Does Neuroscience Challenge the Existence of Free Will?

[Ken G]

Yes, and if a convincing case can be argued for an equation along the lines of
M = Ps <--> Pr,
I think it would be even more interesting if the relation was something more akin to
P(M) = Ps <--> Pr,
where P means "the projection onto the physical." It would not be necessary for P to be invertible, so the physicalist claim that
M = P^-1(Ps <--> Pr)
does not necessarily logically follow.

It is apparent that changes in the Ps <--> Pr interaction correlate with changes in M, and can be viewed as causal of changes in M because the detection of causality is one of the main properties of the P operation. However, if E signifies the evolution operator, involved in making some change, we still cannot say
E[M] = P^-1(E[Ps <--> Pr]),
as that requires not only that P is invertible, but also that it commutes with E. Instead, what we can say is
E[P([M])] = E[Ps <--> Pr].
If we assert that EP = PE' as our definition of E', then we have
P(E'[M]) = E[Ps <--> Pr],
and this is the fundamental equation that systems-type neurologists study. But note we must wonder to what extent P is invertible, and to what extent P commutes with E. If neither holds, we have a particularly interesting situation.

 

[apeiron]

Yes, and if a convincing case can be argued for an equation along the lines of M = Ps <--> Pr,

OK, you have lost me there. I'm not even sure if you are making a satirical argument. So you may have to explain it more fully .

A quick aside, to make a systems argument, one of the issues is having a systems notation. So I used set theory (as suggested by Salthe's hierarchy theory). But Peirce's sign of illation might be another route(http://www.math.uic.edu/~kauffman/TimeParadox.pdf).

Or because the = sign is always a statement about symmetry, and the systems view is about symmetry-breaking, then perhaps the notion of the reciprocal is the most accurate way to denote a process and its obverse - an invertible operation?

So Pr = 1/Ps could be another way of framing my argument. But then I was saying that Ps is the super-set, so not really invertible.

Anyway a logical notation that expresses the concepts is a live issue - and Louis Kauffman has highlighted the connections between Peirce, Nicod and Spencer-Brown. Another longer paper you might enjoy is http://www.math.uic.edu/~kauffman/Peirce.pdf.

Back to what you posted.

M = Ps <--> Pr - I translate this as the mind contains two constrasting views of causality, that are formed mutually as a symmetry-breaking of ignorance. But I think still the set theoretic view is more accurate.

My claim on P (models of physical causality) is that Ps = Pl + Pg. So systems causality is local construction plus global constraints.

Whereas Pr = Pl. So reductionist causality is based on just local construction.

However I then also claim that global constraints are still implied in Pr - they are just frozen and so can be left out of the modelling for simplicity's sake. Only the local construction has to be explicitly represented.

So Pr = Pl + not-Pg? Doesn't really work, does it?

But you raise an interesting issue just about the need for a formal notation that captures the ideas of systems causality. There is an abundance of notation to represent reductionist constructive arguments, but not really an equivalent for the systems view.

 

[Lievo]

it is not at all obvious that this approach will ever be anything but a study of the neural correlates of mental states, i.e., the mental states may always be something different.

Sure it's logically sound. But could you think of a way to make a positive statement along this line?

 

[Lievo]

Nascent mainstream is not self-contradictory. Nonlinear science is nascent to the mainstream, but it is mainstream (i.e. the work is published in well-known peer-reviewed journals). I don't know what you think my interpretation is; I responded to Q_Goest who (wrongly) put computational models and nonlinear science at odds.

I certainly agree your view is mainstream within the subfields that care about it. My point is that you're stretching the mainstream too far by applying it to neuroscience as a whole. The fact is most neuroscientists are not influenced by this view, because it does not have any impact in their day to day job. By the way, I guess what I don't like is that calling one's view mainstream is close to appeal to authority, which is hardly ever a good thing. When someone use that, usually that's because it doesn't have anything better to say. I know you can do better than that.

 

[Pythagorean]

Q Goest is the one that introduced mainstream as being scientifically meaningful.

I don't think most neuroscientists are influenced by the view, but I interpreted mainstream as pertaining to scientific peer review: the list of acceptable journals.

 

[Pythagorean]

In other words, these idea aren't beingrejected by the scientific community, and are passing peer review, even in the traditional neuroscience journals.

My traditional neuro advisor is happy to reach across the table and help us motivate our models biologically.

 

[apeiron]

By the way, I guess what I don't like is that calling one's view mainstream is close to appeal to authority, which is hardly ever a good thing. When someone use that, usually that's because it doesn't have anything better to say. I know you can do better than that.

Yes, you have made your position clear on appeals to authority...

As a neuroscientist, I wish you both stop what is either poorly supported or wrong view about what is mainstream in neuroscience.

And why you continue to battle strawmen beats me.

It is only you who set this up as claims about being mainstream. You can check back to the post where I urged Q Goest to focus on the particular literature of neural receptive fields and top-down attentional effects if you like. You will see that it was hardly an appeal to authority but instead an appeal to consider the actual neuroscience.

https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3177690&postcount=36

Of course, you are now trying to say that the receptive field studies are not mainstream, or not new, or not influential, or something.

But all you have supplied as a source for that view is an appeal to authority. And a lame suggestion for a google search.

BTW, google scholar returns 142,000 hits for brain + fMRI and 164,000 for brain + receptive fields. What does that tell us?

 

[Lievo]

You lose credibility with every post.

Your usual line when you got it wrong, it seems.

Check the top 10 papers from Nature Neuroscience over the past 10 years.

Small detail: this is Nature Reviews Neuroscience, which is not the same as Nature Neuroscience nor Nature.

Not so small detail: what you suggest is a bad methodology. Don't you know how to use pubmed?

I've check it anyway. Among these 10 papers, none but one discuss receptive fields, and only one reference is discussed. Among 114.

So again you said that "effects on selective attention on neural receptive fields has been one of the hottest areas of research for the last 20 years.", and again this is wrong. I can just wonder how you came to pretend otherwise despite it's wrong even using the data you emphasized.

Your claim that scanning can't be used to research top-down effects is obvious nonsense.

Obvious strawman building, given I never made this claim. I'm better not: this my line of research.

And are you suggesting electrode recording is somehow passe?

In a sense, yes. In a sense, no. The no part is that these kinds of data are still very interesting. The yes part is that data collection using electrode recording has been becoming too slow when compared to the 20-y-new neuroimaging technics in humans.

 

[Lievo]

Q Goest is the one that introduced mainstream as being scientifically meaningful.

I don't think most neuroscientists are influenced by the view, but I interpreted mainstream as pertaining to scientific peer review: the list of acceptable journals.

Oh I just misunderstood you then. To me mainstream is "the common current thought of the majority". I've just missed the part where this definition was otherwise. My bad, sorry.

 

[Lievo]

Yes, by design Turing machines are isolated from global influences.

If reality is computational, then all global influence are inside a TM. It may or not be the case, but if you assume the global environnement is not inside a Turing machine, there is no surprise you will conclude it's not computationnal.

Their internal states are simply informational, never meaningful.

By definition?

Are you unfamiliar with Searle's Chinese Room argument for example?

You actually give a sh.. about this argument?

BTW, I don't accept the weak~strong dichotomy as it is being used here because it too hardwires in the very reductionist assumptions that are being challenged.

As I have said, the entire system is what emerges. So you have a development from the vaguely existing to the crisply existing. But if weak = vague, and strong = crisp, then perhaps you would be making a fair translation.

Is there any system that does not emerge, from these definitions?

BTW, google scholar returns 142,000 hits for brain + fMRI and 164,000 for brain + receptive fields. What does that tell us?

*cough cough* I'm afraid it tells us you are not very familar with this engine. Brain + "receptive field" returns 88 700 hits. You see the trick?

You may notice that brain + MRI returns 1 130 000

 

[Pythagorean]

Oh I just misunderstood you then. To me mainstream is "the common current thought of the majority". I've just missed the part where this definition was otherwise. My bad, sorry.

Sarcasm is very productive. There's something Q_Goest and you are conflating here.

There's three things going on:

1. constituent reductionism
2. causal reductionism
3. philosophical reductionism

My point is that nonlinear dynamics conforms to 1. and 2. so it IS mainstream scientifically; there's no change of view necessary in a strictly fundamental, scientific manner. If you're a real neuroscientist, then you have got to understand this at least with the canonical Hodgkins Huxley model.

apeiron and Q_Goest are arguing about 2. I'm not part of that argument, I'm a causal reductionist (i.e. I agree with Q_Goest there). Nonlinear dynamics is in the same camp, strictly speaking (it says nothing about 3., human interpretation does).

I disagree with Q_Goest that he can jump from (1 and 2) to 3 as he did, suggesting that because there's compartmental models, 3. must be true too. Nonlinear dynamics is evidence to me, that 3. is wrong. This may not be a mainstream view in philosophy (I wouldn't know) but we were talking about science, weren't we? Which is why you flashed your alleged neuroscience credentials.

 

[apeiron]

So again you said that "effects on selective attention on neural receptive fields has been one of the hottest areas of research for the last 20 years.", and again this is wrong. I can just wonder how you came to pretend otherwise despite it's wrong even using the data you emphasized.

Yeah, easy tactic to pick out isolated statements rather than deal with the substance of a post.

Again, the context was Q Goest disbelief in global constraints, and my saying global constraints are mainstream in neuroscience since forever (like since Luria for example). He asked about neurons so I cited the specific receptive field research.

Now you want to make it about receptive fields rather than top-down causality. Well still the effects of selective attention on receptive fields was the biggest thing to happen in the field since Torsten/Wiesel. Fair to say Singer/Gray oscillations would have grabbed more headlines, of course.

Perhaps you were not around at the time so don't quite appreciate the impact the work had?

Obvious strawman building, given I never made this claim. I'm better not: this my line of research.

And now you can tell us exactly how the scanning revolution has changed our view of the brain perhaps. What do you consider a few of the things that have been revealed that we never expected?

If scanning is the new gold standard as you seem to want to suggest, where are the results to match animal studies? Name your hot 5 or 10 results when it comes to the cognitive architecture of the brain and let's see what is not essentially a confirmation of animal studies.

Or you could just answer the OP. What new light has imaging thrown on the subject of freewill (that had not already been foreshadowed by EEG studies or animal studies)?

I expect the usual silence on matters of any substance.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi Pythagorean,

Nascent mainstream is not self-contradictory. Nonlinear science is nascent to the mainstream, but it is mainstream (i.e. the work is published in well-known peer-reviewed journals). I don't know what you think my interpretation is; I responded to Q_Goest who (wrongly) put computational models and nonlinear science at odds.

You’ve misunderstood then. I previously tried to bring out what your views were on the topic of downward causation and you took offense. The reason I was asking was to figure out what kind of downward causation, if any, you were supporting. As I’d eluded to before, I’m not sure you understand what some of these folks are saying about how nonlinear systems allow for downward causation. I have no problem with the fact that most of reality is nonlinear. Reality really is nonlinear. I only have a problem with the concept of strong emergence and downward causation, and it seems there are those in the literature who attempt to use the concept of nonlinear systems to push these ideas. I’m not sure if you’re aware of those attempts or not, but it appears you aren’t.

 

[nismaratwork]

I would have to agree with Pythagorean here, or rather, his assessment. I don't think I'm knowledgeable enough yet to pick a camp beyond the default I thoughtlessly hold.

Put in terms of 123 however, and re-reading the thread, I have to say that either Lievo, you're not understanding Pythagorean's position, or you're uncharacterstically taunting him.

 

[Pythagorean]

Hi Pythagorean,

You’ve misunderstood then. I previously tried to bring out what your views were on the topic of downward causation and you took offense. The reason I was asking was to figure out what kind of downward causation, if any, you were supporting. As I’d eluded to before, I’m not sure you understand what some of these folks are saying about how nonlinear systems allow for downward causation. I have no problem with the fact that most of reality is nonlinear. Reality really is nonlinear. I only have a problem with the concept of strong emergence and downward causation, and it seems there are those in the literature who attempt to use the concept of nonlinear systems to push these ideas. I’m not sure if you’re aware of those attempts or not, but it appears you aren’t.

I clearly said weak emergence, and that I have no idea what downward causation means and that I'm not supporting it because I don't understand it. Then I was given definitions (for the fifth time) that don't help me to understand it. I'm not particularly concerned about understanding it, either.

I thought you were attacking nonlinear sciences (I do realize there are people that abuse it, just like they do with quantum mechanics, maybe my post above replying to lievo will clear up my disagreeance with you, if it exists; not sure anymore) post #211

 

[apeiron]

If reality is computational, then all global influence are inside a TM. It may or not be the case, but if you assume the global environnement is not inside a Turing machine, there is no surprise you will conclude it's not computationnal.

But reality is not computational.

*cough cough* I'm afraid it tells us you are not very familar with this engine. Brain + "receptive field" returns 88 700 hits. You see the trick?

You may notice that brain + MRI returns 1 130 000

Why would I search for MRI instead of fMRI? You want that I compare anatomy studies to functional ones? So yes I did see your trick .

But continue with your appeal to the authority of google searches in place of engaging in substantive arguments by all means. It is really making you look clever.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi apeiron,

Davies correctly says that global constraints are not some extra force. Force is a localised, atomised, action - efficient causality. Constraints are just constraints. They might sound "forceful" because they act downwards to constrain the local degrees of freedom (as I say, shape them to have some distinct identity). But they are a complementary form of causality. A constraining or limiting action, not a constructive or additive one.

If one defines global constraints as you say, I have no argument. It sounds more like "boundary conditions". Benard cells for example, are bounded top and bottom with heat flux on the bottom and heat removed at the top. Are these "global constraints"? Certainly Benard cells are not an example of downward causation. I think the quote I've provided by Davies states that position quite clearly.

 

[Q_Goest]

There's something Q_Goest and you are conflating here.

There's three things going on:

1. constituent reductionism
2. causal reductionism
3. philosophical reductionism

My point is that nonlinear dynamics conforms to 1. and 2. so it IS mainstream scientifically; there's no change of view necessary in a strictly fundamental, scientific manner. If you're a real neuroscientist, then you have got to understand this at least with the canonical Hodgkins Huxley model.

apeiron and Q_Goest are arguing about 2. I'm not part of that argument, I'm a causal reductionist (i.e. I agree with Q_Goest there). Nonlinear dynamics is in the same camp, strictly speaking (it says nothing about 3., human interpretation does).

I disagree with Q_Goest that he can jump from (1 and 2) to 3 as he did, suggesting that because there's compartmental models, 3. must be true too. Nonlinear dynamics is evidence to me, that 3. is wrong. This may not be a mainstream view in philosophy (I wouldn't know) but we were talking about science, weren't we? Which is why you flashed your alleged neuroscience credentials.

What do you mean by philosophical reductionism?

 

[Lievo]

Yeah, easy tactic to pick out isolated statements rather than deal with the substance of a post.

You could say "Ok I was wrong". That happens, you know. Even to those guys who talk to Chalmer.

the effects of selective attention on receptive fields (...)
Perhaps you were not around at the time so don't quite appreciate the impact the work had?

Or perhaps it had little impact.

And now you can tell us exactly how the scanning revolution has changed our view of the brain perhaps. What do you consider a few of the things that have been revealed that we never expected?

That we never expected... strawman but interesting: at a glance I would say default mode, cognition in cerebellum, consciousness in insula, modulation of cortical tickness, BCI with person supposely in coma.

 

[Pythagorean]

What do you mean by philosophical reductionism?

epistemological reductionism?

The idea that we can (deterministically) predict what will emerge just by knowing the constituents. That the behavior of the whole can be described by behavior of the constituents.

I found this: It's really tough to read but it outlines the difference between ontological and the epistemological reductionism:
http://www.zeww.uni-hannover.de/026_Hoyningen_Ep_Reduct_Biol.pdf

 

[Q_Goest]

Can you explain why separability should breaks down at this border, despite QM is perfectly computable?

Sorry. This is a great question, but I think our discussion of 'free will' has already gotten a bit far afield. Maybe another thread is in order?

 

[Lievo]

Sarcasm is very productive.

I would have to agree with Pythagorean here

I give you my word I was not sacastic here. Please read my post #209 as pure first degree, including apology. I've no idea why it appears otherwise.

 

[Pythagorean]

I give you my word I was not sacastic here. Please read my post #209 as pure first degree, including apology. I've no idea why it appears otherwise.

Not a big deal, no worries. I even made my statement sarcastic for fun. But there was also substance in that post.

 

[apeiron]

Hi apeiron,

If one defines global constraints as you say, I have no argument. It sounds more like "boundary conditions". Benard cells for example, are bounded top and bottom with heat flux on the bottom and heat removed at the top. Are these "global constraints"? Certainly Benard cells are not an example of downward causation. I think the quote I've provided by Davies states that position quite clearly.

OK, now go back to Pattee on the difference between holonomic and non-holonomic constraints.

Sorry about the jargon, but this is important. Remember that we are talking about the modelling of conscious freewill - and so the modelling of complex adaptive systems, or systems with life and mind.

So the claim is that these are systems with control over their global constraints/boundary conditions - in a way that non-living systems like Benard cells are not.

A dissipative structure like a Benard cell is about the self-organisation that occurs within certain fixed boundary conditions (the constraints are imposed from the outside - by an experimenter in this case). So there is a kind of downwards causality - the simplest possible kind. You could call it strong, or weak, or whatever. Holonomic is what some physicists would call it.

But life and mind are more complex. They have the memory mechanisms that can manipulate the constraints acting on dynamical systems. Genes know when to toss an enzyme into the mix to change the dynamics of a metabolic reaction. They can shift the global constraints.

The human mind - employing speech - does the same trick. Clear your mind as best you can (relax the constraints and so maximise the degrees of freedom). Now I will toss the word DONKEY at you. Your state of awareness will now be constrained selectively. You will be thinking about donkeys, what they look like, what they mean, etc. Now I will say ANGRY DONKEY, and your state of thought will become even more constrained, more selective, more highly specified.

So the point about complex systems is that they are also still just dissipative structures (all life and mind exists as order that accelerates the entropification of the universe). But they have these extra levels of control over the global contraints by which their dynamical processes are self-organising.

So now downwards causation starts to seem like something strong and distinctive. For example, I can of my own freewill decide to rest or run about. So even my rate of entropification is under some control (over a limited range of course).

You can see two things hopefully here. The first is that this view maintains a gradualism from the non-living system (like a Benard cell) to living ones. Yet it also defines the crucial difference. One is merely holonomic, the other is also non-holonomic.

And it seems fair enough to say both are examples of strong downward causation - one being of the strong holonomic variety, the other being of the strong non-holonomic one. But I am not going to die in the ditch over jargon.

The idea I am defending is that the causality of systems is based on a dichotomy of local construction and global constraint. This loosely translates to what people have meant by bottom-up and top-down causality. Or even initiating conditions and boundary conditions.

But the advantage of the jargon I prefer is that it is based on a logic of vagueness. It presumes the existence of local degrees of freedom (the indeterminate potential) and then the constraints that arise to organise them into a force that can actually construct.

 

[Lievo]

But reality is not computational.

How do you know?

Why would I search for MRI instead of fMRI? You want that I compare anatomy studies to functional ones?

C'mon. You have to search MRI because fMRI does not appears in functionnal MRI, echo-planar MRI, sparse sampling MRI, event-related MRI, block designed MRI, ... and yes also anatomical MRI. A lot to look at with this technics alone. Alternativley, search for brain imaging.

I also suggest you look at the pattern in time. I did not keep the data, but that's impressing.

 

[Q_Goest]

epistemological reductionism?

The idea that we can (deterministically) predict what will emerge just by knowing the constituents. That the behavior of the whole can be described by behavior of the constituents.

I found this: It's really tough to read but it outlines the difference between ontological and the epistemological reductionism:
http://www.zeww.uni-hannover.de/026_Hoyningen_Ep_Reduct_Biol.pdf

I'd say that, strictly speaking, we can't deterministically predict things, even in principal. The reason being that wave function collapse is not, in principal, deterministically predictable. But that doesn't mean that classical mechanics isn't deterministic. Yes, classical mechanics is a model that takes agregates of particles and sums them up and makes deterministic predictions which I don't see as being controversial at all. What I've tried to bring out is that the deviation from this deterministic prediction of the model is not important to providing for any kind of downward causation, mental causation, free will, etc... Just because our initial conditions may not be knowable down to the particle level in principal, doesn't mean that we now have wiggle room to allow for some kind of 'free will'.

 

[nismaratwork]

I give you my word I was not sacastic here. Please read my post #209 as pure first degree, including apology. I've no idea why it appears otherwise.

Well, I did say it would have been uncharacteristic for you... for me that's practically a compliment.

@apeiron: What does it say about someone who holds an image in their mind, ignoring everything including, (to keep the theme) 'ANGRY DONKEY'? Are they selectively bypassing this causation, or is it a matter of truly gathering your thoughts? Can you avoid the downward casuation by essentially swimming upstread to being with, or would you need to be utterly autistic for that to be meaningful?

Understand, I'm not trying to test your hypothetical, I just wonder how my speculative questions fit within its framework.

 

[nismaratwork]

I'd say that, strictly speaking, we can't deterministically predict things, even in principal. The reason being that wave function collapse is not, in principal, deterministically predictable. But that doesn't mean that classical mechanics isn't deterministic. Yes, classical mechanics is a model that takes agregates of particles and sums them up and makes deterministic predictions which I don't see as being controversial at all. What I've tried to bring out is that the deviation from this deterministic prediction of the model is not important to providing for any kind of downward causation, mental causation, free will, etc... Just because our initial conditions may not be knowable down to the particle level in principal, doesn't mean that we now have wiggle room to allow for some kind of 'free will'.

What does the (possible fiction) of collapse have to do with determinism? That just leads to circular reasoning dictated by the choice of Interpreation one chooses, unless it's dBB in which case there is no wavefunction collapse of any form in any way.

 

[Lievo]

Sorry. This is a great question, but I think our discussion of 'free will' has already gotten a bit far afield. Maybe another thread is in order?

No pb. I think this is the heart of what I don't get in your position, surely we will have to discuss it at one point.

 

[apeiron]

How do you know?

Quantum mechanics.

So how do you know its computational?

C'mon. You have to search MRI because fMRI does not appears in functionnal MRI, echo-planar MRI, sparse sampling MRI, event-related MRI, block designed MRI, ... and yes also anatomical MRI. A lot to look at with this technics alone. Alternativley, search for brain imaging.

I also suggest you look at the pattern in time. I did not keep the data, but that's impressing.

Argument by citation impact still? Hilarious.

OK, if we are comparing modalities, then google scholar brain + "single unit". Try comparing apples and apples a little bit.

You are obsessing about techniques, I was discussing concepts. Let me know anytime you feel up to discussing concepts.

 

[Ken G]

Sure it's logically sound. But could you think of a way to make a positive statement along this line?

Yes-- if we adopt a physicalist perspective, we are led to imagine that ultimately, all means of understanding the mind must be framed in physicalist language. If one merely sees physicalist language as the most objectively accessible correlates of the mind, one is led in a different direction, one that continues to allow validity to more psychological, as opposed to strictly neurological, approaches. That is the positive way to say it-- we are embarking on an inclusive study of mind, not an exclusive one. This also relates to what insights a systems approach can bring to the table-- I'm merely expanding the view that top-down physical approaches have value to saying that nonphysical approaches (introspection, psychology, behavioral studies, etc.) have value as well. I doubt we'll get a well-rounded view of what the mind is strictly with physicalist reductionism, and probably not even by extending that to include systems approaches, if doing so means turning away from all other modes of investigation. Doing so is essentially mistaking the meaning of language, and its role in human inquiry, which would be a particularly unfortunate mistake in regard to language about the mind.

 

[Pythagorean]

I'd say that, strictly speaking, we can't deterministically predict things, even in principal. The reason being that wave function collapse is not, in principal, deterministically predictable. But that doesn't mean that classical mechanics isn't deterministic. Yes, classical mechanics is a model that takes agregates of particles and sums them up and makes deterministic predictions which I don't see as being controversial at all. What I've tried to bring out is that the deviation from this deterministic prediction of the model is not important to providing for any kind of downward causation, mental causation, free will, etc... Just because our initial conditions may not be knowable down to the particle level in principal, doesn't mean that we now have wiggle room to allow for some kind of 'free will'.

And I agree with you. I've actually pointed out (somewhere around here) two independent experiments that don't look good for free will, where experimenters were able to predict people's behavior who thought they were making choices up to six seconds later. So six seconds after the deterministic system was already on it's way, the individual thought "hey, I'll choose this one" but the computer had already detected the system's (the brains) direction and beat the individual to the conclusion.

here's one of the two videos:

 

[apeiron]

@apeiron: What does it say about someone who holds an image in their mind, ignoring everything including, (to keep the theme) 'ANGRY DONKEY'? Are they selectively bypassing this causation, or is it a matter of truly gathering your thoughts? Can you avoid the downward casuation by essentially swimming upstread to being with, or would you need to be utterly autistic for that to be meaningful?

Understand, I'm not trying to test your hypothetical, I just wonder how my speculative questions fit within its framework.

That's why you have to clear your mind - clear away any existing imposed state of anticipation/intention.

I presume you already have some thoughts organising your mind at that moment - a prevailing top-down constrained view of what to expect. So you have to relax that to appreciate the power of the words alone.

 

[Q_Goest]

OK, now go back to Pattee on the difference between holonomic and non-holonomic constraints.

Sorry about the jargon, but this is important. Remember that we are talking about the modelling of conscious freewill - and so the modelling of complex adaptive systems, or systems with life and mind.

So the claim is that these are systems with control over their global constraints/boundary conditions - in a way that non-living systems like Benard cells are not.

A dissipative structure like a Benard cell is about the self-organisation that occurs within certain fixed boundary conditions (the constraints are imposed from the outside - by an experimenter in this case). So there is a kind of downwards causality - the simplest possible kind. You could call it strong, or weak, or whatever. Holonomic is what some physicists would call it.

But life and mind are more complex. They have the memory mechanisms that can manipulate the constraints acting on dynamical systems. Genes know when to toss an enzyme into the mix to change the dynamics of a metabolic reaction. They can shift the global constraints.
...

And it seems fair enough to say both are examples of strong downward causation - one being of the strong holonomic variety, the other being of the strong non-holonomic one. But I am not going to die in the ditch over jargon.

The idea I am defending is that the causality of systems is based on a dichotomy of local construction and global constraint. This loosely translates to what people have meant by bottom-up and top-down causality. Or even initiating conditions and boundary conditions.

But the advantage of the jargon I prefer is that it is based on a logic of vagueness. It presumes the existence of local degrees of freedom (the indeterminate potential) and then the constraints that arise to organise them into a force that can actually construct.

Ok, I guess we'll disagree on that. I think you're saying that genes and/or enzymes are causally influenced by the 'global state' of the brain. If that's what you're suggesting, then why allow one classical mechanical system to differ from another? By that I mean I see no reason to segragate 'living' systems that are described using classical mechanics from 'not alive' systems. That represents a paradox to me. We have 2 systems, both of which can be described to the degree necessary to make legitamate descriptions, modeled as classical, but the live one has genuine downward causation and the other non-living one doesn't. Is that what you mean?

 

[Pythagorean]

Ok, here's an argument, and it seems something along the lines of apeiron's argument.



I disagree with the assertion that we have choice over our environment. This video ignores the whole "did I really choose what I chose" question. Our choice of environment could easily be predetermined by the factors that he spoke of before drawing the final conclusion.

 

[apeiron]

Ok, I guess we'll disagree on that. I think you're saying that genes and/or enzymes are causally influenced by the 'global state' of the brain. If that's what you're suggesting, then why allow one classical mechanical system to differ from another? By that I mean I see no reason to segragate 'living' systems that are described using classical mechanics from 'not alive' systems. That represents a paradox to me. We have 2 systems, both of which can be described to the degree necessary to make legitamate descriptions, modeled as classical, but the live one has genuine downward causation and the other non-living one doesn't. Is that what you mean?

No, you completely misunderstand if you think I said brain states are controlling genes and enzymes. The example I gave was of enzymes controlling metabolic processes, and making a parallel with the way words control brain states.

And the symbol grounding problem is an example of why there is more to life than just rate dependent dynamics (classical physics).

Perhaps we have indeed reached the end of the road on this discussion. I would really recommend reading Pattee carefully as I have founded him the sharpest writer on this particular aspect of the systems approach.

 

[Pythagorean]

Here's the one I was talking about that predicted 6 seconds before the person consciously "made a decision" :

 

[Lievo]

Quantum mechanics.

So how do you know its computational?

That's you who pretend to know that. I personnaly don't know -altough it would be my guess.

What I know, is that if QM applies correctly describe reality, then reality is computationnal.

Argument by citation impact still? Hilarious.

Yep. An hilarious standard technics.

google scholar brain + "single unit"

Yep. For each paper mentionning single unit, 6 mention brain imaging. Again you're pointing data that show you're wrong, as if it was showing you right.

You are obsessing about techniques, I was discussing concepts.

Good for you. Just stop dig your heels in when you're so obviously wrong and we may switch faster to more interesting or at least fresh stuff. :zzz:

 

[Ken G]

OK, you have lost me there. I'm not even sure if you are making a satirical argument.

No satire-- just putting physicalism into a kind of operator formalism. When one does that, it exposes several hidden assumptions, in particular that P is invertible (so knowledge of a physical state of a mind is identical to knowledge of the mind) and that it commutes with E (so the evolution of a physical state is the same thing as evolution of mind). Those are actually different assertions, neither of which has any solid support.

For example, it is possible that the physical state of the mind is never going to suffice to tell us what is "in" that mind, and it is sheer assumption on our part that it ever could (and there I also echo your points about a reductionist "state" as being a kind of modelers fiction, indeed I extend that as well to the more potent coupling in the systems view). If knowing everything there is to know about the physical state of a mind is still not enough to know what is "in" that mind (imagine even trying to define the meaning of that phrase), then P is not invertible.

Also, one might imagine a situation where P actually is invertible, but does not commute with E. That is the case for invertible matrices, for example. Then if a mental state M evolves into E[M], and we look at its physical expression, we have P(E[M]). If we claim that P is invertible, we can say M = P^-1(Pr<-->Ps), where by Pr<-->Ps I just mean whatever physical interplay between top-down and bottom-up interactions one wishes to imagine. However, we could still only say E[M] = E[P^-1(Pr<-->Ps)], we could not say E[M] = P^-1(E[Pr<-->Ps]). In other words, if we start out with a state where M = P^-1(Pr<-->Ps) does hold, it does not necessarily continue to hold as it evolves, if P does not commute with E. This is the case, for example, in quantum mechanics, where states of known observables do not have to evolve into states of known observables, so even if we can initially invert the observable to obtain the state, we are not likely to be able to do that later on after evolving the observable correlates of the state.

M = Ps <--> Pr - I translate this as the mind contains two constrasting views of causality, that are formed mutually as a symmetry-breaking of ignorance. But I think still the set theoretic view is more accurate.

Indeed, I would say the actual equation must be P(M) = Ps<-->Pr, such that physical language we apply to the mind contains the two contrasting views you mention. The mind itself does not contain those contrasting views, because the mind is just the mind, and is not responsible for our language about it. This is usually a nitpick, but here it becomes centrally important-- we are trying to understand the limitations we impose when we use reductionism, so we should also understand the limitations we impose when we choose any type of language. The mind leading the mind, in effect-- and I'm going to claim that one! (neuroscience: the mind leading the mind.)

My claim on P (models of physical causality) is that Ps = Pl + Pg. So systems causality is local construction plus global constraints.

Yes, I see your point that Ps subsumes Pr, so my notation Ps<-->Pr does not embody that-- I wasn't too worried about the notation, only the issue that one may or may not take a systems approach, what I'm focusing on at the moment is the physicalist element of either.

However I then also claim that global constraints are still implied in Pr - they are just frozen and so can be left out of the modelling for simplicity's sake. Only the local construction has to be explicitly represented.

Yes, I agree here completely. I haven't heard it said from a systems perspective, but I always stress that all laws of physics are differential equations, so are never complete-- there is no "theory of boundary conditions", that is the dirty little secret of the manual elements of physics. It's the thaumaturgical element.

But you raise an interesting issue just about the need for a formal notation that captures the ideas of systems causality. There is an abundance of notation to represent reductionist constructive arguments, but not really an equivalent for the systems view.

That's an interesting point, and I agree that causality in the Ps and Pr domains is a very important aspect of physicalist thinking. What I'm saying, though, is that we also need a notation for lifting the physical language into a broader language of mind. Simply assuming that the mind is completely describable by its physical correlates strikes me as a good way to shoot ourselves in the foot down the road, and the notation involving P and E operations is intended to draw out the hidden (and unlikely) assumptions being made.

 

[Lievo]

Yes-- if we adopt a physicalist perspective, we are led to imagine that ultimately, all means of understanding the mind must be framed in physicalist language.

One precision please: here do you equate physicalist and mathematical language?

 

[Ken G]

And I agree with you. I've actually pointed out (somewhere around here) two independent experiments that don't look good for free will, where experimenters were able to predict people's behavior who thought they were making choices up to six seconds later. So six seconds after the deterministic system was already on it's way, the individual thought "hey, I'll choose this one" but the computer had already detected the system's (the brains) direction and beat the individual to the conclusion.

But that doesn't necessarily preclude free will for (at least) two reasons:
1) The ability to predict with high precision an outcome does not necessarily mean free will was not expressed. I love creme brulee, and so if I am choosing a dessert at a restaurant that serves creme brulee, a scan of my brain can probably detect that I am salivating over creme brulee before I actually decide to order it. Does that mean I do not have the free will to choose to order creme brulee? Free will is more subtle than that, we tend to imagine there is a "moment of decision", but that's probably a fiction-- decisions are more likely a process, with varying levels of predictability throughout the process, than they are an instantaneous moment of execution of free will.
2) Free will is not the same thing as the perception of free will. I may make a free will choice 6 seconds before I perceive that I have made a free will choice, and it can still be free will.
So what I would say that studies like this do, above all, is force us toward a more sophisticated understanding of what free will is, not challenge the basic concept. At worst, the neurology of free will might make free will seem like a kind of mirage, but even in a mirage, there is really light doing something there, it is merely our naive interpretation of what it is doing that needs to be replaced by the science. More likely, in my view, we will find that a workable definition of free will must include the perception of it-- such that, free will must involve multiple elements, including absence of coercion, and either conscious introspection, or a free will choice to activate "autopilot", and the perception of these factors persisting both during and after the fact.

 

[Pythagorean]

Well yes, that's my point: Our concept of free will is being challenged. I don't come out and say that there is no free will, but you seem to detect that I feel that way (which is largely irrelevant).

 

[apeiron]

What I know, is that if QM applies correctly describe reality, then reality is computationnal.

I see. So the Planck scale is not a limit on computation after all.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limits_to_computation

Yep. For each paper mentionning single unit, 6 mention brain imaging. Again you're pointing data that show you're wrong, as if it was showing you right.

Good for you. Just stop dig your heels in when you're so obviously wrong and we may switch faster to more interesting or at least fresh stuff. :zzz:

So it wouldn't matter how trivial a victory you could score, you would feel ever so grateful about it?

But clearly you selectively quoted. You did not relate the statement to the context of what I said...which was...

Within neuroscience, that was the big revolution of the past 20 years. To study the brain, and even neurons and synapses, in an ecologically valid way. Even the NCC hunt of consciousness studies and the brain imaging "revolution" was based on this.

People said we have been studying the brain by isolating the components. And it has not really told us what we want to know. We stuck electrodes into the brains of cats and rats. But they were anaethetised, not even conscious. And it was single electrodes, not electrode arrays. But now (around 20 years ago) we have better equipment. We can record from awake animals doing actual cognitive tasks and sample activity from an array of regions. Even better, we can stick humans in a scanner and record the systems level interactions.

Yet you say the mainstream for neuroscience is people checking the electrical reponses of disected neurons in petri dishes, or IBM simulations...

I do still feel that the demonstration of attentional enhancement and other top-down effects in microelectrode studies was the most important discovery made from this move to ecologically valid brain research (others might argue for neural oscillations of course).

You have only stated that you don't agree with this. And then attempted to find evidence in patently spurious google counts.

So first you say compare MRI and receptive fields (why compare a modality for anatomical studies with a functional construct?). To compare like with like, you would have to compare a functional modality with a functional modality (fMRI with single unit) and yet even since this error of logic was pointed out, you still try to get away with comparing generic MRI with a specific functional technique.

If you did compare the appropriate terms, you would in fact find that it is 155k to 153k in favour of single unit. Not that I think this means anything much, I'm just humouring you here.

Actually I am surprised a little by these numbers because any masters psychology student can whip up an fMRI study in a few days given access to a machine. But doing microelectrode studies on animals is grinding science. You have to work in a fortress in fear of animal liberation terrorists. You need considerable technical skill as well as a good ethical justification.

So as you would know, being a neuroscientist and all, the pool of animal experimenters is far smaller than that of neuroimagers, and that would be an obvious constraint on raw publication tallies.

But anyway, if you believe the debate was all about the number of times the words neural receptive field has ever been mentioned, or whether neuroimaging has more research impact than animal studies, then that is up to you. My arguments were about the fact that top-down has been a mainstream neuroscience concept since Luria and Sperry.

If you want to challenge that, be my guest.

 

[Pythagorean]

This always had interesting implications to me (only the first couple minutes about bacteria/human symbiosis)



That, and the idea of a transition from unicellular to multicellular life. Slime molds are an especially interesting case that could lead to explanations about the transition; from single celled community to multicellular slug:



I think these may have interesting insights to understanding human behavior as well. Where does the consciousness of the individual (cell or person) stop and the consciousness of the community (cells or persons) begin?

 

[Pythagorean]

here is some excellent footage. It's in german, but fastforward to 7:25 and enjoy the visuals knowing what you're looking at (slime molds described above).

 

[apeiron]

That we never expected... strawman but interesting: at a glance I would say default mode, cognition in cerebellum, consciousness in insula, modulation of cortical tickness, BCI with person supposely in coma.

OK, you suggest five neuroimaging breakthroughs. Let's see if they involve the discovery of top-down principles.

1) Default mode network

Yes. Raichle/Snyder contrast the bottom up "driven" view of computer science and the top-down systems view now revealed.

One view posits that the brain is primarily reflexive, driven by the
momentary demands of the environment. The other view is that the
brain's operations are mainly intrinsic involving the maintenance
of information for interpreting, responding to and even predicting
environmental demands.
http://www.appliedneuroscience.com/Default%20mode-a%20brief%20history.pdf

Then Friston/Carhart-Harris have more explicitly linked the default mode to the top-down Bayesian brain model in http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/content/133/4/1265.full.pdf+html

Some interesting snippets in that like...

Furthermore, we associate failures of top-down control with non-ordinary
states of consciousness, such as early and acute psychosis, the
temporal-lobe aura, dreaming and hallucinogenic drug states.

2) Cerebellum plays role in cognition and behaviour.

Again yes. I well remember the shock that the Fox/Raichle paper created (a PET experiment BTW, not that that matters).
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC391365/

It did indeed show that language production was not confined to a couple of brain modules but was a dynamical hierarchy that included even "low level" structures like the cerebellum. For a long time critics insisted it must be an artifact.

So again a significant experiment because it undercut the reductionist computational model of brain processing and pointed to a hierarchical view of top-down in interaction with bottom-up. That was precisely why it got people excited. I was at conferences where the work was presented (as well as discussing it with Raichle, Fox, Posner and others).

3) Consciousness in insula

I presume you mean Craig's recent hypothesis - http://www.appliedneuroscience.com/Insula-what%20you%20feel%20&%20consciousness.pdf

Sadly you would be right that he wants to call it the seat of consciousness. So not a systems point of view. But then dig into the actual research and this claim starts to evaporate like the attention grabbing hype it is.

Quite quickly we are back into a standard hierarchical view of brain function. Craig says the insular handles the high level view of the interior millieu while the cingulate does the job for motor intentions. They work as a team and both have spindle cells (for strong and fast top-down control over the respective hierarchies below them). Etc. The seat of consciousness fast becomes the hierarchical systems story that it should be.

So disregard the hype and the insular cortex is not especially significant except as a higher brain area that is important for top-down influences.

4) Modulation of cortical thickness

Not sure what you mean here unless you are talking about the anatomical studies of brain maturation?

If so, isn't it interesting that the most top-down areas develop the slowest. As a hierarchy it takes time to develop from the bottom up (construction) and for the global constraints to fully organise. Exactly as hierarchy theory would predict (see Salthe on the stages of immaturity, maturity and senescence).

Adolescents are now said to be impulsive and temperamental simply because they are incapable of top-down regulation of their behaviour. The brain areas have not fully developed.

So if this was the neuroimaging finding you meant, yes it was big news. And because it was all about top-downness in neuroscience.

5) BCI with person supposely in coma

OK, again top down (if you are talking about brain computer interfaces and locked in syndrome) - if indirectly this time. A loss of top-down control in coma patients means they can't overtly produce response. But can generate enough EEG activity to be translated as an attempt to command. So a demonstration of top-down control over computer hardware.

I'm puzzled how this counts at a great breakthrough for fMRI though. Perhaps you can elaborate.

Anyway, five findings and the actually significant ones (that is 1, 2 and 4) are significant because they confirmed that the hierarchical approach to the brain, with top-down effects being key, are the way to go.

 

[Q_Goest]

No, you completely misunderstand if you think I said brain states are controlling genes and enzymes. The example I gave was of enzymes controlling metabolic processes, and making a parallel with the way words control brain states.

And the symbol grounding problem is an example of why there is more to life than just rate dependent dynamics (classical physics).

Perhaps we have indeed reached the end of the road on this discussion. I would really recommend reading Pattee carefully as I have founded him the sharpest writer on this particular aspect of the systems approach.

Ok, thanks for the clarification. Thanks also for clarification on the "top down constraints" and all that. I understand your position more clearly now, though I think I'm still not understanding a large chunk of it.

Are you suggesting that genes are what overcome the symbol grounding problem that Harnad talks about? What paper does Pattee have that explains that concept best? I might go along with that. Here's the problem though. Neuron interactions are governed by classical mechanics, so any strongly emergent phenomena (ie: phenomenal consciousness) can not emerge from those interations alone since classical interactions only allow for weakly emergent phenomena. Yet the mainstream view holds that phenomenal consciousness is emergent on the neuron interactions and not for example, genes or any molecular interactions. Does Pattee address this issue or does he go along with the mainstream view that phenomenal consciousness emerges from neuron interactions alone?

 

[Lievo]

I see. So the Planck scale is not a limit on computation after all.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limits_to_computation

Absolutly not.

But clearly you selectively quoted. You did not relate the statement to the context of what I said...which was...

You said something stupid. Context doesn't change it was stupid. If I wanted to challenge the context, I'd have quote the context.

Actually I am surprised a little by these numbers because any masters psychology student can whip up an fMRI study in a few days given access to a machine. But doing microelectrode studies on animals is grinding science. You have to work in a fortress in fear of animal liberation terrorists. You need considerable technical skill as well as a good ethical justification.

Any fMRI experiment cost at least 5000$. I don't think many master student are allowed to whip up an fMRI study in a few day.

Regarding electrods studies, that's not the problem. The problem is that when you work in humans, you can ask anything and the subject will do it. When you work even in squirel monkeys, that's 6 month to learn to be quite with the head fixed, then 6 month to understand the task, then one to two years of data collection. Every day, every week, one week-end free every three weeks (ethical concern for the animal, good the student can benefit it also) Hope you have a result.

My arguments were about the fact that top-down has been a mainstream neuroscience concept since Luria and Sperry.

This is not the claim I contested. I would agree that top-down is one of the mainstream approach. However Luria and Sperry has little impact here. It's simply that there's only two logical possibilities: bottom-up and top-down approach. If you think that's a big claim one of the two is mainstream...well at least it's not false

 

[Lievo]

OK, you suggest five neuroimaging breakthroughs. Let's see if they involve the discovery of top-down principles. (...) they confirmed that the hierarchical approach to the brain, with top-down effects being key, are the way to go.

That's very instructive. So I understand now, that when you say your claim are supported by evidence, what you mean is that your claim are general enough to accommodate any evidence. Good to know, I won't have to lose my time next time.

 

[Ferris_bg]

By that I mean I see no reason to segregate 'living' systems that are described using classical mechanics from 'not alive' systems. That represents a paradox to me.

May be apeiron's view is that the functionality, which gives rise to consciousness can be implemented only through neurons.

But that's really not a problem relating to free will. The core problem is that even if we accept that the mental (defined as a property of the physical and qualia capable) is somehow reported by the physical, even then we still have some weak form of top-down causality, which in no way implies that there is any free will. To have free will the mental should apply some unique type of strong downward causality. And if you want to have such thing, you must accept that these greater causal powers of the mental do not derive from the physical substance thus http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-re...won_Kim.27s_argument_against_non-reductivism".

And don't assume that I say that dualism is not a possibility, I am just saying that you can't have free will in any materialistic theory of mind. To illustrate my above writings I present you this example:

1) I throw a ball in a lake. I know where the lake is, but I do not see it. I know that the way I throw guarantees the ball to fall inside the lake. Now I want to find out the exact position of the ball, and Q_Goest can report it to me. I have a visual contact with him and he with the lake. So he says to me the exact coordinates of the ball.

2) Now imagine that apeiron is in a machine in the bottom of the lake and can influence the waters the way he likes. I throw the ball, apeiron modifies its location and Q_Goest reports it to me.

In example 1) we have a form of weak top-down causality, while in example 2) we have strong downward causality. Now if I define the lake as a property of the park, which I control, then we can only be in situation 1). The park is the only substance, even if it can have a special property like the lake, which I can not report by myself. But if the lake is itself a substance named apeiron then we find ourselves in 2). Apeiron can influence the ball's location thus changing my further computations. We can say that he has used his free will upon the park.