Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

[Calvadosser]

jlduh: "That's why I said a long time ago that i strongly think that the final containment of this mess will be the pacific ocean. I still hope to be really wrong. But my hope is more miracle based than science based."

I am trying to figure out your point. I assume you don't want them to give up and pump this water into the sea, even though that would fulfill your prediction. They are just starting up this process and will have some startup issues.

I think jlduh is simply expressing what I and many others have come to believe. That the indications are that the consequences to the accident at Fukushima are not being dealt with effectively and that, if this is correct, some very large releases of radioactivity into the ocean will be the result. Nobody is suggesting TEPCO give up their efforts and we ernestly hope that our lack of confidence in what they are attempting is proved unfounded.

 

[jlduh]

I am trying to figure out your point. I assume you don't want them to give up and pump this water into the sea, even though that would fulfill your prediction. They are just starting up this process and will have some startup issues.

I'm not criticizing Tepco attempts to put "something" in place, of course. I'm criticizing Tepco attempts to put in place these kind of last resort solutions NOW, in the current situation where prototype process has no time to be prototype.

The total imprepareness for managing that kind of situation is softly covered by the generic term "Beyond design basis accident and expectations". Let me tell you that anger, distress, fear and current or future suffering of people is "beyond design basis human acceptation" also.

The problem is that when things are considered as "impossible to happen", nothing is done to anticipate the consequences, and this water treatment story started a few days before overflowing of contaminated water is a typical example. This is the all story of this Fukushima disaster in fact: Fukushima is an impossible accident, but consequences are real.

I'm a little bit fed up with that kind of rhetoric in which some consider accidents impossible but THEN very easily present as "possible" what are in fact very improbable solutions to (try to) manage consequences of these "impossible" accidents!

I think they just screwed up in the way they placed the word "impossible", in fact. But this is a critical and even criminal mistake, at least IMHO.

But this leads to one real technical question to specialists: does it ever exists in production in the world a system to separate so much contamination at a such rate of 1200 tons per day (even letting aside the question: can it be installed and started up in 2 months which is the "cherry on the cake", as we say in french?)

If this exists, then I will admit that my comments above are biased or even wrong.

If not, then I will tend to think that they are just biased... by facts?

 

[Luca Bevil]

I apologise if this point has already been discussed and was just I that had not enough time for recognising it.

I just came across this analisys
http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/4704112149/how-many-cancers-did-chernobyl-really-cause-updated

nothigh that appeared extraordinarily new as of now, but it was clearly written and well presented so I kept reading until my attention was catched by this statement:

"The momentary loss of power closed the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). As shown in the diagram above, there are two MSIVs in each of the four pipes carrying steam from the reactor vessel to the turbine. The fail-safe position of the MSIVs is closed. When power was lost, the MSIVs closed. Steam being produced by the reactor core’s decay heat had been traveling through the steam lines to the turbine.
When the MSIVs closed, that steam could no longer travel this path. In addition, the normal supply of makeup water to the reactor vessel to compensate for water leaving as steam is via the feedwater system.
The feedwater system features steam-driven pumps. The source of steam for the feedwater pump turbines is taken from the steam lines downstream of the MSIVs. Thus, closure of the MSIVs made the feedwater pumps unavailable.
The successful start of both emergency diesel generators restored power to essential plant equipment. The operators would have been able to re-open the MSIVs. But that step, if taken, would not have been longlasting.
The emergency diesel generators do not provide power to the equipment handling the steam
collecting in the main condenser. Normally, the pressure inside the condenser is maintained as close to perfect vacuum conditions as can be obtained. The near-vacuum conditions help pull steam through the turbine. As condenser vacuum is lost, sources of steam to it are automatically isolated. Thus, if re-opened, the MSIVs would have soon automatically re-closed".

Now if the statement is correct, and I am not extrapolating erroneously, that seems to suggest to me that EVEN IF the EDG had not failed the EDG provided power would have not been enough for the condenser to operate correctly.

In this case what would have been done to prevent meltdown ?
I can only think of external, out of loop, water injection and repeated venting.
In other words in such designs assuming grid connection fail, but EDG do not fail, what is the expected release to the environment ?
It would seem to me that in such cases at least a TMI2 pattern if not probably much more could be expected (may be something in a INES 5, or even INES 6 if grid connection takes several days to restore, classification range ?).

Not that reinsuring to say the least... one would wonder what could happen in different designs, like PWRs for example..

but for that I guess would be better to open different threads.

 

[rmattila]

Now if the statement is correct, and I am not extrapolating erroneously, that seems to suggest to me that EVEN IF the EDG had not failed the EDG provided power would have not been enough for the condenser to operate correctly.

That's right; the large seawater pumps supplying cooling water to the condensers are too large to be run with the EDGs. Therefore, for the situations where the normal heat transfer route is lost due to loss of external power, the plant is equipped with auxiliary/emergency cooling systems - so called safety systems.

These systems supply water to the reactor, which is converted to steam and directed to the containment suppression chamber/condensation pool (instead of the condenser). The heat is supposed to be transferred from the condensation pool to the sea via dedicated heat transfer systems which are small enough to be run with the EDG power. This is quite usual operation mode of the BWR plants whenever the large seawater pumps stop for some reason. The problem at Fukushima was the loss of these safety systems designed to run when the systems for normal operation are not used - not the loss of the normal operation systems, which is just an operational occurrence - supposed to take place once a year or so.

 

[Luca Bevil]

That's right; the large seawater pumps supplying cooling water to the condensers are too large to be run with the EDGs. Therefore, for the situations where the normal heat transfer route is lost due to loss of external power, the plant is equipped with auxiliary/emergency cooling systems - so called safety systems.

These systems supply water to the reactor, which is converted to steam and directed to the containment suppression chamber/condensation pool (instead of the condenser). The heat is supposed to be transferred from the condensation pool to the sea via dedicated heat transfer systems which are small enough to be run with the EDG power. This is quite usual operation mode of the BWR plants whenever the large seawater pumps stop for some reason. The problem at Fukushima was the loss of these safety systems designed to run when the systems for normal operation are used - not the loss of the normal operation systems, which is just an operational occurrence - supposed to take place once a year or so.

Thanks.
That would be Residual Heat Removal System - Suppression Pool Cooling Function I suppose.

I see.
While reading a BWR manual on line - I incorrectly assumed that these functions would use subsystems or sections of the heat exchanger in the condenser and hence got alarmed when reading that the condenser to be operated needs low pressure to be maintened on its outlet on the primary side.

 

[NUCENG]

I'm not criticizing Tepco attempts to put "something" in place, of course. I'm criticizing Tepco attempts to put in place these kind of last resort solutions NOW, in the current situation where prototype process has no time to be prototype.

The total imprepareness for managing that kind of situation is softly covered by the generic term "Beyond design basis accident and expectations". Let me tell you that anger, distress, fear and current or future suffering of people is "beyond design basis human acceptation" also.

The problem is that when things are considered as "impossible to happen", nothing is done to anticipate the consequences, and this water treatment story started a few days before overflowing of contaminated water is a typical example. This is the all story of this Fukushima disaster in fact: Fukushima is an impossible accident, but consequences are real.

I'm a little bit fed up with that kind of rhetoric in which some consider accidents impossible but THEN very easily present as "possible" what are in fact very improbable solutions to (try to) manage consequences of these "impossible" accidents!

I think they just screwed up in the way they placed the word "impossible", in fact. But this is a critical and even criminal mistake, at least IMHO.

But this leads to one real technical question to specialists: does it ever exists in production in the world a system to separate so much contamination at a such rate of 1200 tons per day (even letting aside the question: can it be installed and started up in 2 months which is the "cherry on the cake", as we say in french?)

If this exists, then I will admit that my comments above are biased or even wrong.

If not, then I will tend to think that they are just biased... by facts?

OK, I.m still trying. Are you suggesting that this type of recovery system should have been prototype tested and standardized before the accident? That is a valid idea, but since that didn't happen, we are seeing the prototype go through its birthing pains in an actual emergency.

 

[intric8]

1 of 24 cartridges reached capacity within 5 hours time. Given the volume of water and Cs content therein, we can speculate that under normal operations, after every 5-10 hours an additional cartridge would max out and require manual removal.

Let's face facts - this water cleansing operation will prove notoriously expensive not only monetarily, but in precious time and cumulative exposures to staff, especially if each cartridge is removed manually.

I think this was a bit unanticipated by tepco, and that the areva staff are getting an earful right about now. Areva was provided the appropriate data and indicated that each cartridge would be http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jlXd5_F1goJBmZByasNwAiP6EoRA?docId=d223ba8d656345f2972d68b492c83187" .

 

[ManuBZH]

I think this was a bit unanticipated by tepco, and that the areva staff are getting an earful right about now. Areva was provided the appropriate data and indicated that each cartridge would be http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jlXd5_F1goJBmZByasNwAiP6EoRA?docId=d223ba8d656345f2972d68b492c83187" .

Well, in this case, it is Kurion's system (cesium absorption) which is not working as expected. Not Areva's water decontamination one (yet?).

 

[joewein]

Let's face facts - this water cleansing operation will prove notoriously expensive not only monetarily, but in precious time and cumulative exposures to staff, especially if each cartridge is removed manually.

I recall recently seeing an interview with someone from Areva in which they were introducing the treatment system and explained that it was being provided at a fixed price, as they were not going to take advantage of TEPCOs troubles to make a great profit.

If indeed all cartridges were included then -- ignoring the practical problems involved in frequently swapping cartridges for the moment -- Areva would have a problem. Kurion would make money in the short term if they sell more cartridges to Areva, but it would be bad for their business relationship if the cartridges don't last as advertised.

Ultimately none of the three companies will be happy if the solution sold to the public doesn't work.

 

[swl]

Well, in this case, it is Kurion's system (cesium absorption) which is not working as expected. Not Areva's water decontamination one (yet?).

[STRIKE]"The (TEPCO) official said teams working at the plant believed the radiation rise could be linked either to sludge flowing into the machinery absorbing caesium or a monitoring error caused by nearby pipes carrying contaminated water."[/STRIKE]

Bold text highlighted by me.

[STRIKE]http://ibnlive.in.com/news/radiation-spike-halts-work-at-japan-nplant/160610-2.html[/STRIKE]

Please see following post by Tsuji san.

 

[tsutsuji]

Or walked into a greenhouse in the middle of Summer to water the plants.

For reference, the yield strength of polyethylene is about 4,000 psi or about 25 MPa. About 1/3 that of copper (at 70 MPa).

So, a 1 mm square string could support ~2.5 kg. Or a 25 mm x 1 mm strip could support ~62.5 kg.

We will wait and see, but I am optimistic that it isn't in tatters by this time next year.

The cover is not made of polyethylene, but of polyesther fabric coated with PVC (polyvinyl chloride), like truck covers or tarpaulins : http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110614e17.pdf

They are using 40mil poly pond liner (40mil = 1mm).

Where did you find the 1 mm thickness data ?

I haven't examined the design yet , but it would seem logical to suppose that there would be a multitude of cartridges to absorb and replace.

The news makes it look like one of the cartridges is experiencing a buildup , perhaps due to an uneven distribution of contaminated water.

They would have to look at ways to regulate the parallel flow and processing.

Either that or the level of contamination is much higher than expected , or the filter is doing a better job than anticipated

The absorption facility is divided into 4 parallel lines (see the figures on http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110612_01-e.pdf and http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110617_04-e.pdf ). Yesterday they started only two. And both of them are having the unexpected high radiation trouble. 4.7 mSv/h was measured on line No. 1 and 3.9 mSV/h on line No. 3. (No.2 and No.4 were unused).

The absorption towers displaying these radiation levels are the oil and technetium removing towers, at the entrance of the system. Three possibilities were mentioned during the NISA's press conference on June 18th ( http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/15456089 ) :

* To do without the oil and technetium absorption tower (starting directly with the cesium removal towers) ;
* Use of silica sand to filter oil
* Changing the location of the radiation sensor

The first two will be tested on June 18th and 19th, using different solutions on each line and making comparisons.

If my understanding is correct, most of the oil is removed by the Toshiba oil separator mentioned in http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110616p2a00m0na013000c.html before the water enters the Kurion-made facility. There is hardly any technetium in the water so there is no harm in bypassing the oil and technetium removal tower.

Flushing with clean water had been started, and the radiation level had decreased to around 1 mSv/h at the time of the press conference.

OK, I.m still trying. Are you suggesting that this type of recovery system should have been prototype tested and standardized before the accident? That is a valid idea, but since that didn't happen, we are seeing the prototype go through its birthing pains in an actual emergency.

Having to design a solution from scratch is not unlike the various attempts to plug and pump the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. However, the water purifying facility is not totally made from scratch, because the Kurion-made part is "an improved version of the reputable TMI water treatment", and the Areva-made part "has a track record at the reprocessing plant at La Hague" : http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110609e8.pdf

"The (TEPCO) official said teams working at the plant believed the radiation rise could be linked either to sludge flowing into the machinery absorbing caesium or a monitoring error caused by nearby pipes carrying contaminated water."

Bold text highlighted by me.

http://ibnlive.in.com/news/radiation-spike-halts-work-at-japan-nplant/160610-2.html

What was said in the press conference is the possibility that radioactive particles may combine with oil to form something similar to "salad dressing".

 

[etudiant]

We have, according to NISA, the bulk of the contamination onsite in the water. many terabequerels worth. The treatment will hopefully move this to the filters and the processing sludge, leaving (fairly) clean water.
The plan is to exchange the cartridges when the ambient radioactivity exceeds 4 millisievert, which has happened very quickly, unsurprising given the extent of the water contamination. Yet the stated expectation was that this level would only be reached after a month.
So the problem is why did anyone expect the filters to last so long if the water is so dirty?
Afaik, the bulk of the contamination is from the cesium and the Kurion filters are designed to pick up the cesium, which they appear to be doing. So the problem is that because the filters cannot be changed out automatically, they can only serve for a brief period before they must be changed, lest they become too contaminated for humans to handle.
This seems like a design flaw. What am I missing?

 

[Astronuc]

We have, according to NISA, the bulk of the contamination onsite in the water. many terabequerels worth. The treatment will hopefully move this to the filters and the processing sludge, leaving (fairly) clean water.
The plan is to exchange the cartridges when the ambient radioactivity exceeds 4 millisievert, which has happened very quickly, unsurprising given the extent of the water contamination. Yet the stated expectation was that this level would only be reached after a month.
So the problem is why did anyone expect the filters to last so long if the water is so dirty?
Afaik, the bulk of the contamination is from the cesium and the Kurion filters are designed to pick up the cesium, which they appear to be doing. So the problem is that because the filters cannot be changed out automatically, they can only serve for a brief period before they must be changed, lest they become too contaminated for humans to handle.
This seems like a design flaw. What am I missing?

It could be that the filters worked very efficiently, or it could be a matter of communication or rather miscommunication. Is it perhaps the water is more highly contaminated, or is it perhaps that the water chemistry is such that the collection of the intended radioisotope(s) was much more efficient than expected. If the collection reached a limit in hours instead of weeks, then that's two orders of magnitude difference in collection rate. So one must ask, is the concentration of radioisotope(s) so high, or so specific (i.e., not so many different metal ions (each with a different decay constant) competing for the same amount of absorber), or . . . ?

If a filter is too hot to manually handle, then obviously it must be handled remotely, just as with any radioactive source or object. Normally enriched fuel is handled with thin gloves, while MOX fuel is handled remotely, often in glove boxes (with heavier gloves) if an individual must do 'hands on' work.

 

[elektrownik]

Someone here computed that in basements of reactors and turbine buildings contain 1/2 of Chernobyl core (amount of cesium and iodine), so yes there is change problem but also there would be thousands of radioactive filters to store somewhere...

 

[Astronuc]

OK, I.m still trying. Are you suggesting that this type of recovery system should have been prototype tested and standardized before the accident? That is a valid idea, but since that didn't happen, we are seeing the prototype go through its birthing pains in an actual emergency.

Adding to NUCENG's comment - I believe the water treatment system is based on current AREVA technology used in their waste treatment streams either in their reprocessing plants or remediation programs. What we don't know is what access AREVA has had to the TEPCO site, or what information has been provided by TEPCO to AREVA concerning the contaminated water.

 

[Luca Bevil]

Given the Tsutsuji post just added, it would seem that the first (oil+technetium removal) stage was uncorectly designed/dimensioned and picks up too much radioactive material.

I am hoping it can be skipped and/or fixed in a few days.

It is now critical to have that kind of recirculation in place before contaminated water inventory becomes unmanageable, with sore consequences.

 

[etudiant]

Quoting from tsutsuji's informative and comprehensive post: ' said in the press conference is the possibility that radioactive particles may combine with oil to form something similar to "salad dressing" '.

What this makes clear is that nothing about this cleanup is easy.
The removed oil will apparently be intensely contaminated, so that facility too will generate a serious waste stream.
In effect, the processes only buy time and hopefully allow the plant to get pumped out, with the radioactivity moved to a mountain of contaminated cartridges, spent co-precipitation agent and perhaps waste oil.

 

[clancy688]

Someone here computed that in basements of reactors and turbine buildings contain 1/2 of Chernobyl core (amount of cesium and iodine), so yes there is change problem but also there would be thousands of radioactive filters to store somewhere...

That someone would be me.

According to http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/betu11_j/images/110603a.pdf" TEPCO pdf, there's ~140 PBq C137 and C134 each and ~430 PBq I131 flowing around in all basements.
I wouldn't trust the iodine numbers, since they added up measurements which lie one month (=four half times) apart, but the Cesium should be correct...

 

[SteveElbows]

Any real news on what is happening at Fukushima?

I don't know what news you are expecting, but I think its quite possible that you will remain frustrated for a long time. It is always possible that a major new event may happen, but we can see now that months can pass without anything drastic happening. They may learn something new & important about the state of one or more reactors, but don't hold your breath waiting for this, it could take years.

I was hoping I may learn something from TEPCOs report on the first 5 days of the disaster, which NHK mentioned a few days ago. Well I've seen Japanese version of this, and computer translated bits of it, and I struggle to see what new information it contains. It does not seem to add much to the picture we already had, although I have to wait for proper translation to be sure. ( http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11061805-e.html )

Next week there is IAEA conference, where we might learn a few new details, but there is every chance we won't learn much from this either, since we already saw reports that were sent to IAEA about what TEPCO and NISA etc think happened.

Given that we already know that very bad things happened, I am not really sure why some people are expecting some smoking gun evidence to emerge, or have felings that massive new events must be happening that are getting covered up. Certainly there are many questions, and I expect more answers at some point, but our impatience does not tell us anything, and I haven't seen any radiation monitoring data that makes me think anything noteworthy has happened in recent weeks. Sometimes there is weak evidence that something may have happened, but so far good evidence never comes along to back it up, so I assume its just people clutching at straws in a desperate bid to find something new.

 

[NUCENG]

It is a bit more difficult.



Yes, corrective measures must be taken in a specified timeframe.
But, what are "corrective measures"?
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0536/ML053620142.pdf" gives some definitions.

One of the "corrective measures" specified there is that the nuclear operator company has three years to make a statement that this problem is no safety risk.
Bingo, safety restored!

And most times the regulatory authority will not be able to check if that statement is correct.
One of the reasons is that the NRC is way understaffed to be able to perform its control duties. (Thanks to NUCENG for pointing this out!)

So it can take decades to have safety problems corrected.

They just make sure the problem is "being addressed" in a bureaucratically correct manner.
And, so it all is in order, no need to complain...

For example, there are reports stating that still about a dozen NPPs in USA have that old highly-flammable insulation used in Browns Ferry.
The operators state that this is safe and just use smoke generators instead of candles when checking insulation tightness.

And the NRC just has no time / manpower to check this and demand some real remedial action.

This bureaucracy phenomenon is well-known in other countries also.
So safety upgrades are often being installed in a "reasonable" timeframe of up to almost two decades, if at all.


This problem is well-known for long time, probably some decades.
It will be addressed by the nuclear industry in reasonable time, whatever this means. (see above)

Corrective Actions are actions to bring the condition into compliance plus actions to address the extent of condition (fix it all not just the current example) plus measures to prevent recurrence.

Compensatory measures may be taken in the interim while corrective actions are being performed. Compensatory measures for fire protection might be to station a fire watch in an area until the condition is corrected.

We are talking about enforcement discretion for a condition believed to be a violation of regulatory requirements. If a company sits on its hands for three years and then declares it not required, that violation still needs to be closed out by the regulators. You seem to pick that option out of context to insinuate that is all that will be done. If NRC believes the licensee is deliberately stalling corrective actions, they can whthdraw enforcement discretion or apply enforcement action for violations of requirements for prompt and effective corrective action programs. So BINGO right back at ya.

"And most times the regulatory authority will not be able to check if that statement is correct." Opinion based on nothing.

Your comment about under staffing is interesting. Are you trying to imply that the nuclear industry is making staffing decisions? Could you please cite your sources? Neither the President not the Congress can make a budget, and the threats of government shutdowns and defaults make long-term planning challenging. That is politics and a failure in leadership. THat is why the NRC staff requested the extension - so they can give adequate review to ensure plant safety.

Similarly the fact that fire protection is still an open sore is as much the fault of NRC as the industry. Internal disagreements within NRC are sometimes as close to warfare as this thread. And before you jump to conclusions, these battles are the engineers dilemna: "Better is the enemy of good enough."

And in spite of all my criticisms at the end of the day this flawed system still has established a record of continuous improvement in safety, reliability and production without building new plants and that record isn't threatened by your unsupported claims and opinions. There have been over 3500 US reactor years since the Browns Ferry Fire and we are still seeking ways to improve on that.

 

[Orcas George]

Where did you find the 1 mm thickness data ?

In the linked video; the wording was "approximately 1mm", also in other reports. This was from the guy doing the presentation; later on he said "I'm told it is really thick." This is in the English translation of the audio, so caveat emptor.

The absorption towers displaying these radiation levels are the oil and technetium removing towers, at the entrance of the system. Three possibilities were mentioned during the NISA's press conference on June 18th ( http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/15456089 ) :

* To do without the oil and technetium absorption tower (starting directly with the cesium removal towers) ;
* Use of silica sand to filter oil
* Changing the location of the radiation sensor

Call my cynical but I think I know where this story is heading...

If my understanding is correct, most of the oil is removed by the Toshiba oil separator mentioned in http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110616p2a00m0na013000c.html before the water enters the Kurion-made facility. There is hardly any technetium in the water so there is no harm in bypassing the oil and technetium removal tower

This is something that I almost know a little about (I use a RO system to desalaniate seawater which is one reason I'm concerned about all the radiation dumped into the Pacific.) We have a really tricky engineering problem here. They need a very efficient oil separator before Areva's reverse osmosis system or they will destroy the membrane. The percentage of oil allowed in has to be very close to zero at these volumes. I don't imagine that oil and Zeolite interact well together. They must not remove the oil separator tower from the system. They do not have time to clean a water treatment system of radioactive oil.

 

[mrcurious]

Tepco did not fail to anticipate current circumstances, they failed to implement. Safety standards for the current crisis were rejected in favor of a less severe tsunami projection. Your anger at them not being prepared is noted but to use an American phrase, that horse has left the barn.

Last resort solutions are all that are available to them at this point. Judgement might be better directed on how effective they implement not why they are necessary, which is a question for post crisis analysis where answers can be more complete.

 

[Luca Bevil]

I don't know what news you are expecting, but I think its quite possible that you will remain frustrated for a long time. It is always possible that a major new event may happen, but we can see now that months can pass without anything drastic happening. They may learn something new & important about the state of one or more reactors, but don't hold your breath waiting for this, it could take years.

I was hoping I may learn something from TEPCOs report on the first 5 days of the disaster, which NHK mentioned a few days ago. Well I've seen Japanese version of this, and computer translated bits of it, and I struggle to see what new information it contains. It does not seem to add much to the picture we already had, although I have to wait for proper translation to be sure. ( http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11061805-e.html )

Next week there is IAEA conference, where we might learn a few new details, but there is every chance we won't learn much from this either, since we already saw reports that were sent to IAEA about what TEPCO and NISA etc think happened.

Given that we already know that very bad things happened, I am not really sure why some people are expecting some smoking gun evidence to emerge, or have felings that massive new events must be happening that are getting covered up. Certainly there are many questions, and I expect more answers at some point, but our impatience does not tell us anything, and I haven't seen any radiation monitoring data that makes me think anything noteworthy has happened in recent weeks. Sometimes there is weak evidence that something may have happened, but so far good evidence never comes along to back it up, so I assume its just people clutching at straws in a desperate bid to find something new.

Hi Steve for me critical are now news (hopefully good news) about the working of the water processing plant.

It does not seem to be flowing smoothly (to say the least) I do not see much of contingency backup planning, other than saying that the plant has to work, and overspilling of highly radioactive water would be definitely a drammatic problem.

 

[Orcas George]

It does not seem to be flowing smoothly (to say the least) I do not see much of contingency backup planning, other than saying that the plant has to work, and overspilling of highly radioactive water would be definitely a drammatic problem.

The contingency is to dump the water into the Pacific, which is terrible but not much different than what has been (and may still be) going on. It would be a big step backwards but better than flooding the plant grounds and making everything inaccessable.

They have been working on turning the harbor into an ersatz storage pool so they must have that in the back of their minds as well.

The goal at this point is to avoid irreversable steps. I'm pretty sure that they will be able to get some form of treatment working if they keep their cool; it probably will not work as well as advertised but may be "good enough".

Let's say that I am not as enamored of the nuclear power option as I used to be...

 

[Luca Bevil]

The contingency is to dump the water into the Pacific, which is terrible but not much different than what has been (and may still be) going on. It would be a big step backwards but better than flooding the plant grounds and making everything inaccessable.

They have been working on turning the harbor into an ersatz storage pool so they must have that in the back of their minds as well.

The goal at this point is to avoid irreversable steps. I'm pretty sure that they will be able to get some form of treatment working if they keep their cool; it probably will not work as well as advertised but may be "good enough".

Let's say that I am not as enamored of the nuclear power option as I used to be...

Well I for one never was... :-)

that personal opinion apart, discharging radioactive water into the Pacific is not feasible, Corea and China would be raising too harsh protests, maybe if nothing else proves possible they will try with the megafloat as a temporary storage...

it could may be fail later on, but an accident will be in any case more tolerable than a deliberate act...

probably building another more stable facility would have been a safer and more stable option than makeshift containers...

do you think they ruled that out till now because of costs or because of time constraints ?

 

[robinson]

What is the date for water to start going into the ocean? If they can't fix the problem?

 

[Luca Bevil]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/18_18.html

TEPCO says the contaminated water could overflow from storage facilities in about one week, unless the system resumes operating.

TEPCO says depending on the cause of the problem, it may slow the decontamination process from the originally-planned 1,200 tons per day.

Saturday, June 18, 2011 22:12 +0900 (JST)

Time is running short... desperately so

 

[Quim]

The contingency is to dump the water into the Pacific, which is terrible but not much different than what has been (and may still be) going on. It would be a big step backwards but better than flooding the plant grounds and making everything inaccessable.

IMO it would be better to flood the Fukushima site and have the Japanese pay the cost of their series of blunders, rather than trashing the Pacific.

There seems to be more than a little insensitivity to the consequences of dumping large amounts of radioactive contaminants into the Pacific.

Case in point:

And no, I don't care about the whales glowing in the dark. They can use a break from Japanese "marine biology research" anyway.

This is no trivial matter and it is certainly no joking matter, and you, the guys of the industry had better get out front on this or you are sealing the doom for the NPP industry.

Zapperzero's post has been gnawing on me ever since I first read it, but I am trying to avoid contentious issues so I hoped somebody else would challenge that "joke."

If TEPCO starts dumping quantities of radioactive waste into the Pacific it is likely to generate more ill will towards your industry than some of you seem able to imagine.

And I for one, don't see one iota of difference between dumping it in the harbor or the open ocean. If they can't clean up the water they have how are they going to clean up that amount of water? The answer is that they won't. They will try to let the publicity die down and they will issue confusing press releases and generally spew fog. In the meantime the harbor waters will be finding paths to the open ocean for the next 150 years (five half lives of cesium.)

 

[Borek]

IMO it would be better to flood the Fukushima site and have the Japanese pay the cost of their series of blunders

Care to elaborate? "Fukushima site" is already flooded - water filled up every basement, there is no other place at "Fukushima site" that could hold water. It will soon start to leak to the Pacific, so what you wrote doesn't make sense to me.

 

[Quim]

Care to elaborate? "Fukushima site" is already flooded - water filled up every basement, there is no other place at "Fukushima site" that could hold water. It will soon start to leak to the Pacific, so what you wrote doesn't make sense to me.

Were they to bring in Earth moving equipment they could in a few days time create a gully surrounded by a berm lined with something to reduce the leakage into the ground.

That would be the short term emergency action needed.
Then they could work on a mid term solution.
Then they could work on a long term solution.