Question about Many Worlds branching in Quantum Mechanics

Pleonasm
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Supposing the Many Worlds interpretation of QM is true... If a branching occurs during what we perceive is a wave function collapse, why would this be perceptible to us as probabilties? Wouldn't we just branch, leaving it just as imperceviable as the passage of time? That is, it just happens. By way of analogy, there is no intermediate process in the passage of time. And this is how I envision the branching of many worlds.

In other words, why would we have any evidence of our own branching?
 
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Pleonasm said:
Supposing the Many Worlds interpretation of QM is true... If a branching occurs during what we perceive is a wave function collapse, why would this be perceptible to us as probabilties? Wouldn't we just branch, leaving it just as imperceviable as the passage of time? That is, it just happens. By way of analogy, there is no intermediate process in the passage of time. And this is how I envision the branching of many worlds.

In other words, why would we have any evidence of our own branching?
Why do you think that passage of time is not perceivable? What do you mean by "intermediate process in the passage of time"?
 
Demystifier said:
Why do you think that passage of time is not perceivable? What do you mean by "intermediate process in the passage of time"?

Point is, the supposed branching process is impercievable in the macroscopic world. I know decoherence explains part of that, but it isn't scientifically accounted for why there is a manifestation of the branching process in the microscopic world, when measuring/observing. It is unaccounted for as far as I can tell
 
Pleonasm said:
the supposed branching process is impercievable in the macroscopic world.
Why?

Pleonasm said:
I know decoherence explains part of that, but it isn't scientifically accounted for why there is a manifestation of the branching process in the microscopic world, when measuring/observing. It is unaccounted for as far as I can tell
It is one thing to claim that it is not clear why the branching has a manifestation, and another to claim that it does not have a manifestation. Which of the two do you actually claim?
 
Demystifier said:
It is one thing to claim that it is not clear why the branching has a manifestation, and another to claim that it does not have a manifestation. Which of the two do you actually claim?

The first one. We are assuming for arguments sake that some version of the many worlds is true, that is alternate histories are constantly taking place. There is no accounting for why there is a visible branching in the subatomic world when measuring, instead of just branching right away and no knowledge that it took place.
 
Perhaps you are asking this: If the wave function branches, then why do we see only one branch and not all of them? Is that your question?
 
Demystifier said:
Perhaps you are asking this: If the wave function branches, then why do we see only one branch and not all of them? Is that your question?

I am asking why we see any branching at all, and probabilities assigned, supposing Many Worlds is true. I don't believe a Many Worlds universe would look like the universe we live in. If it was proposed prior to findings of QM, I would be far more receptive to the theory.
 
Pleonasm said:
I don't believe a Many Worlds universe would look like the universe we live in.
So how do you believe that a many worlds universe would look like?
 
Pleonasm said:
I am asking why we see any branching at all, and probabilities assigned, supposing Many Worlds is true. I don't believe a Many Worlds universe would look like the universe we live in. If it was proposed prior to findings of QM, I would be far more receptive to the theory.

No, it was proposed about 30 years later, essentially with the intent to explain elements of probabilistic outcomes. If you throw a die repeatedly, and there is branching, you still see the expected statistical outcomes. Except in perhaps a very small number of branches. And even those will eventually evidence the normal patterns.
 
  • #10
For instance, a many worlds theory can account for why the value of the universe is largely arbitrary. As you know, there a far more theoretically functional universes than just the one we live in, and this is driving physicists nuts. One is prone to thinking that the universe somehow exists out a mathematical neccesity, but modern physics debunks this old notion.
Many worlds can explain these arbitrary values due to the other universes already existing parallel to ours.
 
  • #11
DrChinese said:
No, it was proposed about 30 years later, essentially with the intent to explain elements of probabilistic outcomes. If you throw a die repeatedly, and there is branching, you still see the expected statistical outcomes. Except in perhaps a very small number of branches. And even those will eventually evidence the normal patterns.

I wrote "if" it was proposed before rather than after QM
 
  • #12
Demystifier said:
So how do you believe that a many worlds universe would look like?

A subatomic world identical to the macroscopic, driven by Newtonian principles.
 
  • #13
Pleonasm said:
I wrote "if" it was proposed before rather than after QM

I saw that. What I meant is that MWI was proposed to resolve the some of the collapse issue.

I personally don't see it as much of a solution, but that's me. After all, some collapse is reversible. :smile:
 
  • #14
DrChinese said:
I saw that. What I meant is that MWI was proposed to resolve the some of the collapse issue.

I personally don't see it as much of a solution, but that's me. After all, some collapse is reversible. :smile:

It is not a bad theory and exemplifies "thinking out of the box". I don't think there was much thought given to multiverses and many worlds prior to Everett.
 
  • #15
Pleonasm said:
I am asking why we see any branching at all, and probabilities assigned, supposing Many Worlds is true.
Perhaps you think that first there are many worlds and then branching somehow happens? If that's what you think, that's completely wrong and probably the main source of your confusion. We first have one world, then a branching (more precisely - decoherence) occurs, and then we have many branches which can be thought of as "many worlds".

Pleonasm said:
A subatomic world identical to the macroscopic, driven by Newtonian principles.
I have no idea why do you think so. :wideeyed:
 
  • #16
So in my opinion, Many Worlds leads to a

Reductio ad absurdum
"In logic, reductio ad absurdum (Latin for "reduction to absurdity"; also argumentum ad absurdum, "argument to absurdity") is a form of argument which attempts either to disprove a statement by showing it inevitably leads to a ridiculous, absurd, or impractical conclusion, "
 
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  • #17
Demystifier said:
Perhaps you think that first there are many worlds and then branching somehow happens? If that's what you think, that's completely wrong and probably the main source of your confusion.

Not really. It is equally unaccounted for why we are privy to witnessing the branching.
 
  • #18
Pleonasm said:
For instance, a many worlds theory can account for why the value of the universe is largely arbitrary. As you know, there a far more theoretically functional universes than just the one we live in, and this is driving physicists nuts. One is prone to thinking that the universe somehow exists out a mathematical neccesity, but modern physics debunks this old notion.
Many worlds can explain these arbitrary values due to the other universes already existing parallel to ours.
Aaaa, I think I finally see the source of your confusion. You are confusing multiverse with many worlds. Those are different things!
 
  • #19
Demystifier said:
Aaaa, I think I finally see the source of your confusion. You are confusing multiverse with many worlds. Those are different things!

Depends on who you ask.
Multiverse = Many Worlds, Say Physicists
Two of the most bizarre ideas in modern physics are different sides of the same coin, say string theorists

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/424073/multiverse-many-worlds-say-physicists/
 
  • #20
The source cited in this post is not acceptable under the Physics Forums rules
Demystifier said:
I have no idea why do you think so. :wideeyed:

Hehe, well... My contention is that the citizens of a many worlds reality would NOT be privy the manifestation of the branching at any scales of observation. The reason I believe that is because it is an unneccesary component of the theory, and one which is unnaccounted for. You could say that I am applying Ockhams Razor.
 
  • #21
Pleonasm said:
Depends on who you ask.
Multiverse = Many Worlds, Say Physicists
Two of the most bizarre ideas in modern physics are different sides of the same coin, say string theorists

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/424073/multiverse-many-worlds-say-physicists/
So are you actually trying to say that you disagree with this interpretation? I do too, as do most other physicists. Many worlds and multiverse are considered different by almost all physicists. Even the authors of the idea above did not take this idea seriously in their subsequent works.
 
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  • #22
Demystifier said:
So are you actually trying to say that you disagree with this interpretation? I do too, as do most other physicists. Many worlds and multiverse are considered different by almost all physicists. Even the authors of the idea above did not take this idea seriously in their subsequent works.

I am not suggesting that they are one and the same, but they are compatible models that could very well be the same thing.
 
  • #23
Demystifier said:
So are you actually trying to say that you disagree with this interpretation?

Given what we know about quantum mechanics, yes.
 
  • #24
Pleonasm said:
So in my opinion, Many Worlds leads to a Reductio ad absurdum

I think you need to understand what it really is saying first.

Murray Gell-Mann explains it well:


What MW calls a world is almost certainly not what you think it is - it not specified that clearly.

Thanks
Bill
 
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  • #25
bhobba said:
I think you need to understand what it really is saying first.

Murray Gell-Mann explains it well:


What MW calls a world is almost certainly not what you think it is - it not specified that clearly.

Thanks
Bill


I'm not saying that the many worlds theory leads to reductio ad absurdum by default. The theory is consistent but probably not an accurate description of the universe. Quantum Mechanics casts serious doubt on the MW postulates, for the reason I gave.
 
  • #26
Pleonasm said:
I'm not saying that the many worlds theory leads to reductio ad absurdum by default. The theory is consistent but probably not an accurate description of the universe. Quantum Mechanics casts serious doubt on the MW postulates, for the reason I gave.

Well I will detail QM's postilutes

1. For every observation there exists an observable O whose eigenvalues are the possible outcomes of an observation.
2. The average of those outcomes E(O) = trace (OS) where S is a positive operator of unit trace by definition called the state of the system.

Now in what way does MW contradict them, bearing in mind of course, as explained by Murray Gell-Mann it's virtually the same, except for some semantics about what you call a history, as Decoherent Histories. You prove MW wrong and you have done the same for Decoherent Histories.

Thanks
Bill
 
  • #27
The man in the clip seems to suggest that the probability distribution is a function of the theory, rather than just some sideffect. This makes the theories plausability even more remote than I originally perceived it to be. I would be very amused if the universe operates in this way.

I think people are so befuddled by the probability distribution that they desperately conjure up anything. There are less freakish explanations as to why we are stuck with probabilities.
 
  • #28
Pleonasm said:
The man in the clip seems to suggest that the probability distribution is a function of the theory, rather than just some sideffect. This makes the theories plausability even more remote than I originally perceived it to be. I would be very amused if the universe operates in this way. I think people are so befuddled by the probability distribution that they desperately conjure up anything. There are less freakish explanations as to why we are stuck with probabilities.

Do you know who Murray Gell-Mann is? Most would take what he says a bit more seriously and think through it a bit more carefully, asking for clarification on any point not clear.

Anyway that's not what he is saying, but as to the role of probabilities in QM, there is nothing befuddled about it - we know a lot about why it's that way:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gleason's_theorem

You don't like MW, and many agree, but the situation is more nuanced than you seem to think it is.

I hold to the ignorance ensemble interpretation personally, but no interpretation is any more valid than any other. All have something to like and equally dislike. The choice is made purely on personal preference.

You made the claim - 'Quantum Mechanics casts serious doubt on the MW postulates, for the reason I gave.'

I gave the postulates of QM and asked you to simply back it up.

Thanks
Bill
 
  • #29
bhobba said:
Well I will detail QM's postilutes

1. For every observation there exists an observable O whose eigenvalues are the possible outcomes of an observation.
2. The average of those outcomes E(O) = trace (OS) where S is a positive operator of unit trace by definition called the state of the system.
Do those axioms include the bit about the outcomes of the operator will occur one at a time with probabilities determined by the eigenvalues of the operatior ?
I understand the MW ditches that by asserting that every outcome exists in a branch.
 
  • #30
Mentz114 said:
Do those axioms include the bit about the outcomes of the operator will occur one at a time with probabilities determined by the eigenvalues of the operatior ? I understand the MW ditches that by asserting that every outcome exists in a branch.

Of course it does - its in axiom 2.

What you are probably talking about is MW also has a decision theory proof of axiom 2. That is controversial. I prefer to stick with Gleason. There was a thread a while back looking at the various proofs - but it is at an advanced level not really suitable here in a beginners thread. But to be fair I spoke about things like eigenvalues etc that are I level, not B level to flesh out the OP's logic that MW is logically flawed. That is a very strong statement that can only be discussed at the proper technical level. I do not really like doing that - but then again like I said it is a rather strong statement. You can do a search on the thread if you like - but beware it is at the A level.

Murray Gell-Mann explains that the worlds in MW are not really what the usual conception of a world is - Everett, Wallace and others are talking of something less concrete, although one can, if one wishes think of it that way. But what he points out is to what gain - except confusing people. And when thought of in what he thinks of as the correct way it becomes more of a semantic issue if it's any different to the Decoherent Histories approach he, Hartle and Feynman (just before he died) developed.

Please, please, I know its a pain but do look at Murray's video. Murray of course, along with Feynman were the two great physicists at Caltech. Nobody else there could really keep up with them - Murray could only converse at his level with Feynman and initially they were very good friends - you would find them talking all the time with most other physicists just sitting there amazed at how freely the ideas and concepts flowed. Both, like one of the other great physicists of the time, Lev Landau, were so at ease with the physics behind the math it was literally frightening. But Murray and Feynman became a bit estranged later due to differences in style which you can Google. When Feynman died Murray was quite saddened, and was to give a eulogy at his wake. He never turned up and some thought was it because of his estrangement. It wasn't - he was dressed, ready to leave, when FBI agents detained him about a matter to do with possibly stolen Mayan artifacts - that was one of the differences between he and Feynman - Murray was interested in cultural things like that while Feynman was more along the lines of - I am just a kid from Far Rockaway that has seen through the ways of you city slickers. Not germane to the issue here of course, just an interesting aside on Gell-Mann and why what he says in the video should be taken seriously.

Just to finish - there in no logical contradiction in MW - but I would prefer the OP to understand that himself rather than me explaining why.

Thanks
Bill
 
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  • #31
bhobba said:
Of course it does - its in axiom 2.
[clipped to save space]
Thank you, Bill. Just checking.
 
  • #32
bhobba said:
Do you know who Murray Gell-Mann is? Most would take what he says a bit more seriously and think through it a bit more carefully, asking for clarification on any point not clear.

Well, then take negative probabilities seriously: https://arxiv.org/abs/1106.0767
 
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  • #33
when you compute the probability (<a + <b)(a> + b>) = aa* + bb* + ab* + a*b
the last sum may be negative. calling it a negative probability is a question of words
but it is not an exotic thing.
 
  • #34
DrChinese said:
I saw that. What I meant is that MWI was proposed to resolve the some of the collapse issue.

I personally don't see it as much of a solution, but that's me. After all, some collapse is reversible. :smile:

I don't understand the connection with the last sentence with the topic. Does reversibility of collapse say something about MW, or does it say something about human's fickleness in embracing and rejecting interpretations of quantum mechanics?
 
  • #35
atyy said:
Well, then take negative probabilities seriously: https://arxiv.org/abs/1106.0767

I had a conversation with my probability professor about that one. It occurs as an intermediate calculational result in a number of advanced areas - but is thought to be just that - results of calculations that can't be interpreted as usual. I gave him Feynman's famous article on it and explained when it first occurred in QM it turned out it was not really negative probabilities but positive probabilities of antimatter - although I do not think Gell-Mann is talking about something that easily resolved - not that it didn't take a while to sort it out as far as antimatter and the Klein-Gordon equation was concerned.

Decoherent Histories is not a fully developed interpretation - its quite ambitious in its aims so maybe what's going on with negative probabilities will eventually be clearer.

Thanks
Bill
 
  • #36
PaleMoon said:
but it is not an exotic thing.

That was my probability professors view.

But here I tend to agree with ATTY - it may be something deeper going on here.

Thanks
Bill
 
  • #37
I'm not sure if it's the same idea as Feynman's, but I like the following sequence of pictures to show how something like negative probabilities can come into play.

paths7.png


Suppose that you have a string loosely hung between two points. I'm ignoring gravity, so the string has no tendency to droop down. We can possibly model the shape of the string as a random process giving the vertical position ##y## as a function of the horizontal position ##x##, as shown in Figure A above. The shape of the string is almost arbitrary, except for the fact that the ends are fixed and the function ##y(x)## must be continuous. (We might also want to constrain the length of the string, and maybe make the string a little stiff so that ##\frac{dy}{dx}## tends to be small, but that's unnecessary details for what I'm going to say.) We could describe the possibilities for the shape of the string by giving a function ##P(y,x)##, which is the probability that at horizontal position ##x## the vertical position of the string is ##y##. If the shape of string is sufficiently close to being straight, as in Figure A, then there will be only one value of ##y## for each value of ##x##, so we would demand that ##\int P(y,x) dy = 1##. For each ##x##, there is a probability of 1 that the string is at some vertical value ##y##.

Now, Figure B shows a less well-behaved shape of the string. The string is allowed to double-back on itself. So it's no longer true that for each ##x## there is exactly one value of ##y## to find the string. As shown in the figure, there are points, such as the location of the light vertical line, where there are 3 values of ##y## where the string can be located, for the same value of ##x##. So if we're trying to describe the string's shape using probabilities, we can no longer use a probability ##P(y,x)## that has to obey ##\int P(y,x) dy = 1## for each value of ##x##.

Probably the most elegant approach would be to treat ##x## and ##y## symmetrically, and consider them both random variables as a function of a path variable, ##s##. But for the purposes of motivating "negative probabilities", we can take the approach shown in Figure C. Rather than having a positive probability of finding the string at height ##y##, we introduce a counting function ##C(y,x)## that can be positive (to indicate the presence of a section of the string with ##\frac{dx}{ds} > 0##, where ##x## is the horizontal location, increasing to the right, and ##s## is the path parameter, which increases monotonically along the string) or negative (to indicate ##\frac{dx}{ds} < 0##, so it's a section of a string that has doubled back). In the figure, at the light vertical line, there are two positive sections of the string and one negative section. So counting orientation, it adds up to 1 string. So our constraint on the probabilistic function ##C(x,y)## would be that for each value of ##x##, ##\int C(x,y) dy = 1##, allowing both positive and negative values for ##C##.

If you think of the ##x## axis as being time, rather than a spatial dimension, then the string represents a worldline of a particle. The points where the string doubles back can be interpreted as particle/antiparticle pair creation, making three particles temporarily, two of which then annihilate each other.
 

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  • #38
i appreciate mwi but not the w for world. the notion of probability would disappear in certain branches.
shooting a coin would obey the 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 ... rule in some worlds. qm mechanics would not be random in others and so on.
 
  • #39
PaleMoon said:
the notion of probability would disappear in certain branches.

Most definitely not. Observers in every branch would swear there is random probability in quantum outcomes.

By the way: the coin tossing result 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 is as equally likely as 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1. About once in every 16,000 series.
 
  • #40
in the branch in which every toss give a 1 the observers would have no idea of what would be a random toss.
spin would always be up.
remember that in the everett construction there are automats with memories. this could not be possible in several branches. a memory has to contain all the possible values from 00000000... to 11111111...
this would not be possible if all the spins are up
a memory has to be close to our physical branch
Several branches would not even contain atoms
 
  • #41
PaleMoon said:
in the branch in which every toss give a 1 the observers would have no idea of what would be a random toss.

Sure they would. However, in such a branch, based on those results, the observers would conclude that the state of the system was "spin up", instead of a superposition of up and down, precisely because the results they observed were not a random mixture of 1 and 0, but all 1.

PaleMoon said:
remember that in the everett construction there are automats with memories. this could not be possible in several branches. a memory has to contain all the possible values from 00000000... to 11111111...
this would not be possible if all the spins are up
a memory has to be close to our physical branch
Several branches would not even contain atoms

This all looks like word salad to me. I think you are confused about what the MWI actually says.
 
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  • #42
i have everett's thesis at home.
we can discuss about these automats and their properties if you want.
 
  • #43
  • #44
the book in the first lind is too expansive for me
dr chinese replied that 01010101010101... has the same probability than 111111111...
this is only true for us. we cannot get conclusions for other branches
i cannot see how statistics could be done in many other words or histories.
could they see that they belong to rare branches?
 
  • #45
PaleMoon said:
i cannot see how statistics could be done in many other words or histories.
could they see that they belong to rare branches?

I don't see why not.

Some people have talked about this rare branch stuff and I must say I do not really get it. Its not in Wallace as far as I can recall.

Most certainly though you can read Griffiths text which he has kindly made available for free. Its not MW but as I said, as explained by Murray Gell-Mann, decoherent histories and MW in his view is more of a semantic than an actual difference. If I haven't posted it before here is Murray's video:


Thanks
Bill
 
  • #46
in fact the problem does not concern only rare branches.
in our branch bell's inequalities are violated.
what about this violation in all the branches? i recall that all possible outputs are supposed to exist.

i know that it is not your preferred interpretation. it is hard to have answers from defenders
 
  • #47
bhobba said:
Some people have talked about this rare branch stuff and I must say I do not really get it.

I'm not sure what there is to "get". In some possible "worlds" the observed frequencies for repeated experiments will not equal the predictions of quantum mechanics.
 
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  • #48
PaleMoon said:
could they see that they belong to rare branches?

Of course, every branch is equally rare. The thing you refer to is that quantum outcomes themselves appear to violate statistical predictions of QM. Accordingly, an observer in such a world might conclude spin up is the outcome of EVERY measurement rather than being a 50-50 proposition, as we observe. (Or maybe they see it as 60-40.)

I agree there are a few branches as you describe - as stevendaryl also says. Out of the many times greater branches that yield normal statistics. So what? Certainly, in any experimental situation, you might be part of an environment that gives a "biased" answer as compared to some other environment.

Honestly, that part of MWI doesn't bother me as it does you. My question is: where are the other branches? Are they accessible?
 
  • #49
if they are orthogonal to us they are not accessible. (orthogonal meaning with no possible transition)
 
  • #50
PaleMoon said:
if they are orthogonal to us they are not accessible. (orthogonal meaning with no possible transition)
That is a tautology and tells us nothing. It is an assumption that there is no interaction. This fits the facts so any other assumption obviously would be false.
 
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