D. Findings
45. Iran’s nuclear programme, as the Agency currently understands it, consists of a practically complete front end of a nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, heavy water production, a light water reactor, a heavy water research reactor and associated research and development facilities.
46. Iran has now acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge enrichment programme, and, for 12 years, a laser enrichment programme. In that context, Iran has admitted that it produced small amounts of LEU using both centrifuge and laser enrichment processes, and that it had failed to report a large number of conversion, fabrication and irradiation activities involving nuclear material, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium.
47. Based on all information currently available to the Agency, it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored. In his June and August 2003 reports to the Board of Governors (GOV/2003/40 and GOV/2003/63), the Director General identified a number of instances of such failures and the corrective actions that were being, or needed to be, taken with respect thereto by Iran.
48. Since the issuance of the Director General’s last report, a number of additional failures have been identified. These failures can be summarized as follows:
(a) Failure to report:
(i) the use of imported natural UF6 for the testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric
Company in 1999 and 2002, and the consequent production of enriched and
depleted uranium;
(ii) the import of natural uranium metal in 1994 and its subsequent transfer for use in
laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the
loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer of
resulting waste;
(iii) the production of UO2, UO3, UF4, UF6 and AUC from imported depleted UO2,
depleted U3O8 and natural U3O8, and the production and transfer of resulting
wastes;
(iv) the production of UO2 targets at ENTC and their irradiation in TRR, the
subsequent processing of those targets, including the separation of plutonium, the
production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of unprocessed
irradiated targets at TNRC;
(b) Failure to provide design information for:
(i) the centrifuge testing facility at the Kalaye Electric Company;
(ii) the laser laboratories at TNRC and Lashkar Ab’ad, and locations where resulting
wastes were processed and stored, including the waste storage facility at Karaj;
(iii) the facilities at ENTC and TNRC involved in the production of UO2, UO3, UF4,
UF6 and AUC;
(iv) TRR, with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets, and the hot cell facility
where the plutonium separation took place, as well as the waste handling facility
at TNRC; and
(c) Failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the implementation of
safeguards, through concealment.
