meopemuk said:
I see your point. Clock, rulers, observers, reference frames are, in fact, quantum objects whose positions and velocities cannot be determined simultaneously. So, everything becomes fuzzy: results of measurements, the Poincare group, etc. I have no idea how one can build a theory on such shaky grounds. Maybe I haven't thought hard enough.
Something like that, yes. And I agree the ground is shaky, but if life could evolve from chaos, I think we can build a theory on shaky ground. It's just that we need to build the reference too. This isn't just making it all more complex and shaky, it's also easier to see the potential of unification once everything is shaken up a bit. My personal thinking around this is that this relational information thinking isn't consistent unless it's combined with a deep evolutionary mechanism. Somehow it's obvious that we need a reference, but it's also obvious that this reference is "alive". The consistent solution I have as a vision is to this seemingly circular reasoning is that our reference is evolving. So our reality is not a static thing, it's probably more like a steady state, which appear static at certain scales. I've been thinking about this in circles for a few months and it seems that it's hard to find even a starting point because formalism, representation and dynamics are deeply entangled. But I am convinced there is a solution to this, it seems intuitively obvious althought hard to nail.
meopemuk said:
A different question worries me. We have established that measurements of space and time are fundamentally different, and that time even cannot be called an observable. Nevertheless special (and general) relativity assumes complete equivalence and interchangeability of space and time. Is this conclusion of SR really inevitable? or we can keep space and time separate while respecting such predictions of SR as relativity of simultaneity, time dilation, etc? My guess is that yes, we can. We probably went too far by declaring the space-time unification in the 4D Minkowski continuum.
I haven't worked out the formal details yet, but I envision a similarly symmetry as local lorentz invariance, that implies an upper bound of information propagation, at least in the differential sense. It should I suspect follow from the nature of the relational information. There is a relation between the information of the clock and the ruler (or any other configuration parameter for that matter). I picture time to simply be a parametrisation of the excepted future (to be defined as the pak of a bayesian-analog of a generalised entropy), relative to a sub-future (pure clock device). But this is probably again only an expectation, in the sense that the analog of lorentz invariance is likely to be observed. Classicaly this expectation should peak to be effectively a "rule", in the QG domain OTOH I think the notion of spacetime and lorentz invariance gets blurred enough to not make sense. The statement of lorentz invariance is probably blurred, thus the answer gets even more ambigous.
At least conceptually and intuitively I don't there is a problem for a radical approach to reduce to GR and ordinary QM in the respective limiting case.
I think this is quite a challange, I've been thinking about this off and on in circles for a few months and I try to make infinitesimal progress and come up with a working formalism.
I suspect the formalism will to start with, look something like a generalization of thermodynamics. But in a bayesian outfit, and a more realistic treatment of the ensembles and the measurement problems. I think dynamics can be integrated into this. The action principles should be something like minimizing information divergences. Once I've toyed on a little I will compare it to the standard expression and see what terms are missing. Right now it looks like the assumption of complete knowledge of probabiliy distributions may have something to do with it. What I am trying to find is a generalized entropy that isn't just a "state function" it rather contains the expected dynamics itself, so that minimizing the action will show to be nothing but a ME method. There should I think not be a need to "quantize it" because it would take these effects into account from construction. Classical mechanics should be limiting cases. One challange is that I hope (eventually) to see some of the basic CM stuff pop out by itself, for example the basic inertia and Newtons gravity as a limiting case. That would serve as a checkpoint. The standard model phenomenology would have to be ontop of that, by evolving the model to higher levels. I don't know exactly how I should do it yet, but something suggest that there is a way.
I like Ariel Catichas thinking. He has some good thinking in his papers.
http://www.albany.edu/physics/ariel_caticha.htm But except that I havn't had much luck finding ideas elsewhere. Most approachers are taking off at a level of abstraction that has broken a clean line of reasoning long time ago. I'm too much of a philosopher to find any motivation in that. I think you need to have another mindset to appreciate it, it's not for me anyway.
/Fredrik