Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

In summary: RCIC consists of a series of pumps, valves, and manifolds that allow coolant to be circulated around the reactor pressure vessel in the event of a loss of the main feedwater supply.In summary, the earthquake and tsunami may have caused a loss of coolant at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, which could lead to a meltdown. The system for cooling the reactor core is designed to kick in in the event of a loss of feedwater, and fortunately this appears not to have happened yet.
  • #1,331
AntonL said:
I fully agree and if it is red hot where is the smoke? There would be enough debris around to ignite

The most watchable videos are here, that guy has nice software.

http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=KurtsFilmeVideo&aq=f

. . . and the most watchable image stabilized videos have been edited from the original 9+ minutes to 6 min 18 seconds, with all the close up shots of the white rods and the questionable glowing red spot removed. Hmmm.

Addendum:
Here is the original 9 minute video of the 'copter fly over:
 
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  • #1,332
AntonL said:
(edit I do not know my left from the right sorry for confusing)

check the bottom right hand corner and you will see the breeze over the warm pool just below the smoke/steam line

You will also see some junk sticking out of the water so my theory of bombs damagaing the fuel rods is feasible

attachment.php?attachmentid=33550&stc=1&d=1301142414.jpg

Dude - that is a picture of the south wall elevation of Building 4. Check it out in this wide angle view. . .

and compare to the best post-explosion shot of the south elevation of Bldg 3 from the 'copter video (Picture 22)
 

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  • #1,333
I found these infographics of the basement flooding

Can someone translate?
attachment.php?attachmentid=33554&stc=1&d=1301145974.jpg


translation provided
使用済み核燃料 SFP
海側 towards the ocean
タービン turbine

地下一階のイメージ図 underground (B1) map
浸水している場所 submerged area
タービンの復水器 machine to restore turbine water (literal translation - I don't know the technical name) - condensers
タービンは階上 turbine is upstairs
被曝した作業員がいた場所 place where workers were exposed to radiation
高圧復水ポンプ high pressure pump to return water
一階への階段 stairs to the first floor
ケーブルをつなぐ作業 work to connect the cable (electrical?)
 

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  • #1,334
TCups said:
Dude - that is a picture of the south wall elevation of Building 4. Check it out in this wide angle view. . .
TCups correct and right would be east and SE corner is the SFP!

Grabbed from this video, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=95a8obR2GaE&feature=BF&list=ULr5HsMVY6W0k&index=3
presumably originally grabbed from a news broadcast, the low res video at 2:20 halts,
a high def view is shown for 12 seconds, and I presume the shimmer of water is discussed -
it was an issue as at the time as water was being sprayed into 3 and USA said that 4 is most
important and Tepco countered by saying water was spotted in 3

Just my thoughts and I did not say that the debris in the pool is from 3
 
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  • #1,335
|Fred said:
Picture of the operating floor of UNIT 6 (similar to the operating floor of the other unit)
According to an Japanese engineer who work on the design of the containment vessel of unit 4
[PLAIN]http://min.us/jjP5c0.jpg[/QUOTE]

Fred:

This would have to be a "Fish Eye" lens photo taken from atop the large crane. If I am seeing this correctly, then the large orange structure is the drywell cap (DWC) and it is not in the equipment pool. Also, Reactor Unit 6, I believe, was a later design. In this photo, the top of the reactor containment appears to be centered north-south and east-west, if oriented as were Bldg 3. Note the relationship of the (two?) pools to the right of the larger SFP and that there are apparently channels, smaller, but not unlike the channel to the primary containment, connecting all 3 pools.

I have to believe this layout is a bit different from what may be in Units 3 and 4.

Also, IF the plug were blown in Unit 3, then the DWC would have blown skyward too. That would be a pretty large chunk of painted metal debris which might be visible on the satellite photos. I haven't seen anything like it on the ground.
 

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  • #1,336
AntonL said:
TCups correct and right would be east and SE corner is the SFP!

Grabbed from this video, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=95a8obR2GaE&feature=BF&list=ULr5HsMVY6W0k&index=3
presumably originally grabbed from a news broadcast, the low res video at 2:20 halts,
a high def view is shown for 12 seconds, and I presume the shimmer of water is discussed -
it was an issue as at the time as water was being sprayed into 3 and USA said that 4 is most
important and Tepco countered by saying water was spotted in 3

Just my thoughts and I did not say that the debris in the pool is from 3

I see no shimmer at unit 4, 2:20 on the video -- I see part of the green fuel handling equipment through some smoke.

And before the 9 minute version of the video was edited, there was a pretty good shot of the SFP of 3 (just before the 'copter passed through the steam/smoke) that showed what looked like a deep black hole at SFP3. One of my earlier posts has a screenshot. Maybe I can find it.

. . . yes. Here is the original 9 minute video link


and post #784, page 49 shows the best look into SFP3 from the original 'copter fly over video.
 

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  • #1,337
AtomicWombat said:
'Two of the three have been hospitalised due to possible burns caused by beta rays, which can cause major skin damage.

They were not wearing boots at the time so their feet were soaked in the water.

TEPCO said almost no water was present during an on-site inspection the previous day and also that the level of radiation was low during the inspection.

"Because of this, the workers were believed to have continued their work even after their dosimeter alarm went off, assuming a problem with the machine," a TEPCO official said.

TEPCO plans to strictly reinforce the rule of evacuating the site whenever the dosimeter's alarm goes off.'

See:
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2011/03/25/3173500.htm"

This is farcical.
-------------------------
So is the term "Beta Rays". Since they are particles, Electrons or Positrons.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beta_particle"
 
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  • #1,338
only translating the non-obvious ones (but even some of these are obvious):

使用済み核燃料 SFP
海側 towards the ocean
タービン turbine

地下一階のイメージ図 underground (B1) map
浸水している場所 submerged area
タービンの復水器 machine to restore turbine water (literal translation - I don't know the technical name)
タービンは階上 turbine is upstairs
被曝した作業員がいた場所 place where workers were exposed to radiation
高圧復水ポンプ high pressure pump to return water
一階への階段 stairs to the first floor
ケーブルをつなぐ作業 work to connect the cable (electrical?)

The interesting stuff looks like it's on the bottom half - if you need any other translations of the diagram on top, just post/ask...
 
  • #1,339
Borek said:
To all:

Please stop speculating about these red spots. There is a lot of debris of all colors in the area, just because something is red or orange doesn't mean it is hot and glowing.

Besides, even if it was orange glowing, I very much doubt it that it could have been recorded by camera and seen in fully daylight (think about volcanic lava: you need twilight to appreciate its brilliant orange glow).
Somebody said it could be a fire extinguisher.
It could also be an orange painted metal structure.
 
  • #1,340
I have personally observed such events in the nuclear industry, which is primarily due to intelligence level and a work effect beyond normal. When in an emergency these people will generally suffer the most. I have seen workers continue to work on equipment when they were doused with contaminated water, dosimetry alarmed, respiratory equipment failed (cocked masked to breath better), gloves were schredded and they continued to perform their assigned work.

Tokyo Electric Power Company has been criticised over yesterday's exposure to workers operating in ankle-deep water,

But it is thought that contractors ignored alarms from their dosimeters, while ankle-deep in contaminated water for about three hours.

Also, it is incomprehensible that station Health Physicist would not know the basement of Turbine Building always has low levels of radioactive contamination present in wet areas. Which would increase during a reactor accident and by the use of the feed system to inject water into the reactor. At some point to keep the RPV from going solid, they had to let some water out to somewhere.
 
  • #1,341
@TCups
it is the bolted DWC (but obviously no in place)
you are welcome to watch the full video here http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/13414000
2 hours in Japanese translated but kind of a pain to follow
 
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  • #1,342
AntonL said:
(edit I do not know my left from the right sorry for confusing)

check the bottom right hand corner and you will see the breeze over the warm pool just below the smoke/steam line

You will also see some junk sticking out of the water so my theory of bombs (falling debris) damagaing the fuel rods is feasible

attachment.php?attachmentid=33550&stc=1&d=1301142414.jpg

Anton:

I think that is questionable. And besides, if the damage to building 4 were caused by falling debris, the debris would have had to be aloft a loooooooonnnng time as satellite photos show Bldg 4 intact sometime after Bldg 3 has exploded. I remember this from the original posts where I suggested blast damage from Bldg 3 had blown a square hole in the north side of Bldg 4 (remember the infamous tongue of insulation, etc.?). That would have been somewhere around posts 300-400, I think. If I can find it, I will edit this and add the image.

Addendum: Actually, no -- it was later in the thread where the holes in the roof of Turbine Bldg 3 and the contaminated water in the basement were being discussed. Still looking. . .

Second Addendum: I cannot find the post, but I am sure someone posted a satellite picture showing an intact Bldg 4 after the blast at Bldg 3, refuting my conjecture that the blast at Bldg 3 might have blown the square hole in the north side of Bldg 4 and damaged the roof of Bldg 4. That, of course, would also constitute photographic proof that heavy falling debris from the blast at Bldg 3 had not damaged Bldg 4.
 
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  • #1,343
M. Bachmeier said:
I read a report somewhere that indicated that pressure sensing equipment for units 2 and 3 might not be operable or reliable.

I believe that there was conjecture on this site about that. I do not remember reading it outside of this forum. Anybody have a link?
 
  • #1,344
Couple of questions:

What is the purpose of the dry-well cap, outside of the obvious?
More specific, is it also designed to help prevent or deflect energies from the ejection of core material in case of a catastrophic event?
How heavy would the steel gauge be for the cap?
Are all these dry-well caps orange?
If they are orange would in not be possible to observe the cap from number 3 reactor from aerial observation?
 
  • #1,345
M. Bachmeier said:
Couple of questions:

What is the purpose of the dry-well cap, outside of the obvious?
More specific, is it also designed to help prevent or deflect energies from the ejection of core material in case of a catastrophic event?
How heavy would the steel gauge be for the cap?
Are all these dry-well caps orange?
If they are orange would in not be possible to observe the cap from number 3 reactor from aerial observation?

------------------

The dry well/Primary Reactor Vessel Containment cap is a pressure boundary/seal for the primary containment. Stacked concrete and inflatable seals would not hold sufficient pressure. It is thick steel, probably over 3/4". Do not know if the color is pertinent, and probably is a corrosion inhibitor paint.
 
  • #1,346
kfmfe04 said:
only translating the non-obvious ones (but even some of these are obvious):


The interesting stuff looks like it's on the bottom half - if you need any other translations of the diagram on top, just post/ask...
thanks
 
  • #1,347
Reno Deano said:
------------------

The dry well/Primary Reactor Vessel Containment cap is a pressure boundary/seal for the primary containment. Stacked concrete and inflatable seals would not hold sufficient pressure. It is thick steel, probably over 3/4". Do not know if the color is pertinent, and probably is a corrosion inhibitor paint.
So I guess containment, even in the case of a powerful explosion is factored into the design. The design seems to be such that energy from an explosion would be partially channeled either sideways or down or both. In the absence of more information I think I'll avoid speculation.
 
  • #1,348
Pressure sensors:

"Earlier hopes that restoring offsite power to the control rooms at Units 1-2 and 3-4 would allow quick reactivation of normal cooling systems were dashed with discovery, anticipated in our coverage, that critical pumps, valves and pressure sensors might be damaged and need repair or replacement. With radioactive smoke still coming from Unit 3, three more workers (laying electrical cables) at the site were exposed to dangerous levels in excess water outside, two of them hospitalized. "

Can't vouch for validity:

http://my.firedoglake.com/scarecrow/tag/fukushima-fifty/
 
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  • #1,349
We discussed this earlier, now Japanese researcher confirms our view

Researcher warned 2 yrs ago of massive tsunami striking nuke plant
TOKYO, March 27, Kyodo

A researcher said Saturday he had warned two years ago about the possible risk of a
massive tsunami hitting a nuclear power plant in Japan, but Tokyo Electric Power Co., the
operator of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant crippled by the March 11 earthquake and
ensuing tsunami, had brushed off the warning.

According to the researcher, Yukinobu Okamura, and the records of a government council
where he made the warning, TEPCO asserted that there was flexibility in the quake
resistance design of its plants and expressed reluctance to raise the assumption of possible
quake damage citing a lack of sufficient information.

''There should be ample flexibility in the safety of a nuclear power plant,'' said Okamura, head
of the Active Fault and Earthquake Research Center at the National Institute of Advanced
Industrial Science and Technology. ''It is odd to have an attitude of not taking into
consideration indeterminate aspects.''

Okamura had warned in 2009 of massive tsunami based on his study since around 2004 of
the traces of a major tsunami believed to have swept away about a thousand people in the
year 869 after a magnitude 8.3 quake off northeastern Japan.

He had found in his research that tsunami from the ancient quake had hit a wide range of the
coastal regions of northeastern Japan, at least as far north as Ishinomaki in Miyagi
Prefecture and as far south as the town of Namie in Fukushima Prefecture -- close to the
Fukushima Daiichi plant -- penetrating as much as 3 to 4 kilometers inland.

As a result of the quake and tsunami earlier this month, Japan has been facing its worst
nuclear crisis as electricity and cooling functions failed at the power plant in Fukushima
Prefecture, releasing radioactive materials.

==Kyodo
 
  • #1,350
AntonL said:
We discussed this earlier, now Japanese researcher confirms our view
Re: possible tsunami, I saw an interview the scientist following the quake, but any warnings to TEPCO were either not addressed or not included.
 
  • #1,351
M. Bachmeier said:
So I guess containment, even in the case of a powerful explosion is factored into the design. The design seems to be such that energy from an explosion would be partially channeled either sideways or down or both. In the absence of more information I think I'll avoid speculation.

There is the problem of radioactive contamination from Unit 3. Specifically, this evidence I again summarize and put forward to review. It has been previously released by various sources and discussed in several of the preceding posts in this thread:

1) the timeline of radiation spikes shows the highest spike immediately following the blast at Unit 3.

2) it was reported that workers were initially pulled back after the explosion at Unit 3 because of concern of radiation after the blast.

3) it was reported access to Unit 3 was temporarily limited by high level radiation on the ground

4) it was reported that military tanks with dozer blades were to be brought into clear the radioactive debris so work could continue (no pictures of that I have seen, or confirmation that it actually happened as far as I know).

5) an unsourced diagram that showed the locations of the highest levels of measured radiation on the ground around Fukushima 1,2,3 and 4 shows the highest levels around Bldg 3 and has a positive correlation with visible debris blasted from the east, west, and south sides of Bldg 3, including some higher readings on the east side of Turbine Bldg 3 where side wall panels of Reactor Bldg 3 blew across the roof.

A counter hypothesis might be that the explosion at Bldg 4 was from the SFP and SFP4 hydrogen production, and that this may have been the source of high level radioactive debris (less likely, IMO). Even so, if that were possible, then it is equally possible that the same mechanism may have been at play in whole or in part in the explosion of Bldg 3.

Therefore, I conclude that the blast from Unit 3 carried high level radioactive waste with it.

If so, then regarding this high level waste in the explosion debris of Unit 3:
1) was it from the spent fuel pool of 3?
2) was it from the (damaged) reactor core of Unit 3?

Ultimately, those would seem to be the only two sources of high level ground debris.

3) how could an explosion, if powered only by vented hydrogen from the containment of Unit 3, and originating from the top floor of Bldg 3, disperse high level waste as ground debris from either of these sources?

Think about it.
 
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  • #1,352
TCups said:
There is the problem of radioactive contamination from Unit 3. Specifically, this evidence I again summarize and put forward to review. It has been previously released by various sources and discussed in several of the preceding posts in this thread:

1) the timeline of radiation spikes shows the highest spike immediately following the blast at Unit 3.

2) it was reported that workers were initially pulled back after the explosion at Unit 3 because of concern of radiation after the blast.

3) it was reported access to Unit 3 was temporarily limited by high level radiation on the ground

4) it was reported that military tanks with dozer blades were brought into clear the radioactive debris so work could continue (no pictures of that I have seen).

5) a diagram that showed the locations of the highest levels of measured radiation on the ground around Fukushima 1,2,3 and 4 shows the highest levels around Bldg 3 and has a positive correlation with visible debris blasted from the east, west, and south sides of Bldg 3, including some higher readings on the east side of Turbine Bldg 3 where side wall panels of Reactor Bldg 3 blew across the roof.

A counter hypothesis might be that the explosion at Bldg 4 was from the SFP and SFP4 hydrogen production, and that this may have been the source of high level radioactive debris (less likely, IMO). Even so, if that were possible, then it is equally possible that the same mechanism may have been at play in whole or in part in the explosion of Bldg 3.

Therefore, I conclude that the blast from Unit 3 carried high level radioactive waste with it.

If so, then regarding this high level waste in the explosion debris of Unit 3:
1) was it from the spent fuel pool of 3?
2) was it from the (damaged) reactor core of Unit 3?

Ultimately, those would seem to be the only two sources of high level ground debris.

3) how could an explosion, if powered only by vented hydrogen from the containment of Unit 3, and originating from the top floor of Bldg 3, disperse high level waste as ground debris from either of these sources?

Think about it.

Well I've been considering some of the orange debris and wondered if some of it might not be a portion of the dry-well cap. And in keeping with your theory, a heavy steel dome shaped cap would be like the plate used in an explosive device for directional control (directional charge). In a dome like structure the point where it is attached to the upper reactor would seem a likely weak point, not to mention concerns that have been mentioned in the past about ensuring proper dry-well mounting.

If the orange debris is 3/4 inch steel section from the cap it would match your description sideways then upper energy release at unit 3.
 
  • #1,353
I've started to create this using all released data.. but it's kind of taking me to much time since I'm not using the appropriate tool (picture editor)
[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/imgwBU.gif
 
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  • #1,354
M. Bachmeier said:
Well I've been considering some of the orange debris and wondered if some of it might not be a portion of the dry-well cap. And in keeping with your theory, a heavy steel dome shaped cap would be like the plate used in an explosive device for directional control (directional charge). In a dome like structure the point where it is attached to the upper reactor would seem a likely weak point, not to mention concerns that have been mentioned in the past about ensuring proper dry-well mounting.

If the orange debris is 3/4 inch steel section from the cap it would match your description sideways then upper energy release at unit 3.

Somewhere, way back there, there was a post about the color scheme of painting various equipment in a nuc power plant. In short, there may be lots of stuff painted different colors, including red.

I doubt that the drywell cap has been completely blown off and even if so, that it were blown, it was not exploded, shrapnel-like, into many small pieces. More likely, it would be yet another bullet-like projectile, along with the drywell plug. But that is just my SWAG (scientific wild - guess) vs. WAG (wild - guess). Remember that the cap would tend to vent hydrogen gas into the upper portions of the dry wall containment and region of the fuel transfer chute and gate under as little as 2 ATM of pressure, if previous post references are correct.
 
  • #1,356
Refering to https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3210895&postcount=1342" and below plan the building is about 125 meters long (google earth)
then the flooded area is about 1650 m2

http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/03/81133.html said:
Pools of water that may have seeped from either the reactor cores or spent fuel pools were
also found in the turbine buildings of the No. 2 and No. 4 reactors, measuring up to 1 meter
and 80 centimeters deep, respectively, while those near the No. 1 and No. 3 reactors were
up to 40 cm and 1.5 meters deep.
1 40cm
2 100cm
3 150cm
4 80cm
confirms that the source of the water is from unit 3 and has leaked into the neighbouring
units through cable tunnels. The cable tunnels would be fire proofed between the buildings
restricting the flow hence the varied heights

at the time of measurement volume of water is about 6000m3
 

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  • #1,357
|Fred said:
I've started to create this using all released data.. but it's kind of taking me to much time since I'm not using the appropriate tool (picture editor)

What is the significance of the red line at 4 atm?
 
  • #1,358
March 25' Areva's analyses of the case, i don't know if it is usefull or useless

http://www.scribd.com/doc/51564602?secret_password=th7hw1mmpjwnfmd0mbj
 
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  • #1,359
timeasterday said:
What is the significance of the red line at 4 atm?

That is supposed to be about the maximum design pressure of the primary containment. In theory it should hold for a pressure somewhat above 4 atm.
 
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  • #1,360
Yes Astronuc, and according to this gentleman it sustained up to 8 before leaking http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/13414000
Now, What I 'm not sure to have right is: is this value is for the core (primary) or the drywell
 
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  • #1,361
|Fred said:
Yes Astronuc, and according to this gentleman it sustained up to 8 before leaking http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/13414000
Now, What I 'm not sure to have right is if this value is for the core (primary) or the drywell

refer to the attached for specification
 

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  • #1,362
Can anyone direct me to information that would help quantify the differences in meltdown scenarios between MOX and non MOX fuel reactors?

i.e. all things being equal what is the additional risk?

Can we reasonably quantify it as some percent (5%) worse due to higher PU levels?

TIA, DWB
 
  • #1,364
I have a mundane question. Is Plutonium more toxic or radioactive than Uranium? I thought it was, but a spokesman from the Nuclear Safety Agency specifically denied this. Other "experts" seem to contradict his statement.
 
  • #1,365
Ivan Seeking said:
I have a mundane question. Is Plutonium more toxic or radioactive than Uranium? I thought it was, but a spokesman from the Nuclear Safety Agency specifically denied this. Other "experts" seem to contradict his statement.

Pu isotopes have shorter half-lives than the two main U isotopes, U-235 and U-238. Radiologically, the same number of atoms of Pu would be more radioactive.

Uranium dioxide fuel contains up to 5% U-235. The FK BWR fuel should have a peak enrichment around 4% U-235.

MOX might contain about 5%, which would be a mix of Pu-239, 240, 241 and 242. Pu-240 and Pu-242 also undergo spontaneous fission.

See attached figure.
 

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