I Murray Gell-Mann on Entanglement

[Thecla]

In this video Murray Gell-Mann discuses Quantum Mechanics and at 11:42 he discuses entanglement. At 14:45 he makes the following statement:

"People say loosely ,crudely,wrongly that when you measure one of the photons it does something to the other one. It doesn't."
Do most physicists working in this field agree with the above statement ?

 

[ddd123]

"People say loosely ,crudely,wrongly that when you measure one of the photons it does something to the other one. It doesn't."
Do most physicists working in this field agree with the above statement ?

I think so. But I don't think this means they necessarily reject non-locality, because non-locality can mean more than one thing.

 

[DrChinese]

"People say loosely ,crudely,wrongly that when you measure one of the photons it does something to the other one. It doesn't."
Do most physicists working in this field agree with the above statement ?

That's a fair statement. But it really is interpretation dependent. And a lot of physicists don't really get tangled up in the question anyway.

 

[Jilang]

What would be the definition of "to do something to the other one?" in this example?

 

[Thecla]

In response to Dr. Chinese, I thought that question that physicists don't want to get tangled up in is the most important question of entanglement, i.e.spooky action at a distance: How can measurement of for example spin of one particle affect instantaneously the spin of a very distant particle?

 

[atyy]

What would be the definition of "to do something to the other one?" in this example?

In this example, for Murray's statement to be true, he would be talking about the reduced density matrix of an observer who only makes a measurement on the other photon.

However, it would be equally right to say that measuring one photon does affect the other photon, since a measurement collapses the wave function of both photons.

 

[vanhees71]

In this video Murray Gell-Mann discuses Quantum Mechanics and at 11:42 he discuses entanglement. At 14:45 he makes the following statement:

"People say loosely ,crudely,wrongly that when you measure one of the photons it does something to the other one. It doesn't."
Do most physicists working in this field agree with the above statement ?

I don't know about "most physicists", but I couldn't agree more! I don't want to go into the discussion about "collapse" again. I just state once that in the sense used again by atyy, it's inconsistent with relativstic quantum field theory, and that's why Gell-Mann is completely right in his statement. Of course, he knows his QFT better than any of us ;-)).

 

[ddd123]

The way I see the reason why it's not true that "when you measure one of the photons it does something to the other one", is that it involves the absence of counterfactual definiteness. If "doing something" means "causing an effect", then for me this applies: “We may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.” (Hume, 1748)

Without CFD there is no "doing" in this case. But it doesn't mean rejecting non-locality, if non-locality for you means that changing the experiment alters the whole situation holistically: there's no action between the two parts of the experimental setup because there are no independent parts, if you change one you just have a different whole experimental setup, not a different part of the same experimental setup.

 

[atyy]

I don't know about "most physicists", but I couldn't agree more! I don't want to go into the discussion about "collapse" again. I just state once that in the sense used again by atyy, it's inconsistent with relativstic quantum field theory, and that's why Gell-Mann is completely right in his statement. Of course, he knows his QFT better than any of us ;-)).

But Bell himself knew QFT well too. His lesser accomplishment beyond proving quantum nonlocality was discovering the chiral anomaly.

 

[vanhees71]

Bell's accomplishment was to prove that quantum theory enables stronger correlations than any local deterministic hidden-variable theories can explain. He did not disprove local relativistic QFT, and you can well argue whether the discovery of the ABJ anomaly or his inequality were greater or lesser. I think they are pretty equal.

 

[stevendaryl]

In all due respect to a physics giant, I think that Gell-Mann's definitive statement that measurement of one particle in EPR has no effect on the other particle is going beyond what we understand about quantum mechanics. He says that

The point is that the different measurements, say of linear polarization of one [photon] revealing the linear polarization of the other, or circular polarization of one revealing the circular polarization of the other...those measurements are made on different branches of history, decoherent with each other, only one of which occurs...

This explanation of why EPR is not nonlocal is not very satisfying to me. In Alice/Bob terms, he's talking about Alice's measurement of her photon's state of circular polarization revealing Bob's photon's state of circular polarization. But if Alice's measurement is only revealing the state of Bob's photon, that sounds like it's implying that Bob's photon had that state already, before her measurement. That sounds like the "elements of reality" that Einstein, P[whatever] and R[whatever] were talking about, which Gell-Mann says is just wrong. Here's where what Gell-Mann is saying differs from Einstein's hidden variables: Gell-Mann seems to be saying that on this branch of history, Alice measures the circular polarization of her photon, and Bob's photon has a definite circular polarization state (either left-handed or right-handed). On some other branch (one that doesn't actually occur), Alice measured a different property of her photon, and Bob's photon was in some other definite state all along.

I sort of understand this point of view, but it seems a little mysterious, to me. After all, Alice chooses which branch is actual by choosing which measurement to make. (Actually, I guess her choosing a measurement means picking two possible branches; one in which she has a right-handed photon, and one in which she has a left-handed photon. She can't choose which of those she is in, but she can choose not to be in a possible branch in which her photon is linearly polarized.)

 

[ShayanJ]

P[whatever] and R[whatever]

Podolsky and Rosen!

 

[stevendaryl]

Podolsky and Rosen!

I knew that.

 

[ShayanJ]

I knew that.

Sorry! But that wasn't mockery, it was just fun to read that.

 

[ShayanJ]

only revealing the state of Bob's photon, that sounds like it's implying that Bob's photon had that state already, before her measurement

This was my objection to vanhees71's views on the subject. But this objection is only legitimate if the quantum state is taken to be objective. But if we assume the the quantum state only represents the knowledge of the observer, this objection goes away.

 

[forcefield]

In line with what Gell-Mann says there, Bell rules out only commutative local hidden variables. See https://arxiv.org/pdf/1106.1453. That does not rule out non-locality though.

 

[stevendaryl]

This was my objection to vanhees71's views on the subject. But this objection is only legitimate if the quantum state is taken to be objective. But if we assume the the quantum state only represents the knowledge of the observer, this objection goes away.

I suppose. But I can't completely make sense of that. In the case of EPR with correlated photons, Alice measures her photon to be vertically polarized along some axis. She then knows that Bob has a 0% chance of measuring horizontal polarization along that axis. If it's just a matter of Alice updating her knowledge of Bob's situation, then I would think that would mean that Bob had 0% chance before Alice's measurement, even if Alice didn't know that. Which to me implies that Bob's result was predetermined, at least for that particular measurement choice, which is sort of a hidden-variables conclusion.

 

[ddd123]

Is Gell-Mann presenting decoherent histories faithfully here? Kind of an useless question but you never know.

 

[Jilang]

I suppose. But I can't completely make sense of that. In the case of EPR with correlated photons, Alice measures her photon to be vertically polarized along some axis. She then knows that Bob has a 0% chance of measuring horizontal polarization along that axis. If it's just a matter of Alice updating her knowledge of Bob's situation, then I would think that would mean that Bob had 0% chance before Alice's measurement, even if Alice didn't know that. Which to me implies that Bob's result was predetermined, at least for that particular measurement choice, which is sort of a hidden-variables conclusion.

So we are to assume that this is incorrect because of a pesky factor of 2^1/2?

 

[DrChinese]

In line with what Gell-Mann says there, Bell rules out only commutative local hidden variables. See https://arxiv.org/pdf/1106.1453. That does not rule out non-locality though.

First, I would object to that reference as generally accepted science. I consider that reference (which I was already familiar with) to be in the "Bell is wrong/non-applicable/etc" camp. Got another from an undisputed source?

Second, Bell says no such thing as you describe. Bell does NOT rule out commuting local hidden variables. Bell DOES rule out non-commuting local hidden variables. Or more specifically, overlapping (partially non-commuting) observables are ruled out as being local realistic.

 

[forcefield]

First, I would object to that reference as generally accepted science. I consider that reference (which I was already familiar with) to be in the "Bell is wrong/non-applicable/etc" camp. Got another from an undisputed source?

My only other reference is what Gell-Mann says on the video and that made me search from Google with "local non-commutative hidden variables". I may have misheard or misinterpreted what he said though.

Bell does NOT rule out commuting local hidden variables.

That is inconsistent with "No physical theory of local Hidden Variables can ever reproduce all of the predictions of Quantum Mechanics. "

overlapping (partially non-commuting) observables are ruled out as being local realistic.

I said nothing about observables.

 

[atyy]

Bell's accomplishment was to prove that quantum theory enables stronger correlations than any local deterministic hidden-variable theories can explain. He did not disprove local relativistic QFT, and you can well argue whether the discovery of the ABJ anomaly or his inequality were greater or lesser. I think they are pretty equal.

To be clear I have never said Bell disproved local relativistic theory. I do object to your saying that local relativistic theory is inconsistent with the nonlocality of collapse.

For concreteness, we can discuss:

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9906034
Classical interventions in quantum systems. II. Relativistic invariance
Asher Peres

http://omnibus.uni-freiburg.de/~breuer/paper/proc98-1.pdf
State vector reduction in relativistic quantum mechanics
H. P. Breuer and F. Petruccione

http://omnibus.uni-freiburg.de/~breuer/paper/ischia.pdf
Relativistic theory of continuous measurements
H. P. Breuer and F. Petruccione

 

[Thecla]

I bring this up because of a paper I read, "What Bell Did" ( a very readable 30 page paper available on the internet along with a YouTube video with the same title.) This was written by Tim Maudlin from the Dept of Philosophy at NYU. He has the opposite opinion of Murray Gell-Mann and in this paper he traces entanglement from EPR, EPR+Bohm, to Bell. The first sentence of his paper sums up Maudlin's position : "The experimental verification of Bell's inequality for randomly set measurements at space-like separation is the most astonishing result in the history of physics."

 

[atyy]

Is Gell-Mann presenting decoherent histories faithfully here? Kind of an useless question but you never know.

I bring this up because of a paper I read, "What Bell Did" ( a very readable 30 page paper available on the internet along with a YouTube video with the same title.) This was written by Tim Maudlin from the Dept of Philosophy at NYU. He has the opposite opinion of Murray Gell-Mann and in this paper he traces entanglement from EPR, EPR+Bohm, to Bell. The first sentence of his paper sums up Maudlin's position : "The experimental verification of Bell's inequality for randomly set measurements at space-like separation is the most astonishing result in the history of physics."

Good point - yes, Gell Mann is referring to decoherent histories, which probably evades the reality requirement of the Bell theorem. Or perhaps Gell-Mann is thinking of realism as in http://arxiv.org/abs/1106.0767 but there the Bell theorem is evaded by having negative probabilities.

So there is probably no contradiction at all with Maudlin, since Maudlin assumes realism, while Gell-Mann is working in decoherent histories, which doesn't assume realism.

 

[vanhees71]

This was my objection to vanhees71's views on the subject. But this objection is only legitimate if the quantum state is taken to be objective. But if we assume the the quantum state only represents the knowledge of the observer, this objection goes away.

No, Bob's photon had not this polarization state before, but it was totally unpolarized. I've given a full statement just recently in

https://www.physicsforums.com/threa...-experiment-begin.883537/page-11#post-5562148

It should be clear that the only thing that happens, when A measures her photon's polarization (e.g., with the outcome "H"), is that she'll update her state to $|VH \rangle$, and that's what atyy has declared to call collapse in the above quoted long thread. On the other hand, since this (minimal) interpretation implies that nothing happens (at least not instantaneously) to Bob's photon, he is contradicting himself, when he says that Gell-Mann is wrong in saying that nothing happens to Bob's photon.

That at the same time Bob's photon's polarization state is completely undetermined (i.e., he has an exactly unpolarized photon!) before Alices's meausurement but yet Alice knows Bob's result after measuring her photon's polarization without any instantaneous influence of this measurement on Bob's photon, is the astonishing consequence of the polarization-entanglement of the two photons, and that's what distinguishes quantum from classical physics. Bell's great achievement was to show that this correlation is stronger than any correlation due to any local deterministic hidden-variable model.

Of course, I'm not agreeing with Gell-Mann concerning the many-worlds (or however you call his flavor of it) explanation. That's too esoteric for me ;-)).

 

[vanhees71]

To be clear I have never said Bell disproved local relativistic theory. I do object to your saying that local relativistic theory is inconsistent with the nonlocality of collapse.

For concreteness, we can discuss:

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9906034
Classical interventions in quantum systems. II. Relativistic invariance
Asher Peres

But this strengthens my argument, not yours (at least the section on superluminal signal propagation, particularly the statements below Eq. (11)). That for me implies (or is just another more precise way of stating) that there is no instantaneous collapse.

http://omnibus.uni-freiburg.de/~breuer/paper/proc98-1.pdf
State vector reduction in relativistic quantum mechanics
H. P. Breuer and F. Petruccione

http://omnibus.uni-freiburg.de/~breuer/paper/ischia.pdf
Relativistic theory of continuous measurements
H. P. Breuer and F. Petruccione

Let's discuss the papers one by one. So let's start with Peres's who is, as usual, very clear.

 

[ShayanJ]

No, Bob's photon had not this polarization state before, but it was totally unpolarized

when A measures her photon's polarization (e.g., with the outcome "H"), is that she'll update her state to $|VH\rangle$

So, when A measure's her photon, she updates the state to $|VH\rangle$, so now she knows that her photon is in state V and B's photon is in state H. But Bob's state is not affected and his photon is still unpolarized and has no defiinite polarization. But this means what A knows is wrong! So this can't be what we want because we want laws that give us the correct results or at least just stay quiet!

The other possibility, which you confirmed is what you think, is that the quantum state is subjective. So its just that A assigns a pure state to the two photons(which are separate systems after her measurement of her photon) and B assigns a mixed state to the two photons(which still constitute one system according to B). Now from this, I can clearly see the point of disagreement between you, atyy and stevendaryl in this thread. You don't care whether there is any underlying theory that assigns an objective state to the system and just accept the argument as it is. But they have the urge to go deeper and see that with your explanation, going deeper means accepting a hidden-variable theory which they don't like. So they think there should be something wrong with your explanation and that's why they need collapse which they accept as a yet-unexplained phenomena with yet-unknown reasons. You point out that this can't be true because QFT doesn't allow any kind of FTL signalling which of course they understand too. So I think they just want to assume collapse for now to escape from hidden variables and leave its explanation for future.(or maybe assume its fundamental?)
So its a choice between "never mind", "collapse" and "hidden variables". You seem to choose "never mind"(which is expected from a minimalist) and they choose "collapse". It seems collapse can neither be confirmed nor ruled out experimentally, and theoretically you just can't rule out that they can someday explain collapse(and if they assume its fundamental, then they don't need to explain it too and its only left to observations!). So this argument never ends!
This is how I see the situation!

 

[atyy]

But this strengthens my argument, not yours (at least the section on superluminal signal propagation, particularly the statements below Eq. (11)). That for me implies (or is just another more precise way of stating) that there is no instantaneous collapse.

Let's discuss the papers one by one. So let's start with Peres's who is, as usual, very clear.

OK, the statement below Peres's Eq 11 is

"The statistics of Bob’s result are not affected at all by what Alice may do at a spacelike distance, so that no superluminal signaling is possible."

I agree with it. which is in agreement with my point: the collapse does not lead to superluminal signalling, hence there is no contradiction between collapse and relativity.

 

[vanhees71]

But what is then "collapse" other than that A updates her knowledge due to the achieved polarization measurement of her photon (and the knowledge that it is polarization-entangled before her measurement)? Nothing happens to B's photon, and B still has unpolarized photons. So indeed Gell-Mann is right in his statement that nothing happens to B's photon!

 

[vanhees71]

So its a choice between "never mind", "collapse" and "hidden variables". You seem to choose "never mind"(which is expected from a minimalist) and they choose "collapse". It seems collapse can neither be confirmed nor ruled out experimentally, and theoretically you just can't rule out that they can someday explain collapse(and if they assume its fundamental, then they don't need to explain it too and its only left to observations!). So this argument never ends!
This is how I see the situation!

That's the point: Either collapse (in its naive form) contradicts the theory itself or it is an at best empty but at worst usually misleading phrase. That's why I'd prefer not to use it at all when talking about QT.

 

[atyy]

But what is then "collapse" other than that A updates her knowledge due to the achieved polarization measurement of her photon (and the knowledge that it is polarization-entangled before her measurement)? Nothing happens to B's photon, and B still has unpolarized photons. So indeed Gell-Mann is right in his statement that nothing happens to B's photon!

The collapse is nonlocal in the sense that the wave function is assigned to a spacelike surface of simultaneity, and the wavefunction on that hypersurface collapses instantaneously.

From the nonlocal collapse, the reduced density matrix of B can be derived, from which it can be seen that the collapse does not allow superluminal signalling.

So locality can be derived from nonlocality, and nonlocality does not contradict locality.

 

[atyy]

So, when A measure's her photon, she updates the state to $|VH\rangle$, so now she knows that her photon is in state V and B's photon is in state H. But Bob's state is not affected and his photon is still unpolarized and has no defiinite polarization. But this means what A knows is wrong! So this can't be what we want because we want laws that give us the correct results or at least just stay quiet!

The other possibility, which you confirmed is what you think, is that the quantum state is subjective. So its just that A assigns a pure state to the two photons(which are separate systems after her measurement of her photon) and B assigns a mixed state to the two photons(which still constitute one system according to B). Now from this, I can clearly see the point of disagreement between you, atyy and stevendaryl in this thread. You don't care whether there is any underlying theory that assigns an objective state to the system and just accept the argument as it is. But they have the urge to go deeper and see that with your explanation, going deeper means accepting a hidden-variable theory which they don't like. So they think there should be something wrong with your explanation and that's why they need collapse which they accept as a yet-unexplained phenomena with yet-unknown reasons. You point out that this can't be true because QFT doesn't allow any kind of FTL signalling which of course they understand too. So I think they just want to assume collapse for now to escape from hidden variables and leave its explanation for future.(or maybe assume its fundamental?)
So its a choice between "never mind", "collapse" and "hidden variables". You seem to choose "never mind"(which is expected from a minimalist) and they choose "collapse". It seems collapse can neither be confirmed nor ruled out experimentally, and theoretically you just can't rule out that they can someday explain collapse(and if they assume its fundamental, then they don't need to explain it too and its only left to observations!). So this argument never ends!
This is how I see the situation!

Reality is just a tool to calculate the outcomes of experiments.

 

[ShayanJ]

Reality is just a tool to calculate the outcomes of experiments.

So collapse is unnecessary because vanhees can do his calculations without it. Why do you insist on it then?

 

[ddd123]

So collapse is unnecessary because vanhees can do his calculations without it. Why do you insist on it then?

In some cases you're practically forced to use it, afaik.

 

[atyy]

So collapse is unnecessary because vanhees can do his calculations without it. Why do you insist on it then?

Collapse is needed for the consistency of quantum mechanics (in the Schroedinger picture).

If you do calculations in one frame in which collapse is not needed, the collapse will be needed to achieve the same prediction in a different frame, assuming you use the Schroedinger picture.

So collapse preserves the principle of relativity: any frame is as good as any other.

 

[Ken G]

If it's just a matter of Alice updating her knowledge of Bob's situation, then I would think that would mean that Bob had 0% chance before Alice's measurement, even if Alice didn't know that. Which to me implies that Bob's result was predetermined, at least for that particular measurement choice, which is sort of a hidden-variables conclusion.

For me, the resolution of this is to get away from the idea that "there is a probability" of something happening. Instead, simply treat the purpose of a probability to be an assessment based on your knowledge. I cannot think of a single physical situation where there actually "is a probability" of something happening in some absolute sense (that isn't trivially 1 or 0)-- can you? I wager that any example you give there, I could show how you are simply connecting a set of assumptions with a set of possible outcomes based on those assumptions-- in short, you will always be talking about information. I think this is an important point, even in classical situations like playing with a deck of cards-- there never is any such thing as "the probability I will get a straight flush", there is only what I know about that deck (or think I know), and how I assess my chances in the long run. It's true that a classical deck supports a concept of "how the cards lie" prior to the deal, but the fact that the player never uses that concept shows that's not what they need probabilities for. So Alice "has a probability," and Bob "has a probability," and that's it.

 

[secur]

So this argument never ends!

Fortunately it can end for you, or me: just ignore the whole thing, and do something productive instead.

Another approach is to remember that these are interpretations. That means we can't decide which, if any, is right. (If we could they wouldn't be interpretations any more: one would be "physics", the other "wrong".) The proper approach then is to use whichever suits your purpose for a given situation. Wait for new discoveries which will allow a decision. More pro-actively, try to think of experiments which could decide.

Either collapse (in its naive form) contradicts the theory itself or it is an at best empty but at worst usually misleading phrase. That's why I'd prefer not to use it at all when talking about QT.

The phrase "at best empty but at worst usually misleading" means precisely: I don't like that interpretation. But other people do. The resolution: don't use any phrase you don't like. When others do, just translate it to the interpretation you do like.

Consider a parallel situation: two people are credited with one theorem. This happened often during the Cold War: Soviets said their scientist ("A") discovered it, while the West said their guy, "B", did. So one side called it A's theorem, the other B's. Made no difference scientifically but a big difference politically. Now, we used to have conferences where the two sides met for co-operative discussions. The scientists didn't care, but couldn't comfortably call it by the other's name, because their politicians would send them to Siberia, or cut their DARPA funding. The resolution was easy. We agreed to let each side call it as they wished. There was no confusion, each knew exactly what the other meant. It became an in-joke, and actually enhanced collegiality.

Recommend you do the same with these interpretations.

So collapse is unnecessary because vanhees can do his calculations without it. Why do you insist on it then?

The calculations can always be done without any interpretation. But people like to have an intuitive picture to go along with their math. Few, if any, really "shut up and calculate". It's reasonable that atyy, or anyone, insist they're allowed their favorite interpretation. But don't insist the other guy has to use it too! Let each use whatever language they're comfortable with. I admit it might get a bit confusing, but surely it's better than endless argument, or Siberia.

For me, the resolution of this is to get away from the idea that "there is a probability" of something happening. Instead, simply treat the purpose of a probability to be an assessment based on your knowledge. I cannot think of a single physical situation where there actually "is a probability" of something happening in some absolute sense (that isn't trivially 1 or 0)-- can you? ... So Alice "has a probability," and Bob "has a probability," and that's it.

True in classical physics, but for QM it's not so clear. You're advocating the "minimal statistical interpretation", a.k.a. "minimal ensemble interpretation". Perhaps we can call it "minimal ensemble statistical interpretation" (MESI). Other interpretations of QM disagree. They say QM probabilities are absolute: not merely describing our limited information but truly inherent in just one instance.

Can QM really be interpreted the MESI way? I can think of a couple objections, and would like to hear what MESI proponents think of these. One, covalent bonds. It seems that superposition of orbits - in one single molecule - is essential. The other, quantum computing. When we have a bunch of qbits in the typical Bell state, the probabilities (50/50) must be essentially present in each one. You can't say half are "really" in one state, the others in the other state, we just don't know which are which. Quantum computing won't work at all with that model - it seems. Please let me know if I'm wrong about these objections.

 

[Jilang]

For me, the resolution of this is to get away from the idea that "there is a probability" of something happening. Instead, simply treat the purpose of a probability to be an assessment based on your knowledge. I cannot think of a single physical situation where there actually "is a probability" of something happening in some absolute sense (that isn't trivially 1 or 0)-- can you? I wager that any example you give there, I could show how you are simply connecting a set of assumptions with a set of possible outcomes based on those assumptions-- in short, you will always be talking about information. I think this is an important point, even in classical situations like playing with a deck of cards-- there never is any such thing as "the probability I will get a straight flush", there is only what I know about that deck (or think I know), and how I assess my chances in the long run. It's true that a classical deck supports a concept of "how the cards lie" prior to the deal, but the fact that the player never uses that concept shows that's not what they need probabilities for. So Alice "has a probability," and Bob "has a probability," and that's it.

Radioactive decay comes to mind. How would knowledge enter into that?

 

[Ken G]

Can QM really be interpreted the MESI way? I can think of a couple objections, and would like to hear what MESI proponents think of these. One, covalent bonds. It seems that superposition of orbits - in one single molecule - is essential.

I don't have any objection to the concept of superposition, it is a form of information too. We have information about the state, and that allows us to predict what will happen-- the information includes interference effects. A minimal ensemble interpretation does not require we say the state is either one or the other, and we just don't know which, it says we have some information and we do some mathematics and make a prediction that involves the concept of superposition.

 

[Ken G]

Radioactive decay comes to mind. How would knowledge enter into that?

Even with radioactive decay, information plays a role. Let's say the setup is at t=0 it has been established that an unstable nucleus has come into being. That's a form of information right there, but let's say we regard that as a fact of nature, and look at the probability a decay will occur between t=t_o and t=t_o+dt. Of course we agree that probability is e^-t_o/T dt/T, and we will say that is also the probability of a decay in that interval after time t_o has elapsed if we have no other information. But someone else who has the information that no decay has occurred for time t_o will reassess that probability as just dt/T. So there, even with radioactive decay, we have two different physicists with different information who will assess two different probabilities, and both will test their probabilities over many repetitions of the same situation, and both will find that their probability worked perfectly. So in both those situations, we see there is not "the probability" that the decay occurs in a given interval, there is the probability of that based on what you already know has or has not happened, and that's different for different people, but it works just like a probability for either one.

 

[secur]

I don't have any objection to the concept of superposition, it is a form of information too. We have information about the state, and that allows us to predict what will happen-- the information includes interference effects. A minimal ensemble interpretation does not require we say the state is either one or the other, and we just don't know which, it says we have some information and we do some mathematics and make a prediction that involves the concept of superposition.

We agree entirely on the physics, then - which is all that really matters. (Although I still wonder if other proponents of MEI, or MSI, would agree with your stance.) However I'm puzzled by your terminology. We know the covalent bond works by observing one single molecule. The fact that it doesn't fall apart requires the exchange interaction. This isn't an ionic bond which can be explained without recourse to superposed states. So - what does the word "ensemble" signify here?

 

[Ken G]

We agree entirely on the physics, then - which is all that really matters. (Although I still wonder if other proponents of MEI, or MSI, would agree with your stance.) However I'm puzzled by your terminology. We know the covalent bond works by observing one single molecule. The fact that it doesn't fall apart requires the exchange interaction. This isn't an ionic bond which can be explained without recourse to superposed states. So - what does the word "ensemble" signify here?

The concept of "ensemble" in a superposition is simply you can have a lot of copies of the superposition, and that information allows you to predict the behavior of the ensemble.

 

[secur]

The concept of "ensemble" in a superposition is simply you can have a lot of copies of the superposition, and that information allows you to predict the behavior of the ensemble.

We're predicting a single molecule's behavior. Statistical averaging over an ensemble of molecules is irrelevant, since the probability that the constituent atoms remain bonded is 1 (normal conditions). Nevertheless it's a "QM phenomenon", i.e., QM is required to explain it.

 

[Ken G]

We're predicting a single molecule's behavior. Statistical averaging over an ensemble of molecules is irrelevant, since the probability that the constituent atoms remain bonded is 1 (normal conditions). Nevertheless it's a "QM phenomenon", i.e., QM is required to explain it.

It doesn't matter what the probability is, that is only relevant to the size of the ensemble you will need to demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach. The key point is, in practice, physics works like this: information-->prediction-->testing. So if you just take that at face value, that's all you need-- you regard the probabilities you use in the "prediction" phase to be a simple function of the information you have and the laws you apply. Different information, different prediction, but it's all the same physics, and that's all we ever test. It's the minimal approach-- you simply never need to assert anything you don't have direct evidence for.

 

[bhobba]

That's a fair statement. But it really is interpretation dependent. And a lot of physicists don't really get tangled up in the question anyway.

Exactly.

As with so many things in QM its interpretation dependent.

Even knowing what the formalism says is very difficult which is why studying interpretations is quite interesting. You may think, for example, that at first sight QM is random, but we have interpretations in QM where it isn't (eg BM) so great care is needed in deciphering what QM says.

I have said it before, and will say it again, I think a much better starting point to understand QM is the following:
http://www.scottaaronson.com/democritus/lec9.html

The key issue of interpretations is exploring what those 'negative' probabilities are saying and what it means.

Strangely a lot of it is simply an aggrumet about the meaning of prpbrability:
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/bayes.html

Thanks
Bill

 

[bhobba]

In all due respect to a physics giant, I think that Gell-Mann's definitive statement that measurement of one particle in EPR has no effect on the other particle is going beyond what we understand about quantum mechanics.

Yes - but its for a lay audience. I think a bit of latitude is reasonable.

Thanks
Bill

 

[bhobba]

In response to Dr. Chinese, I thought that question that physicists don't want to get tangled up in is the most important question of entanglement, i.e.spooky action at a distance: How can measurement of for example spin of one particle affect instantaneously the spin of a very distant particle?

They don't want to get tangled up in a going nowhere philosophical analysis of it - they leave that up to philosophers.

What the great physicist Bell did was lift its beyond that - and that most definitely is where physicists come into it because it is subject to experimental testing.

Thanks
Bill

 

[Ken G]

Exactly.

As with so many things in QM its interpretation dependent.

Even knowing what the formalism says is very difficult which is why studying interpretations is quite interesting. You may think, for example, that at first sight QM is random, but we have interpretations in QM where it isn't (eg BM) so great care is needed in deciphering what QM says.

I have said it before, and will say it again, I think a much better starting point to understand QM is the following:
http://www.scottaaronson.com/democritus/lec9.html

The key issue of interpretations is exploring what those 'negative' probabilities are saying and what it means.

Strangely a lot of it is simply an aggrumet about the meaning of prpbrability:
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/bayes.html

Thanks
Bill

I finally bookmarked both of those, glad you reposted them.

 

[Herman Trivilino]

However, it would be equally right to say that measuring one photon does affect the other photon, since a measurement collapses the wave function of both photons.

Not necessarily. One could argue that you don't affect the other photon. Instead all you affect is the result of a measurement. According to the interpretation of QM that includes wave function collapse the property you measure is not a property that the particle possesses.

 

[Ken G]

The reason I agree with Gell-Mann is that I feel in physics we should have a standard for the word "effect" that is different from what a philosopher might use. To say we have an "effect", we must be able to demonstrate causation, not merely correlation. Entanglement is an example of the old adage "correlation is not causation", because causation requires an arrow that is not present in a correlation. So the physicist is always agnostic about causation until it is demonstrated as such-- it is never necessary to demonstrate the absence of causation, it is necessary to demonstrate its presence by means that go beyond correlation.