NUCENG said:
My apologies if I stepped on your toes. I saw PietKuip ask "Don't they want to know what it is?" And in fact they probably do not care. That guy on the loader or crane and the technician monitoring radiation know that concrete is dangerous and in their way. They are working with dose limits and if they spend time studying a particular piece of debris they will soon be useless because they will be at their limits. These workers are trying to get the job done. They may never be able to return to their homes. When the site is stabilized they may be unemployed. Put yourself in their place. There is radioactivity in the air water and soil. There is sharp metal and debris all over the place. There is more debris hanging perilously over head. It could be corium, it could be a piece of spent fuel blown out of a fuel pool. It may be a hot piece of Cesium or irradiated steel, or a spec of cobalt-60.
It seems that there are more and more people on this site that really believe TEPCO is lying about everything. That was reinforced today when the government of Japan took over the PR communications role. We'll have to wait and see if that improves anything. I am also sensitive to a tendency to project the distrust and contempt on the workers, and I may have over-reacted if that wasn't what you and Piet were saying.
NUCENG, I truly appreciate your posts and those of others who have posted here with specific industry knowledge and/or perspective. It helps keep the discussion on track and informative. That said let me respond in a general way to you as a representative of your profession. Nothing personal intended or implied.
The death toll from the quake and tsunami is around 30,000 people. The exact figure is still climbing as it has been hard to determine the number of missing given the scale of destruction. Who knows how many will die when LA or San Fransisco or Lisbon or Tokyo (etc.) is shaken by another 'big one'. Human nature and behavior intersecting with natural forces that manifest sporadically, unpredictably (regarding the precise time of an event, not necessarily it's probability) and with great force - many types of examples come to mind here. However, this is quite a different matter from the accident at Fukushima.
The attitude of the staff and management at TEPCO was that such an accident was impossible and no preparations had been made or consideration given to the possibility. Training and equipment to deal with a serious accident was not implemented or acquired, one of the rationals being that to pursue such matters would show insecurity or fear and call into question the safety of nuclear plants.
The historical and scientific knowledge about tsunamis was not properly considered given the known risks to plants on the coast. It was stated that unit 1 was constructed with an 'off the shelf' plan from GE that wasn't modified to suit the site specific risks because the engineers were not familiar enough with plant design to confidently recommend changes to it. Once the first unit was built the following units were added using the same basic format, incorporating the same site-based flaws. This was not corrected later because of cost, and as above, because the major changes required would have been acknowledgment that the original design wasn't safe.
When the accident occurred (first couple of days) the site technicians were left on their own to do the best they could while upper management was MIA. There was a fundamental misunderstanding of the seriousness of the situation (one shared by many in the nuclear power industry around the world) that resulted in hesitation to take necessary steps. TEPCO balked at venting, because of liability issues most likely, as well as the use of seawater for cooling because of concerns for their investment.
When it became clear that venting was necessary TEPCO made no attempt to re-establish the network of radiation monitors around the site perimeter that were disabled from lack of power. This violation of public responsibility and trust meant that it was impossible to adequately assess/measure risk to the public during the critical first week of the accident.
There was no system put in place to monitor conditions at the plant, given that it was too dangerous for workers on-site to do this, resulting in confusion over how the situation was progressing/deteriorating.
Offers of outside help and equipment were refused despite the fact that TEPCO lacked adequate equipment and trained personnel.
Plant workers were neither adequately trained nor equipped for safely and effectively carrying out their duties.
All of the above has led to confusion, misinformation, and an ad-hoc response that exacerbated an already terrible situation, unnecessarily endangered public safety and the safety of those tasked with working on the site. TEPCO in particular deserves neither the benefit of the doubt nor public trust. The government response, as the steward of the public interest, has not effectively mitigated TEPCO's failures. After all this the public will be asked to foot the bill for damage and cleanup and to suffer the various risks and ramifications of the accident for decades to come. [That said, there is also public responsibility in a democracy to make sure that public officials are doing their jobs, and consumers who rely on/expect 24hr electricity should understand that this requires acceptance of some risks and costs.]
