Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

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The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant is facing significant challenges following the earthquake, with reports indicating that reactor pressure has reached dangerous levels, potentially 2.1 times capacity. TEPCO has lost control of pressure at a second unit, raising concerns about safety and management accountability. The reactor is currently off but continues to produce decay heat, necessitating cooling to prevent a meltdown. There are conflicting reports about an explosion, with indications that it may have originated from a buildup of hydrogen around the containment vessel. The situation remains serious, and TEPCO plans to flood the containment vessel with seawater as a cooling measure.
  • #3,511
TCups said:
Is there any "reasonable" estimate as to when sufficient cooling of the core(s) might be expected to occur and thus eliminate the need for continued high volume water cooling and permit consideration of some type of permanent containment of the core material?

Assuming reactor 2 was working at design capacity of 2380MW thermal at shutdown, I plotted the decay in heat in Watt against days from shutdown and also showed the amount a water at 25oC needed to boil this away to keep the core at constant temperature. As you can see without secondary cooling it is a very long time before before it cools. That s why the spent fuel is kept upstairs for such a long time - it is just too hot to move safely.

Bottom line, secondary cooling needs to be installed and with the contamination and flooding in the basement I put in question if existing secondary cooling will ever function again, It may be better to use the basement as a water store and build new secondary cooling above ground level. The possibility to re-inject the contaminated water should also be considered as the amount of waste water can be reduced.

[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/ikojis.jpg

[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/ikop60.JPG

Edit: Thanks to tsutsuji san a small correction in the text
 
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  • #3,512
Krikkosnack said:
about alpha and beta particle detections... listen to the 4:18 - 4:30 intervall


What does he means?

I have no idea, but I looked at the beta data from San Francisco. It is difficult to see longer time series, but the count rates seem a bit higher than usual - see attachment.
 

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  • #3,513
@Krikkosnack and PietKuip

Alpha radiation - positive charged helium nucleus traveling at high speed
Beta Radiation - negative charged electron traveling at high speed
Gamma Radiation - electromagnetic waves

http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/nuclear/radact.html
 
  • #3,514
bytepirate said:
available in english as well: http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110412-4.pdf

another question:
tepco is concerned, that the radiation may reach the chernobyl values.
http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/04/84828.html

as the radiation currently leaks much slower than before, this would mean, that they expect/fear that the current situation lasts *for years* ?


Or, as I speculated last night, before my post was deleted, could it mean that they expect the release rate to get much worse again sometime soon?
 
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  • #3,515
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  • #3,516
AtomicWombat said:
I've been with this discussion pretty much since the start and the possibility of the No.3 explosion originating in the primary containment and blowing off the containment plug has NOT been debunked; it has been debated with no clear consensus so far.

The mechanism of the building 3 explosion remains open, but any explanation MUST explain why it is clearly different from the explosion in builkding 1.

Yes, what the Wombat said above, but with a few added comments:

1) it was not a single explosion at unit 3 -- there were multiple explosions, probably 3 discrete explosive events.

2) it appears that there may have been simultaneous or near simultaneous explosions involving:
a) the "containment" - exact nature and extent of damage unknown,
b) the spent fuel pool - with partial ejection of the contents of the SFP, extent unknown, and
c) an explosion of accumulated hydrogen with destruction of the building (secondary containment)

. . . and with a bunch of added questions:

As for the definition of "cold" in regards to the residual core temperatures, how cold is cold enough to add boron (or some other material?) to prevent re-criticality and to consider entombing the residual core contents in concrete without ongoing cooling? It it a matter of weeks, months or years that might be anticipated to achieve this?

It is in the realm of possibility to consider entombment combined with a closed loop cooling system? I can't see how.

Would spent fuel be entombed as well (seems doubtful)? If not, then would not some sort of clean up of the spent fuel would have to precede permanent entombment?

What of the "giant elephant" in this disaster scenario, the little mentioned large SFP7 out back? The spent fuel stored there will have to be permanently maintained somehow. This will either have to occur in place or all of that spent fuel is going to have to be removed and stored at an alternate facility that is not highly contaminated and dangerous on a long term to maintain.

What does the "big picture" TO DO LIST look like for Fukushima? Perhaps:

1) cool the cores of U1, 2, 3,
2) contain, entomb the cores of U1, 2, 3,
3) clean up SFP1, 2, 3, 4,
4) clean up external contamination near and far from the Fukushima site as best possible,
5) safely operate or permanently shut down U5,6, and
6) safely operate or permanently shut down SFP7,

So far, it seems to me that TEPCO is still struggling with item #1, and perhaps starting on item #4.

Am I missing any of the "BIG" items on the to do list?

Addendum:
Here's one I may have missed:
7) build a giant new facility for the long-term storage, reprocessing, and disposal of high-level radioactive wastes. Somewhere within a 20K radius of the Fukushima plant might seem an obvious location, given real estate prices.
 
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  • #3,517
I just found this :

Fact Sheet : Major Modifications and Upgrades to U.S. Boiling Water Reactors With Mark I Containment Systems

1. Added spare diesel generator and portable water pump — 2002.
2. Added containment vent — 1992.
3. More batteries in event of station blackout — 1988.
4. Strengthened torus — 1980.
5. Control room reconfiguration — 1980.
6. Back-up safety systems separated — 1979

http://resources.nei.org/documents/japan/major_mod_usbwr_4511.pdf

"updated 4/1/11" according to http://nei.cachefly.net/newsandevents/information-on-the-japanese-earthquake-and-reactors-in-that-region/reactor-designs/

Note that the caption on the picture reads "portable pump & diesel", implying the diesel is "portable" too, and shown on a vehicle with wheels.
 
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  • #3,518
Samy24 said:
Normaly strontium should not travel that far. There was not heavy graphite fire like in Chernobyl. If strontium could travel that far, that would also be possible for plutonium.

http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/04/85002.html"

Strontium Sr is even more reactive with water than calcium. It can be transported in water or in droplets with vapor. So it may be much easier to transport than plutonium which tends to form oxides.

Sr-90 uptake in plants and concentration in milk are its method of entering the body. Once there it concentrates in bones and is reputed to cause bone cancers and leukemia.

Also there is a much higher fission yield of Sr and its predecessors (Kr and Rb) than generation of Pu.
 
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  • #3,519
Samy24 said:
Normaly strontium should not travel that far. There was not heavy graphite fire like in Chernobyl. If strontium could travel that far, that would also be possible for plutonium.

http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/04/85002.html"
I would expect those in the water being discharged in the ocean.

The measurements are mostly for volatiles such as Cs and I isotopes, which easily get out. Cs is also a decay product of Xe, which makes it easier to transport. On the other hand, Xe-137 has a very short half-life.

I would expect any fuel particles to be local to the plant, and discharge water.

Any failure from the spent fuel pool might pose a risk of release of less volatile fission products, if temperatures were high enough.

I'd be looking for Np-239 in the water, as well as isotopes of Eu, Ce, Ba, La, Y, Zr.
 
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  • #3,520
once upon a time man learned to master fire
something no other living creature done before him
man conquered the entire world

one day he found a new fire
a fire so powerful it could never be extinguished
man reveled in the thought
that he now possessed the power of the universe

then in horror he realized
that his new fire could not only create but could also destroy
not only could it burn on land but inside all living creatures
but inside his children the animals and all crops

man looked around for help but found none
and so he build a burial chamber deep in the bowls of the earth
a hiding place for the fire to burn into eternity
when the burial chamber was complete
man laid his new fire to rest and tried to forget about it

he knew only through oblivion would he be free of it
but then he started to worry
that his children might find the burial chamber
and awake the fire from its sleep

so he begged his children
to tell their children and their children's children too
to remember forever to consign the burial chamber to oblivion
to remember forever to forget


extracted from
a 71 minute film documenting "Onkalo"
Finland's world’s first permanent repository for nuclear waste
that must last 100,000 years as this is how long the waste remains hazardous.
 
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  • #3,521
NUCENG said:
Strontium Sr is even more reactive with water than calcium. It can be transported in water or in droplets with vapor. So it may be much easier to transport than plutonium which tends to form oxides.

Sr-90 uptake in plants and concentration in milk are its method of entering the body. Once there it concentrates in bones and is reputed to cause bone cancers and leukemia.

Also there is a much higher fission yield of Sr and its predecessors (Kr and Rb) than generation of Pu.

I was a child at the time of the Chernobyl desaster and we learnd that only a small amount (<3%) of the Strontium in the reactor was released and most landed in the direct perimeter of the plant.

Cs-137 and Sr-90 have nearly the same physical half-life but the biological half-life in human body of Cs is only about 110 days. In comparision to Sr it is about 18 years.

If Sr can be transported with steam, and steam is coming out of the plant till today this could be a bad thing for the long term in that region.
 
  • #3,522
Samy24 said:
I was a child at the time of the Chernobyl desaster and we learnd that only a small amount (<3%) of the Strontium in the reactor was released and most landed in the direct perimeter of the plant.

Cs-137 and Sr-90 have nearly the same physical half-life but the biological half-life in human body of Cs is only about 110 days. In comparision to Sr it is about 18 years.

If Sr can be transported with steam, and steam is coming out of the plant till today this could be a bad thing for the long term in that region.

I agree, and I also wish the regulators and TEPCO were reporting more of the isotopes in air, water and on land. Even if it only is a report that the other isotopes aren't there. We may end up having to wait for this information until they stabilize the site. In the meantime they are creating an exclusion zone and restricting agriculture which may be the way they are trying to be safe. And unless they can stabilize the plants this will only get worse. From that viewpoint their priorities are reasonable.
 
  • #3,523
Astronuc said:
I would expect those in the water being discharged in the ocean.

The measurements are mostly for volatiles such as Cs and I isotopes, which easily get out. Cs is also a decay product of Xe, which makes it easier to transport. On the other hand, Xe-137 has a very short half-life.

I would expect any fuel particles to be local to the plant, and discharge water.

Any failure from the spent fuel pool might pose a risk of release of less volatile fission products, if temperatures were high enough.

I'd be looking for Np-239 in the water, as well as isotopes of Eu, Ce, Ba, La, Y, Zr.

The fuel pool thing looks like a good direction. TEPCO is on the same way now!

TEPCO, meanwhile, took 400 milliliters of water from the spent fuel pool of the No. 4 unit to check to what extent the spent nuclear fuel stored there is damaged.

There is a possibility that the fuel may have been temporarily exposed when the water level at the storage pool dropped following the March 11 disaster, but camera footage found that the water level now was enough to cover the fuel. But the temperature of the water was 90 degrees, much higher than the usual 20-30 degrees.

http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/04/85030.html"
 
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  • #3,524
Professor Magdi Ragheb provides the following analysis :

Figure 15. Plant layout of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor generator, ABWR, identifies the diesel generator (18) as clearly high up at the level of loading deck inside the reactor building (upper left), and could not have been flooded by the tsunami. The transformers in the switchyard. (33), which were misidentified from satellite photographs as the diesel generators, are outside the building enclosure and could have been affected by the tsunami. The real vulnerability from the tsunami is the flooding of the lower level of the plant that would have impacted the functioning of the electrical components as well as the Residual Heat Removal, RHR pump (15), the HPCF pump (16), and most importantly, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RCIC system steam turbine and pump (17). The same vulnerability could be identified as an accident initiating event fro reactors sited at interior locations vulnerable to floods occurrence. Source: GE.

page 11/55 of https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/mragheb/www/NPRE%20402%20ME%20405%20Nuclear%20Power%20Engineering/Fukushima%20Earthquake%20and%20Tsunami%20Station%20Blackout%20Accident.pdf (dated 4/11/2011)

Put together with http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201104060126.html , Mr Ragheb's figure is probably a closer description for Fukushima Daini (No 2), where the diesel are inside the reactor building, rather than for Fukushima Daiichi (No 1), although none of them are ABWRs.
 
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  • #3,525
Samy24 said:
The fuel pool thing looks like a good direction. TEPCO is on the same way now!

TEPCO, meanwhile, took 400 milliliters of water from the spent fuel pool of the No. 4 unit to check to what extent the spent nuclear fuel stored there is damaged.


http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/04/85030.html"
If the water is warm, then the cooling is not adequate.

If they took samples of the water, I wish they would also take video of the SFP, or at least the tops of the fuel assemblies. I would then be relatively easy to judge the condition of the fuel. The upper tie plates should be visible near the top of the racks. If not, then can assume the fuel rods are broken. Of course, the fuel rods could be breached. Then one would look for discolourations, or other abnormalities. They will need some special hooded/sipping fuel handling systems to hand the fuel.
 
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  • #3,526
Updated my plots of #Fukushima reactor #1-#3 vars (temp,pressure,water level,CAMS) up to NISA release 89 (apr/12 13:00) #
http://bit.ly/gAuxse
 
  • #3,527
TCups said:
Here's one I may have missed:
7) build a giant new facility for the long-term storage, reprocessing, and disposal of high-level radioactive wastes. Somewhere within a 20K radius of the Fukushima plant might seem an obvious location, given real estate prices.

TEPCO was building such a facility: www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/accidents/6-1_powerpoint.pdf
 
  • #3,528
Jorge Stolfi said:
Updated my plots of #Fukushima reactor #1-#3 vars (temp,pressure,water level,CAMS) up to NISA release 89 (apr/12 13:00) #
http://bit.ly/gAuxse

Why there is no update for unit 1 and 2? They repeated the data from the report 88. Someone can speculate they want to hide something :)

http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/04/20110412006/20110412006-3.pdf"
http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/04/20110412002/20110412002-3.pdf"
 
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  • #3,529
Naive question: if a critical mass of fissile fuel is spread it out evenly in three dimensions, does it continue to be critical?
 
  • #3,530
Jorge Stolfi said:
Naive question: if a critical mass of fissile fuel is spread it out evenly in three dimensions, does it continue to be critical?
Criticality has to much to do with composition (fissile material, fuel matrix, moderator, burnable poisons (e.g., boron, gadolinia, . . .)), concentration (of each element species) and geometry (fuel lattice as well as size/array of fuel materials). Usually, if a system is critical, then the material is increased in volume, the critical system becomes subcritical, because the concentration decreases, particularly if the material mass is fixed, but the volume increase, and the surface area increases. Larger surface area means more leakage of neutrons from the system.
 
  • #3,531
Jorge Stolfi said:
TEPCO was building such a facility: www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/accidents/6-1_powerpoint.pdf

That is a fuel reprocessing facility

What is needed a nuclear waste processing facility, they have such a facility on site south of Unit 4, but that would be only for lightly contaminated waste
 
  • #3,532
Astronuc said:
Criticality has to much to do with composition (fissile material, fuel matrix, moderator, burnable poisons (e.g., boron, gadolinia, . . .)), concentration (of each element species) and geometry (fuel lattice as well as size/array of fuel materials). Usually, if a system is critical, then the material is increased in volume, the critical system becomes subcritical, because the concentration decreases, particularly if the material mass is fixed, but the volume increase, and the surface area increases. Larger surface area means more leakage of neutrons from the system.

Good to hear it is save by design. The other way it would be the bigest known atomic bomb.
 
  • #3,533
Jorge Stolfi said:
Updated my plots of #Fukushima reactor #1-#3 vars (temp,pressure,water level,CAMS) up to NISA release 89 (apr/12 13:00) #
http://bit.ly/gAuxse

http://www.ic.unicamp.br/~stolfi/EXPORT/projects/fukushima/plots/cur/plot-un1-full.png

Core pressure of Unit 1 steadily rising.

Is that getting dangerous?
 
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  • #3,534
PietKuip said:
http://www.ic.unicamp.br/~stolfi/EXPORT/projects/fukushima/plots/cur/plot-un1-full.png

Core pressure of Unit 1 steadily rising.

Is that getting dangerous?

I do not find the PDF doc at the moment but they have tested it at 7x the actual pressure and at that stage a valve would open automaticaly to release some pressure. I do not know if this thing is still working but there is much room there.
 
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  • #3,535
PietKuip said:
Core pressure of Unit 1 steadily rising.

Is that getting dangerous?

I'd like to know that as well. And more questions:

- Unit 2 and 3 pressure seems to be around atmosphere level, containment / pressure vessel breach has so far been confirmed for unit 2 (as far as I know...) but what's with unit 3?

- at Unit 2 and 3 there's a fluctuation in water level right before the explosions, where's the connection between these two events?

- drywell radiation sensor in Unit 1 seems to be gone, after topping 100 Sv/h and then falling back at ~70. Is 100 Sv/h the maximum level it can measure? Was it fried by higher radiation levels? And is there any connection between this failure, higher drywell radiation and rising core pressure?
 
  • #3,536
AntonL said:
Bottom line, secondary cooling needs to be installed and with the contamination and flooding in the basement I put in question if existing secondary cooling will ever function again, It may be better to use the basement as a water store and build new secondary cooling above ground level. The possibility to re-inject the contaminated water should also be considered as the amount of waste water can be reduced..


Not only is an external cooling being considered they also thinking of flooding the PCV
TEPCO also admit existing cooling is most probably in non functioning condition

so my earlier assessment was not all that wrong

http://www.asahi.com/science/update/0412/TKY201104120234.html (machine translated) said:
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station for TEPCO and the government is pulling the pipes leading to outside the reactor building began consideration of a new system to cool the reactor while circulating the water. Order to create conditions that fuel in the water, which also plans to submerge the emerging nuclear fuel to each cylinder submerged in the containment. Ease of operation due to damage to the reactor, and so each one is thinking of a different response.
...
 Not depend forever on irrigation. TEPCO aims to recover the conventional cooling system circulating water is not expected to stand at the moment. Is expected that the pipes and pumps were destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami. There is also an area that exceeds 10 Sv per hour at the bottom of the containment should also expect the repair work is 近Dzukezu workers is not easy.

[URL]http://www.asahi.com/science/update/0412/images/TKY201104120242.jpg[/URL]
 
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  • #3,537
gmax137 said:
I think you're mis-remembering, or someone gave you bad info in 1970. Standard Tech Specs call for seven days diesel fuel onsite. There may be more fuel, but it wouldn't be in seismic storage tanks, and it wouldn't be available to the emergency diesels without manually opening cross ties and possibly using non-safety related transfer pumps. And I really doubt the six month figure. That would be over 3/4 million gallons per diesel generator (taking a swag at 200 gph). I've never seen diesel fuel tanks that size at a nuclear unit.

You are right. We have one and two million gallon tanks at work for fire suppression water and the tank at Pilgrim 1 was not that size. I may have been remembering being told that the need for the generators and fuel was because it could require six months of cooling after the shutdown of an operating reactor.

The tank shown on Pg 9 of this document citing a 1979 TEPCO generator problem looks to be in the 30-40,000 gal range. https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/mragheb/www/NPRE%20402%20ME%20405%20Nuclear%20Power%20Engineering/Fukushima%20Earthquake%20and%20Tsunami%20Station%20Blackout%20Accident.pdf
Picture 1.png
 
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  • #3,538
image-202548-galleryV9-udvu.jpg


Strawberries, tomatoes and vegetables from the Fukushima district are not only tasty and full of vitamins - by the process of irradiation they are preserved and last longer without refrigeration. Yokio Edano and comedian Yamazaki Shizuyo (Shizu-chan)

(apologies - could not help cynical humour)
 
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  • #3,539
biggerten said:
I wonder if we don't have translation issues here. The way I read that, it doesn't mean that cooling for the generators themselves was lost, but that the pumps that the diesels were to operate had nothing to pump. Perhaps the tsunami took out plumbing from the ocean or some heat exchange equipment. Diesels themselves require special coolant (SCA or OAT) to prevent internal damage (cavitation damage to cylinder sleeves, etc), sea water use would be extremely short term as a coolant in a diesel.

Perhaps translation is part of the problem. It seemed they were citing pump failure as the cause of the generator failure??

I know they also have more important things at hand than my need for information at the moment but they are as sparse with words as I am. Still, I prefer that they be accurate in their information than just provide me with volume of it.

It concerns me that the inability to approach many areas of the facilities will lessen the information available to reconstruct events in detail and lower the value of lessons learned. As bad as this is I want to see the maximum value of wisdom extracted from it.

To address your second point, "the pumps that the diesels were to operate had nothing to pump", if the sea water or reactor coolant pumps were disabled then it would not have helped to have offsite or emergency power. This incident would have occurred. We would have had a better picture of it progression.
 
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  • #3,540
AntonL said:
Strawberries, tomatoes and vegetables from the Fukushima district are not only tasty and full of vitamins - by the process of irradiation they are preserved and last longer without refrigeration. Yokio Edano and comedian Yamazaki Shizuyo (Shizu-chan)

Their smile looks really forced, doesn't it? And Edanos looks like he's thinking "Is he really going to swallow this tomatoe? I'm only going to eat my strawberry if he's eating his, too!" ;)
 

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