boneh3ad said:
China's approach is different, though. Their DF-ZF is intended to be used to sink carriers from stand-off range. That's a much more tactically and strategically relevant system that isn't really subject to MAD deterrence. Basically, if China decided to invade Taiwan, we wouldn't be able to safely park carriers within range (assuming the DF-ZF works as claimed).
Meanwhile, what the US is developing is intended largely to be used more like very fast Tomahawk missiles. Basically, build a large number of smaller, tactical systems that can be used for fleeting targets and in contested airspace.
Correct on both points. Most modern missile defense, whether against subsonic, supersonic, hypersonic, or exoatmospheric weapons, is predicated on predicting where the target will be at a given time. That's why it's comparatively easy to intercept an ICBM reentry vehicle (or decoy), as it's on a "fixed" path and unable to maneuver defensively, and easier to counter sub- and supersonic weapons, as the speeds are slower and you have more time for your interceptor to react. The challenge with hypersonic, especially stuff that can maneuver, is the ability of the target to maneuver in ways that make the intercept far more difficult to successfully complete. Not impossible, as you can throw enough interceptors up and guarantee you'll kill the target by simply covering all possible vectors it could use to evade, but that gets cost and resource prohibitive in a hurry. Similarly, using a big enough 'boom' can do the trick, and that was considered a viable strategy in the Cold War for the SAFEGUARD program. Sprint and Spartan both carried nuclear warheads to compensate for the challenges in using 1960s computing to intercept incoming ICBM RVs within and outside the atmosphere, respectively. Sprint, iirc, used the blast effect
and the radiation pulse to effect the kill, while Spartan was exclusively a radiation kill using high x-ray flux, but that's a topic for another thread.
As for the DF-ZF, I think there's more capability in defending a US carrier battlegroup than is widely publicized, for obvious reasons, including the ability to perform a "soft" or "mission" kill on the warhead. If you kill the electronics on it with a high powered maser, for example, it can't guide to the target, right? I don't know exactly how much power the current radars on the
Arleigh Burkes are, but my dad used to do work on the earlier ones, especially their power control system. (Liquid cooled vacuum tubes, if you can believe it.) He says there's enough power there to cause some serious havoc on electronic systems, and the new radars are even more powerful and capable. I suspect brighter minds than mine could figure out a way to use those huge AESA radars to fry multiple incoming warheads seekers in less time than it takes for you to read this post.
And yeah, the US is looking hard at a range of hypersonic weapons, both boost-glide and air-breathing, mainly for extended range, time sensitive strike against well defended targets. I mean, if you get actionable intel on the location of a DF-ZF TEL, you don't want to wait 2 hours for a subsonic, non-stealthy Tomahawk to cruise to the area. that TEL is gonna be long gone by the time the missile would arrive, if it ever arrives at all. But a ARRW dropped from a B-52 loitering a thousand miles out will get there in reasonable timeframes, and stand a very good chance of getting through the defenses. Or, use it to destroy air defense capabilities that could threaten something like the B-21, allowing several such aircraft to slip into enemy airspace to provide more precise targeting data for follow-on strikes. Heck, even just slamming one into a runway where they launch long-range fighters and tankers from would shut that airfield down for several valuable hours while they patch the runway up. It's no Durendal or SG-357 submunition (dedicated anti-runway weapons), but I wager it'll still crater that runway pretty well.
). I believe they are also primarily anti-ship missiles.
