Wooden Neurons: Will They Be Conscious?

[basePARTICLE]

From a pure computation perspective, expectation states may be pre-computed for the experience/encounter, so without the whole map subsets of activity cannot approach that level of awareness especially when additional effects are missed!

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To a degree I base my interpretation of consciousness on the being not-blind-to it paradyne. To the degree some automata may become not-blind-to what its functions are, or how it self-manages, that automata can reputably climb up the little known ladder of consciousness.

 

[basePARTICLE]

From my last post I wanted to elucidate this not-blind-to phenomena which is esentially a knowledge based awareness. Remember knowledge based action is essentially, the ability to demonstrate your information is substantially correct, minus the Gettier defect.

Knowledge some philosophers argue is a purely conscious human activity, leading them to conclude that un-conscious activity cannot be knowledge based. Their argument is one cannot know if one is unaware. However I believe that with some Test(x) = X, with an, f(x), and g(x), such that F(f(x),g(x)) = y and Text(y) = X, f(x) could be known to be correct along with g(x). An automated function which shows f(x) to be correct in itz domain, F(f(),j), and can act on that information, should be called knowledge-in-itself.

As the great Chalmers has passed on his feedback mechanisms from simple human made thermostats, to an evolution as knowledge-in-itself, of course with the appropriate computations, we find ourselves with a mechanism underlying consciousness which implies realiability and surety. In other words consciousness cannot be compounded without a basis for realiablity.

As such consciousness is based on known information flow.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi basePARTICLE,

From my last post I wanted to elucidate this not-blind-to phenomena which is esentially a knowledge based awareness. Remember knowledge based action is essentially, the ability to demonstrate your information is substantially correct, minus the Gettier defect.

Knowledge some philosophers argue is a purely conscious human activity, leading them to conclude that un-conscious activity cannot be knowledge based. Their argument is one cannot know if one is unaware. However I believe that with some Test(x) = X, with an, f(x), and g(x), such that F(f(x),g(x)) = y and Text(y) = X, f(x) could be known to be correct along with g(x). An automated function which shows f(x) to be correct in itz domain, F(f(),j), and can act on that information, should be called knowledge-in-itself.

As the great Chalmers has passed on his feedback mechanisms from simple human made thermostats, to an evolution as knowledge-in-itself, of course with the appropriate computations, we find ourselves with a mechanism underlying consciousness which implies realiability and surety. In other words consciousness cannot be compounded without a basis for realiablity.

As such consciousness is based on known information flow.

I don't know what you're getting at. If I Google http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q="knowledge+based+awareness"++chalmers", I get 4 hits that have nothing to do with this topic.

What I do understand is:

… with the appropriate computations, we find ourselves with a mechanism underlying consciousness which implies realiability and surety. In other words consciousness cannot be compounded without a basis for realiablity.

If by that you mean Chalmers supports the viewpoint that a conscious machine must reliably support counterfactuals, then I’d agree. He goes through his viewpoint in detail in his paper, “Does a Rock Implement Every Finite State Automaton?”.

It’s this viewpoint I find lacking and indefensible in view of those papers by Maudlin, Putnam and Bishop. Like Christley, Endicott and Copeland, Chalmers is essentially attempting to define “computation” in a way which excludes systems that can’t support counterfactuals.

The problem all these philosophers come up against seems fairly simple to me however, and that is that nature doesn’t give a damn about our definitions. You can define all day and you won’t find anything intrinsic in your definitions that correlate a system to your definition. Searle points this out in considerable detail also, as does Harnad and others. Reliability in the sense of a computational mechanism being able to support counterfactuals will be a long dismissed notion 5 or 10 years from now.