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From MIT's 'Future of Nuclear Power':
http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/img/summary.gif
Proliferation Summary
Under unresolved problems:
Statement:
Recommendation:
Design recommendations: some particular designs and methods as realizing the lowest proliferation risk:
-a uraniuim once-through and dispose fuel cycle vs a close-thermal or closed-fast cycle. They specifically mention the use of the PUREX/MOX closed cycle used by Europe and Japan as inferior to open cycles for non-proliferation purposes.
-gas-cooled vs LWR
http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/img/summary.gif
Proliferation Summary
Proliferation. The current international safeguards regime is inadequate to meet the security challenges of the expanded nuclear\ deployment contemplated in the global growth scenario. The reprocessing system now used in Europe, Japan, and Russia that involves separation and recycling of plutonium presents unwarranted proliferation risks.
Under unresolved problems:
Proliferation: nuclear power entails potential security risks, notably the possible misuse of commercial or associated nuclear facilities and operations to acquire technology or materials as a precursor to the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. Fuel cycles that involve the chemical reprocessing of spent fuel to separate weapons-usable plutonium and uranium enrichment technologies are of special concern, especially as nuclear power spreads around the world;
Statement:
Nuclear power should not expand unless the risk of proliferation from operation of the commercial nuclear fuel cycle is made acceptably small. We believe that nuclear power can expand as envisioned in our global growth scenario with acceptable incremental proliferation risk, provided that reasonable safeguards are adopted and that deployment of reprocessing and enrichment are restricted. The international community must prevent the acquisition of weapons-usable material, either by diversion (in the case of plutonium) or by misuse of fuel cycle facilities (including related facilities, such as research reactors or hot cells). Responsible governments must control, to the extent possible, the know-how relevant to produce and process either highly enriched uranium (enrichment technology) or plutonium.
Three issues are of particular concern: existing stocks of separated plutonium around the world that are directly usable for weapons; nuclear facilities, for example in Russia, with inadequate controls; and transfer of technology, especially enrichment and reprocessing technology, that brings nations closer to a nuclear weapons capability. The proliferation risk of the global growth scenario is underlined by the likelihood that use of nuclear power would be introduced and expanded in many countries in different security circumstances. An international response is required to reduce the proliferation risk. The response should:
o re-appraise and strengthen the institutional underpinnings of the IAEA safeguards regime in the near term, including sanctions;
o guide nuclear fuel cycle development in ways that reinforce shared nonproliferation objectives.
Recommendation:
Accordingly, we recommend:
o The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should focus overwhelmingly on its safeguards function and should be given the authority to carry out inspections beyond declared facilities to suspected illicit facilities;
o Greater attention must be given to the proliferation risks at the front end of the fuel cycle from enrichment technologies;
o IAEA safeguards should move to an approach based on continuous materials protection, control and accounting using surveillance and containment systems, both in facilities and during transportation, and should implement safeguards in a risk-based framework keyed to fuel cycle activity;
o Fuel cycle analysis, research, development, and demonstration efforts must include explicit analysis of proliferation risks and measures defined to minimize proliferation risks;
o International spent fuel storage has significant nonproliferation benefits for the growth scenario and should be negotiated promptly and implemented over the next decade.
Design recommendations: some particular designs and methods as realizing the lowest proliferation risk:
-a uraniuim once-through and dispose fuel cycle vs a close-thermal or closed-fast cycle. They specifically mention the use of the PUREX/MOX closed cycle used by Europe and Japan as inferior to open cycles for non-proliferation purposes.
-gas-cooled vs LWR
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