Fra
- 4,338
- 704
I think one reason this is hard to understand is because we implicitly but repeatedly confuse normative/guiding P of possibilities and descriptive P of what actually happened historically.
Histories don't interfere. Interference lies in how guiding probabilities account for possibilities and uncertainties of the future.
In inference its important to not mix the concepts. This is closely related to what barandes label the "category error" or "category problem".
Ie. If you keep thinkning of the transition probabilites as descriptive, it gets wrong. But if you think of them as guiding P for an agent taking stochastic actions, it makes more sense.
The flawed application of common cause in bells ansatz is easier to spot if you think in terms of guiding probabilities of agent/observer - which of course, like barandes thinks, is a physical system. One just have to not confuse this with thinking that means there is an exteral view of all this. It is beacause it does not, that makes the guiding view of P more fundamental.
/Fredrik
Histories don't interfere. Interference lies in how guiding probabilities account for possibilities and uncertainties of the future.
In inference its important to not mix the concepts. This is closely related to what barandes label the "category error" or "category problem".
Ie. If you keep thinkning of the transition probabilites as descriptive, it gets wrong. But if you think of them as guiding P for an agent taking stochastic actions, it makes more sense.
The flawed application of common cause in bells ansatz is easier to spot if you think in terms of guiding probabilities of agent/observer - which of course, like barandes thinks, is a physical system. One just have to not confuse this with thinking that means there is an exteral view of all this. It is beacause it does not, that makes the guiding view of P more fundamental.
/Fredrik