine a world where bodies gravitate towards one another according to the inverse of the distance, or the inverse cube, and so on. Newton in fact did envisage these possibilities since there is no logical contradiction in assuming any of them[/color]. It is just that our world does not work in any of these ways.

Ah but there is a logical contradiction! It is just that people don't examine the consequences as carefully as they should. Your post brings up an issue close to my heart.

What the above shows is that there is often an intuition of a certain kind of "necessity" about the laws of nature as they operate in this world. Nature it seems is inescapably committed to behaving in accordance with its laws and cannot behave otherwise. But is this a correct view of the laws of nature?

I think you are confusing two very different modes of thought.

In essence, there are two very different ways of "understanding" anything. There is that emotional feeling that something makes sense; that you understand what is going on and have no doubts as to the validity of your expectations. Then again there is a very different kind of understanding which allows you to logically defend some set of analytical expectations in intimate detail; even in cases where no emotional feeling exists to defend the validity of those expectations (here I am talking about all those totally counter intuitive deductions so common in analytical work).

In my head, both meanings are very important. When someone says that they "think" something is true, they can have either of the two meanings in mind and they seldom make it clear as to which phenomena they mean to convey. I believe that it is very important that these two different phenomena should be carefully identified and kept in mind whenever rational discussion is attempted.

I like to use the adjective "logical" to classify a specific kind of thought commonly believed, particularly by intellectuals, to be the only possible variety of rational thought (I suspect they believe rational and logical are merely different words for the same phenomena). In my head, the term "rational thought" implies the idea being expressed makes sense: i.e., it does not generate emotional doubts as to its validity[/color]. Under that view, the adjective rational does not always imply "logical" (and neither does it imply easy believability but rather only that the presenter believes it). The view also makes it apparent that "rational statements" (though they seem to make sense) are not necessarily valid[/color], a point anyone familiar with the development of science should be aware. That is, very bright people have made errors in their beliefs from time to time; but that does not mean that those beliefs were irrational.

If one holds that only logical thoughts are rational, then scientific progress becomes impossible since any deductions must be based on things presumed to be valid without reason (those axioms one starts with) and that is certainly irrational. However, I hold that there is a second kind of rational thought which needs to be clearly understood. Call it intuition, Zen or my favorite "squirrel thought"; whatever you prefer.

Squirrels are great in the treetops but they lack a bit of skill on the streets. All my life I have heard those smears you see on the street (and I think you know what I mean) humorously referred to as "poor squirrel decisions". Well, they were actually results of real decisions and I think "squirrel" is an excellent adjective to use. I doubt anyone would classify those decisions, whether they are in the tree tops or in the streets, as "logical"; "intuitive" seems much more reasonable .

So all thought is divided into two categories, each with its own strengths and weaknesses. The great strength of logical thought is that the conclusions reached through logical thought are guaranteed to be as valid as the premises upon which they are based. The weakness of logical thought is that it is limited to a very small number of premises: i.e., the specific number of factors which can be included in the analytical statement of the problem. This is usually a seriously small number when compared to the volumes of information available to us through our senses.

A further problem with logical thought is that the number of specific steps in the process cannot be excessive as we must be consciously aware of each step. If we are to be truly logical, each and every step must be consciously validated. Anyone who has carefully thought anything out is very well aware of the fact that considerable time is consumed in such an analysis. If a logical process were to involve a few billion steps, I doubt many here would attempt to follow that logic. Now mathematics and formal logic provide us with a certain respite from that last constraint but, even so, logical thought is of very limited applicability.

Intuitive thought, on the other hand, has its own strengths and weaknesses. Its strength lies in the astonishing number of factors which can be taken into account (seemingly beyond counting though as Paul points out, it cannot be "infinite"). Its weakness is the fact that the process can not be validated: i.e., there is no way to prove your intuitive conclusions are correct. Nevertheless, most of them will be good decisions. Why is that? The answer should be clear. Whatever the mechanisms are, by which those decisions are reached, they have been honed and polished through millions of years of survival; failure to make good[/color] "squirrel" decisions has been cleaned from the gene pool by the shear consequences of making really bad decisions.

What I am getting at is the fact that logical thought is actually a rather worthless endeavor when it comes to life and death decisions. It is often much better to "go with your gut". In fact, in the absence of mathematics, logical decisions are so limited as to be almost entirely inapplicable to any day to day activities. This is why many students can not understand a purpose to learning mathematics. Actually they are quite right, neither math nor logic serve much of a purpose to important problems. I have known very successful people who have never made a logical decision in their entire life.

However, when a problem can be approached with math and logic, one can be quite sure of the absolute validity of their conclusions. Well, "absolute" to a certain extent: it is always possible that an important factor was omitted or that some axiom thought to be true was, in fact, false. Thus it is important that we understand how those factors came to be established. There is but one answer; intuition (pure "squirrel" decisions). I have come to the fundamental conclusion that these intuitive decisions are the single most important part of thinking; logical thought is not even possible in the absence of intuition. But the problem is that almost everyone has a great tendency to presume their intuition is infallible.

This is, in fact, the single biggest problem in trying to understand the universe. Most everyone believes the ideas they have arrived at via their personal "squirrel" decisions are the only possible conclusions which can be reached (see my post to the thread: "is computability an empirical fact of the universe?"). The reader should understand that "belief" of anything is a squirrel decision. The ability to communicate (language itself) was acquired through "squirrel" thought. Accept your squirrel decisions as your best bet when it comes to any serious question, but don't ever think that those squirrel decisions are infallible. You don't have to believe they are infallible to follow them; when it comes to life, "you pays your money and you takes your chances" and worrying about it is a waste of time.

On the other hand, if you want to do science, you should remember that even your most cherished "squirrel" decisions could be wrong. Even you guys who are not "crackpots" should remember that. A lot of science is done in the total absence of logical thought and that has to be so; but scientists should not forget that fact. If they do, science folds over to religion. It may seem to work great, but that does not mean it is valid. Think about that next time you see a "poor squirrel decision".

Have fun -- Dick

 

[PIT2]

Whoa. Some people think they are not different. I don't, and obviously you don't, but it's an open question in science as to who is right. You can say "I know that experience is completely different from the physical" but not "we know ...".

I used the wrong words but I didnt mean it like that. I meant that 'from what we currently understand' of the physical (as how it is defined and operates in natural laws), we know that it is completely unlike (better word perhaps) consciousness. And from this follows that however the subjective influences the subjective, it is likely to also be completely unlike how we currently know the physical influences the physical...

I did not mean they are separate (dualism).

Of course we can imagine a world where bodies might travel faster than light; there is no logical contradiction in this. And we can imagine a world where bodies gravitate towards one another according to the inverse of the distance, or the inverse cube, and so on. Newton in fact did envisage these possibilities since there is no logical contradiction in assuming any of them. It is just that our world does not work in any of these ways.

Can u give an example of a thought that would be logically contradictive to have?
(i have no idea what this means)

And this may be a dumb question also, but is there anything logical about a qualia?
Does a qualia logically contradict itself?

 

[moving finger]

Of course we can imagine a world where bodies might travel faster than light; there is no logical contradiction in this. And we can imagine a world where bodies gravitate towards one another according to the inverse of the distance, or the inverse cube, and so on. Newton in fact did envisage these possibilities since there is no logical contradiction in assuming any of them. It is just that our world does not work in any of these ways.

Ah but there is a logical contradiction! It is just that people don't examine the consequences as carefully as they should. Your post brings up an issue close to my heart.

Can you point out the alleged logical contradiction? I cannot find anything in the rest of your post which throws any light on this.

What the above shows is that there is often an intuition of a certain kind of "necessity" about the laws of nature as they operate in this world. Nature it seems is inescapably committed to behaving in accordance with its laws and cannot behave otherwise. But is this a correct view of the laws of nature?

I think you are confusing two very different modes of thought.

Can you identify explicitly which two modes of thought you think I am confusing? Again, the rest of your post was very interesting, but it doesn’t seem (to me) to explicitly identify just which two modes of thought you think I am confusing.

Can u give an example of a thought that would be logically contradictive to have?
(i have no idea what this means)

Logical contradiction is a matter of simultaneously saying, putting forward, or defending both some specific and definite statement and the denial of that self-same statement. Or, in other words, it is the conjunction of a statement with its own negation, p & ~p.

Thus the statement that "Socrates was a man" and "Socrates was not a man" are logically contradictory if both refer to the same male human being, Socrates of Athens, who lived from approximately 469 to 399 B.C.E. and if both mean by "was a man" exactly the same thing.

And this may be a dumb question also, but is there anything logical about a qualia?
Does a qualia logically contradict itself?

Singular of qualia is quale.
Quale is a noun. There is nothing logically contradictory about a noun. Propositions may be contradictory, but nouns cannot be.

Best Regards

 

[moving finger]

Nice post. I agree that we tend to think of laws in the wrong way, as if there were a rule book somewhere that had to be consulted before an effect could follow a cause. But I think the question was more about where physical causation ended and 'mental' causation begins, or whether there is a difference between them.

The very word "causation" invokes thoughts of animism, which I believe is a false view of the world. What we interpret as "A causes B" is simply a conjunction of A and B. In this respect, there is no difference between physical causation and so-called mental causation (which I see as simply a subset of physical causation, and involving the same kinds of conjunctions of events, but without any animism and without any prescriptive laws).

Best Regards

 

[Canute]

Fair enough. I prefer to think of causation as psychophysical, since if it were not then psychology would be a branch of neuroscience.

Small point, but according to physicists it is perfectly possible that a mirror universe exist on the other side of the speed of light, in which the mass of a body becomes infinite (or zero, I forget) as it slows down to c. The mathematics allows for this possibility, but whether ones own brain allows it is another matter.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Fair enough. I prefer to think of causation as psychophysical, since if it were not then psychology would be a branch of neuroscience.

Small point, but according to physicists it is perfectly possible that a mirror universe exist on the other side of the speed of light, in which the mass of a body becomes infinite (or zero, I forget) as it slows down to c. The mathematics allows for this possibility, but whether ones own brain allows it is another matter.

Small point? I prefer to think of causation as psychophysical, since if it were not then psychology would be a branch of neuroscience.

That's the WHOLE point. For me, causation is not at all psychophysical, and psychology is an (emergent) branch of neuroscience. The more we learn the more psychology shows its neuroscientific roots.

And don't quote scientific speculations if you can't understand the fuller context they exist in. The history and understanding of tachyon physics does not deserve the description "mirror universe" and the phrase 'mirror universe" was not coined to describe tachyon physics.

 

[PIT2]

Singular of qualia is quale.
Quale is a noun. There is nothing logically contradictory about a noun. Propositions may be contradictory, but nouns cannot be.

Best Regards

I asked about qualia because i wanted to know how logical contradictions apply to those. The example of logical contradiction u mention is applied to thoughts, but qualia don't need thoughts to exist or interact with each other, so logic does not apply to them. For example the taste of a strawberry combined with the smell of onions produces a different experience, but does this proces have anything to do with logic?

 

[selfAdjoint]

I asked about qualia because i wanted to know how logical contradictions apply to those. The example of logical contradiction u mention is applied to thoughts, but qualia don't need thoughts to exist or interact with each other, so logic does not apply to them. For example the taste of a strawberry combined with the smell of onions produces a different experience, but does this proces have anything to do with logic?

This example would seem to be a kind of superposition. The type of logic that applies to such things is a non-distributive lattice, somewhat like Boolean Algebra but without the exclusion of the mean.

 

[moving finger]

I asked about qualia because i wanted to know how logical contradictions apply to those. The example of logical contradiction u mention is applied to thoughts, but qualia don't need thoughts to exist or interact with each other

Don't they? Has anyone isolated a so-called "quale" outside of human consciousness? imho qualia are "virtual reality" illusions created by the process of consciousness.

For example the taste of a strawberry combined with the smell of onions produces a different experience, but does this proces have anything to do with logic?

In the sense that everything (imho) has a logical explanation, yes. But as far as I can see it has nothing to do with logical contradiction.

Best Regards

 

[moving finger]

Fair enough. I prefer to think of causation as psychophysical, since if it were not then psychology would be a branch of neuroscience.

Psychophysics is the science of the mental perception of stimuli. Are you suggesting there is no "causation" in the world in absence of mental perception?

Best Regards

 

[Canute]

I suppose I am, yes. You could think of it in terms of David Chalmers double-aspect theory of information, in which the features of the world have both a psychological and a physical aspect. If so, then in the absence of the minds no phenomena would exist on which causation could operate.

Self-Adjoint points out that for him, and others, psychology is an emergent branch of neuroscience, thus of quantum physics. But this is an assumption that has not yet been justified. It creates the 'hard' problem of consciouness which appears to be intractable, suggesting to me, and others, that the assumption is false.

Self-Adjoint

Could you say a bit more about non-distributive lattices?

Cheers
Canute

 

[moving finger]

I suppose I am, yes. You could think of it in terms of David Chalmers double-aspect theory of information, in which the features of the world have both a psychological and a physical aspect. If so, then in the absence of the minds no phenomena would exist on which causation could operate.

you are referring here to common and garden macroscopic causation aren't you? things like "the cause of the window breaking was the flying brick"? or "the cause of the burning tree was the lightning strike"?

Best Regards

 

[Canute]

Yes. I was suggesting that the to explain all caused events in terms of physical causation is problematic, especially in consciousness studies.

 

[PIT2]

This example would seem to be a kind of superposition. The type of logic that applies to such things is a non-distributive lattice, somewhat like Boolean Algebra but without the exclusion of the mean.

Wouldnt that imply that:
1. our consciousness works on the quantum level and
2. that we can experience superpositions before they collapse?

 

[PIT2]

Don't they? Has anyone isolated a so-called "quale" outside of human consciousness? imho qualia are "virtual reality" illusions created by the process of consciousness.

Well i think qualia exist by virtue of consciousness(the observer), so the answer is no. Can i ask u what ur definition of 'a thought' would be, and also how do u think they arise?

 

[moving finger]

Well i think qualia exist by virtue of consciousness(the observer), so the answer is no. Can i ask u what ur definition of 'a thought' would be, and also how do u think they arise?

agreed, imho qualia do exist "by virtue of consciousness" (ie qualia supervene on consciousness).

a "conscious thought" (imho) is any part of the information processing within consciousness which the conscious agent is able to associate in some way or form with other parts of it's conscious information processing.

How do conscious thoughts arise? simply as part and parcel of the process of dealing with information within the conscious mind.

Best Regards

 

[moving finger]

Yes. I was suggesting that the to explain all caused events in terms of physical causation is problematic, especially in consciousness studies.

Is it? Could you perhaps fill me in on some of the alleged problems?

Best Regards

 

[moving finger]

Self-Adjoint points out that for him, and others, psychology is an emergent branch of neuroscience, thus of quantum physics. But this is an assumption that has not yet been justified. It creates the 'hard' problem of consciouness which appears to be intractable, suggesting to me, and others, that the assumption is false.

I am confused about just what this "hard problem" is supposed to be. Could you perhaps fill me in?

Best Regards

 

[octelcogopod]

What I think is important to recognize is the layers of emergence that are at work here.

While everything may follow the "laws of physics" at the core, that does not mean knew rules cannot emerge at higher levels.
I define higher level as an increment in scale.

The world we live in, the world of qualia (I think everything we sense and think is qualia, kind of like another version of solipsism), new laws apply.
While yes, we may be able to peel off layers until at the end we get down to the most fundamental law of existence (for nstance string theory), but I think calculating the amount of strings, and calculating the amount of patterns and connections between these strings, and understanding ALL the relationships that these fundamental strings have built up (aka how to explain qualia with string theory) would take such an immense computer that it would take many decades to calculate even on a fast quantum computer.

It has come to my understanding that ANY fundamental building block needs to be in some way or another scientifically explainable.
As in we are able to empirically measure it.
There has been no proof yet that mind can control matter, so far, all mind is controlled by matter, thus it would make sense to think that actually our minds are "controlled" by our brains, and not that it lies outside of our brains.

Personally I just think that once we understand quantum physics, string theory, and most importantly the most fundamental physics that exists, then we can start to "peel off layers" and calculate the immensely complicated patterns and layers that emerge from the basic physics.

Until I see proof that consciousness somehow is excluded from physics I will hold this viewpoint.

 

[Canute]

I am confused about just what this "hard problem" is supposed to be. Could you perhaps fill me in?

Yeah. It is generally accepted that states of consciousness are correlated with brain-states. If someone sticks a pin in your foot then signals are sent up your leg and into your brain and a state of consciousness corresponding with a feeling of pain is caused. Most scientists and philosophers feel that there is nothing mysterious about most of this process, and that it can be explained without calling into question the assumption that brains give rise rise consciousness. However, it is argued by many, and the argument has not been successfully refuted as yet, that we cannot explain the existence of phenomenal consciousness in this way. We can explain all the neurophysiological states which lead to the feeling of pain, but not why there is such a feeling.

Explaining the functional aspects of mind is therefore considered an 'easy' problem. However, explaing the 'what it is like' of consciousness, e.g. the fact that there is something that it is like to feel pain, cannot be explained so easily. David Chalmers, who christened the hard problem, suggest that there are in principle reasons that prevent us from explaining it in terms of brain functions. The evidence suggests he is right, since nobody has yet come up with any such explanation (if we ignore the mystical explanation). There are a number of hypotheses doing the rounds, but each has only a few adherents.

Chalmers therefore speaks of psychological consciousness, which is 'easy' to explain (relatively) and phenomenal consciousnes, which seems inexplicable once one assumes that either mind causes brain or brain causes mind (in an ontological sense). It is explaing the 'what it is like' of consciousness that is called 'the hard problem'. By 'hard' is meant intractable. (Just as if it were a metaphysical question, which it is in my view).

This is from Chalmers' paper 'Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness'

"We have seen that there are systematic reasons why the usual methods of cognitive science and neuroscience fail to account for conscious experience. These are simply the wrong sort of methods: we need an extra ingredient in the explanation. This makes for a challenge to those who are serious about the hard problem of consciousness: What is your extra ingredient, and why should that account for conscious experience?"

Of course, some researchers do not agree that this problem is hard in the way Chalmers suggests, but many do, and nobody has shown it is not. Some argue that consciousness is not a scientific explanandum at all, and with physics defined as it is at present this seems inarguable to me. The question is then, does the the hardness of the hard problem imply that we need to ignore it in physics or redefine physics to include it.

Octelcogopod feels it belongs in physics, thus arguing there is no hard problem. But to show there is no hard problem one would have to solve it, and unless one can solve it then the evidence suggests that Chalmers is right, it cannot be solved by our usual method, nor in line with our usual assumptions about it.

Hope that helps. I'm poor at explanations. I suggest visiting Chalmers' site, which has papers covering almost all the relevant issues.

Regards
Canute

 

[octelcogopod]

No, I do believe there is a hard problem, but that doesn't mean consciousness can't be explained.
Some people say that one cannot even quantify qualia, so the usual method of math wouldn't work.

This is really what the discussion comes down to, qualia, imo.

If we define everything we sense, with all 5 senses, as qualia, then the whole world is in return qualia.
In fact, if there was no qualia, one could not prove that the universe existed.

Qualia also applies to thoughts, because, it's not just sensory input, it's also memory pattern matching.

It is also my belief that any living thing who has some sort of nervous system or brain, experiences qualia, though ants experience it on a weaker level than humans.

So basically what this boils down to, is that little thing called experience.
If we can agree for arguments sake that ants experience qualia, then we can also say that qualia need not be some mysterious force that nobody can understand.

Because when you think about it, what's the chance that every living thing in the universe is connected in some metaphysical network, and that everything about experience is outside of physics?
Why not just say, "yes there is something there that we do not understand, we may be looking in the wrong places, we may be analyzing it the wrong way, but at least we can say that it has something to do with the brain, a nervous system, and sensory input."

And then work from there?

Another thing that's been nagging me for awhile is just why exactly haven't we figured out what a brain is and does?
It seems to me that even the simplest of brains, has this qualia component, and that it is tied in with stimuli and a nervous system.

I refuse to believe there is some sort of magic going on here. Heh.

 

[Canute]

Yes, I don't believe in magic either, and agree about ants. Some people even argue for microphenomenalism, the view that electrons etc. have some form of experience. My impression is that this view is gaining ground. But its supporters do not argue that electrons have brains and nervous systems.

 

[octelcogopod]

I do not agree with that though.
My opinion is that for the "qualia component" to arise, there needs to be something in the organism or object that makes it basically feel the outside world.
Experience it in other words.

We humans have the most developed qualia system that we know of on earth, we can smell, feel, see, hear, all these things are ways for us to absorb the outside world.
An electron on the other hand, has no such system for experiencing the outside world, afaik.

What I'm saying is that there needs to be a mechanism of response, it doesn't have to be a conscious response, we can simply define qualia by asking the following question: "How did it feel?"

So in a way, qualia is a consciousness that arises from the organism experiencing some sort of stimuli, usually via some sort of sensory system, but who knows what other types can exist out there.

 

[PIT2]

I refuse to believe there is some sort of magic going on here. Heh.

Why do u 'refuse this', what is this based on? U said that u need to "see proof that consciousness is excluded from physics", but isn't it really supposed to work the other way around? We need to see proof that it is included in physics, otherwise that's also magic!

Why not just say, "yes there is something there that we do not understand, we may be looking in the wrong places, we may be analyzing it the wrong way, but at least we can say that it has something to do with the brain, a nervous system, and sensory input."

Yes this has been done, and i would say every child in non-religious schools gets taught this assumption (at least i did). But when discussing these matters, we should also reconsider this assumption itself. Personally i have troubly really believing any of the options (because they both boil down to magic like i said), but still i tend to go in the opposite direction that u go in. I see no reason why physicalism could explain consciousness without seriously altering the insight into (and definition of) what is physical in the proces.

 

[Canute]

octelcogopod

My apologies. I didn't read your posts properly. I now realize you were not saying what I thought you were saying. I agree with you that the existence of the hard problem does not mean we cannot explain consciousness. (If we oneday prove otherwise then we will have proved that mysticism is nonsense).

My opinion is that for the "qualia component" to arise, there needs to be something in the organism or object that makes it basically feel the outside world.Experience it in other words.

As far as it goes I agree. However, you have not yet shown that consciousness is a quale and so have not shown that sensory experiences are necessary to consciousness.

We humans have the most developed qualia system that we know of on earth, we can smell, feel, see, hear, all these things are ways for us to absorb the outside world. An electron on the other hand, has no such system for experiencing the outside world, afaik.

I'd say the first statement is an assumption. The second seems true, but this has no bearing on the truth or falsity of microphenomenalism, the modern term for hylozoism, a doctrine or theory in which electrons are conscious.

What I'm saying is that there needs to be a mechanism of response, it doesn't have to be a conscious response, we can simply define qualia by asking the following question: "How did it feel?"

Hang on a moment. How did what feel? The qualia? In this case who felt it? And who wants to know? If you study these questions carefully, whether by logic or introspectively, I think you'll find that that there is more to consciousness than qualia.

So in a way, qualia is a consciousness that arises from the organism experiencing some sort of stimuli, usually via some sort of sensory system, but who knows what other types can exist out there.

Again, this seems true, but it says nothing about why there is something that it is like to experience a quale. (Darn silly word that, imo, sounds like something one might do grouse shooting on the Scottish moors).

Cheers
Canute

 

[octelcogopod]

My apologies. I didn't read your posts properly. I now realize you were not saying what I thought you were saying. I agree with you that the existence of the hard problem does not mean we cannot explain consciousness. (If we oneday prove otherwise then we will have proved that mysticism is nonsense).

Mmm.

As far as it goes I agree. However, you have not yet shown that consciousness is a quale and so have not shown that sensory experiences are necessary to consciousness.

But let's say, for arguments sake, that a quale is anything that a living thing thinks, or experiences, because, not taking into account microphenomalism, if this were true, then qualia would be the exact opposite of that which is not alive.
THat would also mean that we could define that which is alive, as that which experiences qualia.
To do this we would need a definition of qualia, where I propose the following;
Qualia is defined as a phenomena in an agent where the agent has a response to external stimuli, where the response can either be instinctual, conscious, or plain emotional.
If we say that small animals or even insects, start out with very basic qualia systems, where they basically have a very tiny brain and some basic sensory systems, then qualia can be defined as the experience these systems create.
What this "proves" is that the more sensory systems (like eyes, ears, nerves) the agent has, the more conscious it becomes.
My reasoning behind this is that, even a pure emotion like pain, which most animals feel, is a sort of consciousness, I'm basically saying that any sensory system that absorbs stimuli, is a sort of consciousness, and that the more embellished these sensory systems are, the more aware, and the more complex the conscious experience becomes.

IMO of course.

I'd say the first statement is an assumption. The second seems true, but this has no bearing on the truth or falsity of microphenomenalism, the modern term for hylozoism, a doctrine or theory in which electrons are conscious.

Unfortunately I know very little to nothing about microphenomenalism.
I've heard of the idea before, but actually wrote it off as nonsense before thinking any further about it.
I will read up in later though.

Hang on a moment. How did what feel? The qualia? In this case who felt it? And who wants to know? If you study these questions carefully, whether by logic or introspectively, I think you'll find that that there is more to consciousness than qualia.

Well, if we define qualia as "how did it feel?" it was meant more in the way that it doesn't really matter who felt it, or who is asking, it's a hypothetical question where anyone who is experiencing consciousness can ask themselves.
For instance, qualia doesn't exist and cannot be understood fully by anyone who doesn't experience it themselves (imo.)
Thus, my point was that if we were to find out if a mouse experiences qualia, we could simply use the test "does it feel it?"
Seeing as we have no idea if anyone but just yourself experiences qualia(even other humans), I think the test is valid.

Again, this seems true, but it says nothing about why there is something that it is like to experience a quale. (Darn silly word that, imo, sounds like something one might do grouse shooting on the Scottish moors).

Well, if you want to talk about WHAT a quale feels like, then the obvious answer is that you have to feel it for yourself.
Although you might now think "aha! but that means we aren't able to explain it empirically!", I ask you 1. Nobody knows that for sure. And 2. There's basically two possibilities here;
Either qualia is something that somehow lies outside of the physical realm, along with consciousness, or, we have to rethink how we see the physical realm, and how matter and energy works, if qualia even has anything to do with those things.
I don't have all the answers man, I'm just trying to type my way to one:P

Peace
- ocp

 

[octelcogopod]

Why do u 'refuse this', what is this based on? U said that u need to "see proof that consciousness is excluded from physics", but isn't it really supposed to work the other way around? We need to see proof that it is included in physics, otherwise that's also magic!

Well you have a point there man.
But let me ask you this; What's the more sane explanation for consciousness:
1. It is not included in physics, and thus we cannot explain it in any way with current methods or
2. It is included in the physical realm, but we need to rethink how we see the physical realm, maybe to include a new realm? :P

Yes this has been done, and i would say every child in non-religious schools gets taught this assumption (at least i did). But when discussing these matters, we should also reconsider this assumption itself. Personally i have troubly really believing any of the options (because they both boil down to magic like i said), but still i tend to go in the opposite direction that u go in. I see no reason why physicalism could explain consciousness without seriously altering the insight into (and definition of) what is physical in the proces.

I agree, after some hard thinking.
Seems like we have come very far in explaining a lot, but have come no fuirther in explaining what consciousness actually is.
But I don't know, I have a gut feeling that tells me there's a very simple solution.

 

[Canute]

But let's say, for arguments sake, that a quale is anything that a living thing thinks, or experiences,

If you make this assumption then I agree that most of what you say follows. But is it true? I think the truth is a little more subtle. Unless you say that qualia are all there is to consciousness then there is something else to explain besides qualia. Bear in mind that many people have tried to argue that in the absence of qualia there is no consciousness, without success. It is for this reason that some researchers suggest we need to take experience as fundamental in our theories of mind and brain.

Regards
Canute

 

[octelcogopod]

If you make this assumption then I agree that most of what you say follows. But is it true? I think the truth is a little more subtle. Unless you say that qualia are all there is to consciousness then there is something else to explain besides qualia. Bear in mind that many people have tried to argue that in the absence of qualia there is no consciousness, without success. It is for this reason that some researchers suggest we need to take experience as fundamental in our theories of mind and brain.

Regards
Canute

Well, the problem as I see it, is that we are unable to research this experience objectively.

Honestly, I typed out a long message, but then deleted it, I simply don't have any reasonable theories that can not be categorized as anything but assumptions.

 

[Canute]

I agree that only our experiences cannot be investigated intra-subjectively, but I'm not sure that means they cannot be researched objectively. I suppose it depends on what we mean by 'objectively'.

 

[moving finger]

It is generally accepted that states of consciousness are correlated with brain-states. If someone sticks a pin in your foot then signals are sent up your leg and into your brain and a state of consciousness corresponding with a feeling of pain is caused. Most scientists and philosophers feel that there is nothing mysterious about most of this process, and that it can be explained without calling into question the assumption that brains give rise rise consciousness. However, it is argued by many, and the argument has not been successfully refuted as yet, that we cannot explain the existence of phenomenal consciousness in this way. We can explain all the neurophysiological states which lead to the feeling of pain, but not why there is such a feeling.

Explaining the functional aspects of mind is therefore considered an 'easy' problem. However, explaing the 'what it is like' of consciousness, e.g. the fact that there is something that it is like to feel pain, cannot be explained so easily. David Chalmers, who christened the hard problem, suggest that there are in principle reasons that prevent us from explaining it in terms of brain functions. The evidence suggests he is right, since nobody has yet come up with any such explanation (if we ignore the mystical explanation). There are a number of hypotheses doing the rounds, but each has only a few adherents.

Chalmers therefore speaks of psychological consciousness, which is 'easy' to explain (relatively) and phenomenal consciousnes, which seems inexplicable once one assumes that either mind causes brain or brain causes mind (in an ontological sense). It is explaing the 'what it is like' of consciousness that is called 'the hard problem'. By 'hard' is meant intractable. (Just as if it were a metaphysical question, which it is in my view).

I don’t see where there is a problem. Metzinger’s account of consciousness is (imho) a perfectly rational and reasonable explanation of how consciousness arises.

“What it is like for individual Y to feel X”, the phenomenal feeling of X by Y, is something unique to that individual Y in the process of feeling X – it corresponds to a particular and unique configuration of neurophysiological states within individual Y which is correlated with a particular set of stimuli. There is no reason to think that such states will be identical to those found in any other individual – though the fact that we are all genetically similar does suggest that we may be able to assume our phenomenal feelings may also be “somewhat similar”.

What more needs to be explained? Where is the problem?

This is from Chalmers' paper 'Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness'

"We have seen that there are systematic reasons why the usual methods of cognitive science and neuroscience fail to account for conscious experience. These are simply the wrong sort of methods: we need an extra ingredient in the explanation. This makes for a challenge to those who are serious about the hard problem of consciousness: What is your extra ingredient, and why should that account for conscious experience?"

If by “fail to account for conscious experience” Chalmers means that we cannot explain exactly why the feeling of X is what it is for individual Y, then he is right – but why is this a problem? The feeling is unique to that individual, in the same way that any given random real number is unique. We do not try to explain why a random real number “is what it is” – we do not classify this as a “problem” - we simply accept that it is a random real number.

Of course, some researchers do not agree that this problem is hard in the way Chalmers suggests, but many do, and nobody has shown it is not.

What does it take to show that it is not a problem? It seems to me that Chalmers is seeing a problem where there is no problem. You claim that nobody has shown that it is not a problem – I could equally claim that nobody has shown that it is a problem (in the same sense that “explaining why a random real number is what it is” is not a “problem” – it’s a meaningless question).

But to show there is no hard problem one would have to solve it, and unless one can solve it then the evidence suggests that Chalmers is right, it cannot be solved by our usual method, nor in line with our usual assumptions about it.

I disagree. How can one solve a problem which does not exist?

What I'm saying is that there needs to be a mechanism of response, it doesn't have to be a conscious response, we can simply define qualia by asking the following question: "How did it feel?"

Exactly – and we can ask the same question of a machine, once we build a machine which can report “how it feels”. Qualia are just elements of “how it feels”.

Hang on a moment. How did what feel? The qualia? In this case who felt it? And who wants to know? If you study these questions carefully, whether by logic or introspectively, I think you'll find that that there is more to consciousness than qualia.

“Who felt it” simply requires an agent able to register phenomenal experience and able to make a report of that experience (based on comparisons with stored data from other phenomenal experiences).
“Who wants to know” simply requires an agent asking for reports.

Best Regards

 

[Canute]

I don't think the problem of consciousness can be solved so easily. Nor do most other people. If Metzinger's explanation is good enough then why do so few people accept it? The fact is that nobody has yet come up with a plausible naturalistic-reductive theory of mind and brain that has any widespread support.

The problem is much more difficult than you are assuming according to most professional researchers.

For example. You say that for a feeling all that is required is an 'agent' able to register phenomenal experiences and able to report these experiences. But this is an arbitrary re-defintion of consciousness. All that is required is an 'agent' able to have phenomenal experiences. Reports are irrelevant, as has so often been pointed out by Chalmers, Searle and others.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I don't think the problem of consciousness can be solved so easily. Nor do most other people. If Metzinger's explanation is good enough then why do so few people accept it? The fact is that nobody has yet come up with a plausible naturalistic-reductive theory of mind and brain that has any widespread support.

Widespread among what community? Metzinger's theory was featured on Psyche[/quote] a respected site frequented by both philosophers and neuroscientists. Modulo some details, the general tenor of his acount is practically universal among neuroscientists, and philosophers who dissent are mostly doing so based on higher order concerns, not experience of union.

 

[moving finger]

I don't think the problem of consciousness can be solved so easily. Nor do most other people.

“Most other people”?

At the start of the 20th century, most other people (who were interested enough to hold opinions on such things) believed Newton’s laws of motion were the final word in mechanics. They were wrong. Neither scientific nor philsophical truth is decided democratically.

I would agree that there are a large number of people who today have entrenched (dare I say irrational?) beliefs about human consciousness which forces them to reject all physicalist explanations “out of hand”, and there are also a large number of people who probably don’t really care one way or another. I would also agree that most people have probably never thought very deeply about the issue, and very few people would have taken the time or trouble to read Metzinger’s paper. But so what? None of this shows that Metzinger’s ideas are incorrect.

If Metzinger's explanation is good enough then why do so few people accept it? The fact is that nobody has yet come up with a plausible naturalistic-reductive theory of mind and brain that has any widespread support.

Widespread support is not a criterion for truth, it is a criterion only for popularity. The fact is that there is at least one plausible physicalist account of consciousness which fits the facts, and which is falsifiable. That is all that is required from a sceintific theory.

The problem is much more difficult than you are assuming according to most professional researchers.

That depends on whom you consult. Many physicalists and functionalists would deny that there is a “hard problem”.

For example. You say that for a feeling all that is required is an 'agent' able to register phenomenal experiences and able to report these experiences. But this is an arbitrary re-defintion of consciousness. All that is required is an 'agent' able to have phenomenal experiences.

I did not offer that as a “definition of consciousness”, thus to call it an arbitrary definition of consciousness is incorrect.

Reports are irrelevant, as has so often been pointed out by Chalmers, Searle and others.

Reports, in the context of this question, are fundamental. The full context of the exchange was :

we can simply define qualia by asking the following question: "How did it feel?"

How did what feel? The qualia? In this case who felt it? And who wants to know?

“Who felt it” simply requires an agent able to register phenomenal experience and able to make a report of that experience (based on comparisons with stored data from other phenomenal experiences).

In other words, octelcogopod was suggesting that we ask the agent a question “How did it feel?” – what is the purpose of asking the agent “How did it feel?” unless the agent is able to provide a report?

Best Regards

 

[Canute]

Metzinger's theory was featured on Psyche a respected site frequented by both philosophers and neuroscientists. Modulo some details, the general tenor of his acount is practically universal among neuroscientists, and philosophers who dissent are mostly doing so based on higher order concerns, not experience of union.

This is true. But the general consensus is that the hard problem has not yet been solved. When it has been solved the solution will no doubt be announced in the professional literature. As a subscriber to the Journal of Consciousness Studies I've seen no such announcement.

 

[Canute]

At the start of the 20th century, most other people (who were interested enough to hold opinions on such things) believed Newton’s laws of motion were the final word in mechanics. They were wrong. Neither scientific nor philsophical truth is decided democratically.

Quite so.

I would agree that there are a large number of people who today have entrenched (dare I say irrational?) beliefs about human consciousness which forces them to reject all physicalist explanations “out of hand”, and there are also a large number of people who probably don’t really care one way or another. I would also agree that most people have probably never thought very deeply about the issue, and very few people would have taken the time or trouble to read Metzinger’s paper. But so what? None of this shows that Metzinger’s ideas are incorrect.

All this seems true. It is also true that a large number of people have entrenched (dare I say irrational?) beliefs about human consciousness that forces then to reject all non-physicalist explanations out of hand. This seems rather odd to me given that the existence of consciousness cannot be established by physicalist methods.

Widespread support is not a criterion for truth, it is a criterion only for popularity. The fact is that there is at least one plausible physicalist account of consciousness which fits the facts, and which is falsifiable. That is all that is required from a sceintific theory.

In my opinion the lack of acceptance of any of the current strictly physicalist explanations of consciousness suggests that they are not considered plausible by many people. Of course, this does not make them false, just as the implausibility of a non-physicalist explanation to physicalists and functionalists would not make it false.

That depends on whom you consult. Many physicalists and functionalists would deny that there is a “hard problem”.

Yes, this seems to me the only tenable position for a physicalist or functionalist. However, saying a problem does not exist does not necessarily make it go away, as Watson and Skinner discovered.

I did not offer that as a “definition of consciousness”, thus to call it an arbitrary definition of consciousness is incorrect.

If you define consciousness as the ability of a conscious being to make reports then of course consciousness can be explained as the ability to make reports. Dennett tried this approach but it did not work. If it had worked his book would have been acknowledged as a break-through. In consciousness studies consciousness is generally defined as 'what it is like', after Nagel. This definition carefully and deliberately avoids any assumptions about reports.

Reports, in the context of this question, are fundamental... In other words, octelcogopod was suggesting that we ask the agent a question “How did it feel?” – what is the purpose of asking the agent “How did it feel?” unless the agent is able to provide a report?

The question 'how did it feel' is here equivalent to the question 'are you conscious'. If the agent is not conscious then clearly the question is pointless. The agent won't know what you talking about. Indeed, the agent won't even know that you're talking. The thing is, how can you provide a report on a feeling until after you have experienced the feeling? It seems to me you would not be able to, in which case feelings are not reports.

I feel that you're not making the proper distinction between psychological/functional consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.

Cheers
Canute

 

[moving finger]

This is true. But the general consensus is that the hard problem has not yet been solved.

Truth is not decided by "general concensus".

How can one solve a problem which does not exist?

This is not new - Dennett, amongst others, has been saying pretty much the same thing for many years.

When it has been solved the solution will no doubt be announced in the professional literature. As a subscriber to the Journal of Consciousness Studies I've seen no such announcement

Ahhhh, then no doubt you will have seen Patricia Churchland's paper on "The Hornswoggle Problem" in Journal of Consciousness Studies 3: 402-8, 1996 :

http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/EPL/hornswoggle.html

Patricia Churchland does not go so far as to say the problem does not exist, but she (like many others) doesn't see what people like Chalmers is getting so worked up about.

Best Regards

 

[PIT2]

This is not new - Dennett, amongst others, has been saying pretty much the same thing for many years.

What Dennett has been offering is his view that one day the problem will turn out not to be a problem. Is this view not based on faith?

Also seen in Churchlands paper:

Use of our current ignorance as a premise to determine what we can never discover is one common logical flaw. Use of "I-cannot-imagine" arguments is a related flaw.

I would add that similarly, and more importantly, the "I-cán-imagine" argument is even more flawed. Sorry to introduce the pope again, but he probably can imagine lots of things. For him, there may not exist any problems about the way reality works. God simply did all of it. The pope might well say that anyone who thinks there are problems with producing a theory of everything is wrong. There are no problems, and we will all find out that god is the answer.

 

[Canute]

Good point.

Can we agree that solipsism is unfalsifiable? If so then it is impossible to demonstrate that consciousness has a materialist explanation even if it does have one. I'm not sure why so many researchers ignore this problem.

However, modern physicalism is a slightly more subtle doctrine. For instance, Colin McGinn (who characterises himself as a strictly 'rational' or 'Western' philosopher) proposes that consciousness may originate in a pre-spatial reality 'prior' to the BB. But I get the impression he feels this idea does not contradict physicalism.

MF

I agree, of course, that questions like the one we are discussing cannot be decided by a show of hands. However, the fact that there is so much opposition to the view you are supporting does at least show that there is as yet no convincing evidence that is correct. It is over ten years since Chalmers christened the 'hard' problem and nothing has changed in the meantime. A while ago JCS carried an excellent article proposing relative phenomenalism, an alternative term for the doctrine of dependent existence. As this is a refereed journal then clearly there is no evidence showing this view to be false. In this case if we agree with Churchland, Dennett etc this is simply a matter of personal preference.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Ahhhh, then no doubt you will have seen Patricia Churchland's paper on "The Hornswoggle Problem" in Journal of Consciousness Studies 3: 402-8, 1996 :

http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/EPL/hornswoggle.html

Patricia Churchland does not go so far as to say the problem does not exist, but she (like many others) doesn't see what people like Chalmers is getting so worked up about.

Best Regards

Thanks so much for this link! I was especially struck by this paragraph:

Suppose someone claims that she can imagine the mechanisms for sensorimotor integration in the human brain but cannot imagine the mechanisms for consciousness. What exactly does this difference amount to? Can she imagine the former in detail? No, because the details are not known. What is it, precisely, that she can imagine? Suppose she answers that in a very general way she imagines that sensory neurons interact with interneurons that interact with motor neurons, and via these interactions, sensorimotor integration is achieved. Now if that is all "being able to imagine" takes, one might as well say one can imagine the mechanisms underlying consciousness. Thus: "The interneurons do it." The point is this: if you want to contrast being able to imagine brain mechanisms for attention, short term memory, planning etc., with being unable to imagine mechanisms for consciousness, you have to do more that say you can imagine neurons doing one but cannot imagine neurons doing the other. Otherwise one simply begs the question.

In my opinion this kind of "argument by imagination" is the besetting fault of threads on these PF philosophy forums.

 

[Canute]

I don't think the issue is so simple. The mechanisms for functional consciousness are imaginable precisely because a mechanism performs a function. However, there is no evidence that phenomenal consciousness is functional in this sense. It is not a matter of lack of imagination, it is a matter of how we can imagine a functional mechanism giving rise to to something that is usually defined as non-functional ('what it is like' or whatever). In other words, it is not an inability to imagine the mechanism that sceptics appeal to, it is inability to imagine that functional (psychological) consciousness is the same thing as phenomenal consciousness.

 

[selfAdjoint]

In other words, it is not an inability to imagine the mechanism that sceptics appeal to, it is inability to imagine that functional (psychological) consciousness is the same thing as phenomenal consciousness.

Just exactly what I was talking about in the previous post. You can't imagine it, but others can. There's no force in the statement "I can't imagine that."

 

[-Job-]

Addition, a very basic operation, when combined, in successive steps, gives rise to a number of operations and identities. This knowledge base may grow large and aid us in explaining many things, but one thing it won't allow us to explain is addition itself.
Consider all the mathematics that are derived from addition. Any attempt, through the use of such mathematics, to explain addition is void of meaning as it is equivalent to an explanation of addition that reduces completely to addition. We would find ourselves using the very thing we want to explain, in our explanation.
It's somewhat equivalent to an explanation of the creation of one's body which makes use of one's arms and legs, or an explanation of the origin of consciousness which makes use of thought.

 

[Canute]

Just exactly what I was talking about in the previous post. You can't imagine it, but others can. There's no force in the statement "I can't imagine that."

The point I was trying to make is that it is difficult (for any of us) to imagine a possibility that seems logically incoherent. Therefore, I'd rather say that to you the idea of functional processes giving rise to phenomenal consciousness is logically coherent and to others it is not, rather than saying it is a matter of how imaginative we are.

 

[selfAdjoint]

The point I was trying to make is that it is difficult (for any of us) to imagine a possibility that seems logically incoherent. Therefore, I'd rather say that to you the idea of functional processes giving rise to phenomenal consciousness is logically coherent and to others it is not, rather than saying it is a matter of how imaginative we are.

Well as to logical coherence, any logical argument has to rest on specific clear premises. Then you do logical algebra on these premises to come up with conclusions. And the accusation of incoherence is that your conclusions don't in fact follow from your premises, or else that your premises somehow contradict each other.

Now as far as physical processes producing consciousness, what I see is that partisans of the hard problem have constructed a straw-man theory they call physicalism, which they can show to be inconsistent in this way. But the opponents of the hard problem deny that that physicalism is a correct picture of their beliefs, because they say it includes premises that are plausible to the partisans but not to the opponents.

If you want to discuss this issue, maybe we could start a thread; I don't think it was ever adequately discussed on any of the old threads I remember.