Has determinism ever bothered you?

[TheDonk]

Does the whole free will uncertainty bother anyone? I like talking about it and I would like to have free will but have any of you ever been bothered by the possibility of not having free will? This has never bothered me and I don't think it ever will. For what reason, I don't know... Maybe because I feel free.

 

[abitofnothingleft]

well of course you feel free because there isn't someone sitting over you with a poker telling you what to do. you arent in shackles or a cage. you think you are free to make up your own mind.

it doesn't bother me because I've grown with this. the realization of it is just kind of a shock for some people because, your entire life, you're told you're free to make your own decisions. but after learning this, you look back in your life and try to think up a situation where this doesn't apply and you really cant. or at least, i cant. I've challenged my friends and family to think up situations where this doesn't apply and they can't either. you just have to accept it i guess...

 

[NeutronStar]

If determinism is true then no one is responsible for their actions. People who murder, rape or pillage are just as innocent as anyone else because they have no control over their own actions.

Personally I don't believe in determinism. At least not in the sense that all acts are predetermined. Now I do believe in another type of determinism. For example, it's been determined that we will have a free will and we have absolutely no control over that. So we have no free will to stop having free will.

Believing in determinism can be a bad thing. For one thing, if a person believes that everything is predetermined then a person could go out and do anything at all imaginable and not feel the least bit guilty about it. After all, it must have been predetermined right? In other words, it wasn't really their free choice to do whatever they did.

I personally don't believe that. I believe that people can genuinely choose how they will live out their lives.

Besides, I thought that with the discovery of quantum randomness indeterminism was the "in" thing.

Why would anyone believe in determinism? Didn't that go out with Newton's clockwork universe?

 

[Aquamarine]

It is difficult to have an omnipotent, omniscient God without determinism. Obviously such a God knows and has decided how everything will be in the future. Also, if you don't believe in determinism, how can you be absolutely sure of a life after death, just judgement and heaven?

On the other hand, if you believe in determinism and God, why has he decided that there should be evil and unhappiness in the world?

If determinism is true then no one is responsible for their actions. People who murder, rape or pillage are just as innocent as anyone else because they have no control over their own actions.

On the other, a world not deterministic seems to imply randomness. If evil act are due to randomness, how anyone be responsible?

Besides, I thought that with the discovery of quantum randomness indeterminism was the "in" thing.

There are many interpretations that allows determinism.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretations_of_quantum_mechanics

 

[russ_watters]

Does the whole free will uncertainty bother anyone? I like talking about it and I would like to have free will but have any of you ever been bothered by the possibility of not having free will? This has never bothered me and I don't think it ever will. For what reason, I don't know... Maybe because I feel free.

It has never bothered me either, and for a similar reason: if you believe you are free, you are.

It is difficult to have an omnipotent, omniscient God without determinism. Obviously such a God knows and has decided how everything will be in the future. Also, if you don't believe in determinism, how can you be absolutely sure of a life after death, just judgement and heaven?

Just because he can decide how everything will be doesn't mean he has. Most religions these days aren't even deterministic, despite how a great many people see it. Freewill is an essential part of Christianity, for example.

 

[Aquamarine]

It has never bothered me either, and for a similar reason: if you believe you are free, you are. Just because he can decide how everything will be doesn't mean he has. Most religions these days aren't even deterministic, despite how a great many people see it. Freewill is an essential part of Christianity, for example.

God does not escape responsibility by being passive and voluntarily giving up omnipotence and omniscience. Either God lies to himself or he knows that he is at least allowing the possiblity of evil. And passively allowing the possibility of evil is not much better than actively causing evil, when one has the choice of totally preventing it. And saying that God accepts evil because free will is more important will not work:

No matter how successful this response, it can only explain evil caused by human free will. It does not explain any catastrophic horror that has nothing to do with human choices. Think of earthquakes, floods, and disease—so-called 'natural evil' or 'acts of God'. We cannot confront a paralyzed, demented, and blind Tay-Sachs child and his despondent parents and then chalk up the entire wretched scenario to free will. No one chose it. Healing that child wouldn't tread on anyone's freedom. At its best, the value of free will is relevant to, and can only excuse God for, a mere portion of the evil we find. Whether of not we call that 'evil', we must stick with the evil that we humans freely create—so-called 'moral evil'.

But there is another, similar problem. Some instances of moral evil already involve violations of free will—e.g., rape. For God to step in and deny the violator his freedom would also be to protect the victim's freedom. In such cases, it all comes down to whose free will is more valuable—which instance of coercion would be worse? And it is morally implausible that the best thing to do is to respect a rapist's freedom to rape unhindered rather than protecting the victim's freedom. So, for a large category of moral evil—all moral evil involving coercion—it's automatically implausible that the value of free will can justify God's inaction. We must then narrow the domain of admissible evil yet again.

With the candidate evil suitably restricted, we can ask: Is God off the hook? Many say no. Some deny the existence of free will, and so can dismiss the entire proposal as mere fiction. Compatibilists sometimes attack the essential premise that God cannot influence our choices without thereby cancelling our freedom. After all, compatibilists believe that determinism is consistent with human freedom. And if determinism can allow for freedom, perhaps so can appropriate divine meddling with our decisions. The upshot of these challenges is that, to absolve God, we need a reason to think that he really couldn't influence our choices without cancelling our freedom. The customary theistic appeal is to a libertarian conception of free will, but such a conception is under heavy fire from its rivals.

Another challenge focuses on different ways to interfere with freedom. One way is to 'jump in' and take control of the agent, dictating its every movement and thought. This is the kind of coercion we envision in mad scientist stories. But it might also be the kind of coercion that motivates our above intuition that if God got involved, we'd all be 'robots'. We should remember that there are other, softer kinds of coercion. Look to policemen and jailers. They don't take control of an agent's decisions. They just threaten the agent with physical force and restraint, and carry out their threats if necessary. Policemen and jailers restrict our freedom, but it is a restriction we're willing to accept, for our own protection and safety. Now, return to God. If he were to get involved as a Divine Policeman, making threats and enforcing them, then would we be 'robots'? Seemingly not. Instead, we'd be citizens of a divine nation-state, and a very safe and reliable nation-state at that. But then the moral claim is dubious—it's no longer clear that God should hold back. Taking total control of our decisions would be wrong, but laying down the law might be right. So why hasn't God done it?

Several further challenges attack the idea that evil-eliminating divine interventions must cancel human freedom. These challenges suggest different ways for God to eliminate evil, all the while leaving our free will untouched—"innocent interventions". One proposal is that God allow sinful acts, but stop their evil consequences. So if I fire a rifle at your head, God allows me to make the decision, but then makes the trigger stick, or the rifle misfire, or the bullet pop out of existence. Such interventions would, happily, divorce evil choices from the subsequent suffering. Another proposal is for God to fortify humans as to render us less vulnerable to the sins of our fellows. We could be bullet-proof, invulnerable to poison, etc. That way, humans would retain the capacity for evil choices and activities; it's just that such evil behavior would be harmless to the 'victims' and futile for the evildoers.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will_and_the_problem_of_evil

 

[russ_watters]

Yes, that is the catch - nevertheless, that is what many religions teach. You choose the pessimistic way of looking at it (there can be no evil without freewill) and religion teaches the optomistic (there can be no good without freewill - and evil is punished later). Both are really two sides of the same coin though and both support the concept of freewill.

Also, we've been talking about religious determinism - scientific determinism works the same way.

 

[RAD4921]

The philosophy of Forrest Gump

In the movie "Forrest Gump" he ask the question of free wiil or determinism and at the end, the idiot Gump comes to the conclusion that there must be a little bit of both and I wonder about the wisdom of the movie. I agree with the other postings that if determinism is true than we are not responsible for our actions (at least in the eyes of God). Determinism would remove all meaning to life since we aould be "robots of the cosmos". If this is the case I can go out and kill 15 people in a strip mall and blame it on God because after all that is his plan. If one doesn't believe in God they could blame it on the cause and effect action of the universe.
On the other hand, if one has complete free will I should be able to live forever if I choose and walk through mountains at my choice so maybe Old Forrest has a point there.
You are correct the whole damn issue of free will and determinism gives me a headache. Asprin Please!

 

[Jikx]

If determinism is true then no one is responsible for their actions. People who murder, rape or pillage are just as innocent as anyone else because they have no control over their own actions.

And yet they will go to jail.. why? Because the act of jailing offenders will influence other pre-offenders to not offend, the offender to not re-offend, or simply remove him/her to protect society.

The those who act to jail them, will be influenced by this fact to do the jailing.. and you can see you should never think too much about this..

 

[Royce]

The simple answer is that we have limited free will just as we have limited choices.
If God is good and created goo in the universe; and, there is free will then evil must exist as there can be no free will without choice. Our choices are good or evil.
If we have free will then we are responsible for our choices and as we benifit from good choices we suffer from bad, evil, choices.
While in creating good God created the possiblity of evil the fact that some of us choose evil is our responsiblity not Gods.
How else can we learn and grow?
If all is good and there is no choice then the universe is deterministic.
What then is the point of it all if we are simply destined to play out our given rolls and die with no choices, no responsibility for our choices or actions?
That isn't life, It isn't even theater.
It's like playing a game of cards with a stacked deck. We already know what the out come is. It never changes. It never can change. Just the same old rerun over and over again. Why?
I cannot believe in an illogical, perverse, cruel, psychotic God.

 

[Rasine]

i strongly believe that we as humans have God given free will. this is so we can freely find God and believe in his awesome power. i also believe that He has set a divine path for us. He gives us a choice weather or not to follow it, but within us, our inutition (God within) leads us on that path. that divine path is not something to be constrained to, for it is the rightous path for that individual in that will make he/she the most content and peaceful.

 

[honestrosewater]

Welcome to Headache City!

Define random as "uncaused". Give an example of a random event.

 

[abitofnothingleft]

He has set a divine path for us. He gives us a choice weather or not to follow it, but within us, our inutition (God within) leads us on that path. .

but look at that as it is...if you dont follow that path you go to hell...so of course you're going to believe it.

 

[Rasine]

what is your reasoning behind the assumption that you will go to hell if you don't follow your divine path? yes you can still go to heaven if you stray away from it. that doesn't forbid you from believe in God, you just won't be as content as you would be if you followed the path.

ex: maybe God is telling you to move to chicago, but you move to atlanta instead because all of your family lives there and chicago is forgin to you. well..maybe in chicago you would have made a new friend whom you invest in and become very succussful.

choosing to move to atlanta won't send you to hell, you just would not receive the good fortune that God would have granted you.

 

[bola]

I won't comment on god, but I will put my own theory into this.
I imagine it works something like this; determinism exists, but a little different than people might imagine.

Imagine 2 balls, floating in space. They have no consciousness, as thus they do not move, they stand still all the time.
But suddenly, they get a consciousness, and ball A moves into ball B, and since determinism exists, ball B rolls backwards, then it stops.

The consciousness itself is too complex to have a level of determinism, so two levels emerge, the quantum level and the higher level.
The higher level controls where the quantum world takes them.
Basically what I'm saying is, consciousness is an entity in itself, and therefore it is fully responsible for what it does, even in a deterministic world.

You have to see the consciousness as a separate whole entity, not just a collection of electrons following determinism, because to us, it's not.

 

[honestrosewater]

bola,
Is consciousness limited in how it can interact with the physical world? When operating in the physical world, does consciousness have to obey the laws of physics?

 

[bola]

It does, but the thing is there are so many interactions that make up a consciousness that it's unbearably hard to determine anything.
And also you have to see it from OUR point of view, in that, are you ale to look into the future? Do you feel like a slave to determinism?
I don't at least.

 

[abitofnothingleft]

what is your reasoning behind the assumption that you will go to hell if you don't follow your divine path? yes you can still go to heaven if you stray away from it. that doesn't forbid you from believe in God, you just won't be as content as you would be if you followed the path.

ex: maybe God is telling you to move to chicago, but you move to atlanta instead because all of your family lives there and chicago is forgin to you. well..maybe in chicago you would have made a new friend whom you invest in and become very succussful.

choosing to move to atlanta won't send you to hell, you just would not receive the good fortune that God would have granted you.

the christian religion tells you that if you don't follow god you go to hell...i presonally don't even follow christianity or god for that matter because i don't believe in either of them...

how is it that god would tell you to move to another city?i thought following god was just following the religion you are in...in christianity abiding by the ten commandments and participating in the 7 sacraments are following god...are they not? I am pretty sure that moving to a different city will not affect your relationship with god.

 

[moving finger]

The concept of Free Will has been thrown back and forth in this thread, but I haven't seen anyone give a clear and unambiguous definition of what they mean by Free Will. Without an agreed definition it's pretty pointless debating whether Free Will exists or not.

Would anyone care to try defining it?

MF

 

[moving finger]

If determinism is true then no one is responsible for their actions. People who murder, rape or pillage are just as innocent as anyone else because they have no control over their own actions.

Personally I don't believe in determinism. At least not in the sense that all acts are predetermined. Now I do believe in another type of determinism. For example, it's been determined that we will have a free will and we have absolutely no control over that. So we have no free will to stop having free will.

Believing in determinism can be a bad thing. For one thing, if a person believes that everything is predetermined then a person could go out and do anything at all imaginable and not feel the least bit guilty about it. After all, it must have been predetermined right? In other words, it wasn't really their free choice to do whatever they did.

I personally don't believe that. I believe that people can genuinely choose how they will live out their lives.

Besides, I thought that with the discovery of quantum randomness indeterminism was the "in" thing.

Why would anyone believe in determinism? Didn't that go out with Newton's clockwork universe?

Quantum indeterminism has nothing to do with free will.

The assumption that determinism is true does not mean that no-one is responsible for their actions, this is a common "fatalistic" argument used to argue against a belief in determinism.

My actions today determine what happens tomorrow, and if I am a thinking, conscious being then I am responsible for my actions, EVEN IF THE FUTURE IS PRE-DETERMINED, because the "I" that is making the decisions is part of that pre-determination. Even though the future is determined it is still dependent on the actions of the present.

Think of Aristotle's famous example of the sea-battle to take place tomorrow between two fleets led by admirals A and B, the result of which will leave one admiral victorious. Assuming the law of the excluded middle, then it is the case today that either A will win tomorrow, or A will lose tomorrow. Does this mean that the outcome tomorrow is not dependent on the actions of A and B today? No, of course not. The outcome is maybe determined, and maybe it is the case that admiral A will win, but that does not mean that admiral A can relax and not worry about the battle, because the outcome of the battle depends on his actions today,and there is no way that he can know in advance whether he will win or not. So whether the future is determined or not, admiral A MUST still behave as if the future was under his control and as if he has free will, because no matter what happens, the future depends on his actions today.

MF

My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will.William James

 

[OutofPlace]

Quantum indeterminism has nothing to do with free will.

The assumption that determinism is true does not mean that no-one is responsible for their actions, this is a common "fatalistic" argument used to argue against a belief in determinism.

My actions today determine what happens tomorrow, and if I am a thinking, conscious being then I am responsible for my actions, EVEN IF THE FUTURE IS PRE-DETERMINED, because the "I" that is making the decisions is part of that pre-determination. Even though the future is determined it is still dependent on the actions of the present.

Think of Aristotle's famous example of the sea-battle to take place tomorrow between two fleets led by admirals A and B, the result of which will leave one admiral victorious. Assuming the law of the excluded middle, then it is the case today that either A will win tomorrow, or A will lose tomorrow. Does this mean that the outcome tomorrow is not dependent on the actions of A and B today? No, of course not. The outcome is maybe determined, and maybe it is the case that admiral A will win, but that does not mean that admiral A can relax and not worry about the battle, because the outcome of the battle depends on his actions today,and there is no way that he can know in advance whether he will win or not. So whether the future is determined or not, admiral A MUST still behave as if the future was under his control and as if he has free will, because no matter what happens, the future depends on his actions today.

MF

My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will.William James

I don't really believe any admiral would just sit back and relax, this would inevitably lead to losing the battle and unless he intended to lose it he would act, so maybe the existence of FREE WILL can not be determined by looking at hypotethical actions, for example like me saying so if there is Free Will i could go out and kill a few people and wouldn't be responsible for it when i very well know i wouldn't dare do anything like that.


So FREE WILL must be determined not by actions, but by the internal mental disposition of each person; what allows someone to kill or deliberately loose a battle, what forces someone not to kill or fight to win the battle. IS
IT A FREE WILL or SOMETHING ELSE THAT EXISTS IN THEM NO MATTER WHAT.

One could argue that knowing there would be consequences to actions could prevent Free Will to exist, in the sense of giving us limited choices. SO LAWS MADE BY HUMANS LIMIT OR FREE WILL, THEN AGAIN, NO ONE ALIVE HAS LIVED WITHOUT ANY LAWS AT ALL, SO THERE IS NO POINT OF REFERENCE

 

[Tournesol]

Quantum indeterminism has nothing to do with free will.

The assumption that determinism is true does not mean that no-one is responsible for their actions, this is a common "fatalistic" argument used to argue against a belief in determinism.

Then indeterminism has nothing to do with responsibility. It could
still have something to do with FW, so long as FW has nothing to do
with responstibility. This is called "semicompatiblism".

(Another sweeping nothing-to-do-with).

 

[moving finger]

Then indeterminism has nothing to do with responsibility. It could
still have something to do with FW, so long as FW has nothing to do
with responstibility. This is called "semicompatiblism".

(Another sweeping nothing-to-do-with).

hehehehe, it seems you are seeking me out my dear sunflower. this is fun!

Agreed, it is simply my opinion that “quantum indeterminism has nothing to do with free will”. You are entitled to believe otherwise. Are you suggesting that you do?

MF

 

[rygar]

i didn't read most of this thread yet, so sorry if I'm being repitious

If determinism is true then no one is responsible for their actions. People who murder, rape or pillage are just as innocent as anyone else because they have no control over their own actions.

in some respects, yes. the person who committed rape had no actual control over his actions--but neither did the person who got raped, the police officer that arrested the rapist, or the judge that sentenced him to jail. it really makes you think whether the illusion of free will is a necessity for us to have both a consciousness AND determinism, and how would our consciousness differ if we didn't have the illusion of free will?

if anyone wants to comment, i'd be interesting in hearing it...

Besides, I thought that with the discovery of quantum randomness indeterminism was the "in" thing.

i was under the same misconception just a week ago. see my thread on einstein/bohr, where selfAdjoint directly addresses this. quantum mechanics shows no evidence for free will anymore than relativity.

Why would anyone believe in determinism? Didn't that go out with Newton's clockwork universe?

i believe in determinism. in fact, i don't know of any evidence that supports a theory of free will, other than our intuitions! perhaps you can help me out.

 

[Telos]

There is a question that is far more important than the free will question, and that is the worth of a free mind.

It makes very little sense to enquire on the freedom of the will. The only really important thing is to acknowledge that there is such a thing as will and it exists - knowing whether or not it is free will not serve our understanding of it. We must ask, "what good is the will?"

The rights of the will are not as important as the rights of the mind, for the rights of the mind encompasses the rights of the will and much else. What is okay to think, and what is not okay to think? What way of thinking is appropriate, and what way of thinking is not appropriate?

Whether or not the mind is distinct from the body is also another unimportant matter - what's important is realizing that the mind governs the body and vice versa. It doesn't really matter how, just that they do.

Asking about the free will problem or the mind-body problem are only veiled attempts to ask about the real problem. What good is a free mind?

 

[Dissident Dan]

I felt very disturbed when I first thought about it, but now, oddly enough, after becoming used to the idea, I am not emotionally bothered.

 

[moving finger]

the person who committed rape had no actual control over his actions

I disagree that this necessarily follows. It depends on how one defines "person". It is possible to make oneself "really really small" and thus externalise everything (ie externalise all causal influences), which in a deterministic world would imply that this infinitesimally small "person" indeed "has no control over his actions". But in reality a "person" is not an infinitesimally small agent; in practice many (most?) of the causal influences of behaviour are more or less internalised within the agent that we define as the "person", and are thus related in a complex and self-referential manner with that agent's behaviour. There is no simple chain of cause and effect in an agent containing self-referential causal loops (what Hofstadter calls "strange loops"), and it is no longer true to say that such an agent "has no control over his actions".

it really makes you think whether the illusion of free will is a necessity for us to have both a consciousness AND determinism, and how would our consciousness differ if we didn't have the illusion of free will?

Before one can make any progress in debating these (very interesting) questions, one must agree a useful definition of this phenomenon that you call "free will" - would you care to offer a definition?

i believe in determinism. in fact, i don't know of any evidence that supports a theory of free will, other than our intuitions! perhaps you can help me out.

See my comment on definitions above.

MF

 

[moving finger]

There is a question that is far more important than the free will question, and that is the worth of a free mind.

Can you define please what you mean exactly by the expression "free mind" (for example, as distinct from an "unfree mind")?

Thanks

MF

 

[moving finger]

i believe in determinism. in fact, i don't know of any evidence that supports a theory of free will, other than our intuitions! perhaps you can help me out.

Discussions on "free will" are notoriously difficult, usually because most participants take sides before they even agree what they are talking about (ie participants declare "I do/do not believe in free will" before there is any agreement on the definition or meaning of "free will").

Therefore, rather than debate whether "free will" (whatever the definition) really exists, I think it is much more instructive to ask :

what do people really mean when they say that they believe they act with "free will", and are they justified in having this belief?

I humbly suggest that what most people (who claim to believe in "free will") mean when they say they act with "free will" is that they believe "their actions are not entirely constrained by external factors".

I say "entirely" constrained because I believe most of us would agree that our actions are usually some way constrained to a greater or lesser extent by external factors (eg I cannot willingly hold my breath for more than a minute or two, no matter how much I "want" to), but belief in "free will" would imply that not all of the external constraints on our actions are necessarily absolute.

This is where it becomes useful to look closely at how we define the "person" (or better still, the agent) which we are claiming has this "free will".

Paraphrasing Dennett, one can externalise everything by making oneself really, really small. Conversely, an agent can subsume many (potentially external) constraints within itself by making itself a sufficiently finite size.

What we call our "self" is not an infinitesimal point in space. It has finite physical and logical boundaries and, most importantly, it includes within those boundaries many of the causes and effects of our decisions; in fact the personal decision-making process is based on what I like to call self-referential causal loops.

If we can identify the external "cause" of a particular decision (ie an external constraint on our "free will") then we know that we are not in fact deciding freely. But for many of our decisions we are unable to unambiguously identify the "causes" of those decisions, simply because those causes are internalised in a complex and self-referential way within our decision-making selves.

Thus, it is not the case that our "free will" decisions are uncaused; neither is it the case that our "free will" decisions are unconstrained. It is simply the case that the decisions which we choose to call our "free will" decisions are largely caused and constrained by internal self-referential causal loops, of which we have (most of the time) incomplete awareness - and this is what leads us to say that we act with "free will".

Some may call "free will" illusion. I do not. "Free will" is a very real feeling that we do have, and when we understand precisely what this "free will" is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is very real, and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe.

"Free will" is not an illusion. But it is important to understand exactly what it is, and also what it is not.

MF

 

[Telos]

Can you define please what you mean exactly by the expression "free mind" (for example, as distinct from an "unfree mind")?

Thanks

MF

Sure. A free mind is not authoritatively restricted by other minds. An unfree mind is authoritatively restricted by other minds.

What good is a free mind? In other words, what good is letting people think and do what they want?

Our current answer seems to be "very little" for children and "none" for criminals. We treat children very much like criminals.

 

[rygar]

Before one can make any progress in debating these (very interesting) questions, one must agree a useful definition of this phenomenon that you call "free will" - would you care to offer a definition?

well, here's the definition i proposed in my einstein/bohr thread when asked what a universe with free will would entail:

a universe with free will would imply that the results of our actions are determined by us, the causes. furthermore, it implies that we, the causes, are not the results of other causes. or at the least, our ability to change our results does not depend on our being the result of a cause, but instead it depends on something instrinsic that we label "free will". that is, the ability to cause our own results by genuine choice. free will implies we are more than just a small part of a gigantic cause and effect chain; we have the ability to disrupt that chain, and choose its direction without any factors pre-determining the results.

I disagree that this necessarily follows. It depends on how one defines "person". It is possible to make oneself "really really small" and thus externalise everything (ie externalise all causal influences), which in a deterministic world would imply that this infinitesimally small "person" indeed "has no control over his actions". But in reality a "person" is not an infinitesimally small agent; in practice many (most?) of the causal influences of behaviour are more or less internalised within the agent that we define as the "person", and are thus related in a complex and self-referential manner with that agent's behaviour.

i see your point, but i disagree that size is relevant to having free will. my internal organs are part of me, but they act on cause-effect relationships, without my conscious willpower. i wouldn't be able to stop them if i wanted to, short of killing myself and terminating my consciousness. yes, the end result of an action can be caused by the physical entity that is me, but the whole reaction is beyond my control. that is to say, the consequences are inevitable.

by "i", i generally am referring to my conscience as a being, and not my physical body--however intertwined they might be. so yes, i agree that i am a cause, but i am also an effect. and both are unavoidable, and uncontrollable by my consciousness.

There is no simple chain of cause and effect in an agent containing self-referential causal loops (what Hofstadter calls "strange loops"), and it is no longer true to say that such an agent "has no control over his actions".

i am unclear about this, but i'll try reading something on Hofstadter.

 

[moving finger]

Sure. A free mind is not authoritatively restricted by other minds. An unfree mind is authoritatively restricted by other minds.

If a mind is restricted in other ways (not necessarily by other minds), can it still be free?

We treat children very much like criminals.

Who is "we"? I don't.

MF

 

[moving finger]

well, here's the definition i proposed in my einstein/bohr thread when asked what a universe with free will would entail:

a universe with free will would imply that the results of our actions are determined by us, the causes. furthermore, it implies that we, the causes, are not the results of other causes.

This is Libertarianism (ie that the human mind/will can be the uncaused cause of our actions), and is akin to Descartes' Dualism. Nobody has come up with any coherent rational or logical mechanism for how this could work, and there is no scientific evidence that the mind works in this way.

or at the least, our ability to change our results does not depend on our being the result of a cause, but instead it depends on something instrinsic that we label "free will". that is, the ability to cause our own results by genuine choice. free will implies we are more than just a small part of a gigantic cause and effect chain; we have the ability to disrupt that chain, and choose its direction without any factors pre-determining the results.

I disagree. It is possible to define free will such that it is compatible with determinism and yet we still have free will. See post number #29 in this thread.

i see your point, but i disagree that size is relevant to having free will. my internal organs are part of me, but they act on cause-effect relationships, without my conscious willpower.

If you examine any small part of you, including any small part of your brain (where most of your rational thinking takes place) then I think you will find that it all operates deterministically. This is what reductionism does. You will never find any part which does not operate deterministically, ie there is no “source” of the kind of Libertarian free will that you believe in.

i wouldn't be able to stop them if i wanted to, short of killing myself and terminating my consciousness.

There are parts of your body that you do consciously control – you control (most of the time) whether you will lift your arm or not for example. Yet your arm and your brain all operate determinsitically. The key here is that the causal chain is convoluted with multiple self-referential loops, many of them inaccessible to your consciousness within your brain, hence it is impossible (either for you or anyone else) to unambiguously identify the precise cause of you lifting your arm.

yes, the end result of an action can be caused by the physical entity that is me, but the whole reaction is beyond my control. that is to say, the consequences are inevitable.

Yes, if the world is determinsitic then everything is determined.

by "i", i generally am referring to my conscience as a being, and not my physical body--however intertwined they might be.

But you cannot separate them. You cannot draw a line and say “this is me” and “this is my body”. They are not only intertwined (with multiple self-referential causal loops), they are also interdependent.

so yes, i agree that i am a cause, but i am also an effect. and both are unavoidable, and uncontrollable by my consciousness.

Agreed, except that your consciousness DOES exert some control, even though it in turn is caused. (and there is no need for Libertarian sources of free will)

i am unclear about this, but i'll try reading something on Hofstadter.

His book “Godel Escher Bach, the Eternal Golden Braid”, is excellent.

MF

 

[Walkingman]

A thought:

If the world is deterministic, then you are bound to a certain path.
You cannot know the path, because the path cannot be known.

If the world is non-deterministic, then you can influence the path.
You cannot know the path, because others may also influence the path.

You cannot know the path.

As for Godel Escher Bach,

This sentence is false.

 

[moving finger]

If the world is deterministic, then you are bound to a certain path.
You cannot know the path, because the path cannot be known.

This fits perfectly with my definition of free will :

the ability of an agent to anticipate alternate possible outcomes dependent on alternate possible courses of action and to choose which course of action to follow and in so doing to behave in a manner such that the agent’s choice appears, both to itself and to an outside observer, to be reasoned but not consistently predictable.

MF

 

[Billy T]

... You cannot draw a line and say “this is me” and “this is my body”. They are not only intertwined (with multiple self-referential causal loops), they are also interdependent.

MF and I have had a long an fruitful exchange on this subject in thread "What price free will?" and I think we understand and respect each other's positions, but he is being kept so busy that he has not responded to my last 2 posts there.

I disagree, slightly, with his statement above. It is entirely correct if as most people do, one associates "I" with a physical body, but in error either if one is a soul (which I do not want to consider) OR if one is only an informational processes in some computational facility (specifically a human brain at the current stage of technology). Then one can separate the "I" from the "computational facility" as one can separate software from hardware. Obviously one can not do anything with the software alone. Thus, executing software (or the informational "I" process) is dependent on the hardware. For example, in the case of "me" and my brain, drugs may modify "me."

Where the question gets interesting is if the software that is "me" in my understanding (see attachment which is same as to first post of the "what price free will" thread) can be something other than "deterministic" or "random" in its logic, at least in part - logic I have called "Middle Ground", MG.
(1)If universe is deterministic, there is no free will as most people understand these words, but MF has a perfectly good definition that keeps him happy with the concept that he does have "free will" even in a completely deterministic universe.
(2)If there is chance as may be the case and is commonly believed to be the case (because of quantum theory as understood in the Copenhagen school), then one can no doubt also define a "Free Will", but this free will is to me only chance and not what I call "genuine free will." Personally if that is all there is, I prefer MF's free will and to rely upon evolution to make me "chose" appropriate acts. -That is, I want the wisdom developed by evolution, not a random decision, if I can not have genuine free will.

It all comes down to the question: Is there a MG? Clearly determinism and random are mutually exclusive concepts, but are they all inclusive of all logical possibilities? - That is the question, which MF has promised to think about.

If it can be shown that no MG exists, then I join MF in his definition of FW but until that is shown, I will continue to believe that the very advanced "computer" which is the human brain, under the influence of evolution, has found this MG.

 

[The Rev]

Ultimately, it's all academic, since we can choose to believe either way and there will be no way to prove either choice wrong. That being said, yes, the idea that what I am is simply a set of links in long causal chains is repugnant to me.

Chain, chain chain...chain of causality...

\Sigma

The Rev

 

[moving finger]

Ultimately, it's all academic, since we can choose to believe either way and there will be no way to prove either choice wrong. That being said, yes, the idea that what I am is simply a set of links in long causal chains is repugnant to me.

and this idea being "repugnant" to one, one's intuitive and unscientific response is to believe in the impossible, because believing the impossible makes one feel better

Alice laughed, "There's no use trying," she said, "one can't believe impossible things."
"I daresay you haven't had much practice," said the Queen. "When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast."
Lewis Carroll

MF

 

[moving finger]

MF and I have had a long an fruitful exchange on this subject in thread "What price free will?" and I think we understand and respect each other's positions, but he is being kept so busy that he has not responded to my last 2 posts there.

Apologies, Billy T, I have a “day-job” too, and I did not want to respond to your last posts until I had time to sit down and think about your ideas.

I disagree, slightly, with his statement above. It is entirely correct if as most people do, one associates "I" with a physical body, but in error either if one is a soul (which I do not want to consider) OR if one is only an informational processes in some computational facility (specifically a human brain at the current stage of technology). Then one can separate the "I" from the "computational facility" as one can separate software from hardware.

I agree one can separate software from hardware, but I do not agree that this is a good analogy for the concept of “self”. Let us imagine a “gedanken” experiment – Einstein’s brain. Let us imagine that some incredibly advanced alien race had managed to analyse the way that Einstein’s brain worked to the finest detail, such that they could reproduce his brain, in it’s entirety, on one of their computers as a program (in hardware plus software). By running the program they are able to reproduce Einstein’s thoughts in precise detail (I know, I know, there are lots of assumptions here, but it is a thought experiment after all). It is possible for the aliens to effectively “have a conversation with Einstein” by running the program, and their program responds in the same way that Einstein would have done. Now, one can separate the “software” from the hardware and one can even write down the details of the software and the hardware. But the software listing by itself does not “behave like Einstein”, and the idle hardware also does not “behave like Einstein”. The “Einstein behaviour” emerges only when the software runs on the hardware.
In a similar sense, I believe the essence of “self” only emerges when a brain processes information in a certain way – it is this act of information processing which generates the “self”. Summed up nicely by Antonio Damasio :

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then. “You” are the music, while the music lasts.
Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens

Obviously one can not do anything with the software alone. Thus, executing software (or the informational "I" process) is dependent on the hardware. For example, in the case of "me" and my brain, drugs may modify "me."

Exactly. I’m glad we think the same way on this. But if you now agree that it is the execution of the software on the hardware which generates the “self”, this surely contradicts with your earlier statement “Then one can separate the "I" from the "computational facility" as one can separate software from hardware.”?

Where the question gets interesting is if the software that is "me" in my understanding (see attachment which is same as to first post of the "what price free will" thread) can be something other than "deterministic" or "random" in its logic, at least in part - logic I have called "Middle Ground", MG.
(1)If universe is deterministic, there is no free will as most people understand these words, but MF has a perfectly good definition that keeps him happy with the concept that he does have "free will" even in a completely deterministic universe.
(2)If there is chance as may be the case and is commonly believed to be the case (because of quantum theory as understood in the Copenhagen school), then one can no doubt also define a "Free Will", but this free will is to me only chance and not what I call "genuine free will." Personally if that is all there is, I prefer MF's free will and to rely upon evolution to make me "chose" appropriate acts. -That is, I want the wisdom developed by evolution, not a random decision, if I can not have genuine free will.

I would summarise the above by saying that (IMHO) whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic (either partially or in entirety), there is simply no free will in the naïve sense of free will (because IMHO most naïve concepts of free will are based on an intuitive feeling of free will and not on a rigorous and self-consistent definition of free will), BUT I nevertheless believe free will can be rigorously defined such that free will exists and is entirely compatible with both determinism and indeterminism.

It all comes down to the question: Is there a MG? Clearly determinism and random are mutually exclusive concepts, but are they all inclusive of all logical possibilities? - That is the question, which MF has promised to think about.

I’ve been mulling this over the last few days. If I take the accepted definition of determinism (this defines the “deterministic space”), and I then take the negation of determinism – which to me seems to be “indeterminism” – which defines the “indeterministic space”, then the problem I have is there seems to be “no space left over” – ie there seems (to me) to be nothing left which is neither deterministic nor indeterministic, there is no “room” for this middle ground.

Definition of Determinism : The universe, or any self-contained part thereof, is said to be evolving deterministically if it has only one possible state at time t1 which is consistent with its state at some previous time t0 and with all the laws of nature.
Definition of Indeterminism : The universe, or any self-contained part thereof, is said to be evolving indeterministically if there is more than one possible state at time t1 which is consistent with its state at some previous time t0 and with all the laws of nature.

Do we accept the above two definitions? If yes, then they seem to be perfect “mirrors” of each other, defining the whole space of possibilities, with no space “left over” for anything else to get a toe-hold?

If we could somehow define the “properties" of this middle ground, we might be able to specify where it fits in relation to determinism and indeterminism. In the absence of a definition of middle ground I simply cannot see how it fits in.
MF

 

[Billy T]

Responce to MF is in another thread

See post 100 in the "What price Free Will?" thread for my response to one point of Moving Finger's that is here. (And several others that he made there.) Perhaps these two "free will threads" can be (and should be) merged in some way. As the starter of the other one, I would agree to this, but do not know how it could be done. (I also don't know why this new one was created as "determinism" is a central discussion there also. Why I started the "What price FW" thread is clearly explained in the first post.)

 

[moving finger]

See post 100 in the "What price Free Will?" thread for my response to one point of Moving Finger's that is here. (And several others that he made there.)

see you there...

MF

 

[C0mmie]

I don't believe determinism has been defined properly in this thread. For something to be predetermined, there has to be an observer that can do the determining, which means that this observer has to be aware of the speed and velocity of every particle in the universe (or whatever system he is studying) and then extrapolate from that into the future. Now, given what we learned from QM, there cannot be an oberver of any kind that does not affect the outcome of whatever he's observing, so if you attemp to know everything about a particular system, you "observing" it will have an unpredictable effect on it, which will affect the way in which your system behaves. Thus, determinism in itself presents a logical contradiction, and we cannot talk about determinism unless we can postulate of such an impartial observer.

I like the definition of free will that has been presented earlier - that it would require uncaused causes. That is also a logical fallacy, because it leaves one to ask the question "what caused it?"

In my opinion, neither can exist.

 

[Billy T]

I don't believe determinism has been defined properly in this thread. For something to be predetermined, there has to be an observer that can do the determining, which means that this observer has to be aware of the speed and velocity of every particle in the universe (or whatever system he is studying) and then extrapolate from that into the future. Now, given what we learned from QM, there cannot be an oberver of any kind that does not affect the outcome of whatever he's observing, so if you attemp to know everything about a particular system, you "observing" it will have an unpredictable effect on it, which will affect the way in which your system behaves. Thus, determinism in itself presents a logical contradiction, and we cannot talk about determinism unless we can postulate of such an impartial observer.

To save him the trouble (and time) I note that MF has given (in post 39) the following commonly accepted definition:
"Definition of Determinism : The universe, or any self-contained part thereof, is said to be evolving deterministically if it has only one possible state at time t1 which is consistent with its state at some previous time t0 and with all the laws of nature."

You view relates more to the question of epistemology, than to determinism. Also you should be aware that long before QM was discovered this observer you speak of (LaPlace called it a demon more than 100 years ago) caused a conceptual problem in that knowledge about every thing had to be contained in some storage system (as moderns would call it) and as this storage system was also part of the universe, knowledge of everything in the universe would need to be self reflexive, and arguably a divergent accumulation. Thus there were critics of LaPlace (and of your ideas above) more than 100 years ago! If you are not willing to inform yourself about a subject that has been discussed for a long time, at least you should read the recent posts, like MF's #39.

I like the definition of free will that has been presented earlier - that it would require uncaused causes. That is also a logical fallacy, because it leaves one to ask the question "what caused it?"...

Glad you like one, but which? - MF's, which is consistent with determinism, or my feeble attempts to define Genuine Free Will (mainly by telling things GFW is not.), which is not, or some one else's?
As far as your conclusion that a logical fallacy exists, there is certainly none in MF's definition and even mine is not worse off than either "Uncaused causes" presented now:
(1) The widely accepted (by the scientific community) concept of the universe and time starting in a "big bang."
(2) The widely accepted (by the religious community) concept at a "first God" exists, one who was not created by some greater God.

Very few people are not part of at least one of these two communities and quite a few are members of both.

I say "no worse off" (implying perhaps "better off") because I at least tell how a non-material "agent" can exist in the physical world (as only information - See attachment to my first post of this thread, #36.).

I can not define the logic which let's this "agent," at least partially, causes things without his contribution itself being caused by other things. (The agent of GFW must be an uncaused cause, at lease in part.) I suspect this characteristic has to do with self referencing logic loops etc. such as the famous four word sentence: "This sentence is false.". I understand that this type of self referencing logic has been placed on reasonably solid grounds by B. Shaw and A. Whitehead in some classic papers, which I have never read, but I am willing also to think that still other forms of logic may exist that are neither random nor deterministic, as is required for the logic of the "uncaused agent" I suggest may exist. - I want to be clear - I have never claimed that GFW exists, only I hope it does, so that the common feeling almost everyone has could be true, and not just the most universal of illusions.

 

[C0mmie]

@Billy_T

To save him the trouble (and time) I note that MF has given (in post 39) the following commonly accepted definition: "Definition of Determinism : The universe, or any self-contained part thereof, is said to be evolving deterministically if it has only one possible state at time t1 which is consistent with its state at some previous time t0 and with all the laws of nature." You view relates more to the question of epistemology, than to determinism.

I was specifically trying to say that I don't think we can define determinism without epistemology. I know this seems offtopic, but how can we discuss certainty of something in reality without specifying how we'd go about measuring it or observing it, and the fact that there is no possible way to observe a system entirely implies that we can't use the concept of determinism.

Also you should be aware that long before QM was discovered this observer you speak of (LaPlace called it a demon more than 100 years ago) caused a conceptual problem in that knowledge about every thing had to be contained in some storage system (as moderns would call it) and as this storage system was also part of the universe, knowledge of everything in the universe would need to be self reflexive, and arguably a divergent accumulation.

No, I wasn't aware of LePlace's view, but what I was referring to is slightly different. The observer in my post did not have to "know" everything in the universe, but only everything in a specific closed system. Thus if you are studying a chemical reaction in a lab, what LePlace said doesn't apply. You are not necessarily a part of it. However, QM does apply because you can't observe it without affecting it, and thus you can't predict the outcome with 100% certainty, even if you know all the physical/chemical laws involved.

Regarding the attachment in post #36:
I can agree that we have an internal representation of reality, and we experience free will directly in this internal representation. However, this process of internally representing reality would have to be reducible to the physical brain. So for everything that happens in this internal fantasy would have a cooresponding neural process, and neural processes have to happen in such a way as to not violate physical laws. So even though you experience free will, the process that makes up this experience is entirely physical, and if you observe your brain at this level, nothing you do is ever free. The introduction of this internal reality to the debate just adds an increased level of complexity.

Oh and thanks for pointing out the things I overlooked in my previous post. I hope this one cleared up what I meant to say.

 

[moving finger]

I was specifically trying to say that I don't think we can define determinism without epistemology. I know this seems offtopic, but how can we discuss certainty of something in reality without specifying how we'd go about measuring it or observing it, and the fact that there is no possible way to observe a system entirely implies that we can't use the concept of determinism.

With respect, I suggest you are confusing "determinism" with "determinability".

Determinism (or indeterminism) is an ontic property - it relates to "how the world is" and not to "how we see the world". A world can be deterministic (or indeterministic) in the absence of any observers; the property of determinism is not dependent on whether there are observers around or not.

What you are calling "determinism" is in fact "determinability" - ie whether the world can be observed to be operating deterministically or not. Determinability by definition requires an observer; it is an epistemic as opposed to an ontic property of the world.

It makes no sense to talk about determinability in absence of observers, but determinism is not dependent on observers.

MF

 

[Billy T]

MF has responded for me this time but I will add a two comments:

...what I was referring to is slightly different. The observer in my post did not have to "know" everything in the universe, but only everything in a specific closed system. ...

In most circumstances, one can consider a "closed system" but when one is discussing whether or not the future is determined, the concept of a "closed system" is a good example of your "logical fallacy." This is true because there is no shielding of gravity and the future under discussion can be very distant. To take a specific example Pluto's gravitational force does not affect Venus very much, but accumulated of time, this force will cause significant displacement of Venus. Even in your chemistry lab example the gradient of Pluto's gravity could make the Brownian motion of reacting molecules very slightly different on one side of the container than the other. That is the future here on Earth of a deterministic universe with PLuto is different from Earth's future without Pluto existing.

This may be hard for you to accept when I only speak of it's gravity effects, but once you bring humans into consideration the effect can be large and quick. For example, I wrote a book (Dark Visitor) trying to recruit students not currently interested in the sciences to be science students. The postulated premiss of the book is related to the fact that Pluto was discovered in a systematic search for "Planet X" which was believed to exist in the 1920s because of observed perturbations in Neptune's orbit. It is now known that Pluto was not the cause (It is smaller than the moon and would need a mass several times that of Earth to have been responsible) In book I speculate that it could have been some "dark visitor" passing by the solar system, probably a small black hole. IF this BH were formed by a dying star in the early universe, it is likely that two gravitationally bound stars both formed BHs and the second could be approaching about now. (I was trying to scare the currently uninterested student to become a little interest in science and used this Pluto history in the effort.) If I am successful with only one student, and he/she turns out to do something important in science, then Pluto's existence could significantly change live on Earth in one generation! - Planet X has already done so - It caused Percival Lowell to fund the construction of the observatory at Flagstaff AZ that bears his name where Pluto was discovered.

I rarely describe my book here, but when I do, I make it a policy to tell how to read it for free - visit www.DarkVisitor.com to learn how and more about it, if interested.

Regarding the attachment in post #36:...this process of internally representing reality would have to be reducible to the physical brain. So for everything that happens in this internal fantasy would have a cooresponding neural process, and neural processes have to happen in such a way as to not violate physical laws. So even though you experience free will, the process that makes up this experience is entirely physical, ...

I agree with your comments entirely if you are a physical object as you seem to be asserting, but I am asserting that you are only an information process in a simulation, not a set of physical processes that must follow the physical laws. I think the simulate laws (logic) does indeed mirror the physical laws in most matters that concern the representation of the physical world, but need not do so in the representation of "YOU." "You" live/ exist only in the simulation and simulated world in my view. For example "pain" does not exist in the physical world. It need not follow physical laws. You can suffer it when there is nothing physically wrong or not have it when there is. An example of the later is common with war time injuries. An nurse giving a shot to a soldier, who had his entire arm torn off and did not report feeling pain, but he complained that she hurt him by her clumsy injection technique! Some people never feel pain and some times only discover that their body is being injured by vision etc. - they usually don't live long lives and fortunately are not very common. What you experience is not determined by or reducible to physics as you are suggesting. It is your own brain's mental creation. That is, I strongly disagree with the part of your text above I have made bold.

 

[moving finger]

I agree with your comments entirely if you are a physical object as you seem to be asserting, but I am asserting that you are only an information process in a simulation, not a set of physical processes that must follow the physical laws. I think the simulate laws (logic) does indeed mirror the physical laws in most matters that concern the representation of the physical world, but need not do so in the representation of "YOU."

Hi Billy T. Me again. For the avoidance of doubt, are you saying that the representation of “YOU” is determined by no laws at all (either “simulate laws” or “physical laws”)?

"You" live/ exist only in the simulation and simulated world in my view.

Plausible.

For example "pain" does not exist in the physical world. It need not follow physical laws.

Plausible. But are you then saying that pain “does not follow ANY laws”?

You can suffer it when there is nothing physically wrong or not have it when there is.

OK, are you suggesting there is no “cause” at all for this feeling of suffering?

An example of the later is common with war time injuries. An nurse giving a shot to a soldier, who had his entire arm torn off and did not report feeling pain, but he complained that she hurt him by her clumsy injection technique!

I hope you are not suggesting that there was “no cause at all” for the soldier’s feeling of pain?

Some people never feel pain and some times only discover that their body is being injured by vision etc. - they usually don't live long lives and fortunately are not very common.

Sorry, your point here is….?

What you experience is not determined by or reducible to physics as you are suggesting. It is your own brain's mental creation.

The key question, however, is “is it a creation from nothing, or is there in fact a cause”?

MF

 

[Billy T]

Hi Billy T. Me again. For the avoidance of doubt, are you saying that the representation of “YOU” is determined by no laws at all (either “simulate laws” or “physical laws”)?...

Most of your questions are really this one so I'll answer it only, except to admit that there was no thread related point in my observation that some people never feel pain. (I was just trying to make fact that pain is a mental construct, not tissue injury, etc. more strongly.)
No, "I" am law governed, but I am definitely saying "you" do not follow all the physical laws and neither does the "world 'you' live in" (for example, in the world "I" live in, the solar spectrum is essentially one octave wide and I only assume that far IR, radio waves etc. are real because of my instruments. - I don't directly experience them. - everything I believe about the physical world could just be a trick played on me by some very capable demon but he can't eradicate me, only deceive me. I know I exist and live in my {presumably brain constructed} world.) but of course the physical world (assuming it does in fact exist, as I do) follows all the physical laws, even if we do not know them all.

"Simulate laws" should have been "simulation laws" (dyslexia error or just careless) but even that is not really what I was trying to talk about.
"Simulation logic" would have been better and answer for this also "No." I believe that the subroutine (if that is what it is) that is "me" in my postulated "real time simulations" DOES follow regular procedures, which could (probably do) include some random elements.
How these random elements are produced, I don't know, but doubt that the UP of QM has anything to do with it, but as I can't think of any other truly random (woops, my bias towards the assumption to a non deterministic universe is showing - no offense - in fact admiration for your more rational and open position is admitted) mechanism.

The problem, as you well know from our discussion in the "What price free will" thread, is that I also want a "genuine agent" to sometimes exercise "genuine free will" in this subroutine, at least once or twice between birth and death
Unfortunately I have even less, if less than "none" is possible, ideas about how such agent could rigidly follow the simulation logic and yet not be either deterministic or random. I only hope that some logic, exists in what I once called a "middle ground" but no longer do as I have accepted you definitions and thus now locate this logic as a subregion of the non deterministic division of logic which certainly includes "random choice logic", discussed above, but I am not sure that only "random logic" can exist in this non deterministic subdivision of logical space. If there is any thing else, I bet self reflexive logic has something to do with it, but I am too ignorant of the field of logic theory to know if there is any subdivision of non deterministic logic of the nature my agent requires to exist. - We have been thru most of this before and I don't want to try to defend my views (hopes) - you will just beat me up again because I can't define what I am talking about.

I readily admit I am only dealing in hope, can't define either of my "genuines," except to give examples of what they are not. As stated before, the only reason I don't adopt your view 100% is that I can't prove that the necessary Non-random and Non-deterministic logic my "genuine agent" uses/ follows is nonsense / not a real possibility.

I like to stick the word "genuine" in as I often do to try to distinguish what I am saying from things people who start with the "fact" they have free will and then speak of agents etc. without being honest enough to admit that this is a very hard position to support. It is impossible to support, IMHO, if they think of themselves as existing in the physical world, where the laws of physics rule. These physical laws may allow them a "chance free will" illusion of "genuine free will" if the UP of QM is fundamental (your ontic), instead of only epistemic.

I am sure I prefer your concept of free will to that illusion as I think evolution has produced a much better decision making process that the UP of QM can. If the universe is deterministic, then even that undesired (my me) "chance free will" is not a possibility, backward in time causes are ok, etc. as the total story/history, including what we call the future, is already written. (Not only can your "MF" name sake, not be lured back to change the past, it can't do anything to change the future either.)

I think we agree on a lot of things including that I have only a currently logically indefensible hope, but one that currently neither of us can confidently squash. I am sure that I must give up the idea of being physical and living in the physical world etc., if I want to have my "genuine free will." That price I am willing to pay, as it alone, IMHO, keeps open the possibility that my "genuine FW is anything more that your simple, logically OK, consistent with a deterministic world (should that be the case) FW. My GFW is not consistent with a deterministic world, nor one ruled by QM's chance results.

If those are in fact my only choices in the "real world," I will continue to live in the one I think my brain has constructed, where GFW may be possible and only currently non demonstrable, because all aspects of logic theory may not be completely understood yet.

PS. After posting I noted your "representation of “YOU” .." This may be misleading. There is no "representation" of "me" in my real time simulation, It is "me." "I" am only information, nothing physical, but "I" at least, if no demon is deceiving me, have a special unique relationship to a particular human body in the physical world.

 

[LindaGarrette]

I've been reading this and similar threads for several days now. The arguments are very much like others I've come across numerous times. Most people are very confused about both the definitions and the philosophical interpretations of determinism and free will.

Determinism means predictability but it does not mean predeterminism. There is no supernatural entity with a plan. Even though every event is caused each event preceding a future event has to occur before the future happens.

The ultimate reality is maximum entropy. Until then, every event is part of the process. Our thoughts are causes of events. We are sensitive to events and that causes our thoughts to be directed.

If there were free will, we would be immune to natural causes and would lose the sensitivity that causes us to take the appropriate actions. Our actions cannot be a "first cause."

There is nothing scary about this at all. It just is and has to be. Also, there is no in between. There is no god of the gaps. Linda

 

[Tournesol]

If there were free will, we would be immune to natural causes and would lose the sensitivity that causes us to take the appropriate actions. Our actions cannot be a "first cause."

If there is no 100% strict determinism ITFP, there is no need for a miraculous ability to override physical laws in order to implement determinism.