Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

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The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant is facing significant challenges following the earthquake, with reports indicating that reactor pressure has reached dangerous levels, potentially 2.1 times capacity. TEPCO has lost control of pressure at a second unit, raising concerns about safety and management accountability. The reactor is currently off but continues to produce decay heat, necessitating cooling to prevent a meltdown. There are conflicting reports about an explosion, with indications that it may have originated from a buildup of hydrogen around the containment vessel. The situation remains serious, and TEPCO plans to flood the containment vessel with seawater as a cooling measure.
  • #3,631
Dmytry said:
The real question is: How the hell would it reach detonation limit, 18%, without getting ignited first?

Perhaps the rising steam and/or initial hydrogen combustion removed most of the oxygen from the atmosphere inside pool and just above it?

And what about criticality or near-criticality in the #4 SFP, after loss of the neutron-absorbing baffles? Can we rule that out?
 
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  • #3,632
sp2 said:
Also, is vertical stacking of spent-fuel rods something that's actually done? (Or even can be done?) I thought re-racking referred to cramming in the extra assemblies on the bottom of the pool with the rest?
Is that wrong?

Thanks.

I have never heard of vertical stacking - that 23 feet of water above the assemblies is there for shielding when they move the fuel into the rack. If you had a rack on top of a rack, then the top of the fuel assembly being moved into the top rack would be nearly out of the water. No way they would do that, I just can't believe it.

All of the re-racking I've seen is to fill what was open space with more racks or to squeeze the assemblies closer together in a 'tighter' rack.
 
  • #3,633
sp2 said:
Also, is vertical stacking of spent-fuel rods something that's actually done? (Or even can be done?) I thought re-racking referred to cramming in the extra assemblies on the bottom of the pool with the rest?

These docs were posted by user bythepirate :
http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/29/064/29064415.pdf
http://www.irss-usa.org/pages/documents/11_1Alvarez.pdf

These docs (Czech and US) indeed talk only about using a more compact arrangement of fuel assemblies within each rack, packed solid against each other instead of the original very open arrangement.

However "re-racking" is a general term and may include other bright ideas. And even if re-racking at Fukushima was single-layer, they may have used two layers too. Is the estimate above correct (capacity 1444 after re-racking, actual contents 1535)?
 
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  • #3,634
Another thing that makes a hydrogen detonation less plausible: There are still panels attached in the top row at building 4. Even at building 1, all panels were blown clean off the top two rows. It's hard to see how hydrogen could have exploded with enough force to damage concrete but left panels intact near the roof.

Meanwhile, something stripped concrete away from rebar in the below-decks row (third from top). That didn't happen even in building 3. And I haven't seen anything that looks like soot. I'd speculated that it was oil vapor that exploded, not hydrogen; that could have been heavier than air, and created a below-decks explosion. But I'd think that would leave soot.

I haven't seen any video of building 4 exploding. Someone else posted that they hadn't either. So, thinking outside the box...

What if building 4 did not actually explode? Is it plausible that most or all of the damage was mechanical, from aftershocks?

In the third-from-top row (the upper below-decks row) there are panels that appear to be made of rebar-reinforced concrete. Some of those panels have rebar exposed around the edges, and flat concrete left in the middle. It's hard to imagine that an explosion would do that. But twisting the beams that the panels were mounted between might crumble the panels from the edges in.

Are there any observations that would contradict the quake-damage theory for building 4?
 
  • #3,635
Jorge Stolfi said:
These docs were posted by user bythepirate :
http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/29/064/29064415.pdf
http://www.irss-usa.org/pages/documents/11_1Alvarez.pdf

These docs (Czech and US) indeed talk only about using a more compact arrangement of fuel assemblies within each rack, packed solid against each other instead of the original very open arrangement.

However "re-racking" is a general term and may include other bright ideas. And even if re-racking at Fukushima was single-layer, they may have used two layers too. Is the estimate above correct (capacity 1444 after re-racking, actual contents 1535)?

can they lay extra fuel horizontally?
 
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  • #3,636
cphoenix said:
Another thing that makes a hydrogen detonation less plausible: There are still panels attached in the top row at building 4. Even at building 1, all panels were blown clean off the top two rows. It's hard to see how hydrogen could have exploded with enough force to damage concrete but left panels intact near the roof.

Meanwhile, something stripped concrete away from rebar in the below-decks row (third from top). That didn't happen even in building 3. And I haven't seen anything that looks like soot. I'd speculated that it was oil vapor that exploded, not hydrogen; that could have been heavier than air, and created a below-decks explosion. But I'd think that would leave soot.

I haven't seen any video of building 4 exploding. Someone else posted that they hadn't either. So, thinking outside the box...

What if building 4 did not actually explode? Is it plausible that most or all of the damage was mechanical, from aftershocks?

In the third-from-top row (the upper below-decks row) there are panels that appear to be made of rebar-reinforced concrete. Some of those panels have rebar exposed around the edges, and flat concrete left in the middle. It's hard to imagine that an explosion would do that. But twisting the beams that the panels were mounted between might crumble the panels from the edges in.

Are there any observations that would contradict the quake-damage theory for building 4?
that none of the aftershocks was even remotely strong enough to so effectively destroy something that withstood original quake?
 
  • #3,637
A little bit offtopic:

I heard, that La Hague in france emits several hundred PBq Krypton-85 every year. In my opinion, Krypton-85 is not dangerous to human health, because it's a noble gas and as such very volatile (= doesn't contaminate areas / humans). Furthermore, it has a very short half time in the human body. Is that correct? Or are there errors?

Because 300 PBq Krypton-85 every year sounds a bit much - if it would pose a hazard to human health.
 
  • #3,638
Jorge Stolfi said:
These docs were posted by user bythepirate :
http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/29/064/29064415.pdf
http://www.irss-usa.org/pages/documents/11_1Alvarez.pdf

These docs (Czech and US) indeed talk only about using a more compact arrangement of fuel assemblies within each rack, packed solid against each other instead of the original very open arrangement.

However "re-racking" is a general term and may include other bright ideas. And even if re-racking at Fukushima was single-layer, they may have used two layers too. Is the estimate above correct (capacity 1444 after re-racking, actual contents 1535)?

the common spent fuel pool has an area of 12m*29m and can take 76 racks (90 assemblies each). makes a rough estimate of a size of 2m*2m for each rack (based on the picture on page 11 of http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/accidents/6-1_powerpoint.pdf)
the SFP in #4 has 11m depth and contains 1425m³, thus the area is roughly 129m² -> 32 racks -> 2880 assemblies (?). maybe the racking is more dense in the common SFP?

a *very* speculative thesis:
+ after the quake they tried to re-insert the core to the RPV
- why should they do this?
- two workers were found dead in #4
+ the crane stuck, when the core was directly above the RPV
- covered by water, but not very much
+ water boiled away
+ the core produced hydrogen and an explosion
+ the core fell into the RPV
+ the fire after the explosion has been caused by something else


this would explain the thermal images, that show heat in the place of the RPV.
and this would explain the 4 day 'silence' between explosion and spraying.

but i have to admit, that i am not convinced ;-)
 
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  • #3,639
cphoenix said:
Another thing that makes a hydrogen detonation less plausible: There are still panels attached in the top row at building 4. Even at building 1, all panels were blown clean off the top two rows. It's hard to see how hydrogen could have exploded with enough force to damage concrete but left panels intact near the roof.

Meanwhile, something stripped concrete away from rebar in the below-decks row (third from top). That didn't happen even in building 3. And I haven't seen anything that looks like soot. I'd speculated that it was oil vapor that exploded, not hydrogen; that could have been heavier than air, and created a below-decks explosion. But I'd think that would leave soot.

I haven't seen any video of building 4 exploding. Someone else posted that they hadn't either. So, thinking outside the box...

What if building 4 did not actually explode? Is it plausible that most or all of the damage was mechanical, from aftershocks?

In the third-from-top row (the upper below-decks row) there are panels that appear to be made of rebar-reinforced concrete. Some of those panels have rebar exposed around the edges, and flat concrete left in the middle. It's hard to imagine that an explosion would do that. But twisting the beams that the panels were mounted between might crumble the panels from the edges in.

Are there any observations that would contradict the quake-damage theory for building 4?

cphoenix brings up a good point about how concrete appears fractured by impact and not by explosion. Impact from pieces of a motor or tank or some other hard materials in flight hitting a concrete panel would not pulverized standard mix concrete. Lightweight concrete maybe would pulverize, like used for floors since rebar is not normally placed in lightweight concrete flooring applications. Flexing motions usually don't disturb reinforce concrete (bridges: flex, expand and contract like crazy).

Back many posts, read that summary of worst case scenarios where seawater interactions were not discussed and another conclusion (in this day in age) that the properties of hydrogen in particular conditions was not fully understood (yet). Steam or super-heated steam mixing with hydrogen along with some other gases or fuels makes for many variables.

Even one damaged rod in a pool via debris impacting let alone low water level(s) leading to exposed fuel would ruin your whole day.

Overhead cabling tram system is the only way to work and avoid the radiation and preform the heavy lifting required.

I believe the air blast nukes were less contaminating, only because the plume or mushroom cloud ejected higher into the atmosphere since in a controlled burst you could wait for optimum weather conditions.
 
  • #3,640
bytepirate said:
a *very* speculative thesis:
+ after the quake they tried to re-insert the core to the RPV
- why should they do this?
- two workers were found dead in #4
+ the crane stuck, when the core was directly above the RPV
- covered by water, but not very much
+ water boiled away
+ the core produced hydrogen and an explosion
+ the core fell into the RPV
+ the fire after the explosion has been caused by something else
QUOTE]

Why ? To slow down vaporization of water from sfp ? Fresh fuel which was removed from core has bigger temperature than old fuel, so if they believe that they can restore cooling systems they want to slow down vaporization by removing some fuel from overpacked sfp...
 
  • #3,641
elektrownik said:
Why ? To slow down vaporization of water from sfp ? Fresh fuel which was removed from core has bigger temperature than old fuel, so if they believe that they can restore cooling systems they want to slow down vaporization by removing some fuel from overpacked sfp...

but wouldn't that be putting out a fire with gasoline? they have to cool it anyway...

maybe they were just about to reinsert the core (scheduled). quite unlikely, but the whole disaster is quite unlikely too (one in a million years for a core melt with containment failure, i have been told). add (or rather multiplicate) this new unlikeliness and the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinite_Improbability_Drive#Infinite_Improbability_Drive" can travel quite a bit...
 
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  • #3,642
Does anyone know what is the topscale reading of the Fukushima Daiichi CAMS meters (100 Sv/h?) (I cannot find that info with Google.) Thanks...
 
  • #3,643
elektrownik said:
Also this is strange that tepco only tell us about fire, there was no pictures, videos or news about explosion, only about fire...

This has bothered me too, but I did find a reference to an explosion buried in one of the TEPCO press releases for March 15th:
"At approximately 6:00am, a loud explosion was heard from within the
power station. Afterwards, it was confirmed that the 4th floor rooftop
area of the Unit 4 Nuclear Reactor Building had sustained damage."
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11031504-e.html"

Lack of pictures/video might be attributable to the early hour, ie before the press had their cameras set up for the day. Sunrise time was about an hour before the stated explosion time.
 
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  • #3,644
elektrownik said:
Also this is strange that tepco only tell us about fire, there was no pictures, videos or news about explosion, only about fire...

that's strange indeed. the explosion was *not* at night, as has been stated here before.

at 2:31 you can see the intact building, blown away one frame later.

EDIT:
Cyberspace said:
Lack of pictures/video might be attributable to the early hour, ie before the press had their cameras set up for the day. Sunrise time was about an hour before the stated explosion time.
i have been working for the television. that is *very* hard to believe under these circumstances. but still possible...
 
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  • #3,645
Responding to my question about whether aftershocks could have damaged building 4:

Dmytry said:
that none of the aftershocks was even remotely strong enough to so effectively destroy something that withstood original quake?

I looked at an aftershock graph, and the strongest aftershocks in the relevant time period (March 14 to 27) were under 6.4. So you're probably right. http://aebrain.blogspot.com/2011_04_01_archive.html

So what was it then? The recent JAIF Reactor Status sheets list it as "hydrogen explosion." But I don't see how it could have been an internal hydrogen explosion, given the wall panels still attached near the roof.

Could #4 have been damaged that much by #3 blowing up?

I can't even find a source that tells what day the damage happened. From video of #3 blowing up, #4 appears intact before the #3 explosion. Wikipedia lists the first "observation" of #4 damage on March 27. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Fukushima_I_nuclear_accidents

The JAIF reactor status updates give some clues: The 19:00 March 15 update lists reactor 3 building integrity as "severely damaged" but building 4 as "partially damaged". http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1300189582P.pdf
So does the 8:00 March 16 update, which describes multiple fires in, and increased radiation readings around, building 4.
The 12:30 March 16 update changes 4's status to "severely damaged".
(Updates can be found at http://jaif.or.jp/english/news_index.php )

I had assumed that the damage to 4 was related to the fires. But the more I think, the less likely it seems. A fire severe enough to buckle the steel framework, but not discolor the paint?

I don't have a theory to push - just a big question mark. Surely I'm not the only one wondering? Surely someone has figured out what must have happened?
 
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  • #3,646
cphoenix said:
But I don't see how it could have been an internal hydrogen explosion, given the wall panels still attached near the roof.

Long ago I started to wonder why they are where they are. Perhaps there is something inside of the building that shielded them from the blast.
 
  • #3,647
cphoenix said:
Responding to my question about whether aftershocks could have damaged building 4:



I looked at an aftershock graph, and the strongest aftershocks in the relevant time period (March 14 to 27) were under 6.4. So you're probably right. http://aebrain.blogspot.com/2011_04_01_archive.html

So what was it then? The recent JAIF Reactor Status sheets list it as "hydrogen explosion." But I don't see how it could have been an internal hydrogen explosion, given the wall panels still attached near the roof.

Could #4 have been damaged that much by #3 blowing up?

I can't even find a source that tells what day the damage happened. From video of #3 blowing up, #4 appears intact before the #3 explosion. Wikipedia lists the first "observation" of #4 damage on March 27. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Fukushima_I_nuclear_accidents

The JAIF reactor status updates give some clues: The 19:00 March 15 update lists reactor 3 building integrity as "severely damaged" but building 4 as "partially damaged". http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1300189582P.pdf
So does the 8:00 March 16 update, which describes multiple fires in, and increased radiation readings around, building 4.
The 12:30 March 16 update changes 4's status to "severely damaged".
(Updates can be found at http://jaif.or.jp/english/news_index.php )

I had assumed that the damage to 4 was related to the fires. But the more I think, the less likely it seems. A fire severe enough to buckle the steel framework, but not discolor the paint?

I don't have a theory to push - just a big question mark. Surely I'm not the only one wondering? Surely someone has figured out what must have happened?

#4 was undamaged after #3 exploded: http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/featured_images/japan_earthquaketsu_fukushima_daiichi_march14_2011_dg.jpg
 
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  • #3,650
Updated my plots of #Fukushima reactor variables to NISA release 91 (13/apr 13:00) : http://bit.ly/gAuxse

(Note that release 89 merely repeated the data of release 88 for units #1 and #2, which were measured at 06:00 on apr/12.)
 
  • #3,651
The Alvarez et al document about re-racking claims that
"The standard spacing for new dense-pack racks today is 23 cm—barely above the 21.4 cm spacing in reactor cores. This “dense-packed” fuel is kept sub-critical by enclosing each fuel assembly in a metal box whose walls contain neutron-absorbing boron [...] the cross-section of the portion of a densepack box that is not obstructed by fuel rods would be about 0.032 m2
Assuming that this "standard dense packing" was used at Fukushima Daiichi, we get 1/0.23^2 = 18.9 assemblies per square meter. Then 1535 assemblies in a single layer would use 81.2 square meters. What are the dimensions of the #4 pool?
In the absence of any cooling, a freshly-discharged core generating decay heat at a rate of 100 kWt/tU would heat up adiabatically within an hour to about 600C, where the zircaloy cladding would be expected to rupture under the internal pressure from helium and fission product gases, and then to about 900C where the cladding would begin to burn in air. [...] Steam cooling could be effective as long as the water level covers more than about the bottom quarter of the spent fuel. [...] When the water [level falls to near] the bottom of the fuel assembly, it appears doubtful that [steam flow through the assemblies] could keep the peak temperature below 1200C for fuel less than a hundred years post discharge.
However, the claim that steam cooling would be effective with 75% of the fuel uncovered seems to assume that the whole assembly is at the same temperature, i.e. that heat generated in the top part is efficiently transported down the assembly to the water-covered part. Is my reading correct? Is that claim valid?
 
  • #3,652
Jorge Stolfi said:
And, while spontaneous fission is an insignificant source of heat, even a momentary sub-critical chain reaction could cause a steam explosion, could it not?

I recall that famous accident where someone was trying to demonstrate a sub-critical chain reaction with two chunks of plutonium...
A subcritical (k < 1) system decreases in power to some low level which is that left by spontaneous fissions or other neutron sources. A subcritical system would not cause a steam explosion.

Only if a system went supercritical and achieve a certain power density very rapidly, would there be a possibility of a steam explosion, and likely the system would have to be prompt critical with a significant amount of positive reactivity (i.e., k >> 1.006), which is not the case at Fukushima.

The famous bare critical sphere demonstration, e.g., the one in which Louis Slotin died, was a supercritical assembly with nearly pure fissile material. Such material is not used in power reactors.
 
  • #3,653
Astronuc said:
Such material is not used in power reactors.

You don't suppose they were above fooling around with forbidden materials?

Respectfully submitted, seeking correction
Dotini
 
  • #3,654
georgiworld said:
Would someone like to comment on these images
http://www.houseoffoust.com/fukushima/fukushima.html

Seriously though, the images the above link do not match my (perhaps faulty) recollection of most recent mapping the service floor layout to the buildings done by our esteemed colleagues here. It places the reactor in a different place in the building (not next to the east wall, but in the mid-south part of the building), and the SFPs slightly west of the middle of the south wall in building #4. Can someone please check my memory as this seems like new/revised info to me. Thanks.
 
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  • #3,655
Krikkosnack said:
from the link above...
Beta particles are just electrons from the nucleus, the term "beta particle" being an historical term used in the early description of radioactivity. The high energy electrons have greater range of penetration than alpha particles, but still much less than gamma rays. The radiation hazard from betas is greatest if they are ingested.

so is it possible to say that beta particle derived from plutonium and uranium are indistinguish from normal "electricity in the air"? and therefore unmeasurable?

No, they are certainly measurable, and the high energy distinguishes them from static electricity.
They have energies of hundreds of KeV to several MeV, and that allows them to penetrate at least some layers of the skin. When these electrons are stopped, the energy from their momentum is given off as gamma rays. So, in fact, if the Betas have something like a thin metal foil to stop them, then any sensitive (to low energies) gamma detector will detect their presence.

Jon
 
  • #3,656
georgiworld said:
Would someone like to comment on these images
http://www.houseoffoust.com/fukushima/fukushima.html

Nice work georgiworld, that took some time and effort. Can't add much. Looks like entombment looks impossible due to debris having to be removed first. Everything contaminated and not approachable doesn't help.

'Pit' looks like it took a direct hit to the lid from falling object.

Always wondered how the working deck/platform was constructed. Need a drawing to see how it is assembled and what supports it. Is it anchored down or 'float' independently?

Many weak points when your vessel/capsule is glowing red and venting, ready for takeoff. Flange and pass-through(s) just for starters besides overheating leading to a stress crack qualify as weak points.
 
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  • #3,658
georgiworld said:
Would someone like to comment on these images
http://www.houseoffoust.com/fukushima/fukushima.html

Adding onto my post above -- slogged through many past pages and found several posts from Fred that were good in trying to overlay the reactor floor layout on the existing destroyed buildings -- see this one for example:

https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3235798&postcount=3302

The images above disagree with the placement of the SPF here. I found compelling the combination of the photo of the #4 reactor room (is this really an actual picture of that exact room as is claimed?) then _flipped_ (which is odd), which then matches up with the other images showing the yellow, removed containment cap. Second opinions?
 
  • #3,659
georgiworld said:
Would someone like to comment on these images
http://www.houseoffoust.com/fukushima/fukushima.html

g-

I will risk a comment. The mark-ups in many cases don't match the pre-earthquake pictures or the building schematics.

If this were indeed is a picture of the inside of Unit 4, Fukushima Diiachi, then there is an important clue to what has happened at Unit 4:

http://www.houseoffoust.com/fukushima/reactor4_insideplain.jpg

The mark up of the SFP4 stops short. The mark up should include an accessory pool in the corner of the SFP used for cask transfer. The elevator shafts have to be in the southwest corners to mate with the external access tunnels at the south end of the west walls of Units 3 and 4.

At Fukushima Diiachi, the reactor core, RPV and primary containment are located in the center line of the building on the east-west axis but are located to the east of the center line of the north-south axis, I believe. I suspect "Unit 4" here refers to Fukushima Diana not Fukushima Diiachi.

The floor plan layout that seems to match both the schematic drawings and the actual photography is much closer to this:

http://i306.photobucket.com/albums/nn270/tcups/Picture63.png

http://i306.photobucket.com/albums/nn270/tcups/TopFloor-Floorplan.jpg

http://www.houseoffoust.com/fukushima/reactorcutaway.jpg

That leaves the bulk of the floor storage space to the west side of the access floor, which is where the yellow drywell cap can be seen. I had assumed the pressure vessel's cap would be radioactive enough that after its removal, it would be transferred and placed in the equipment pool to the north of the reactors primary containment plug.

There are pictures that seem to support this in several of my earlier posts.

It has not been conclusively confirmed, at least to me, but I believe that the cask pool for the Bldg 3, 4 design was not incorporated into the corner of a larger SFP as in your marked up photo, but rather was a separate, smaller pool, gated and located between the fuel cask elevator shaft and the SFP of Units 3, 4. If so, then the cask pool may have great significance in the apparent pattern of explosion damage at Unit 4.See also:

http://i306.photobucket.com/albums/nn270/tcups/aerial-floorplan.gif

http://i306.photobucket.com/albums/nn270/tcups/FHM.jpg
Note the absence of an accessory cask pool in the corner of the SFP, and also the concordant location of the yellow drywell cap. Compare to the inside view of Fukushima Diana here, which does have the cask pool in the corner of the SFP

http://i306.photobucket.com/albums/nn270/tcups/Picture38.png

And compare to what I believe to be the layout of the Fukushima Diiachi core and pools seen in this shot. The red arrow indicates the path of transfer of fuel rods through the transfer chute into the SFP, the cutaway detail and green arrow show the access through a much larger gate to the equipment pool and, I believe, the RPV cap in the equipment pool.

http://i306.photobucket.com/albums/nn270/tcups/Picture2-4.png

PS: See also this recent video

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_L5cc8yNvDA&feature=youtu.be
 
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  • #3,660
Dmytry said:
The real question is: How the hell would it reach detonation limit, 18%, without getting ignited first? You can explain it when it's leaking from the reactor, having cooled down sufficiently, but there's zirconium burning in steam (and air) there, at more than 1000 degrees Celsius or so, I'd guess hot pieces of oxide flying around, etc.
From 4% to 18% it is deflagration, not detonation.
See this:
http://www.iaea.org/ns/tutorials/regcontrol/appendix/app9344.htm
and check wikipedia etc:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hydrogen_safety

I'm really kind of confused. I just can't believe in hydrogen detonation in reactor 4. Does not compute. I don't believe in nuke steam explosion in SPF either.

Very good point. I'd forgotten about the difference between flammability and explosive limits.

Hydrogen is lighter than air so it will tend to accumulate near the ceiling of the reactor buildings and could build beyond the explosive limit provided no source of ignition was present.

Whether it would burn in air as soon as it is produced above the SFP would presumably depend on the H2 production rate and the air supply - given the temperature is likely high enough.

This video demonstration - where hydrogen is produced in a steam-zirconium reaction - shows that the hydrogen is not necessarily immediately burnt in air.
http://vimeo.com/22209827"
 
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