Free Will vs. Fate: Examining Choice and Determinism

[hypnagogue]

Since the original thread on fate vs. free will has been lost, I'll try to duplicate my contribution to the discussion here. Basically, I'm not sure that the concept of free will is actually meaningful in any special sense, if we define a free choice in the conventional sense, as follows: given a choice made by an individual under a certain set of circumstances, the choice could have been made differently by that individual, even under precisely the same set of circumstances. More simply put, free choices are not fixed or determined insofar as they could have been made differently.

Let's consider for the sake of argument two ideal beings, one whose actions are fixed in the deterministic sense (D) and one who possesses free will (F). Let's further presume D and F live in independent parallel universes and that up to this particular point in time, D and F have lived absolutely identical lives in absolutely identical universes-- they have had the same experiences, memories and thoughts, had identical interactions with identical people, and made the same choices. (Note that D could not have made his choices any other way, whereas F just happens to have made his 'free' choices such that, to this present moment in time, they perfectly overlap with every decision D has made.) Now let's pick up the story in the present, when D and F are about to choose whether to eat chocolate or vanilla ice cream. Let's call the moment when D and F have made their respective decisions t0. Leading up to t0, we know that D and F both favor (say) chocolate to the same degree. That is, the sum total of their thought, actions, and experiences to this point have acted on both D and F such that they both experience the same inclination to choose chocolate. As a consequence of D's nature, D will inevitably choose the chocolate. However, given that F's choice is not fixed, we cannot predict what F will choose. For instance, if we could enact this scenario arbitrarily many times, we might find that D chooses chocolate 100% of the time whereas F chooses chocolate 70% of the time and vanilla 30% of the time. (Assume that F, like D, has already made up his mind that he will indeed eat one ice cream or the other.)

We note that F's inclination to choose chocolate is expressed by his 70% likelihood of choosing chocolate over vanilla. But what accounts for the 30% of the time when F chooses vanilla? It CANNOT be that F has suddenly changed his mind on a whim, since if that were the case, D would have also changed his mind on a whim at the last instant and chosen vanilla (remember that D and F are identical up to t0). In fact, any meaningful explanation for why F sometimes chooses vanilla can be ruled out by the same logic. If by "meaningful explanation" we mean an explanation made sensible in terms of events, thoughts, feelings, etc. leading up to t0, then any meaningful explanation for why F chooses vanilla in a particular scenario must necessarily also apply to D. A free will advocate might say that at precisely t0, F has a spontaneous, non-deterministic thought that (in some scenarios) changes his mind and compels him to choose vanilla. But we have seen that this spontaneous thought cannot have any meaningful explanation; if it did, this meaningful explanation would also have applied to D. It therefore seems that there is no explanation other than that F's decision making has an inherent element of randomness to it, as if (for instance) some part of F's decision making depended on the outcome of quantum events in his brain. What good is F's free will if its agency is random and essentially meaningless?

Now let's focus on D. A free will advocate might say that although we have been speaking of D as if he has a choice, he actually has no such choice since his decisions are already determined. I say this is nonsense, the result of a common misconception in the free will discussion. Let's first firmly establish what it means to "choose."

From Merriam-Webster:
choose
1 a. to select freely and after consideration <choose a career>
1 b. to decide on especially by vote; elect <chose her as captain>
2 a. to have a preference for <choose one car over another>
2 b. decide <chose to go by train>

freely
in a free manner: as a : of one's own accord <left home freely> b : with freedom from external control <a freely elected government> c : without restraint or reservation <spent freely on clothes> d : without hindrance <a gate swinging freely> <currencies are freely convertible> e : not strictly following a model, convention, or rule <freely translated>

From dictionary.com:
choose
1. To select from a number of possible alternatives; decide on and pick out.
2 a. To prefer above others <chooses the supermarket over the neighborhood grocery store>
2 b. To determine or decide <chose to fly rather than drive>

I see nothing in the above definitions that implies that D has no choice over whether to choose chocolate or vanilla. He is selecting from a number of possible alternatives: chocolate or vanilla. After some consideration, he decides to act on his preference, and he selects the chocolate. This choice is made freely, since it is made of D's own accord and with freedom from external control (there is no one holding a gun to D's head telling him he'd better pick the chocolate). I believe the crux of the common misconception lies with this last point, namely that D's choice is indeed made freely. Now, D's decision is in some sense determined, i.e. by the laws of physics. But the agency through which the laws of physics determine D's choice is precisely D's brain itself, in other words, that which is responsible for his rationality and sense of identity. D's choice is determined, not externally but internally, in other words, D's choice is determined by D himself. It is not as if D exists outside of the laws of physics and that these laws impose their determination on him from the outside. Rather, it would be more correct to say that the laws of physics simply describe that agency through which D himself makes his own choices.

This might make D's existential situation seem demeaning or puppet-like to some, but I see no reason for this sentiment. Even though the agency through which D makes his decisions is ultimately the same as everyone else's, D's distinct set of genetics, brain structure, and personal experience ensure that he is a unique and special guy whose agency (decision making) is essentially his and his alone, even if it is built upon the common ground of the laws of physics.

So we are left with this simple proposition: D has indeed made his own free choice. The fact that he could not have chosen otherwise is irrelevant.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
So we are left with this simple proposition: D has indeed made his own free choice. The fact that he could not have chosen otherwise is irrelevant.

Yes, it is irrelevant to him (part of the reason that we can't prove or disprove predestination), however it is not irrelevant altogether. You see, you quoted the dictionary as defining "choose" as "to select from a number of possible alternatives". In the case of the pre-determined one, there were no possible alternatives. Of course, he will never know this, so - again - it is irrelevant to all parties involved, but the fact remains that he did not really "choose" anything (because there were no possible alternatives).

 

[hypnagogue]

This is indeed a sticky point, but I would contend that vanilla exists as a possible alternative to chocolate before D's brain has settled into the state where it has definitively made its choice to select chocolate. That is, if we consider the condition of D's choice before it has been made, it exists in a sort of nebulous state that has not settled on one alternative or the other, even though it will inevitably settle on chocolate. If we have perfect deterministic knowledge of D's brain and can predict that he must choose chocolate, all we are doing is projecting the resolution of this nebulous state into some point in the future. In the moments when D is still actively considering his choice, there is not yet a definitive answer. In this sense, vanilla is still a 'possible' alternative.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
This is indeed a sticky point, but I would contend that vanilla exists as a possible alternative to chocolate before D's brain has settled into the state where it has definitively made its choice to select chocolate. That is, if we consider the condition of D's choice before it has been made, it exists in a sort of nebulous state that has not settled on one alternative or the other, even though it will inevitably settle on chocolate. If we have perfect deterministic knowledge of D's brain and can predict that he must choose chocolate, all we are doing is projecting the resolution of this nebulous state into some point in the future. In the moments when D is still actively considering his choice, there is not yet a definitive answer. In this sense, vanilla is still a 'possible' alternative.

To say that it is a "possible alternative", is to say that it was possible for D to choose vanilla. This is not the case.

Also, in a less semantic light, we haven't really defined what it is that predetermines D, we have merely taken for granted that he is predetermined. I think that the nature of the "predeterminer" has much to do with the nature of the "predetermination" itself.

For example, if some omnipotent God were the one that predetermined D, then D would have no choice but to choose chocolate, even though the possibility would appear to present itself to him - but, in this case, an outside force is involved, which inclines D in the way that it wants. However, if it is just an intrinsic nature of the Universe, that D is predetermined to choose chocolate, then D will choose chocolate, and there was no force necessary to incline him toward it and away from vanilla, since vanilla will never even present itself as an apparent alternative.

You're right, it is rather sticky.

 

[wuliheron]

Excellent thought experiment Hypna, but a bit too much. I think you might wish to simplify it more for the sake of clarity. Tackle one issue at a time.

For example, your original assertion concerns two simple parallel universes, but then you wander off into a discussion of Quantum Indeterminacy. It's best in my opinion to separate the discussion on the logic train from that of speculation on the reality of our existence.

As far as the logic train goes, the issue arises that neither D nor F can tell whether or not they have free will. Although your scenario does not mention it, for all we know both are ardent fatalists. The real trick in attempting such thought experiments is to think outside our own personal habitual boxes, to do a bit of lateral thinking. Implicitely what your argument assumes is that we somehow have the God-like ability to just know all these things.

As for Indeterminacy and Relativity, neither has been reconciled fully to date and we do not have that God-like ability to decide if our existence is fatalistic, deterministic, or if we possesses free will. Hence, the importance of addressing the thought experiments clearly and succinctly.

 

[Zantra]

Ok let me clarify, and if I'm just reiterating what mentat's saying in a different context, sorry.

You do have a point, HOWEVER, you're going on the assumption that free will exists, which I propose it does not. In fact both (D) and (F) will make the same choice inevitably, no matter how many times the scenario is run. Because (D)=(F). They are both one and the same. Thier thought patterns are equal. Thier experiences, everything up to the point of selection is equal. Therefore each time they would follow the same behavioral patterns and decision based on the static congruity. The only way to change the selection is to introduce another variable into the equation, thus skewing the sampling.

We may PERCIEVE our lives as free will, but in fact they are based on patterns established through our experiences, our intelligence, personality, interactions with other people and our environment, and a myriad of other variables that when combined, bring together the solution of chocolate ice cream. The variables could appear infinite, but if one could calculate them, it would all boil down to something that could have no other outcome without changing the equation. Logically it makes sense, and may one day be proven. That is when we have enough computing power to bring all the variables together to a solution.


By the way, I think we've split up the post in half..

 

[russ_watters]

I like the thought experiment except for one thing: probability. Probability is based on how well you know the situation at hand. Sure, based on "F" eating chocolate 70% of the time in the past that there is a 70% chance that he'll eat it this time. Sounds nice.

But wait, if you dig a little deeper, you might find that he never eats chocolate more than 5 times in a row. Or maybe he's never eaten vanilla twice in a row. Or maybe he eats chocolate in the afternoon and vanilla in the evening.

There is ALWAYS more information that can be added to your understanding of F's decision making process to tighten up your probability. What you find is that the more information you add, the closer and closer (asymptotically) to 100% you get. So then the difference becomes 100% for D who THINKS he has a choice and 99.9999...% for F who KNOWS he has a choice.

Mathematically, the two are equivalent.

So what does this mean? You have freewill.

One possible problem to my thesis: randomness. I don't believe there is anything random about human behavior (I think psychologists would tend to agree). If for example you believe humans are 30% completely random, then you'd asymptotically approach 70% and not 100%.

Originally posted by Zantra
You do have a point, HOWEVER, you're going on the assumption that free will exists, which I propose it does not.

Heh. Interesting. The substance of our arguements was identical but the conclusions exactly opposite. I think we mathematically proved that freewill exists and you think we mathematically proved that freewill does not exist. So what's the difference?

The choice.

Freewill means having a choice. If there is chocolate and vanilla ice cream in your freezer, then you DO have a choice. The fact that your choice is predictable does NOT change the fact that the choice exists.

 

[wuliheron]

Originally posted by russ_watters
Freewill means having a choice. If there is chocolate and vanilla ice cream in your freezer, then you DO have a choice. The fact that your choice is predictable does NOT change the fact that the choice exists.

Possession is ninetenths of the law only in a court of law. Among physicists, it is nothing special.

 

[Owl]

It's more likly that D chooses both vanilla and chocolate considring that we all make the right and wrong choices before we act wheather we are aware of it or not. You can choose without action. I can freely choose to become a superhero but actually becoming one is unlikly.

Freewill. I am willing to do many things freely. But my actions have limits.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by russ_watters
I like the thought experiment except for one thing: probability. Probability is based on how well you know the situation at hand. Sure, based on "F" eating chocolate 70% of the time in the past that there is a 70% chance that he'll eat it this time. Sounds nice.

But wait, if you dig a little deeper, you might find that he never eats chocolate more than 5 times in a row. Or maybe he's never eaten vanilla twice in a row. Or maybe he eats chocolate in the afternoon and vanilla in the evening.

There is ALWAYS more information that can be added to your understanding of F's decision making process to tighten up your probability. What you find is that the more information you add, the closer and closer (asymptotically) to 100% you get. So then the difference becomes 100% for D who THINKS he has a choice and 99.9999...% for F who KNOWS he has a choice.

Mathematically, the two are equivalent.

So what does this mean? You have freewill.

One possible problem to my thesis: randomness. I don't believe there is anything random about human behavior (I think psychologists would tend to agree). If for example you believe humans are 30% completely random, then you'd asymptotically approach 70% and not 100%. Heh. Interesting. The substance of our arguements was identical but the conclusions exactly opposite. I think we mathematically proved that freewill exists and you think we mathematically proved that freewill does not exist. So what's the difference?

The choice.

Freewill means having a choice. If there is chocolate and vanilla ice cream in your freezer, then you DO have a choice. The fact that your choice is predictable does NOT change the fact that the choice exists.

Mathmatically it can be proven, but in the physical world it is not an absolute. I'm not speaking purely in mathmatical terms. If we were to break down his decision into variables(and there would be billions I'm sure) then we would discover that yes he might choose a different flavor when face with decision multiple times, but ultimately it would be based on the changing of a variable, however minute. It could be something as small as him glancing over at someone eating a vanilla ice cream just prior to choice, but ultimately the variation in his selection would be based on variables, not congruity.

Let's try a different example. Dice. Basic representation of probability. One might say in a sense the dice have "free will" because of randomness. But ultimately the outcome of the throw CAN be calculated if you were able to ascertain things such as the position of the dice when they left the hand, the gravity, the degree of force when they left the hand, the vector, the angle at which they first contacted the surface thrown on, etc, etc. Granted those calculations would be extremely difficult and need to be done extremely fast to predict the outcome prior to the dice landing, but ultimately it could be predicted.

The same principal can be applied to the human side of the equation. Yes it would be infinitely difficult to predict a person's choice, because you would have to have all the person's experiences in order to determine outcome of a situation, but it is theoretically possible.

I've heard that the total sum of a human being's memories could be contained in 15 petabytes. Perhaps when we reach that level (not too far off) we can begin to calculate such things. It really comes down to perception. The scales on which these predictions are based, is a scale beyond our current ability to perhaps even understand, but it can't be discounted. What it comes down to is that when you break it down far enough, there cease to be any variables. Because with each specific item of data known, there are no variables, and that leads to a finite and unchangable solution.

I would also like to point out that you're describing trying to repeat the ice cream experiment over and over again. Well if time were in an infinite loop, it would be the same repetition over and over again. That moment would repeat in exactly the same way again and again on to infinity, unless a variable was introduced. Some kind of external influence would have to interact with the time loop in order to change the sequence of events. Otherwise, he always chooses chocolate, because that is the only conclusion he can come to in that loop.

Free will is only perception. We always try and 2nd guess our choices. We always say if we could go back we'd make a different choice. But If you COULD rewind time, you would still make the exact same decision, unless you knew of the future. Because the exact same events would occur, along with your exact same thought process and interactions, and history would repeat itsself... UNLESS you introduce a variable to change it, but that isn't free will- it's a decision based on a change in perception of events.

See where I'm going with this ?

The fact that you have a choice does not infer free will because the choice is already made for you. You just can't percieve it You say that there is a .0001 percent different. I disagree, because if all variables and information that are possible are known, then the variance is 0. I can see a computer one day running a scenario. Remember the movie war games" and how the computer kept running all possible outcomes? he was calculating variables. It's the exact same thing on a much larger scale. If all variables are known, then outcome can be calculated. If you put a deck of cards face down, then flip them over 1 by 1, noting each card, until you reach the last card, then you know what that card is. You don't need to turn it over because it is the only remaining card, and it is known because all others are already known. This is the concept I'm referring to, only on a much larger scale.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by Zantra
Let's try a different example. Dice. Basic representation of probability. One might say in a sense the dice have "free will" because of randomness. But ultimately the outcome of the throw CAN be calculated if you were able to ascertain things such as the position of the dice when they left the hand, the gravity, the degree of force when they left the hand, the vector, the angle at which they first contacted the surface thrown on, etc, etc. Granted those calculations would be extremely difficult and need to be done extremely fast to predict the outcome prior to the dice landing, but ultimately it could be predicted.

And yet with human beings, you have a "choice" in the way that you handle the dice. Of course the guys running the test may "ask" you to handle them a certain way, but who says you "have" to? And if they try to "coerce" you into doing it, then you're probably better off not participating in their tests.

Ever consider that free choice exists out of the equilibrium which exists between two opposing extremes? And, that once an equilibrium is achieved, and functionality exists (in a holistic sense), that it's pretty much up to the individual to decide?

 

[russ_watters]

Originally posted by Zantra
The fact that you have a choice does not infer free will because the choice is already made for you.

That is contradictory. If the choice is already made for you then the choice isn't yours. If you have a choice, then you can make a choice. Thats axiomatic. You can't have it both ways.

Let's try a different example. Dice. Basic representation of probability. One might say in a sense the dice have "free will" because of randomness.

Sounds good except for one thing: Dice are inanimate objects governed purely by probability. They don't make choices either real or imagined. You have consciousness. You CAN make choices. The fact that you chose chocolate doesn't mean that you couldn't have chosen vanilla if you wanted to.

You say that there is a .0001 percent different.

No actually, I was saying that its 100% freewill. That .0000...1% variance is randomness going to zero.

Zantra, how many times have you seen The Matrix and The Matrix Reloaded? They are the best discussions of fate and freewill since Sophoclese:

"as you adequately put it, the problem is choice."

Gawd, I can't wait for The Matrix III.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by wuliheron
Excellent thought experiment Hypna, but a bit too much. I think you might wish to simplify it more for the sake of clarity. Tackle one issue at a time.

For example, your original assertion concerns two simple parallel universes, but then you wander off into a discussion of Quantum Indeterminacy. It's best in my opinion to separate the discussion on the logic train from that of speculation on the reality of our existence.

I just threw the quantum indeterminancy thing in there to make it comprehendable in physical terms how F's decision making could have an element of randomness to it, although it's not a key component of my argument.

As far as the logic train goes, the issue arises that neither D nor F can tell whether or not they have free will. Although your scenario does not mention it, for all we know both are ardent fatalists. The real trick in attempting such thought experiments is to think outside our own personal habitual boxes, to do a bit of lateral thinking. Implicitely what your argument assumes is that we somehow have the God-like ability to just know all these things.

Well, you are right in saying that if we actively consider our choices to be pre-determined or free, this will ultimately have an effect on how we make our decisions, regardless of whether we actually do have free will or not. However, from a theoretical standpoint, even if F considers himself to be a fatalist, there is still a nonzero chance that he will choose vanilla; if there was not, that would imply that he could not have chosen otherwise-- so he would effectively be devoid of free will, contradicting our initial definition. Likewise, even if D considers himself to have free will, he will always choose chocolate due to his deterministic nature.

edit: Also, I'm not saying we have the ability to discern whether a given being has free will or not. I take it as axioms for my argument that F has free will and D does not, for the purpose of exploring precisely what it means to have 'free will.' My argument basically amounts to a proof by contradiction that the 'free' component of F's decision making cannot be meaningful in any physical sense, only an element of randomness.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
And yet with human beings, you have a "choice" in the way that you handle the dice. Of course the guys running the test may "ask" you to handle them a certain way, but who says you "have" to? And if they try to "coerce" you into doing it, then you're probably better off not participating in their tests.

Ever consider that free choice exists out of the equilibrium which exists between two opposing extremes? And, that once an equilibrium is achieved, and functionality exists (in a holistic sense), that it's pretty much up to the individual to decide?

No you're misunderstanding me. You're saying that we can control the person throwing the dice. We cannot change that. He will inevitably throw the dice in the manner he was meant to. various factors such as his mood, alertness, physical makeup, agility, nerve response and other things will contribute to the outcome of the roll. All of those factors can be traced back and calculated to predict the outcome. Instead of trying to control the throwers actions, we must view all the factors which contribute to the way he throws the dice.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Well, you are right in saying that if we actively consider our choices to be pre-determined or free, this will ultimately have an effect on how we make our decisions, regardless of whether we actually do have free will or not. However, from a theoretical standpoint, even if F considers himself to be a fatalist, there is still a nonzero chance that he will choose vanilla; if there was not, that would imply that he could not have chosen otherwise-- so he would effectively be devoid of free will, contradicting our initial definition. Likewise, even if D considers himself to have free will, he will always choose chocolate due to his deterministic nature.

Another problem here is that we can't go on doing things "habitually" before we expire. Or, let's say as a result of eating so much ice cream we eventually develop diabetes, and our doctor tells us to moderate "our habits" or else? That kind of throws the whole experiment out the window as well doesn't it? The fact that the variables needed in order to keep the tests predictable have changed? And, that with change comes a "new choice?"

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok let me clarify, and if I'm just reiterating what mentat's saying in a different context, sorry.

You do have a point, HOWEVER, you're going on the assumption that free will exists, which I propose it does not. In fact both (D) and (F) will make the same choice inevitably, no matter how many times the scenario is run. Because (D)=(F). They are both one and the same. Thier thought patterns are equal. Thier experiences, everything up to the point of selection is equal. Therefore each time they would follow the same behavioral patterns and decision based on the static congruity. The only way to change the selection is to introduce another variable into the equation, thus skewing the sampling.

This is basically what I was getting at. I assumed free will exists at the outset of my argument only to get a handle on exactly how we could distinguish a being with free will from a being without it. My conclusion is essentially the same as yours. Because D and F are identical in every way-- except for our assumption that for any decision F makes, he could have made it differenly-- we cannot trace the degrees of freedom in F's decision making to any physically meaningful variable. But this in itself does not imply that D = F. The ONLY room for variation in this thought experiment, ie the only way it can be that F chooses differently from D, is if part of F's decision making involves an element of randomness. Thus, I conclude that if free will exists, it is only by virtue of randomness. Hence, even if we do have free will, it is not really meaningful for us anyway, since we cannot control these degrees of freedom (the random processes) that exist in our decision making.

edit: For the sake of consistency and clarity, I should say that D and F are precisely identical except for whatever difference exists in F that gives him his free will. If you accept my argument, this statement is equivalent to saying D and F are identical, except for the extra random processes that account for F's 'free will.'

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by Zantra
No you're misunderstanding me. You're saying that we can control the person throwing the dice. We cannot change that. He will inevitably throw the dice in the manner he was meant to. various factors such as his mood, alertness, physical makeup, agility, nerve response and other things will contribute to the outcome of the roll. All of those factors can be traced back and calculated to predict the outcome. Instead of trying to control the throwers actions, we must view all the factors which contribute to the way he throws the dice.

Yes, and we can look back and say, "That must have been the way it had to be, because what's done is done and it therefore couldn't have happened any other way." Hmm ... And yet, if we had chosen differently, it would have happened another way. In which case choice represents "the potential" that we might do things differently.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by russ_watters
I like the thought experiment except for one thing: probability. Probability is based on how well you know the situation at hand. Sure, based on "F" eating chocolate 70% of the time in the past that there is a 70% chance that he'll eat it this time. Sounds nice.

But wait, if you dig a little deeper, you might find that he never eats chocolate more than 5 times in a row. Or maybe he's never eaten vanilla twice in a row. Or maybe he eats chocolate in the afternoon and vanilla in the evening.

There is ALWAYS more information that can be added to your understanding of F's decision making process to tighten up your probability. What you find is that the more information you add, the closer and closer (asymptotically) to 100% you get. So then the difference becomes 100% for D who THINKS he has a choice and 99.9999...% for F who KNOWS he has a choice.

I think you are approaching this the wrong way. You're describing our inability to definitively predict F's behavior in terms of lack of perfect knowledge of F. But we do have perfect physical knowledge of F, insofar as we know that F has lead a life identical to D's. We also know that D always picks chocolate. So why is it that F does not always pick chocolate? The difference between F's and D's behavior cannot be accounted for by any deterministic physical variable (such as, "F has a preference for never eating vanilla twice in a row"), since by definition D's decision already demonstrates the sum total influence of all such deterministic variables. Thus, the only possible way F can make a different decision is if some part of his decision making is not deterministic, i.e. random.

Anyway, if we did have the ability to predict F's choice with 99.999999...% precision, that would imply that F really could not have made his choice differently, and this contradicts our initial assumption that F has free will.

Freewill means having a choice. If there is chocolate and vanilla ice cream in your freezer, then you DO have a choice. The fact that your choice is predictable does NOT change the fact that the choice exists.

This point I agree with, although the crux of the matter is what you think of as choice (as illustrated by Mentat's objection).

 

[Iacchus32]

What's that Dirty Harry used to say? "A man's got ta understand his limitations."

And, so long as he works within the boundaries of his limitations, then he's free to choose.

While people don't just do stupid things like throwing themselves off of buildings if they want to live.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
To say that it is a "possible alternative", is to say that it was possible for D to choose vanilla. This is not the case.

From Merriam-Webster:
possible
1 a. being within the limits of ability, capacity, or realization
1 b. being what may be done or may occur according to nature, custom, or manners

2 a. being something that may or may not occur
2 b. being something that may or may not be true or actual <possible explanation>

I believe you are using "possible" in the sense expressed in 1a and 1b, and I am using it in the sense expressed in 2a and 2b. It is indeed beyond the limits of D's capacity to choose vanilla. However, before we know what D's decision is, we can say that vanilla is a possible choice insofar as it may or may not be the case that D chooses vanilla; we're just not sure yet.

Anyway, even though I concede that vanilla is not a possible alternative in the sense you're using the word, I don't think this tears down my whole argument by implying that D has no choice. The situation is simply that D must decide between vanilla and chocolate, and D makes his decision based on his own thought processes before ultimately selecting chocolate. If you contend that D has no choice in this situation, you are essentially saying that D has no decision to make either. But clearly he must roll the question around in his mind and finally decide on chocolate; this is nothing but the process of deciding, or choosing. Again, the fact that it could not have been otherwise is irrelevant.

Also, in a less semantic light, we haven't really defined what it is that predetermines D, we have merely taken for granted that he is predetermined. I think that the nature of the "predeterminer" has much to do with the nature of the "predetermination" itself.

For example, if some omnipotent God were the one that predetermined D, then D would have no choice but to choose chocolate, even though the possibility would appear to present itself to him - but, in this case, an outside force is involved, which inclines D in the way that it wants. However, if it is just an intrinsic nature of the Universe, that D is predetermined to choose chocolate, then D will choose chocolate, and there was no force necessary to incline him toward it and away from vanilla, since vanilla will never even present itself as an apparent alternative.

This is basically the internal/external distinction. When I said that D has a choice even though he could not have chosen otherwise, I have assumed that D is indeed self-determined, i.e. his actions are controlled by his brain/mind/self (albeit through the agency of the laws of physics). It could be that there is some demiurge determining D's actions for him, in which case he really wouldn't have a choice-- but that's besides the point. Most people automatically equate pre-determination with lack of choice, regardless of whether the determining is done internally or externally. I simply want to establish that even a deterministic being has a choice, so long as the outcome of his choice is determined internally (ie, by that being itself).

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by russ_watters
That is contradictory. If the choice is already made for you then the choice isn't yours.

I think there is some confusion going on here with time. It's not so much that the choice is already made for you as it is that the sum total of everything that is "you" will inevitably lead you to make a certain choice. Also, note that the decision is not "made for you"-- you are the one making this choice! (So long as we presume your choice isn't determined externally by some demiurge, or somesuch.)

To think of it in terms of Matrix terminology, if you do not have free will then in some sense you have already made all your future choices; you just can't understand them yet.

 

[wuliheron]

Originally posted by hypnagogue

edit: Also, I'm not saying we have the ability to discern whether a given being has free will or not. I take it as axioms for my argument that F has free will and D does not, for the purpose of exploring precisely what it means to have 'free will.' My argument basically amounts to a proof by contradiction that the 'free' component of F's decision making cannot be meaningful in any physical sense, only an element of randomness.

This approaches the core issues a bit closer. Just because we can statistically predict something does not axiomatically imply any kind of absolute and uncontestable validity. There are lies, damn lies, and then statistics. It is precisely because of the indeterminacy of QM that it remains such a contested subject. The scientific method taken to its extreme leaves itself open to perpetual attack, but then, demonstrably this is the most productive path to take.

Thus your argument contradicts itself. By attacking the idea of free will using statistics you merely display and open yourself up to criticism. This is a great way to cultivate the art of debate by-the-way, but a terrible way win one!

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
To think of it in terms of Matrix terminology, if you do not have free will then in some sense you have already made all your future choices; you just can't understand them yet.

And yet what is there to understand if everything has been predetermined? In which case basically all you can do is what you're told to do. But that doesn't makes sense either because you still have to "choose" to follow orders -- or, suffer the reprisals. If, on the other hand you were merely a machine, and were not "conscious," then that might be a different story.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
Yes, and we can look back and say, "That must have been the way it had to be, because what's done is done and it therefore couldn't have happened any other way." Hmm ... And yet, if we had chosen differently, it would have happened another way. In which case choice represents "the potential" that we might do things differently.

But the point is that things can only happen once, and in one form. The perception of what he "might do" is overriden by the fact that he can only make one choice, and that choice he will eventually make will be determined by things which are all calculable. What is possible is unimportant. It's the end result that counts, and that end result can be calculated.

 

[russ_watters]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I think there is some confusion going on here with time. It's not so much that the choice is already made for you as it is that the sum total of everything that is "you" will inevitably lead you to make a certain choice. Also, note that the decision is not "made for you"-- you are the one making this choice! (So long as we presume your choice isn't determined externally by some demiurge, or somesuch.)

To think of it in terms of Matrix terminology, if you do not have free will then in some sense you have already made all your future choices; you just can't understand them yet.

I think that's absolutely perfect. And that's freewill. Neo doesn't like it because he thinks that means he doesn't have a choice. But the Oracle is right, he does have a choice - its just that he's already made it.

Anyway, if we did have the ability to predict F's choice with 99.999999...% precision, that would imply that F really could not have made his choice differently, and this contradicts our initial assumption that F has free will.

Why? Just because which alternative will be chosen is predictable to a high degree of precision does NOT mean there isn't still a choice.

The difference between F's and D's behavior cannot be accounted for by any deterministic physical variable (such as, "F has a preference for never eating vanilla twice in a row"), since by definition D's decision already demonstrates the sum total influence of all such deterministic variables. Thus, the only possible way F can make a different decision is if some part of his decision making is not deterministic, i.e. random.

Any psychologist will tell you that human behavior is NOT random. Besides, randomness doesn't imply control over the choice any more than predictability. In fact, I think randomness implies a LACK of control over the choice.

Most people automatically equate pre-determination with lack of choice, regardless of whether the determining is done internally or externally. I simply want to establish that even a deterministic being has a choice, so long as the outcome of his choice is determined internally (ie, by that being itself).

This is a good way to look at it. Pre-determined or not, external = fate, internal = freewill.

By the way, we may be missing something here. Sophoclese argued (as devil's advocate I think) that fate means more than just the individual choices being pre-determined. Its events themselves. It means that even if you could make the choices on your own (if you knew of your fate and tried to escape it) fate would override your choices and the events of your life would happen the way they are fated to.

By corollary, freewill isn't the just the decisions themselves, its the effect of those decisions. Causality.

So by this definition, fate would violate causality.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by wuliheron
This approaches the core issues a bit closer. Just because we can statistically predict something does not axiomatically imply any kind of absolute and uncontestable validity. There are lies, damn lies, and then statistics. It is precisely because of the indeterminacy of QM that it remains such a contested subject. The scientific method taken to its extreme leaves itself open to perpetual attack, but then, demonstrably this is the most productive path to take.

Thus your argument contradicts itself. By attacking the idea of free will using statistics you merely display and open yourself up to criticism. This is a great way to cultivate the art of debate by-the-way, but a terrible way win one!

I don't quite see where you're coming from. Can you clarify for me? Specifically, I don't see how I am using statistical prediction to axiomatically imply anything. As far as I can tell it's more the other way around. I take two assumptions: F has free will, D does not. From these definitions it necessarily follows that if we can somehow repeat the decision made at t0 over and over (say, for instance, if we can observe infinitely many identical parallel universes each with their respective D or F), we will find variations in F's choice but not in D's choice. The stats don't prove the axioms, rather the stats are logically derived from the axioms.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by Zantra
But the point is that things can only happen once, and in one form. The perception of what he "might do" is overriden by the fact that he can only make one choice, and that choice he will eventually make will be determined by things which are all calculable. What is possible is unimportant. It's the end result that counts, and that end result can be calculated.

But if we start thinking that way then we become apathetic, and when we become apathetic that affects the way we choose as well. So what it really boils down to is whether we choose to be apathetic -- or, complacent -- or not.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
This is basically what I was getting at. I assumed free will exists at the outset of my argument only to get a handle on exactly how we could distinguish a being with free will from a being without it. My conclusion is essentially the same as yours. Because D and F are identical in every way-- except for our assumption that for any decision F makes, he could have made it differenly-- we cannot trace the degrees of freedom in F's decision making to any physically meaningful variable. But this in itself does not imply that D = F. The ONLY room for variation in this thought experiment, ie the only way it can be that F chooses differently from D, is if part of F's decision making involves an element of randomness. Thus, I conclude that if free will exists, it is only by virtue of randomness. Hence, even if we do have free will, it is not really meaningful for us anyway, since we cannot control these degrees of freedom (the random processes) that exist in our decision making.

edit: For the sake of consistency and clarity, I should say that D and F are precisely identical except for whatever difference exists in F that gives him his free will. If you accept my argument, this statement is equivalent to saying D and F are identical, except for the extra random processes that account for F's 'free will.'

ok ok I see the perception that you have, but here's the thing. What we're focusing on isn't the choices that they HAVE, but the one that they make. Regarless of 36 possible outcomes of a set of die, only one outcome is possible from a roll, and so we are focusing at the details of how we arrived at that outcome, not the variations of it.
Yes there are many POSSIBLE outcomes. But regardless of WHICh choice is made, only one outcome is possible, and it's HOW we arrive at that particular outcome which supports determinism. this person will make this choice freely, but it was through huge series of variables that he arrived at that particular choice. So free will, as it were, is actually an illusion when in actuality, only one choice was possible based on all the details.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by russ_watters
I think that's absolutely perfect. And that's freewill. Neo doesn't like it because he thinks that means he doesn't have a choice. But the Oracle is right, he does have a choice - its just that he's already made it.

But that signifies determinism. Yes he has a choice, and yes he's already made it, but that choice was already predetermined, so in actuality free will is imagined.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by russ_watters
I think that's absolutely perfect. And that's freewill. Neo doesn't like it because he thinks that means he doesn't have a choice. But the Oracle is right, he does have a choice - its just that he's already made it.

It's not free will. The classic definition I've seen of free will, and hence the one I have used here, is as follows: if A has free will, then for any choice A has made in the past, A could have made his choice differently. Thus, if you cannot have made your choices differently, you don't have free will. Equivalently, if for any future choice you make it is impossible for you to have chosen an alternative, you don't have free will. This isn't the same thing as not having a choice.

I realize that this definition of free will may not be the same as your definition, but as far as I can tell this is the definition most often used for the term. All of my claims about free will apply only to free will as I have defined it.

Why? Just because which alternative will be chosen is predictable to a high degree of precision does NOT mean there isn't still a choice.

No, it doesn't mean there isn't still a choice. But it does mean that there isn't free will. If you can predict a person's future choice with an arbitrary degree of certainty (e.g., 99.999...% as opposed to 99.99%), then, as you noted, you can essentially predict that person's choice with absolute certainty, since 99.999... = 100. (There is a proof of this posted in the math forum if anyone doubts it.) If you can predict a person's choice with absolute certainty, then that person must inevitably make that choice and cannot possibly make it differently, hence that person does not have free will.

Any psychologist will tell you that human behavior is NOT random.

This is besides the point. D and F are hypothetical beings. I think I have shown that in order for F to have free will, F's degrees of freedom in the decision making process must be random. The reasoning stops here. If you introduce the empirical fact (assuming it really is a fact) that human behavior is not in any way random, then all this tells us is that the existence of F is a logical contradiction; in other words, it is impossible for F to exist. Since (as far as we can tell) it is not impossible for D to exist, and since D and F are identical except that F possesses free will, it also follows that it is impossible for free will to exist.

Besides, randomness doesn't imply control over the choice any more than predictability. In fact, I think randomness implies a LACK of control over the choice.

Precisely. So if my argument is correct, then free will implies not some sort of absolute freedom on the part of the chooser, but rather some inevitable lack of control.

This is a good way to look at it. Pre-determined or not, external = fate, internal = freewill.

Not quite... again, choice ~= free will. I would say internal control implies choice, whereas external control implies no choice.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
But if we start thinking that way then we become apathetic, and when we become apathetic that affects the way we choose as well. So what it really boils down to is whether we choose to be apathetic -- or, complacent -- or not.

Never said the truth wouldn't hurt You're right- it can lead to apathy. But it's all on how you view it. Life is an experience, and it is a unique one. Just because we could at some future point know the path our life will take, does not mean that will will CHOOSE to know it. I for one like surprises;) So I would choose not to know. But that does not mean we should ignore the truth.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by Zantra
ok ok I see the perception that you have, but here's the thing. What we're focusing on isn't the choices that they HAVE, but the one that they make. Regarless of 36 possible outcomes of a set of die, only one outcome is possible from a roll, and so we are focusing at the details of how we arrived at that outcome, not the variations of it.
Yes there are many POSSIBLE outcomes. But regardless of WHICh choice is made, only one outcome is possible, and it's HOW we arrive at that particular outcome which supports determinism. this person will make this choice freely, but it was through huge series of variables that he arrived at that particular choice. So free will, as it were, is actually an illusion when in actuality, only one choice was possible based on all the details.

I think the only thing that's not changeable here is the past. And even that we can "learn" to perceive differently. In which case it opens up a whole new ballgame in terms of what we can "choose."

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by Zantra
Never said the truth wouldn't hurt You're right- it can lead to apathy. But it's all on how you view it. Life is an experience, and it is a unique one. Just because we could at some future point know the path our life will take, does not mean that will will CHOOSE to know it. I for one like surprises;) So I would choose not to know. But that does not mean we should ignore the truth.

I believe that ultimately there can only be one "obtainable future" and yet, it must be predicated upon the freedom of choice. How else would it come about then if we didn't choose? Or, at the very least, "behave" as if we did?

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zantra
ok ok I see the perception that you have, but here's the thing. What we're focusing on isn't the choices that they HAVE, but the one that they make. Regarless of 36 possible outcomes of a set of die, only one outcome is possible from a roll, and so we are focusing at the details of how we arrived at that outcome, not the variations of it.

Yes there are many POSSIBLE outcomes. But regardless of WHICh choice is made, only one outcome is possible, and it's HOW we arrive at that particular outcome which supports determinism. this person will make this choice freely, but it was through huge series of variables that he arrived at that particular choice. So free will, as it were, is actually an illusion when in actuality, only one choice was possible based on all the details.

A particular roll of die can have only one outcome, depedent on the initial conditions of the system (i.e., the state of motion of the die just after they have been tossed). This is a deterministic process, insofar as perfect knowledge of the system will allow us to predict the outcome with absolute certainty. It's just that the system is so sensitive to variations in the initial conditions that it's very hard to make a prediction with 100% confidence, so the system takes on the appearance of randomness.

This kind of apparent randomness is not applicable to what I'm talking about. Any deterministic process that occurs in the decision making of F by definition must also occur in the decision making of D. So for instance, if F commits to making his decision of whether to choose chocolate or vanilla based on the outcome of rolling a set of die, then D will also base his decision on rolling an identical set of die in an identical way, and they will have made the same decision. (Recall that D and F are identical up to the moment of the decision at t0-- this roll of the die takes place before a decision has been made, so it takes place before t0.) So we have still not accounted for what is different about F such that his decision will not always match D's.

The only way around this is to introduce a truly random non-deterministic element, such that even with perfect knowledge of this random element we will not be able to predict its outcome. Just such a truly random element is the only thing that can differentiate D from F. For instance, in the above example, F could have decided at t0 to change his mind and reneg on his commitment to base his decision on the die roll. This last minute change of heart cannot have been the result of a wholly deterministic process, otherwise D would have undergone the same process and likewise would have changed his mind, and once again we'd have F's decision always agreeing with D's. So F's last minute change of heart must have been not apparently random, but truly random. Whether such a truly random process exists is another question altogether (although as far as we can tell individual quantum events are truly random); what is relevant here is that a truly random element is the only thing that can explain why F sometimes chooses differently from D. Again, I define a truly random element/event/process as one that cannot be predicted with 100% confidence even if we have perfect knowledge of the system.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
I believe that ultimately there can only be one "obtainable future" and yet, it must be predicated upon the freedom of choice. How else would it come about then if we didn't choose? Or, at the very least, "behave" as if we did?

I would have to reiterate the matrix analogy- You've already made your choice, you just don't know it yet. It's so difficult to separate determinism and free will because of the correlation between the two, and it all depends on your point of view. You have the ability to make choices, but those choices, or "variables" have already been determined by your life path. We accept it as free will because we make choices, but those choices are influenced by unvaried factors in your life which you cannot control.

It's like you're on a train, and you are heading for the destination. And the decisions you make affect which direction you will eventually go on those tracks, but the choices you make now, affect the future direction you can't see yet. the track never splits off, but your choices made all the way back from where you started are what is determining the course of the train. You make a decision, but it's based on decisions made earlier in life, as well as external factors that are beyond your control. The key to understanding, is that you realize that all those decisions you've made have forged the path of that track, and it doesn't split off, only gets changed by decisions of the past. And those past decisions were made based on other decisions, and back, and back, and back, until you reach the very first decision, which may have determined the entire course of one's life. Thus we must conclude that free will is static, and that all our decisions take us on the path we were meant to follow, because we make that decision inevitably based on non-varied things. The past is not variable, nor can it be altered. So through cause and effect, our decisions are static, because they are based on events that are unchangeable.

As someone wise once said- Wherever you go, well there you are

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by hypnagogue


A particular roll of die can have only one outcome, depedent on the initial conditions of the system (i.e., the state of motion of the die just after they have been tossed). This is a deterministic process, insofar as perfect knowledge of the system will allow us to predict the outcome with absolute certainty. It's just that the system is so sensitive to variations in the initial conditions that it's very hard to make a prediction with 100% confidence, so the system takes on the appearance of randomness.

This kind of apparent randomness is not applicable to what I'm talking about. Any deterministic process that occurs in the decision making of F by definition must also occur in the decision making of D. So for instance, if F commits to making his decision of whether to choose chocolate or vanilla based on the outcome of rolling a set of die, then D will also base his decision on rolling an identical set of die in an identical way, and they will have made the same decision. (Recall that D and F are identical up to the moment of the decision at t0-- this roll of the die takes place before a decision has been made, so it takes place before t0.) So we have still not accounted for what is different about F such that his decision will not always match D's.

The only way around this is to introduce a truly random non-deterministic element, such that even with perfect knowledge of this random element we will not be able to predict its outcome. Just such a truly random element is the only thing that can differentiate D from F. For instance, in the above example, F could have decided at t0 to change his mind and reneg on his commitment to base his decision on the die roll. This last minute change of heart cannot have been the result of a wholly deterministic process, otherwise D would have undergone the same process and likewise would have changed his mind, and once again we'd have F's decision always agreeing with D's. So F's last minute change of heart must have been not apparently random, but truly random. Whether such a truly random process exists is another question altogether (although as far as we can tell individual quantum events are truly random); what is relevant here is that a truly random element is the only thing that can explain why F sometimes chooses differently from D. Again, I define a truly random element/event/process as one that cannot be predicted with 100% confidence even if we have perfect knowledge of the system. [/B]

Ok I agree that under the condition that a unique "free will" variable is introduced, a different choice can be made. But such a variable only exists in theory. A good example would be time travel. As I mentioned in one of my earlier posts, he could choose vanilla if he somehow knew of the future, and was thus able to make a decision based o knowledge that (D) did not have. But in the normalcy of things, people don't posess that ability, so we have to assume that D=F because the physical world doesn't allow for variables to be introduced. In mathmatical theory it's possible because we can work from a hypothetical persepective to arrive at that conclusion that D does not equal F, thus allowing for free will. But I concede your point- it is mathmatically possible, if not physically.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by wuliheron
This approaches the core issues a bit closer. Just because we can statistically predict something does not axiomatically imply any kind of absolute and uncontestable validity. There are lies, damn lies, and then statistics. It is precisely because of the indeterminacy of QM that it remains such a contested subject. The scientific method taken to its extreme leaves itself open to perpetual attack, but then, demonstrably this is the most productive path to take.

Thus your argument contradicts itself. By attacking the idea of free will using statistics you merely display and open yourself up to criticism. This is a great way to cultivate the art of debate by-the-way, but a terrible way win one!

Wul I think you have touched on the heart of the issue here. Free will exists, but it is predetermined by probability. Then by definition, if a choice is predetermined, it cannot be considered free will, even though it may have the appearance of it. I'll admit I don't have knowledge of indeterminency of QM, but when all variables are solved, then so may the equation have an answer without variables- or a single definative solution

EDIT: I'm pretty confident at this point that I've shown that free will is only an illusion, and our "choices" are in fact already made, and determined by the events of our lives.

 

[wuliheron]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I don't quite see where you're coming from. Can you clarify for me? Specifically, I don't see how I am using statistical prediction to axiomatically imply anything. As far as I can tell it's more the other way around. I take two assumptions: F has free will, D does not. From these definitions it necessarily follows that if we can somehow repeat the decision made at t0 over and over (say, for instance, if we can observe infinitely many identical parallel universes each with their respective D or F), we will find variations in F's choice but not in D's choice. The stats don't prove the axioms, rather the stats are logically derived from the axioms.

You have stated that the only explanation for the statistical probability of the choices of F is the introduction of a random element. An alternative explanation is that our observations are incorrect. Whether something is random or ordered can be either an absolute state of affairs or a relative one, and which it might be is ultimately anyone's guess.

Originally posted by Zantra
Wul I think you have touched on the heart of the issue here. Free will exists, but it is predetermined by probability. Then by definition, if a choice is predetermined, it cannot be considered free will, even though it may have the appearance of it. I'll admit I don't have knowledge of indeterminency of QM, but when all variables are solved, then so may the equation have an answer without variables- or a single definative solution

EDIT: I'm pretty confident at this point that I've shown that free will is only an illusion, and our "choices" are in fact already made, and determined by the events of our lives.

Without a specific context the terms free will and predestination, real and illusory, have no meaning. When applied as absolutes and generalized to include life, the universe, and everything, they become so much meaningless verbage and the debate disolves into how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Is it random order or ordered randomness? Illusory reality or realistic illusion? Round and round we go.

 

[metacristi]

hypnagogue

So we are left with this simple proposition: D has indeed made his own free choice. The fact that he could not have chosen otherwise is irrelevant.

The usual definition of free will is that human choices are not absolutely determined by external causes,providing the existence of responsability when making the choice:clearly someone presenting mental disorders does not have free will.

All of today's scientific research in neurology suggest that we have such a free will:mind is seen as an emergent property of matter,previous brain internal states influencing the next without the necessity of additional external stimuli.The fact that our choices are limited by some external constraints does not limit our free will (the fact that I cannot fly using only hands does not limit my freedom of choice indeed).

In this view [the so called compatibilist view] free will and determinism are compatible therefore D has free will irrespective whether our universe is deterministic or not (this is still an open question in spite of the claims made by the advocates of the Copenhagen Interpretation regarding the allegedly 'inbuilt' indeterminism of quantum events).

Does there exist the libertarian free will?This implies that at least some of our choices are totally free.Unfortunately we cannot establish that,at least now...Anyway I wouldn't say that it cannot exist,what if our consciousness do randomly select some 'fundamental' properties of our reality (more or less close to Chalmer's panpsychism)?Still there remain a huge doubt:is this really free will?Indeed since we do not 'direct' the random selection of the fundamental properties this could be seen rather as being a 'random will'.The same goes even if consciousness is related with quantum level+the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM (with its postulated 'inbuilt' indeterminacy)...


In my opinion our prospect to draw a clearer conclusion is directly linked with the scientific understanding of consciousness.The actual computational-emergentist theory of consciousness claim that quantum level is not involved,consciousness is entirely related to macroscopic events.Personally I am much more cautious but of course this could be even proved right with arguments beyond all reasonable doubt (still fallible this does not involve having certitudes):for example if the computational approach of consciousness (using boolean algebra) is proved beyond all reasonable doubt as being correct.


Here by arguments beyond all reasonable doubt I mean a detailed,'working',description of the dynamics of the brain,a 'holistic' view (even if we had the proof that all mental states correlate with physical states-anyway far from being achieved now-this would,simply,be not enough).Another chance is to emulate a human mind using technology:an android whose consciousness is indistinguishable from that of a human being for example.These experimental proofs do not imply certitudes,I remember here the philosophical problem of 'zombies' (are machines that show a behaviour indistinguishable from that of a human being really conscious?).

Anyway even in the case that the actual emergentist conjecture (I prefer to label it so we do not have sufficient reasons to think otherwise yet) will be supported by the above presented 'confirmations' I would argue that we still cannot say that reductionism (at the laws acting at macroscopical level) is true.The truth is that we would simply not know.Moreover consciousness could still be emergent in a much broader sense:the 'output' could be more than the initial conditions (previous thoughts+the laws of nature).

Sure to advocate such a position we would need a way to make the difference between simple emergentism of mind from dead matter (but totally determined by the previous brain states+the laws of nature-including external stimuli) and the 'extended' emergentist position.Unfortunately it is possible that we will never be capable of that if consciousness is at least a chaotic phenomenon...Anyway the 'extended' emergentist hypothesis would be totally compatible with the observed reality,though being more complex it cannot be eliminated using Occam's Razor...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok let me clarify, and if I'm just reiterating what mentat's saying in a different context, sorry.

You do have a point, HOWEVER, you're going on the assumption that free will exists, which I propose it does not. In fact both (D) and (F) will make the same choice inevitably, no matter how many times the scenario is run. Because (D)=(F). They are both one and the same. Thier thought patterns are equal. Thier experiences, everything up to the point of selection is equal. Therefore each time they would follow the same behavioral patterns and decision based on the static congruity. The only way to change the selection is to introduce another variable into the equation, thus skewing the sampling.

We may PERCIEVE our lives as free will, but in fact they are based on patterns established through our experiences, our intelligence, personality, interactions with other people and our environment, and a myriad of other variables that when combined, bring together the solution of chocolate ice cream. The variables could appear infinite, but if one could calculate them, it would all boil down to something that could have no other outcome without changing the equation. Logically it makes sense, and may one day be proven. That is when we have enough computing power to bring all the variables together to a solution.

But this is all just an assumption. After all, the variables needn't really be variables at all. If D was fated to choose chocolate, he would choose chocolate, no matter what the mathematical probability is, since mathematical probability deals with a Universe where only the chances of something's occurring can be calculated exactly, not the certainty.

IOW, if you speak of variables and probability, you speak of two concepts that only exist in a "free" world (wherein I will probably pick chocolate (maybe 99.9999999999% chance) but have always had the opportunity to pick vanilla). In a predestined world, there is no such thing as "opportunity". There is only what will happen, and what will not. No variables involved.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by russ_watters
I like the thought experiment except for one thing: probability. Probability is based on how well you know the situation at hand. Sure, based on "F" eating chocolate 70% of the time in the past that there is a 70% chance that he'll eat it this time. Sounds nice.

But wait, if you dig a little deeper, you might find that he never eats chocolate more than 5 times in a row. Or maybe he's never eaten vanilla twice in a row. Or maybe he eats chocolate in the afternoon and vanilla in the evening.

There is ALWAYS more information that can be added to your understanding of F's decision making process to tighten up your probability. What you find is that the more information you add, the closer and closer (asymptotically) to 100% you get. So then the difference becomes 100% for D who THINKS he has a choice and 99.9999...% for F who KNOWS he has a choice.

Since it is my position that it is impossible to logically prove free will or predestination, I feel that I should re-iterate what I said in my previous post to Zantra: Probability only exists in a world of different opportunities. But opportunities only exists in a world of free will.

The fact that I have eaten choclate a million times before, when confronted with the same choice (betwixt vanilla and chocolate) doesn't mean anything in a world of predestination. It may seem like I "tend" toward chocolate, or my "chances" of chosing chocolate the next time are somehow greater, but "tendency" and "chance" do not exist in a predestined world. In a predestined world, I could eat chocolate a hundred times in a row, and it doesn't indicate or imply anything, except that I was predestined each of those times to choose chocolate.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok I agree that under the condition that a unique "free will" variable is introduced, a different choice can be made. But such a variable only exists in theory. A good example would be time travel. As I mentioned in one of my earlier posts, he could choose vanilla if he somehow knew of the future, and was thus able to make a decision based o knowledge that (D) did not have. But in the normalcy of things, people don't posess that ability, so we have to assume that D=F because the physical world doesn't allow for variables to be introduced. In mathmatical theory it's possible because we can work from a hypothetical persepective to arrive at that conclusion that D does not equal F, thus allowing for free will. But I concede your point- it is mathmatically possible, if not physically.

I think you have it backwards. We don't derive that D ~= F, we assume it at the outset and see where that logically takes us-- i.e. is the proposition "D ~= F" logically consistent or contradictory? If it is contradictory, then we are shown that something must be wrong with one of our assumptions, so we can go about re-evaluating them with this extra information in mind. If it is consistent, then we can proceed with theorizing about what can possibly account for F being different from D.

From the assumption D ~= F (ie F has free will as we have defined it but D does not) at the outset, my argument concludes that this relationship is only logically consistent if we assume F's decision making is influenced by "truly" random processes. We can phrase this as the conditional statement, "If person X has free will (again, as I have defined it), then this free will cannot be accounted for by any deterministic process." The conclusion is therefore not a proof or disproof of the propisition "free will exists," but rather a conlusion about the nature of free will, given that it actually does exist.

Of course, the existence of free will in humans would be enormously difficult to prove or disprove, if it is even possible at all. But if anyone insists that free will does indeed exist, then they must also accept that this free will is not a liberation but rather an inherent vulnerability to uncontrollable random processes (assuming there are no chinks in my reasoning, of course).

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by wuliheron
You have stated that the only explanation for the statistical probability of the choices of F is the introduction of a random element. An alternative explanation is that our observations are incorrect. Whether something is random or ordered can be either an absolute state of affairs or a relative one, and which it might be is ultimately anyone's guess.

Alright, let's add the condition that all observations on F and D are made in the same manner, in the same reference frame, and whatever else may be relevant to observational error. This is a theoretical argument, so all that matters is that it is theoretically possible to make observations of F and D such that there is no bias introduced by the observations. So unless there are good reasons to think that such a feat is impossible, we can proceed safely with our reasoning. (Besides, how could it be that if F was deterministic, and we always viewed F making his decision at t0 with the same observational methodology, and the initial conditions of t0 were always identical, that we would not always see F making the same choice?)

Again: If the statistical probability of the choices of F are not generated by a random element, then they must be generated by a deterministic element. But by definition, all the deterministic elements acting on F are also acting on D in an identical way. Therefore, if F's choices can ultimately be traced to purely deterministic elements, then F's behavior must be identical to D's. But this is not the case, so we have arrived at a contradiction; we conclude that there must be a non-deterministic element influencing F's decisions.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by Mentat
But this is all just an assumption. After all, the variables needn't really be variables at all. If D was fated to choose chocolate, he would choose chocolate, no matter what the mathematical probability is, since mathematical probability deals with a Universe where only the chances of something's occurring can be calculated exactly, not the certainty.

IOW, if you speak of variables and probability, you speak of two concepts that only exist in a "free" world (wherein I will probably pick chocolate (maybe 99.9999999999% chance) but have always had the opportunity to pick vanilla). In a predestined world, there is no such thing as "opportunity". There is only what will happen, and what will not. No variables involved.

Ok I'm responding to everyone's threads in one post, so as not to have 10 separate replies- so hang in there- and here we go!..

Ok maybe "variables" isn't exactly the correct word to use then. I say variables because at this time and point their definitions are largely unkown to us. So let's refer to them as causes. And there are billions of causal items which all contribute to the ultimate effect, the decision. Since we're speaking of determinism, these "causes" would all have to be known. Every single factor that would contribute to the decision directly or indirectly would have to be known. If this were the case, then we could determine the outcome of the decision to select chocolate. Let's also discard the term probabilty, since that infers variation. We've already established that D=F because we are talking about 2 completely equal examples up to the point of the decision. We're already established that there is no possibility of making a different choice because D and F are identical. Yes it is possible by introducing a "variable", but then the two become unequal, and the example looses it's point. The "probability" of alternate selection is ZERO, nado, null, nill zipp-o. Introducing a variable may change his mind, but if we solve that variable, then we can determine weather or not it will affect his choice. If someone intercepts his timeline and tells him not to pick chocolate, yes we can determine he will pick chocolate. But in the physical world there are no(proven) identical timelines to validate this. You have one set of causes, and it will one day be possible to add all those causes together to determine his "choice".

You see he does not actually have a "choice". All of his decisions throughout his life are unique, not variable, and can lead to only one choice or conclusion. He sees it as free will, like any other person would. However if he were able broaden his scope and examine the cascading cause and effect that brought him to this moment, and all it's intricacies, he would realize that he already knew what he wanted. He wanted chocolate because earlier was craving ice cream, because he saw someone eating chocolate ice cream. He saw that person because he decided to take a walk that day. he decide to take a walk that day because he got up early and was bored. He woke up early because his neighbor was running the lawn mower. His neihbor was doing that because he'd forgotten to do it the night before. His nieghbor forgot because when going out to do it, a friend called. His friend called because..(you get the point) And on and on and on out to the beginning. And if each chain of events could be followed back, it would lead to the moment of the decision, and we would know before he made the choice, and we would know exactly WHY he made the choice. The point isn't that he can't make a different choice- It's that he won't. I could go walk across a freeway, but I won't. I won't because I want to live. I won't because It's a long walk to the freeway..etc, etc.

My point is that it all depends on how you interpret free will. In a sense it does exist- from out perspective. But we always base our decisions on experiences, and those experiences are static, and if they all could be known, then essentially what we could do is in a sense "become" that person, following all the factors that would cause his to make his choice.

So here's my question. If you make a decision without coersion, or any external influences, but the decision you will inevitably make is static and can be predetermined- is it still free will?

I think you have it backwards. We don't derive that D ~= F, we assume it at the outset and see where that logically takes us-- i.e. is the proposition "D ~= F" logically consistent or contradictory? If it is contradictory, then we are shown that something must be wrong with one of our assumptions, so we can go about re-evaluating them with this extra information in mind. If it is consistent, then we can proceed with theorizing about what can possibly account for F being different from D.

From the assumption D ~= F (ie F has free will as we have defined it but D does not) at the outset, my argument concludes that this relationship is only logically consistent if we assume F's decision making is influenced by "truly" random processes. We can phrase this as the conditional statement, "If person X has free will (again, as I have defined it), then this free will cannot be accounted for by any deterministic process." The conclusion is therefore not a proof or disproof of the propisition "free will exists," but rather a conlusion about the nature of free will, given that it actually does exist.

Of course, the existence of free will in humans would be enormously difficult to prove or disprove, if it is even possible at all. But if anyone insists that free will does indeed exist, then they must also accept that this free will is not a liberation but rather an inherent vulnerability to uncontrollable random processes (assuming there are no chinks in my reasoning, of course).

Ok but it all comes down to how you interpret it. By definition, you're acknowledging that free will is depending upon uncontrollable processes. But those processes are determinable. If we can know ALL the processes which factor into a decision, then we can know that decision. My premise is contingent upon all factors being known. You're trying to introduce this "variable" or unknown "factor X" which allows free will. I submit that factor X isn't a variable allowing for free will, but instead a limiter to our knowledge, which doesn't allow us to draw an infallible conclusion. As long as a piece of the puzzle is missing, we can't see the complete picture and must "guess" that is what allows us to conclude free will. If we have all the pieces, there's no guesswork involved, and we have solved the riddle.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by metacristi
The usual definition of free will is that human choices are not absolutely determined by external causes,providing the existence of responsability when making the choice:clearly someone presenting mental disorders does not have free will.

All of today's scientific research in neurology suggest that we have such a free will:mind is seen as an emergent property of matter,previous brain internal states influencing the next without the necessity of additional external stimuli.

Well, this is a slightly different definition of free will than I have been using, since it has the internal/external distinction built into it. But from whence did those previous internal states of the brain arise? In a deterministic world we can trace these initial brain states themselves to past external influences, all the way back to the fertilization of the egg by the sperm. You are implicitly introducing a temporal variable into the definition of free will, when none exists in your explicit definition. For a choice to be an exercise of free will as you have defined it, it's not sufficient to say that the choice is not a (temporally) direct effect of an external cause. We have to be able to say that the choice was not the inevitable effect of external causes, regardless of when those external causes may have operated.

In this view [the so called compatibilist view] free will and determinism are compatible therefore D has free will irrespective whether our universe is deterministic or not

I was unaware that there was a common idea behind the reconcilability of free will and determinism. According to Wikipedia.org:

Compatibilism, also known as "soft determinism" and most famously championed by Hume, is a theory which holds that free will and determinism are compatible. Properly understood, according to Hume, freedom is not an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires. Alternately, Hume maintains that free acts are not uncaused (or mysteriously self-caused as Kant would have it) but caused in the right way, i.e., by our choices as determined by our our beliefs and desires, by our characters.

I think there are some good points made here, but they all circumvent the determinism/free will clash by defining free will differently from how I have defined it in this thread. Hume equates free will with a person's capacity to act in accordance to his/her desires, which is essentially the same idea I've been using to justify the notion that deterministic beings have a choice even if one particular outcome of that choice is inevitable. This is why I don't think determinism necessarily makes us 'puppet-like' or detracts from the integrity of human life/nature/experience in any significant way. If we define free acts/free will as Hume has, then I agree that we have free will, in this sense. But however we define free will, it looks as if there is still no getting around the notion that the meaningful choices we make are deterministically fixed. If we define free will as freedom from the bonds of causal determination, then either such a thing doesn't exist or it's just an expression of randomness.

 

[Zantra]

I think compatibilism pretty much sums up what I've been trying to voice, I just didn't know the theory existed.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok but it all comes down to how you interpret it. By definition, you're acknowledging that free will is depending upon uncontrollable processes. But those processes are determinable. If we can know ALL the processes which factor into a decision, then we can know that decision. My premise is contingent upon all factors being known. You're trying to introduce this "variable" or unknown "factor X" which allows free will. I submit that factor X isn't a variable allowing for free will, but instead a limiter to our knowledge, which doesn't allow us to draw an infallible conclusion. As long as a piece of the puzzle is missing, we can't see the complete picture and must "guess" that is what allows us to conclude free will. If we have all the pieces, there's no guesswork involved, and we have solved the riddle.

Again, I think you are either overlooking or misunderstanding the theoretical notion of a 'truly' random process. Define a 'truly' random (T-random for short) process as one whose behavior cannot be predicted with 100% certainty, even given perfect knowledge of the system. (Quantum events might be an example of truly random processes that actually exist in nature.) Rather than reiterate my argument, let us assume that the 'free-ness' of F's free will must be the result of T-random process(es). Let us go even further and presume that we have "perfect knowledge" of these T-random processes in F; even with this perfect knowledge, the process will still be unpredictable to some degree. Here's a further assumption: we have perfect knowledge of all the deterministic factors that influence F's decision, and we know how to do the relevant calculations with this data.

So we have perfect knowledge of F, including all the deterministic parts and all the T-random parts-- in other words, there is absolutely no limitation of knowledge here that's just waiting to be unmasked-- we know everything that there is to possibly know about F. But even though we have every single piece of the puzzle that exists, we still have to do some sort of guesswork. We cannot predict with 100% certainty what F's decision will be, since it somehow depends on an unknowable quantity, namely the T-random process. We can do statistics to calculate the probability of what F will decide, but that isn't the same thing as absolute prediction.

We've already established that D=F because we are talking about 2 completely equal examples up to the point of the decision. We're already established that there is no possibility of making a different choice because D and F are identical.

No, that's the thing. There is a possibility that F makes a different choice than D, by definition-- that is why we say F has free will in the first place.

This misunderstanding is probably my fault for being too vague in the initial post and only clarifying the point several posts later, but let me try to clarify it again.

D and F live in identical worlds and have identical attributes, experiences, memories, etc. In fact, they are identical in every single way EXCEPT for the one thing that by definition distinguishes them: the fact that F has free will and D does not. Now, in this thought experiment we are examining what is going on with D and F while they are making a decision at "present" time t0-- every other event fixed in the past is identical. It did not HAVE to be this way-- since F has free will, then he COULD HAVE wound up in a state distinct from D at time t0. We are just examining the one particular situation where it just so happens that F's free choices happen to have been identical in every way to D's determined choices, up until t0. So strictly speaking, D ~= F, even though their histories are superficially impossible to tell apart.

 

[Zantra]

Ok then we must assume (for the sake of the argument) that the T-random process is knowable. I DO understand what you're trying to say. Basically that is always an element of randomness present that allows free will to occur. And I did admit earlier that free will was Mathamatically feasible. I'm not familiar with the aspects of QM pertaining to this(I guess it's time I learned) But in order for determinism to hold true, we must assume no variables, and no unknowns- even T-random process. This may not hold true, but considering we're discussing 2 exactly parallel timelines, you can induldge me So If we assuming perfect knowledge of EVERYTHING, not just from a superficial perpective, but a quantum, molecular, and thought process point of view. We are also making the assumption that we have such a complete knowledge of QM as to be able to determine the T-random process outcome. After all, there is pattern even in randomness (see chaos theory- and no I can't argue the fine points of chaos theory either- I'm not a PHD mathamatician). IF all of the things I just mentioned held true, then indeed D would truly equal F, and determinism would hold true.

Obviously there are a lot of fine points and issues that would have to be resolved in order for determinism to work, and it's not absolutely uncontestable, but compatibility theory works best for me, as contains most of what I've been spewing out.

 

[metacristi]

hypnagogue

Well, this is a slightly different definition of free will than I have been using, since it has the internal/external distinction built into it. But from whence did those previous internal states of the brain arise? In a deterministic world we can trace these initial brain states themselves to past external influences, all the way back to the fertilization of the egg by the sperm. You are implicitly introducing a temporal variable into the definition of free will, when none exists in your explicit definition. For a choice to be an exercise of free will as you have defined it, it's not sufficient to say that the choice is not a (temporally) direct effect of an external cause. We have to be able to say that the choice was not the inevitable effect of external causes, regardless of when those external causes may have operated

An act of will (when making a decision) is linked with a specific moment of time (of course the physical act itself is consequent to the decision to act so),what I had in mind was exactly your point:at a certain moment of time D has free will exactly because there are not only immediate external influences which to lead to the decision made (as behaviourism claim).The fact that there might exist an unknown (by D) chain of purely deterministic causes that leads inevitably toward the decision made is irrelevant.



[QUOTEIn this view [the so called compatibilist view] free will and determinism are compatible therefore D has free will irrespective whether our universe is deterministic or not

I was unaware that there was a common idea behind the reconcilability of free will and determinism. [/QUOTE]


My idea was that though D does not know in what kind of universe does he exist he can still say that he has free will irrespective of whether his universe is deterministic or not ontologically.The freedom of choice he experiences is compatible with both.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by Zantra
I would have to reiterate the matrix analogy- You've already made your choice, you just don't know it yet. It's so difficult to separate determinism and free will because of the correlation between the two, and it all depends on your point of view. You have the ability to make choices, but those choices, or "variables" have already been determined by your life path. We accept it as free will because we make choices, but those choices are influenced by unvaried factors in your life which you cannot control.

Ever consider that "thought" is deterministic (form) and "emotions" are volitile? (essence). And thus illustrates the relationship between predeterminism and free will, as well as the functioning of the human mind?

While here if we learn to keep our emotions "in context" with our thoughts, and exhibit "self control" -- and don't do stupid things! (not always ) -- then we begin to discover we have mastery over overselves and, "our fate."