How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

[fbs7]

I have always been quite curious how physicists reconcile the concept free will with the determinism of physics.

By determinism I mean the one at macroscopic level, because I know that at quantum level most of the things are based on probabilities. So there's no free will for an electron.

But, at macroscopic level, everything seems to have some equation that determines its future, even if that's chaotic and very difficult (for us) to predict. So there's no free will for the Moon, as we'll know its exact position million of years in the future; in the same way, there's no free will for a drop of water falling in a waterfall - it's future is pre-determined, even if it is very difficult for us to calculate that.

Similarly, there's no free will for a computer, given for the same set of inputs it will always produce the same outputs.

So if I'm to believe in physics determinism, I should give up on the concept of free will, because like a computer whatever choice I'm going to make has been pre-determined by my history, genetics, inputs, environment and so forth - even if that choice may be, to our current capabilities, unpredictable, because it would depend on a very complicated equation.

That is very depressing, and as I love physics and much as I love my free will, I just don't think about that. So how do physicists answer that dilemma - is there free will in physics?

 

[Doc Al]

What do you mean by 'free will'?

 

[fbs7]

What do you mean by 'free will'?

That's a good question, and I bet every person will have a different answer. I think this one from Merriam-Webster reflects my thinking:

free will (noun)
1. ..
2. freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention

 

[Doc Al]

Can you give an example of making a choice not determined by prior causes. Not sure what that would mean.

 

[fbs7]

Can you give an example of making a choice not determined by prior causes. Not sure what that would mean.

I reckon you don't believe in free will.

That's a perfectly good point of view - nothing wrong in that. I understand you don't need to reconcile that with physics determinism.

 

[Doc Al]

I reckon you don't believe in free will.

Still waiting for an example so I can understand what you mean by the term.

 

[fbs7]

Still waiting for an example so I can understand what you mean by the term.

The way I see it, free will is when Joan d'Arc chose to be burned instead of saving herself by reneging her beliefs. The way I see it, it was her choice.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

The way I see it, free will is when Joan d'Arc chose to be burned instead of saving herself by reneging her beliefs. The way I see it, it was her choice.

Is it possible to choose what you believe? Clearly her beliefs were strong enough so that when she weighed up the possible options to her burning to death was more desirable than condoning her beliefs.

The point being here that when you "make a choice" you unconsciously and consciously weigh up the ramifications of the options. How you judge the options is based on your accumulated life experience which was largely/entirely out of your control. So imagine that Alice is observed her entire life by Bob and that Bob has a team of expert psychologists. If Bob observes Alice presented with a choice he and his team could use the data and knowledge they have to build a predictive model and predict how Alice will make her decision because what she chooses will be based on her judgement which is built from past experience.

 

[chingel]

Are you sure her actions weren't determined by her past and brain wiring?

 

[fbs7]

So if I write "ABC", then before you read my post it's already pre-determined that you're going to answer "DEF", based on your past experiences, brain wiring, environment, history, etc...?

That is, no quantum processes can modify that, no still-undiscovered factors can influence it, there's nothing else besides working just like a computer - known outputs for known inputs?

 

[Ryan_m_b]

So if I write "ABC", then before you read my post it's already pre-determined that you're going to answer "DEF", based on your past experiences, brain wiring, environment, history, etc...?

Yes I don't see why not. My entire personality is a combination of how my biology reacts with my environment over time, what I know and what I can do is also a product of this. Put the two together and no matter what I do there is a reason that has its basis in some past event.

That is, no quantum processes can modify that, no still-undiscovered factors can influence it, there's nothing else besides working just like a computer - known outputs for known inputs?

Even if we propose there was some sort of quantum randomness how does that bring back "free will"? If anything that's less free. With regards to the rest yes, the physical brain and it's physical mechanical processes are not only all that we have found they are all that is indicated.

(Also just some advice but you might want to consider asking for the title of this thread to be modified to "How scientists..." and moved to the biology forum. Physics isn't really the discipline you want to study if you are looking into cognition and behaviour)

 

[ModusPwnd]

What do you mean by 'free will'?

I think in the context of this question free will is best described as downward causation.

 

[Doc Al]

I think in the context of this question free will is best described as downward causation.

What does that mean?

 

[ModusPwnd]

What does that mean?

Simply that the question of free will from a physics perspective is essentially (IMO) a question about downward causation. Rejecting the possibility of downward causation is rejecting free will and finding a case of downward causation tentatively leaves free will on the table.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

Simply that the question of free will from a physics perspective is essentially (IMO) a question about downward causation. Rejecting the possibility of downward causation is rejecting free will and finding a case of downward causation tentatively leaves free will on the table.

And what exactly is "downward causation" and how does it factor into this specifically?

 

[Doc Al]

What do you mean by 'downward causation'?

 

[ModusPwnd]

Oh, sorry. Downward causation is simply cause and effect working from 'top' level complex processes down to the fundamental 'low' level processes. Physicists generally work under the assumption of reductionism which has been (somewhat) fruitful but at the moment universal reductionism is just an assumption. There is no evidence that all complex phenomenon can be reduced to the physics of the basic constituents (though that is our working hypothesis).

Here is one read about it, http://www.ctnsstars.org/conferences/papers/The%20physics%20of%20downward%20causation.pdf Note that I am not supporting the idea of downward causation in this thread, I am simply casting the notion of Free Will as an issue of downward causation.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

I am simply casting the notion of Free Will as an issue of downward causation.

The link you provided has no mention of free will. How specifically do you think that downward causation means that free will is left on the table? I'm sorry if I've missed something but so far all I've seen is your assertion that downward causation could preserve free will (whatever that means) with no evidence to back it up.

 

[ModusPwnd]

If the actions we make are a function of the micro state, then there can be no free will. Will emerges as a macroscopic phenomenon. If that macroscopic phenomenon is completely a function of the micostate, then any action of that will is not free. But if that macroscopic state is capable of exercising a downward cause and effect then that will is free. That is, the macrostate is the cause rather than the effect.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

If the actions we make are a function of the micro state, then there can be no free will. Will emerges as a macroscopic phenomenon. If that macroscopic phenomenon is completely a function of the micostate, then any action of that will is not free. But if that macroscopic state is capable of exercising a downward cause and effect then that will is free. That is, the macrostate is the cause rather than the effect.

Why is that different from from any form of mechanical feedback? And why can an event be both a cause and an effect?

 

[ModusPwnd]

Why would it be the same as any form of mechanical feedback? Why would it be both a cause and effect? I am not sure what you are getting at.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

Why would it be the same as any form of mechanical feedback? Why would it be both a cause and effect? I am not sure what you are getting at.

You are saying that micro state actions lead to emergent effects (I agree here) then you say that the emergent effects feed back to affect the micro state (I agree here) but then you suggest that this allows free will. Why? What is special about emergent effects that they get to opt-out of the fact that they are caused by past actions? Very specifically this is the statement I take issue with:

if that macroscopic state is capable of exercising a downward cause and effect then that will is free. That is, the macrostate is the cause rather than the effect.

 

[e^(i Pi)+1=0]

Modus,this would be a better topic in the philosophy section. You are simply not going to get much thoughtful discussion from this topic here, as evidenced by the direction this thread has taken.

 

[ModusPwnd]

All emergent effects were not created equal. Some can be reduced to functions of micro states, most cannot. Of those most we just assume that they can be in principle - but that has not been shown. If they cannot be reduced (even in principle) and they can exert a downward causation then that would satisfy as Free Will (IMO).

 

[Ryan_m_b]

All emergent effects were not created equal. Some can be reduced to functions of micro states, most cannot. Of those most we just assume that they can be in principle - but that has not been shown. If they cannot be reduced (even in principle) and they can exert a downward causation then that would satisfy as Free Will (IMO).

I get that but I completely fail to see how it relates to free will. Perhaps we're operating under different definitions here.

 

[daveb]

I think (and correct me if I'm wrong), free will would mean a person chooses A over B without any kind of determining factor. That is, it is totally random which choice is made. The problem with this is you can't scientifically state there are no underlying motivations, since you can never show that scientifically something does not exist, only that it does.

Of course, if the OP means something else by free will, then I'm at a loss to chime in.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

I think (and correct me if I'm wrong), free will would mean a person chooses A over B without any kind of determining factor.

I'd agree that this is the common definition however I don't think it is realistic and as you then go onto say...

That is, it is totally random which choice is made.

This is bizarre to me because if it is random then it is hardly free will either!

Personally I use the term "will" to mean the conscious action of making decisions. The "free" part for me refers to the extent of options the physical and social environment allows me.

EDIT: Good example of this, on the news the presenter just said "industry sources have confirmed that the manager did resign under his own free will and was not pressured by others to go." In other words it was free will because there were no blatant social pressures.

 

[Doc Al]

I think (and correct me if I'm wrong), free will would mean a person chooses A over B without any kind of determining factor. That is, it is totally random which choice is made.

But why would you call something totally random free will? (I can sort of see the free part, but not the will.)

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi Ryan, maybe I can help clear this up.

Why is that different from from any form of mechanical feedback? And why can an event be both a cause and an effect?

For downward causation (sometimes called "strong downward causation") to be a reality, neurons would interact not just with neighboring neurons and other immediately local affects, they would also be influenced by the brain as a whole. Rather than neurons being subjected to neurotransmitters acting on it, along with the local electrical field and other direct influences, they would be subjected to additional causes, sometimes called “formal causes”. These additional causes would influence neurons such that the neurotransmitters, the membraine potential and other causal influences acting on the neuron were no longer sufficient to determine how a neuron behaves – a neuron would actually be influenced by an emergent phenomenon. Mental causation as it’s referred to is a form of downward causation. The emergent thoughts and experiences would influence neurons in a way that was above and beyond the influence of those local affects studied by neuroscience.

This type of "downward causation" is favored by some nonlinear dynamicists and others in the "dynamics" crowd, but is obviously not a mainstream view.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

Hi Ryan, maybe I can help clear this up.

Thanks for that

For downward causation (sometimes called "strong downward causation") to be a reality, neurons would interact not just with neighboring neurons and other immediately local affects, they would also be influenced by the brain as a whole. Rather than neurons being subjected to neurotransmitters acting on it, along with the local electrical field and other direct influences, they would be subjected to additional causes, sometimes called “formal causes”. These additional causes would influence neurons such that the neurotransmitters, the membraine potential and other causal influences acting on the neuron were no longer sufficient to determine how a neuron behaves – a neuron would actually be influenced by an emergent phenomenon. Mental causation as it’s referred to is a form of downward causation. The emergent thoughts and experiences would influence neurons in a way that was above and beyond the influence of those local affects studied by neuroscience.

Hmm I'm still not clear of how this would "keep free will" but more than that I could in principle track the effects of a neuron back to the point where what it has done has contributed to its future behaviour (i.e. the firing of neuron A inhibits neuron B which excites neuron C which excites neuron A. A then fires and the firing of A...).

Either way though I feel like we're straying from the OP's question about free will. Unless someone has something to say regarding the OPs definition of free will and what science has to say about it we're done here.

 

[fbs7]

Even if we propose there was some sort of quantum randomness how does that bring back "free will"? If anything that's less free.

Interestingly (for me, at least), while researching the answers that have been posted in this thread, I found this short discussion from professor Michio Kaku

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFLR5vNKiSw

I think his point of view is quite interestingly. If I understood it right, he calls Determinism the concept that the universe is a "gigantic clock", so someone's acts now are predisposed from what happened a million years ago.

But, against that, you have quantum uncertainty, what means that you cannot predict something completely based on a past state - there is always uncertainty, the "wild card". Therefore someone's thinking is unpredictable at some level, and that level of unpredictability is free will.

Therefore, if he's right then it would seem to me that free will versus determinism is the wrong question. The right question is free will versus indeterminism from quantum mechanics.

Also, I wish I understood it better the concept of the Quantum Brain. I'm not sure if that theory is related to this or not.

 

[James Leighe]

Just because you can't predict your actions doesn't mean they are free will, which is an important point made early on.

But in reality, unless you set up some kind of special case, the brain is too large to even be effected by quantum 'randomness'.

 

[Zarqon]

That's a good question, and I bet every person will have a different answer. I think this one from Merriam-Webster reflects my thinking:

free will (noun)
1. ..
2. freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention

I've been thinking on and off about free will for a few years now, and I've come to the conclusion that the biggest problem in dealing with this question is really to define "free will" in the first place. In Merriam-Websters definition for example, it all falls on the word "choice" which is not well defined(*). If you don't include the word choice, then you get simply "an action that is not determined by prior causes or divine intervention", which may just as well be the definition of total randomness.

A huge problem with defining free will is that it falls down to two different opposites:

1) the brain is deterministic, and while this might be consider as "will" it certainly isn't "free", thus there is no free will.

2) the brain acts from randomness, while this makes your choices "free", most people do no consider this as "will", and thus there is no free will.My best explanation for the notion of "free will", is that it is a collection of algorithms and filters in your brain that are based on information from your past gathered experience + genetics + immediate sensory input, in order to arrive at a "choice". The reason why it feels like the choices you make are out of a free will, is that you may not directly be aware of most filters/algorithms in your brain, since there are so many of them, and they all contribute/interact in subtle ways to help you "make the decision".

In addition to that, I think there is some amount of randomness/unpredictability involved in making choices. This may not stem from quantum randomness, but may simply come from the fact that most sufficiently complicated processes demonstrate some form of chaotic behavior, which gives unpredictability. And your brain is most certainly complicated enough for this.

*) for example, Merriam-Websters defines choice as "the act of choosing" which is a rather useless definition in this context.

 

[fbs7]

I think that's a great summarization, Zargon.

Thanks all for the great inputs!

 

[sophiecentaur]

Free will goes along with consciousness. We are only 'conscious' of having made a decision long after it's been made (hundreds of ms delay) so why get hung up as to whether you have any responsibility for the decision? Your brain got on and decided without your conscious help anyway. All you can do, rationally ist to justify it post hoc.

 

[Ryan_m_b]

Free will goes along with consciousness. We are only 'conscious' of having made a decision long after it's been made (hundreds of ms delay) so why get hung up as to whether you have any responsibility for the decision? Your brain got on and decided without your conscious help anyway. All you can do, rationally ist to justify it post hoc.

This hasn't been 100% confirmed but there is evidence to indicate that you are right and consciousness is actually a by product of subconscious actions i.e. "choice" is an illusion because consciousness is more like a commentary of what is going on rather than a decision making agent.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism#Arguments_for

 

[sophiecentaur]

I like to view my consciousness at the 'chairman of the board' presenting board decisions to the world and justifying them. He gets all the glory and more pay than anyone else.

 

[daveb]

And yet the subconscious gets the blame...seems a little lopsided to me

 

[sophiecentaur]

That's life my boy.

 

[Goodison_Lad]

so why get hung up as to whether you have any responsibility for the decision? Your brain got on and decided without your conscious help anyway. All you can do, rationally ist to justify it post hoc.

Logically, then, is Zargon free to do anything at all, even post-hoc rationalisation. It'll either happen or it won't. Even wanting it to happen must be uncontrollable.

 

[Evo]

This doesn't belong in physics. Moved.

 

[Pythagorean]

Thanks for that

Hmm I'm still not clear of how this would "keep free will" but more than that I could in principle track the effects of a neuron back to the point where what it has done has contributed to its future behaviour (i.e. the firing of neuron A inhibits neuron B which excites neuron C which excites neuron A. A then fires and the firing of A...).

Either way though I feel like we're straying from the OP's question about free will. Unless someone has something to say regarding the OPs definition of free will and what science has to say about it we're done here.

I agree with Ryan. Free will really has no rational definition that's of use to a model where causality is involved. The only place we can show downward causation is in the cases of weak downward causation; like the coupling effects between water molecules make a body we call water and the body as a whole has effects down on to water molecules. But there is no causality trick here; the system can be defined in terms of the participating elements (water molecules) and the coupling between them.

And I also agree with Doc Al that a random event would be equivalently useless to the idea of free will. Thus, free will is a supernatural idea.

I think some people might be confusing free will with willpower. Willpower is the ability for an organism to do what it wants to do despite its own (or external) challenges. But free will is about whether the organism really ever chose its wants.

 

[Kholdstare]

Imagination in straitjacket
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ysYEAC4z66c

 

[Khashishi]

I think the answer is, if you have to ask what free will means, then you don't believe in it. Free will exists only as a gap in our knowledge.

 

[Goodison_Lad]

Well, going back to the OP question, there seems to me to be a simple choice:

a) accept physics in its present form as a complete description of all that is, in which case you must accept free will is impossible according to physics and is merely an illusion

or

b) accept the existence of free will, thereby accepting that physics in its present form is not a complete description of all that is.

I don't think it's provable either way, despite what either side of the debate might say.

I guess most physicists would opt for (a) professionally (but probably run their personal lives as though b were the anwser). If (a) were true, perhaps biology might account for it. Natural selection is frequently invoked to account for a biological phenomenon in terms of the survival/selective advantage the phenomenon conveys. What, I wonder, would be the evolutionary advantage of the illusion of a non-existent free will?

(I choose b - or is it just an illusion that I chose it?)

 

[Gokul43201]

Would one of the people that understands what free will is please describe a thought experiment that determines whether or not free will is being exercised in some chosen situation?

 

[Maui]

Would one of the people that understands what free will is please describe a thought experiment that determines whether or not free will is being exercised in some chosen situation?

People who go on hunger strike and starve to death fighting for a (higher) cause or principle. People who commit suicide over injustice or emotional pain.

Can the interaction between these elements that make up the human body produce emotional pain(why would they care?):

oxygen
carbon
hydrogen
nitrogen
calcium
phosphorus
potassium
sulfur
sodium
chlorine
magnesium
iron
fluorine
zinc
silicon
rubidium
strontium
bromine
lead
copper
aluminum
cadmium
cerium
barium
iodine
tin
titanium
boron
nickel
selenium
chromium
manganese
arsenic
lithium
cesium
mercury
germanium
molybdenum
cobalt
antimony
silver
niobium
zirconium
lanthanium
gallium
tellurium
yttrium
bismuth
thallium
indium
gold
antalum
vanadium
thorium
uranium
samarium
beryllium
tungsten

Elements referred above were taken from here:

http://web2.iadfw.net/uthman/elements_of_body.html

 

[apeiron]

I like to view my consciousness at the 'chairman of the board' presenting board decisions to the world and justifying them. He gets all the glory and more pay than anyone else.

Not a bad analogy as consciousness - or attentional level processing - is there to set the directions rather than sweat the detail.

But what people seem to be missing is that this happens before the action too. The mind works in anticipatory fashion (as made explicit in modern theory, such as the "bayesian brain" model).

So like a board, at an attentive level you form the goals and expectations. You produce a context in which certain things are predicted and habitual/automatic level responses are permitted. Then afterwards, back at the board level, you get to assess and make strategic changes.

The "freewill" experiments everyone talks about - Libet's mostly - are widely misinterpreted because the subjects are quite conscious beforehand of the way they are expected to perform the task. They are mentally prepared in a specific "hands off" state. The chairman of the board has basically said I want my finger to twitch, but I don't want to give a specific order on the moment it happens.

So part of the task demand is a few moments of suitable delay where the subject is in fact consciously thinking "I'm not thinking about making it happen, it's just going to happen, and it hasn't happened yet so I'm doing it right - oh it just happened, and so I've now done what was asked."

 

[josh1492]

Can you give an example of making a choice not determined by prior causes. Not sure what that would mean.

we had this discussion in class and the teacher rebutted this perspective with the idea that I can choose to do some seemingly arbitrary/random action such as clap my hands or jump up and down that is not based upon past experience...meaning that there is the possibility of completing an action for its own sake. Like making a conscious effort to break from a routine and selecting an action.

When you get into the realm of trying to choose actions based upon desired outcomes it is easier to argue that your actions are pre-determined based upon past experience or the current environmental state but even then its not absolutely so. A good example of this is when you have multiple courses to choose from that will all result in the acquisition of a desired result. Those choices are pre-selected(pre-determined) based upon the past but it is your choice, which, if any, action you choose to obtain the end result.

 

[josh1492]

(I choose b - or is it just an illusion that I chose it?)

lol... you didnt really choose B you just think you made a free will choice to choose B your choice was really pre-determined based upon the input you received much like the way that a computer displays the character "B" when I hold down shift and press the "b" key...

trying to be sarcastic...but i find it interesting how such mundane things can become so complex when applied to a philosophical filter.