Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?

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The discussion centers on the claim that everything in the universe can be explained solely by physics. Participants express skepticism about this assertion, highlighting the limitations of physics and mathematics in fully capturing the complexities of reality, particularly concerning consciousness and life. The conversation touches on the uncertainty principle, suggesting that while physics can provide approximations, it cannot offer absolute explanations due to inherent limitations in measurement and understanding.There is a debate about whether all phenomena, including moral and religious beliefs, can be explained physically. Some argue that even concepts like a Creator could be subject to physical laws, while others assert that there may be aspects of reality that transcend physical explanations. The idea that order can emerge from chaos is also discussed, with participants questioning the validity of this claim in light of the unpredictability observed in complex systems.Overall, the consensus leans towards the notion that while physics can describe many aspects of the universe, it may not be sufficient to explain everything, particularly when it comes to subjective experiences and the nature of consciousness.

In which other ways can the Physical world be explained?

  • By Physics alone?

    Votes: 144 48.0%
  • By Religion alone?

    Votes: 8 2.7%
  • By any other discipline?

    Votes: 12 4.0%
  • By Multi-disciplinary efforts?

    Votes: 136 45.3%

  • Total voters
    300
  • #801
Clearly computers do not understand anything at this time. If you want to argue that they will in the future then you need to come up with a method of demonstrating exactly how one is to tell that a human "understands" something and how that understanding can be simulated on a computer, not just argue from an emotional impression.

Please also explain your method of proving that all evidence of human experience is systematically reduced to neuron activity together with chemical activity within a human brain.
 
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  • #802
Canute, I find it very difficult to understand you. Many of your posts seem to indicate that you are a very intelligent person but I am confused by some of your posts. This post is a clear example of what confuses me. On first reading, you seem to be supporting my comments to Philcrat: i.e., assertions should not be made without a substantial argument that those assertions represent a valid position which can be defended. But, if that interpretation is taken, then your posts serve no purpose.
Canute said:
Clearly computers do not understand anything at this time. If you want to argue that they will in the future then you need to come up with a method of demonstrating exactly how one is to tell that a human "understands" something[/color] and how that understanding can be simulated on a computer, not just argue from an emotional impression.
This is exactly what I was saying and I could not understand your restatement of exactly the same complaint without adding anything of interest. The only difference between what I said and what you said was your comment that "Clearly computers do not understand anything at this time", which I presumed you meant reflected the current position on the issue which is clearly true. On rereading, the only consistent interpretation of your comment which I could come up with was that you are agreeing with Philcrat's assertion and didn't think it needs any support. At that point, your final comment,
Canute said:
Please also explain your method of proving that all evidence of human experience is systematically reduced to neuron activity together with chemical activity within a human brain.
seemed to only make sense if it were directed to me and not to Philcrat. But that interpretation requires that you think I am making an assertion in opposition to Philcrat's. This is not at all the case. I have made no assertions at all; I have merely pointed out the fact that assertions are a poor way to begin any discussion. It seems that the whole of the discussion going on here has to do with people making assertions and others arguing against those assertions. I have no intention of making any assertions at all.

It appears to me that you have a very strong impulse to presume that I am making assertions above and beyond the statements upon which I had thought agreement had been obtained. I am doing no such thing. With regard to agreement, I had taken that we had achieved agreement on only two points:
Doctordick said:
[There exists] "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, right"[/color] and "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, wrong"[/color]
All I desire is an easy way to refer to these two different kinds of things one thinks are true. It seems to me that you are presuming I am trying to say something far more sweeping than that. If that is the case, your presumptions are very much in error. Instead of reacting emotionally to what I say, I would appreciate a little serious thought. Without serious thought, we will never communicate.

I am sorry and I don't want ot upset you, but I would really like a rational response -- Dick
 
  • #803
Philocrat wrote that computers cannot understand things in the way that humans do. You wrote that this is an unsupported assumption. I find that very odd. It's like saying that it's an unsuported assumption to say that there is not a teapot in orbit around Mars. Everything's an assumption when you get that picky about it.

It seems best to me to assume that computers don't understand anything until there is at least one piece of evidence to suggest that they do. As far as I know not one serious researcher has suggested that they do. To understand requires consciousness, so in effect you are saying that it is wrong for Philocrat to assume that computers are not conscious. It does not seem wrong to me but rather the only sensible thing to do, since it seems to be a fact.

You say also that there is no evidence that minds do not reduce to brains. I disagree again. There are sound logical reasons for refusing to believe that minds reduce to brains. Not everybody sees these arguments as conclusive, however nobody has yet come up with a single plausible explanation of how consciousness might be caused by brains, even a theoretical one, despite great efforts to do so, and it seems reasonable to take this as good circumstantial evidence that they don't. Other evidence would include the unfalsifiability of solipsism, which entails that we can never know that brains cause consciousness even if they do. There is also the evidence of ones own experience, which for many people shows conclusively that mind does not reduce to brain. There are also various philosophical arguments, hence the 'hard' problem of consciousness. Why 'hard'? Because nobody can yet make scientific sense of the idea that brains cause consciousness. The longer this situation continues the more likely it becomes that it doesn't. So you can rightly say that Philocrat cannot prove what we is saying, but you cannot rightly say that he is making unsupported assumptions.

What is your view? Do you think that brains cause consciousness or not?

Your last extract on "things which one thinks they know etc" seems inarguable, as I've said before, but I don't know yet why you feel it's a significant point.
 
  • #804
Hi Canute; it is nice to know that you are still willing to talk to me. I agree with almost everything you say but differ as to the central import of the issues.
Canute said:
Everything's an assumption when you get that picky about it.
Yes, and "getting that picky about it" is the very essence of exact[/color] science. This thread asks the question, "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" I say the answer is yes; which I qualified some time earlier by the statement that "physics" should really be replaced with "exact science" as the field of physics seems to me to be degenerating into a religion. But, with that proviso, I believe I can do an excellent job of demonstrating that every possible acceptable explanation of anything can be spelled out in an exact manner consistent with the ideals of an exact science. To do that in an exact manner, I must first establish communications which can be said to be exact in the same sense. To date, I have failed to effect that step.
Canute said:
It seems best to me to assume that computers don't understand anything until there is at least one piece of evidence to suggest that they do. As far as I know not one serious researcher has suggested that they do. To understand requires consciousness, so in effect you are saying that it is wrong for Philocrat to assume that computers are not conscious.
What bothers me is that the step is being made prior to a decent definition of consciousness; essentially, no one has explained to me how I am to determine the exact meaning of this term "consciousness".
Canute said:
It does not seem wrong to me but rather the only sensible thing to do, since it seems to be a fact.
I have no idea as to whether it is right or wrong and, as far as I am concerned, the only sensible thing to do is to not worry about the issue. "Seems to be a fact" is quite a vague statement. Certainly the first thing one should desire to do, before wasting much time, it to at least provide an approach which would settle the question.
Canute said:
You say also that there is no evidence that minds do not reduce to brains. I disagree again. There are sound logical reasons for refusing to believe that minds reduce to brains. Not everybody sees these arguments as conclusive, however nobody has yet come up with a single plausible explanation of how consciousness might be caused by brains, even a theoretical one, despite great efforts to do so, and it seems reasonable to take this as good circumstantial evidence that they don't.
The whole issue seems to me to be based on thousands upon thousands of preconceived assumptions. There was once no evidence that chemistry reduced to physics but QED certainly cleared that issue up. Today, a lot of chemical investigations come down to budget decisions: the cost of actually doing the chemistry compared to the cost in time and money to calculate the answer with computers. There is no doubt in the accuracy of the theory.

The real point here is that we are only speaking of opinions and opinions are cheap and common. It is my opinion that most all of what goes on here is a bunch of people stirring that boiling pot of vague emotionally charged concepts in the rather undefendable belief that something of significance will float up to the top.
Canute said:
Other evidence would include the unfalsifiability of solipsism, which entails that we can never know that brains cause consciousness even if they do.
Now that isn't very good evidence of anything as it says we can't know anything for sure. If you ever manage to follow me through, that subject will come up again from a vastly different perspective. :smile:
Canute said:
There is also the evidence of ones own experience, which for many people shows conclusively that mind does not reduce to brain.
Most people are not very bright and, for the most part, very few people are capable of comprehending the actual extent of their limitations.
Canute said:
There are also various philosophical arguments, hence the 'hard' problem of consciousness. Why 'hard'? Because nobody can yet make scientific sense of the idea that brains cause consciousness. The longer this situation continues the more likely it becomes that it doesn't. So you can rightly say that Philocrat cannot prove what we is saying, but you cannot rightly say that he is making unsupported assumptions.
I can if I hold that most of that supposed support arises from other assumptions. You have your opinions and I have my opinions; these issues are not worthy of serious discussion. I am not going to argue who is right and who is wrong about any of this. My only purpose in posting on this forum is to try and get through to someone.
Canute said:
What is your view? Do you think that brains cause consciousness or not?
I regard the question to be in exactly the same category as "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" Conscious is about as well defined a concept as angels.
Canute said:
Your last extract on "things which one thinks they know etc" seems inarguable, as I've said before, but I don't know yet why you feel it's a significant point.
I am well aware of the fact that you don't understand the significance of that fact (and I think I can call it a fact as it pretty well exhausts all possibilities). For well over forty years I have tried and failed to get anyone to look in the direction I have looked. Everyone's reaction is pretty well the same. There is a troll on this forum who has managed to express the attitude of the scientific community pretty succinctly.
Wilhelm said:
Doctordick said:
I further agree that I cannot prove that causality does not exist; however, I can certainly show that the evidence for causality in reality is non-existent
This is nonsense.
Exactly the standard reaction of anyone throughly indoctrinated in the current scientific dogma. Notice that I have specifically asserted that I can show the evidence is non-existent and that his reaction is not at all to listen to my argument.
Wilhelm said:
A thousand teatrises on the evidence against causality go down the drain when faced with simple empirical facts. Paper (and now computer screens) can take any rubbish.
No one has ever proved it before, that obviously implies it can not possibly be true.
Wilhelm said:
Doctordick said:
There is another view only slightly askew of your position but so far from your paradigm that it would absolutely never occur to you.
I have read your posts but all I can say is that your view is not only far from my paradigm, it's also mistaken. As a matter of logic, no one can possibly conclude anything true starting from the premises you start.
Notice the explicit forgone conclusion there?
Wilhelm said:
It should be clear to anyone that dualism is a figment of our imagination, that reality is by definition a monistic entity, because also by definition there exists only one reality. Anyone who starts out with the notion that an explanation of reality is not part of reality itself is doomed to failure. The real challenge is to come up with an explanation that includes itself without ending up in infinite regression. I believe it's possible but I have never seen anyone do it.
First, I have never stated that I had an explanation of reality which was not a part of reality itself and second, I have discovered an attack which does not end up in an infinite regression. So he believes it's possible but certainly not the way I do it. And he doesn't need to think about it; nobody ever does.

I will not present the entire deduction in one fell swoop, though I could, because it is my experience that people invariably look first to my conclusions and on those grounds alone conclude that I am a crackpot and that's the end of it. No one ever makes an attempt to follow my reasoning. There are a number of blocks that I have seen on several occasions (by blocks I mean issues people use to justify their refusal to go any further in my reasoning). That is why I was approaching saviormachine in the manner I was. He seemed to be following my thoughts but, just as you, I think he thought that they led nowhere.

You have said very clearly that you can see no significance to my division of all knowledge into two parts: that about which you are right and that about which you are wrong. I make that division because the two categories obey very different rules. If it is a thing you are right about then it will still be a thing to be explained (or understood as I admit the issue here is a bit vague here) no matter how long we wait for a solution to the problem of understanding or explaining the universe. The point is that it does not change or go away. The other side of the coin is the things you are wrong about. Those certainly have the possibility of changing. In fact, it could be said that there are an infinite number of ways to be wrong. My point is that, even if we cannot tell the difference, the two categories obey violently different constraints and that fact is of very great significance. If you stick with me, I will show you exactly the significance of that difference.

Have fun – Dick
 
  • #805
Doctordick said:
This thread asks the question, "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" I say the answer is yes;
Have you come across the Western philosophical 'problem of attributes'? If not it would be worth looking it up. It shows that matter cannot be reduced to physics.

What bothers me is that the step is being made prior to a decent definition of consciousness; essentially, no one has explained to me how I am to determine the exact meaning of this term "consciousness".
Consciousness is usually defined as 'what it is like' in the scientific and Western philosophical literature. Most philosophers and many scientists seem happy with this definition, although clearly physics cannot reduce 'what it is like' to anything else or prove that it exists. Many people, Crick for insatance, would like to redefine it, but nobody has come up with anything better yet.

The real point here is that we are only speaking of opinions and opinions are cheap and common. It is my opinion that most all of what goes on here is a bunch of people stirring that boiling pot of vague emotionally charged concepts in the rather undefendable belief that something of significance will float up to the top.
As you say, opinions are cheap and common.

Now that isn't very good evidence of anything as it says we can't know anything for sure.
How do you figure that? The unfalsifiability of solipsism does not entail that we cannot know anything.

My only purpose in posting on this forum is to try and get through to someone.
About what?

I regard the question to be in exactly the same category as "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" Conscious is about as well defined a concept as angels.
The question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin is an extremely important one and medieval scholars were well aware of this. They were not fools. The question concerns the fabric of reality and whether it is quantised or a continuum (among other things). It's a question worth pondering in some depth. As for consciousness, it is generally defined as 'what it is like'. Of course this is not a scientific definition but as yet there is no evidence that consciousness can be given a scientific defintion.

I am well aware of the fact that you don't understand the significance of that fact (and I think I can call it a fact as it pretty well exhausts all possibilities). For well over forty years I have tried and failed to get anyone to look in the direction I have looked. Everyone's reaction is pretty well the same.
I can't react one way or the other since I don't know yet what you're suggesting.

You have said very clearly that you can see no significance to my division of all knowledge into two parts: that about which you are right and that about which you are wrong.
This is a misuse of the term 'knowledge'. A piece of knowledge that is false is not knowledge, it is a false assumption. But I know what you mean.

My point is that, even if we cannot tell the difference, the two categories obey violently different constraints and that fact is of very great significance. If you stick with me, I will show you exactly the significance of that difference.
If we cannot tell the difference between what we know and what we don't know, or between which of our beliefs are true and which false, then knowledge is impossible. It is incoherent to suggest that we have knowledge that is false. If a statement is false then one cannot know it is true.

If you mean that we sometimes mistake false assumptions for knowledge then I couldn't agree more. But one cannot say that knowledge may turn out to be false. If what we assumed was true turns out to be false then clearly we cannot ever have known that it is true. Nobody says "I know that this statement is true although I must admit that one day it may turn out to be false". It would be equivalent to saying "I know something I'm not sure I know".
 
  • #806
Doctordick said:
That is why I was approaching saviormachine in the manner I was. He seemed to be following my thoughts but, just as you, I think he thought that they led nowhere.
That certainly isn't true. I'm still watching over your shoulder(s). Stay focused, I'd say. :smile:
If you stick with me, I will show you exactly the significance of that difference.
Go ahead.
 
  • #807
I apologize for being such a hot-head. I needed to cool off for a bit; viewing my previous additions to this subject is kind of embarassing...

here is my reasoning:

When confronted with the world we live in, and when we choose to only understand objectively, we notice many patterns/characteristics that seem to pervade into almost every discrete "system" that catches our interest. We can measure some general things that we observe like mass, charge, heat capacity, electrical conductivity, length, temperature, color, etc. These things are the product of reducing any system into more general components that depend on each other. This is a tantalizing beckoner of the idea that possibly everything can be reduced to pure physics. The general rules we define start our investigation into more general rules that may or may not fully determine the outcome of the rules above them. Science won't accept any explanation that may not be correct, unless it's the best known explanation for that particular discrete system of interest. Ultimately, as we seek to reduce all known physical processes to the most basic and general explanations we can, physics directs our curiosity towards the final say: the four fundamental forces. These forces are how every physical process evolves. So the question "can everything be reduced to pure physics?" depends on your definition of everything, and it also depends on your willingness to accept that there is nothing more general than the four fundamental forces. If you define everything as everything but consciousness and personal experiance, and you willingly accept that there is nothing more general driving the final say in physics (the four fundamental forces), then yes, "everything" can be reduced to "pure physics".
 
  • #808
I just noticed something else; to answer yes or no is to make an unfalsifiable statement (with our current understanding). To answer the question based on different definitions of "everything" and "pure physics" than the definitions of the questioner is unscientific, and should be completely resolved first. When you mean, "everything" do you also mean ideas(things that don't exist within the universe, ie. don't take up space or time)? Was this whole question devised to trick people into trying to prove an unfalsifiable statement?
 
  • #809
Added later by edit - Sorry I did not see the thread title, only the poll question, so first part of original post tht was here has now been removed. I had complained about the use of word "everything", but remainder of post below is still ok and shows how hard it is to use words to express ideas which have various definitions in use. For expample what constitutes "ownership" etc. in the case of the car thief discussed below. - end of edit.

There has also been considerable discussion about beliefs that are false (Ok concept on first consideration) and about knowledge that is false (not OK as would not be “knowledge,“ if false)

On the first - Consider a thief who believes he is stealing a car (because he has just broken in and hot wired the ignition as he does several times each month to support himself). But let us suppose that the car belonged to a man who recently died with a yet unread will that gives the car to anyone who would take it from the garage, which the thief has already done. Is the thief’s belief that he has successfully stolen another car true or false? Would the dog eating the unread will change your answer? What if it just was not found till 50 years later when the house was torn down?

On the second - One can not have sure knowledge that there even is a physical world. One can not really get far from Descartes thinking experiencer with complete confidence. Thus no certain knowledge about the physical world is possible.

I guess my point is let's not be too “picky,” think that facts or beliefs are by necessity either true or false nor rewrite a question others have already voted on.
 
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  • #810
Billy T said:
n the second - One can not have sure knowledge that there even is a physical world. One can not really get far from Descartes thinking experiencer with complete confidence. Thus no certain knowledge about the physical world is possible.
What are you more certain about than about your knowledge about the existence of the physical world?

Are you certain about the uncertainty of your knowledge about the existence of the physicial world? :smile:
 
  • #811
saviourmachine said:
What are you more certain about than about your knowledge about the existence of the physical world?

Are you certain about the uncertainty of your knowledge about the existence of the physicial world? :smile:
Reminds me of the joke :

I used to be indecisive - now I'm not so sure.

I think the point Billy T is making is that our supposed "certain knowledge" about anything and everything is based on assumptions and axioms. Take away the assumptions and axioms and we have "certain knowledge" of... nothing.

Of course I cannot be certain about the truth of that, since I can be certain about nothing.

MF
:smile:
 
  • #812
This is not right. Sure, we cannot be certain of the veracity of the evidence of our senses, or of our reasoning. But this does not mean we cannot have certain knowledge. There is such a thing as direct knowledge, or non-intuitive immediate knowledge. I just came across this essay and I'd say it's worth a read in this context

http://friesian.com/immedi-1.htm
 
  • #813
Canute said:
This is not right.
What is not right?

Canute said:
Sure, we cannot be certain of the veracity of the evidence of our senses, or of our reasoning.

But this does not mean we cannot have certain knowledge.
How does one come to obtain such knowledge if not via senses or reasoning?

Canute said:
There is such a thing as direct knowledge, or non-intuitive immediate knowledge.
Please explain what you mean by “direct knowledge”? How is this knowledge imparted to us?

Canute said:
I just came across this essay and I'd say it's worth a read in this context

http://friesian.com/immedi-1.htm
With respect, a very long and IMHO a very boring and obscure text. Can you summarise the message?

MF

(BTW - Did I tell you that I KNOW there are fairies at the bottom of my garden?)
 
  • #814
moving finger said:
What is not right?
Your comment that you can be certain about nothing.

How does one come to obtain such knowledge if not via senses or reasoning?
What one can be sure of knowing is what one is, once one has dug underneath what one appears to be. This is to say no more than that you know what state your consciousness is in. This is what is meant by 'non-intuitive immediate knowledge'. This can be understood in terms of Aristotle's observation that true knowledge is identical with its object. In more mystical terms this can be restated as saying that certainty entails 'becoming' ones knowledge rather than standing apart from it, and thus doing away with any mediation between oneself and ones knowledge. In more Buddhist terms it can be restated as saying that certain knowledge is knowledge attained by means of non-conceptual experience.

With respect, a very long and IMHO a very boring and obscure text. Can you summarise the message?
Urgh. In a word, no. It is neither boring nor obscure in my opinion, but I agree that it is not easy reading. To some extent it is an argument that Aristotle was right about knowledge, that only unmediated knowledge can be certain. Also it argues that immediate knowledge is not the same thing as intuitive knowledge. Intuitive knowledge, by the everyday usage of 'intuitive', is not certain and therefore not knowledge. Best I can do without doing a days work on it I'm afraid.

(BTW - Did I tell you that I KNOW there are fairies at the bottom of my garden?)
Really? No, you didn't mention it. I suspect you're lying, especially since in your last post you said that you didn't know anything. if so then this entails that there might be fairies at the bottom of your garden, since you do not know that there aren't any. But it is impossible to know that there are fairies at the bottom of your garden, since it is impossible for you to know that your garden exists.
 
  • #815
METAPHYSICAL EXAMINATION OF EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS

To make an explantory statement, we need to include the EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS (ES) of the explainer in the statemtent. Infact, even if we fail to do so as is typically or usually the case in all our reports and conversations, it is still fully metaphysically enforced and semantically and epistemologically presupposed. Don't feel irritated by this, guys, for that is unfortunately the case. Consider for example the following statements:

(1) I am alive
(2) The sun is shining
(3) The grass is green
(4) If I am sitting then, I am neither standing nor lying down
(5) The sun has always been shining, thefore the sun will shine tomorrow
(6) All politicians are liars, Mr. X is a politician, therefore Mr. X is a Liar

And so on. What I am saying here is that although none of these statements mentions or declares the epistemological status of its speaker or reporter or maker, yet such epistemological status is fully metaphysically enforced and semantically and epistemologically presupposed in it. This means that when the epistemological status of a given maker of any statement of fact is not mentioned, it is still passively so. When such statements are recast as follows, then this immediately renders the epistemological status of the speaker relevant in the overall analysis and derivation of their truth values. In other words the epistomological status of the speaker or reporter metaphysicallly contributes to the semantic and truth values of a given statement of fact or proposition.

(1) I can know everything, therefore I am 100% certain that I am alive
Or, alternatively, "If the Epiistemoloical status of my being is such that I can know every, then it is impossible for it to be false that I am alive.

(2) If the ES of my being is such that I can never fall into error of judgement, then I am 100% catainn that the sun is shining.


(3) The ES of my being is such that I am sometimes wrong in my judgement, therefore it is likely or possibly true that The grass is green

(4) If the ES of my being is such that I can only do one of three things at a time and not all three at once, then if I am sitting, I am neither standing nor lying down.

(5) The ES of my being is such that I always, and not sometimes, see the sun shine. Then I am 100% certain that the sun has always been shining, thefore the sun will shine tomorrow.

(6) The ES of my being is such that I always know everything: Then I am 100% certain that "all politicians are liars, Mr. X is a politician, therefore Mr. X is a Liar" is true.

And so on. Of course, these recast statements metaphysically force you to commit yourself to the inevitable inclusion of the ES of their reporters or speakers in your analytical derivation of their semantic values and truth values. Without this metaphysical enforcement, some of these statements (if not all of them) are as good as being semantically meaningless and epistemologically truth-valueless.

NOTE: The metaphysical contribution of the ES of the reporter or speaker to the semantic value and the truth-vlaue of a given proposition or statement of fact is an issue that, even if we wanted to, we can no longer avoid reductively. Science must now fully address and take charge of this fact.
 
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  • #816
UPDATE: what does the current result of the survey tell us?


By Physics alone? --------------------> 94 ---->47.72%
By Religion alone?---------------------> 7------>3.55%
By any other discipline?---------------> 9 ------>4.57%
By Multi-disciplinary efforts? ----------> 87----->44.16%


Does this result suggest anything significant, or are the data from this result rigged or fictitious? For a start the explanatory capacities of Physics and Multidisciplinary tend to run head to head. This seems to me to suggest that not only can other disciplines participatively explain the world, but also physics (with all its explanatory power) cannot write them off altogether.

IMPORTANT QUESTION

Even if Physics can arguably explain everything, can it also succeed in writing off other disciplines completely?

Well, that is the question. For explaining the world in its entirity is one thing, and getting rid of the remaining explanatory layers of the world (obviously done through other existing disciplines) is another thing. It seems to me to be almost impossible to do this. Or if it is possibe at all, this would kick-start a chain of events that would adversely interfer and completely change the human nature and the way we relate to the wider world. Infact, the "PHYSICS OF MAN' would experience a fundamental intervention and overhauling.

NOTE: From the result of this survey, it is no longer clear whether we are anticipating or advocating a form of "ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM" or a NON-ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM. Can physics eliminatively reduce everything to physics? If physics succeeds in doing this, does this render all other explanations in other disciplines WHOLLY redundant? Note also that "Non-eliminative Reductionism" under normal circumstances is supposed to acknowledge and retain all the explainable layers of the world as formulated and set forth by their corresponding disciplines. Should this be the norm or the case, it is therefore peculiar and strange that we even bother with the whole notion of reductionism in the first place. Physics must therefore make clear, at least at this metaphysical level, which of these two fundamental categories of reductionism that it is advocating.
 
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  • #817
This seems to me to suggest that not only can other disciplines participatively explain the world, but also physics (with all its explanatory power) cannot write them off altogether.

It seems to me very likely that this will be the case, at least a long time from now. For example it is unlikely that biology or economics could be 'reduced' to a theory of everything in physics. However this does not mean that our inability to make the reduction implies that, in absolute, that TOE (very probable not complete, probably needing auxiliary assumptions to cope with the 'higher level' sciences) cannot handle the higher level sciences (biology, economics etc).

The explanation can be that the phenomena are so complex (or chaotic) that we are unable to offer a clear explanation or solve the equations which appear (a good example today: it becomes cumbersome, basically impossible, to solve Schrodinger's equations for very complex systems, still there is basically no good reason to think that the standard formalism of QM cannot handle them, that the standard formalism does not hold for them).

This is particularly important in the case of consciousness studies, the brain is one of the most complex systems in the universe (some philosophers even believe that its functioning involves chaotic events which, though deterministic in nature, cannot be predicted accurately). Some other philosophers of science think that there are good reasons to believe that the phenomenon of 'multiple realizations' plays an important role (the multiple realization implies that different, at least slightly different, brain states can produce basically identical mental states).

Upon them the actual incapacity to bridge the gap between the functional 'top-down' and the 'bottom-up' approaches might be due, apart from the huge complexity of the brain (or the chaotic features), exactly to the 'multiple realization' phenomenon, very difficult to account of, probably even for the technology of the foreseable future. As a conclusion 'greedy reduction' (at the laws of physics) might be possible, in theory at least, but it is unlikely that we will be able to do that at least in the foreseable future.
 
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  • #818
metacristi said:
It seems to me very likely that this will be the case, at least a long time from now. For example it is unlikely that biology or economics could be 'reduced' to a theory of everything in physics. However this does not mean that our inability to make the reduction implies that, in absolute, that TOE (very probable not complete, probably needing auxiliary assumptions to cope with the 'higher level' sciences) cannot handle the higher level sciences (biology, economics etc).

The explanation can be that the phenomena are so complex (or chaotic) that we are unable to offer a clear explanation or solve the equations which appear (a good example today: it becomes cumbersome, basically impossible, to solve Schrodinger's equations for very complex systems, still there is basically no good reason to think that the standard formalism of QM cannot handle them, that the standard formalism does not hold for them).

This is particularly important in the case of consciousness studies, the brain is one of the most complex systems in the universe (some philosophers even believe that its functioning involves chaotic events which, though deterministic in nature, cannot be predicted accurately). Some other philosophers of science think that there are good reasons to believe that the phenomenon of 'multiple realizations' plays an important role (the multiple realization implies that different, at least slightly different, brain states can produce basically identical mental states).

Upon them the actual incapacity to bridge the gap between the functional 'top-down' and the 'bottom-up' approaches might be due, apart from the huge complexity of the brain (or the chaotic features), exactly to the 'multiple realization' phenomenon, very difficult to account of, probably even for the technology of the foreseable future. As a conclusion 'greedy reduction' (at the laws of physics) might be possible, in theory at least, but it is unlikely that we will be able to do that at least in the foreseable future.

Yes, this is a fair summary of the problem as faced both by science and by philosophy. But as I have already pointed out somehwere above, TOE only makes sense if we have a clear and worthwhile reason (or reasons) for it. So, the key question still remains: WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF REDUCING EVERYTHING TO PHYSICS? I have made an attempt to make sense of the possible answer to this question by suggesting a few useful reasons for the whole notion of reductionism in the first place.

BIOLOGY: That by reductively rearranging or reprogramming genes in the living organisms we can structurally and functionally improve them. Enhance their functionality, extend their lifespans and make them live longer, reduce or eliminate decaying etc.

PHYSICS: That by reducing things to smaller and smaller scales we may be able to see what we could not see at the macroscale. For example, nanoscale rearrangement of things could improve their structures and functions. We may create self-sufficient, super-sized, super-structured, super-functioning entities. Supper-activities such as inter-state migration, teleportation, time travel etc, may be rendered possible in the forseeable future.

COSTS: By understanding the world to ever smaller and smaller scale we can reduce costs of things, make higher quality things for less money. This would help the human race create and sustain a more progressive society? Is this true?

MANAGABILITY: That the world is easier to manage if we understand it at every explainable or reducible layer. For every layer that is successfully explained or reduced, we are better off knowledgewise. It is to the human advantage to understand the world at every level. Makes sense, but reducibility and its possibility is another matter.

Well, there are hundreds of other reasons that may be given for reductionism, but these are just a few ones that are currently being suggested. Valid or not valid, but the standard assumption is that we do have worthwhile reasons for reducing everything to physics.


THE POSSIBILITY OF TOE

The standard assumption is that everything can be reduced to physics. If we can do this, reduce every layer of the world or discipline to pure physics, what happens to each of this reduced layer or discipline? Would the reductive process itself involve physical reorganisation or rearangement of each reduced layer or discipline? Or perhaps total re-engineering of things in world? I distinguished between ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM (ER) and NON-ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM (NER) as the two main fundamental metaphysical categories of the whole notion of reductionism. Personally, I am not quite sure which of these two types that Physics is advocating. What do you think about this? Do you think that physics is advocating the ER or NER? Can physics eliminatively reduce everything to physics?

Coversely, if we cannot reduce the multi-layered world to physics for all sorts of reasons already given on this thread and elsewhere, would this trigger the advocates of TOE to re-examine their ambition and reasons for it? Would we then turn our attention to us, the proposers and the perceivers of these ideals?

I personally do not rule out its possibility and I retain this position in a rather optimistic way and I think it would be a total disaster to view it otherwise. For all the reasons given and ungiven, TOE is essential if the whole notion of "HUMAN PROGRESS" is to be entertained at all. We just need to know these things if we are to move an inch on the path of progress. Who knows, the whole human survival may very well depend on it.
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Save our world from destruction...Stay GREEN!
 
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  • #819
moving finger said:
I think the point Billy T is making is that our supposed "certain knowledge" about anything and everything is based on assumptions and axioms. Take away the assumptions and axioms and we have "certain knowledge" of... nothing.
:smile: It's semantics indeed. Like DoctorDick's comparison with a dictionary. "Certain knowledge" is defined in other terms from the dictionary, so it does mean what it means because it means that to us. That doesn't say anything about its "existential state". Whatever that is! Because I also said now something limited to our "verbal world".

<off-topic>
By the way, it's interesting to see the difference between the texts of DoctorDick and Philocrat. Both of you I find difficult to follow. DoctorDick, because your texts have such a small "definition density". With common words you tackle difficult concepts, without using many terms that are in use in contemporary science and philosophy. It's like you're writing assembly code. :smile: Philocrat, because your texts have such a big "definition density". You use many new definitions that nobody before, ever thought of creating words for. I guess you've immediately a word for the problem I've with understanding you both. :smile: It's like you're writing a high-level programming language that nobody knows.

Does anybody feel that the same way?
 
  • #820
What do you think about this? Do you think that physics is advocating the ER or NER? Can physics eliminatively reduce everything to physics?

Coversely, if we cannot reduce the multi-layered world to physics for all sorts of reasons already given on this thread and elsewhere, would this trigger the advocates of TOE to re-examine their ambition and reasons for it? Would we then turn our attention to us, the proposers and the perceivers of these ideals?


Nice post philocrat. Certainly, at least for the moment, the main view in the scientific community is that of ER, this based on the previous success of the actual scientific methodology (nonwithstanding that minimal). The fact that the components and processes of this universe can be isolated and profitably analyzed in isolation (that is reductionism) has proved to be too successful in the past to be abandoned at once. Besides there is a widespread acceptance among scientists that science (the actual methodology) is always objective and can surely lead us to the truth.

So even if scientists could not prove in a clear way that everything can be reduced to physics (to a certain TOE in physics for example) that would not discourage them to try further to reduce all higher level sciences to that TOE (possibly by adding some extra auxiliary assumptions, that it by extending the physical theory). Of course for all our practical purposes scientists will use the models provided by the higher level sciences, for example now chemistry is doing very well though there are enough reasons to think that it can be reduced entirely at physics (the best existing physical theory, QM). This is valid even if full reduction would be achieved (for simplicity reasons, exactly as we still use Newtonian mechanics for the majority of our practical purposes).

Neither will it be easily accepted in the scientific community that the goal of science is socially dependent, dependent on scientists finally. For this would imply that scientists have to recognize that we do not know that science really lead us to the truth, that high coherence and simplicity of theories + the practical successes of science do not also involve that science approaches truth (see the problem of 'success' of science, hotly debated in the philosophy of science; unfortunately, in spite of what many scientists believe now, we do not have yet sufficient reasons, beyond all reasonable doubt, to think that 'empirical success' involve approaching truth, in absolute).

The only way to really shaken the belief in reductionism were its failure at the level of physics itself. Something still possible, in quantum physics we already accept that the distinction perceiver-percieved is not so clear, the contextual approaches are much more valued now (the measurement device does influence the object under 'scrutiny'), basically there is still possible a return to Chew's 'bootstrap' (holistic) approach characteristic to the physics of the 60s. Sure this does not automatically mean that all higher level sciences cannot be reduced, at least in theory, for example, to the 'quantum fields' approach but certainly this would have an impact, scientists would be forced to recognize at least that full reduction might be impossible.
 
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  • #821
One small point. The association of physics with reductionism does not seem to be a necessary one, so the failure of one does not necessarily entail the failure of the other. In my view it doesn't matter whether one analyses the universe reductively or holistically. The answers come out the same in the end. There's a New Age idea floating around that reductionism is to be avoided. Its supporters seem to have missed the fact that most 'mystical religions' adopt very reductionist methods of analysis, and Buddhist analysis is far more reductionist than science in this respect, albeit that it is also more holistic.
 
  • #822
metacristi, could you be kind enough to expand upon the following items:

(1)... adding some extra auxiliary assumptions, ...by extending the physical theory.

Would this include (a) The Eperimenter-Experiment Relations, (b) Secondary qualities (smell, taste, qualia, etc), (c) Forms, (d) Scale of Reference, (e) Observer-Object Relations, etc.? Will such an extended system embrace Metaphysics as viable tool of Explanation and Disambiguation?

(2) ...there is still possible a return to Chew's 'bootstrap' (holistic) approach characteristic to the physics of the 60s.

Sorry that I am not aware of this holistic conept. I am aware of the PARTS-WHOLE Relations that I have exhaustivelly examined over the years, both programtically and naratively. What I uncovered in those examinations just sent a chill down my spine. This is what forced me to make the fundamental distinction between (a) Open System, (2) Semi-closed/Semi-open system and (3) Closed system a few pages above on this thread. I summarised it as guidelines for mathematicians and logicians so that we don't risk falling into the metaphysical trap of making another Category Mistake with regards to this notion of Parts-Whole Relation. So, the lesson to learn here is that anyone who takes upon him or herself to embark upon the critical examination of this relation, must pay absolute attention to these three fundamental metaphysical categories involved. Our current world tends to occupy a range between (1) and (2) and I am not quite sure whether the current mathematics and logic clearly account for them. This is still within the scope of debate. However, (3) is ruthlessly diffcult to comprehend. The more I think about it, the more it seems mathematically and logically far removed from reality. It is as metaphysically and epistemologically hair-raising as it can get. This is one issue that I would not mind at all being enlightened on by anyone who knows it any better.

Pardon me that I have not read anything about what you are referring to. Please let me know whether hollistic implies a methology for a complete description of the Parts-Whole Relations.
 
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  • #823
Canute said:
One small point. The association of physics with reductionism does not seem to be a necessary one, so the failure of one does not necessarily entail the failure of the other. In my view it doesn't matter whether one analyses the universe reductively or holistically. The answers come out the same in the end. There's a New Age idea floating around that reductionism is to be avoided. Its supporters seem to have missed the fact that most 'mystical religions' adopt very reductionist methods of analysis, and Buddhist analysis is far more reductionist than science in this respect, albeit that it is also more holistic.

Canute, I remember that you tried once somewhere on this PF to educate me on the Buddhist Reductive System. Could you be kind enough to give it another go and expand upon the following item:

------------
...Buddhism is reductionist while being holistic...
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It just sounds redically paradigmatic in scope. Is it REDUCTIVE MONISM, or perhaps a sort of methodology for eliminatiing parts from a whole? I can at least appreciate and deal with the notion of CAUSAL RELATIONS of things and the multidisciplinary attempts to schematically explain them. Is the holistic approach a methodology for completely weaving these causal relations together?

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Save our Planet from Destruction ... Stay GREEN!
 
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  • #824
(QUOTE=Canute) When you say: "I am aware that..." are you not saying "you are conscious that..."? And does this help understand consciousness?

Canute said:
Have you come across the Western philosophical 'problem of attributes'? If not it would be worth looking it up. It shows that matter cannot be reduced to physics.


Consciousness is usually defined as 'what it is like' in the scientific and Western philosophical literature. Most philosophers and many scientists seem happy with this definition, although clearly physics cannot reduce 'what it is like' to anything else or prove that it exists. Many people, Crick for insatance, would like to redefine it, but nobody has come up with anything better yet.


As you say, opinions are cheap and common.


How do you figure that? The unfalsifiability of solipsism does not entail that we cannot know anything.


About what?


The question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin is an extremely important one and medieval scholars were well aware of this. They were not fools. The question concerns the fabric of reality and whether it is quantised or a continuum (among other things). It's a question worth pondering in some depth. As for consciousness, it is generally defined as 'what it is like'. Of course this is not a scientific definition but as yet there is no evidence that consciousness can be given a scientific defintion.


I can't react one way or the other since I don't know yet what you're suggesting.


This is a misuse of the term 'knowledge'. A piece of knowledge that is false is not knowledge, it is a false assumption. But I know what you mean.


If we cannot tell the difference between what we know and what we don't know, or between which of our beliefs are true and which false, then knowledge is impossible. It is incoherent to suggest that we have knowledge that is false. If a statement is false then one cannot know it is true.

If you mean that we sometimes mistake false assumptions for knowledge then I couldn't agree more. But one cannot say that knowledge may turn out to be false. If what we assumed was true turns out to be false then clearly we cannot ever have known that it is true. Nobody says "I know that this statement is true although I must admit that one day it may turn out to be false". It would be equivalent to saying "I know something I'm not sure I know".
 
  • #825
I apologize to anyone who has been following this thread. I have taken a few weeks off because it is clear to me that no one on this forum has any comprehension of what I am trying to communicate. Everyone on this forum and I are operating on totally different levels.
Canute said:
It shows that matter cannot be reduced to physics.
Without even looking, I know the truth of that comment depends on the meanings of the words making up the comment and thus is not an exact statement in any sense at all. I am interested in "exact analysis", a concept apparently foreign to the perspective of everyone posting on this forum.
Canute said:
Most philosophers and many scientists seem happy with this definition...
If you had been reading my posts carefully you would have realized by now that I am not happy with any definitions except the very few I have decided are essential. It is my opinion that if one goes forth presuming they understand any human language correctly they have left exact science in their wake. The only human language which even approaches the status of exact is the language of mathematics and even that language has some subtle problems. From my perspective anyone who is "happy" with any definition has failed to look at the problem of definition carefully.
Canute said:
If you mean that we sometimes mistake false assumptions for knowledge then I couldn't agree more. But one cannot say that knowledge may turn out to be false. If what we assumed was true turns out to be false then clearly we cannot ever have known that it is true. Nobody says "I know that this statement is true although I must admit that one day it may turn out to be false". It would be equivalent to saying "I know something I'm not sure I know".
And here we arrive at the crux of your post. You would rather stir that pot of vague terms than think about the issue I have brought up. It seems that you would rather keep the issue of a difference between "things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment was, in fact, wrong"[/color] and "there were things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment was, in fact, right"[/color] as insignificant as possible. I think you do this because to admit that the issue is significant would require you to think about it and that is one thing you want to avoid at all costs. I would say that you think you know a lot of things that you don't really know but you would rather muddy the issue than admit there could be any truth to that idea. As I said earlier, you have a habit of taking very dogmatic positions.

At this point I also have become convinced that your real reason for refusing to allow me to use the terms "knowable"[/color] and "unknowable"[/color] to refer to the two different kinds of presumed true facts[/color] because the usage is too short and difficult to stir into confusion. As I said earlier, I will use the adjective "knowable"[/color] to denote the fact that the term being modified by that adjective is, in fact, something which is real in the sense that no acceptable explanation can ever fail to include it: i.e., any explanation will be deemed false if the "knowable" thing is denied by the explanation. I will use the adjective "unknowable"[/color] to denote the fact that the term being modified by that adjective is, in fact, a figment of our imagination: i.e, one of those things we think we know but we are wrong about. When I use those two terms, that is exactly what I mean. You have said that you understand the fact that these two possibilities exist and if you cannot consistently convert those two terms (when I use them) to those two categories, then we will just call the conversation off.
saviourmachine said:
Doctordick said:
That is why I was approaching saviormachine in the manner I was. He seemed to be following my thoughts but, just as you, I think he thought that they led nowhere.
That certainly isn't true. I'm still watching over your shoulder(s). Stay focused, I'd say. :smile:
Doctordick said:
If you stick with me, I will show you exactly the significance of that difference.
Go ahead.
Thank you saviormachine, I will try to stay focused. On reason I presumed you were backing away is that the last post from me, which you failed to respond to contained a lot of important relationships. I doubt you understood it all and proceeding without understanding is pretty well a waste of time. But don't let that bother you; we can always get back on track later. I will try to communicate to Canute on that step.

My definition of an explanation, that it is a defined method of establishing expectations based on known information, is stated the way it is because the definition does not require the known information be defined and thus avoids the issue of the vagueness of the language used to express that information. I can use the simple concept of a set to refer to "what is to be explained". What is to be explained is "A" and "A" can be any set of elements and the elements can be anything. The central issue in a real explanation is that the known information can change thus, as we are not all knowing, "A" , in general, can never be assumed to be completely known. We need to be able to refer to exactly what we know (or think we know) and we need a way to refer to changes in what we know (or think we know) without actually defining either. That is the essence of my definitions of sets "B" and "C" in the complex post.

Try and follow a thought experiment regarding the following problem: I have some set "A" in my head and I am going to take arbitrary collections of elements of "A" (sets "B") and give them to you. Based on "C" (the entire collection you have so far received) you are to come up with a method of establishing your expectations: i.e., your estimate as to the probability of getting any conceivable specific "B". On a small scale this is a problem given to students all the time: if I gave you a "one" and then gave you a "two" and then a "three", you would probably put a high probability on getting a four. But this problem becomes far more difficult when the number of elements involved become far in excess of number you can think of simultaneously on a conscious level. It is my intention to lay out an analytical method of achieving that result which can be extended to any finite number of elements.

What is important here is to come up with a method of establishing expectations without specifically defining the elements of A. Definitions are very seldom well though out as they are almost always arrived at intuitively. No one knows how intuition manages to achieve the results it does and the process cannot be analytically defended in any detail at all. Defining things before we have any idea as to the rules which determine what elements will occur is a very dangerous intellectual step. On the other hand, we need to have some way of referring to these elements or we cannot think about them at all. So we need a labeling method which does not establish any definition of these elements. I propose that attaching a numerical label to each element of interest is an easy solution. There are an infinite number of such labels and none of the labels need carry any implications as to what it is that is being labeled.

However, establishing such a set of numerical labels does provide one with a list of numbers which maps directly into a referenced set "B" above. Likewise "C" becomes a collection of such lists. This allows one to express the problem to be solved in a very simple manner: if your expectations can be expressed as yes, I expected that "B" or no, that "B" was a surprise or any probabilistic range between the two, then the method used to generate that expectation can be seen as a mathematical function. That is, the set of numbers which constitute the list labeling that "B" are the arguments of the function and the value of the function is your expectation. Since the number of elements in "B" is finite and the number of "B"s in "C" is finite, the function can be seen as a tabular function with a finite number of entries.

Knowing that function (writing down the lists for each "B" you were given) constitutes an explanation per the definition I have put forth. It amounts to the explanation, "it's in the list so I expect to see it".[/color] It is at least an exact explanation of the elements you have been given. The tabular function can be thought of as the rule which determines whether or not a particular "B" is possible; some one asks you if you expect to see a certain "B" all you have to do is assign the numerical labels (in what ever way you assigned them) and then check to see if that set is in your table. Now I am not proposing this procedure as a reasonable way to solve a real problem, I am putting it forth to point out an interesting facet of the representation.

Suppose, for the fun of it, someone gave you all the elements but one from some "B" and asked you what element could be added to make that list a valid example of one of the sets you were given. Your table is very close to answering that question. Can anyone out there think of a way to make that result possible in every case?

Think about that question for a while. The correct answer is very enlightening.

Have fun – Doctor Dick
 
  • #826
Canute said:
Have you come across the Western philosophical 'problem of attributes'? If not it would be worth looking it up. It shows that matter cannot be reduced to physics.

If you are referring to the issue of universals , bare particulars, etc, it does nothing of the kind.


If you mean that we sometimes mistake false assumptions for knowledge then I couldn't agree more. But one cannot say that knowledge may turn out to be false. If what we assumed was true turns out to be false then clearly we cannot ever have known that it is true. ".

If you stipulate that knowledge means certainty, it turns out that we don't know anyhthing. Which is a bit drastic.


Nobody says "I know that this statement is true although I must admit that one day it may turn out to be false". It would be equivalent to saying "I know something I'm not sure I know".

If 'know' is stipulated to mean 'best available hypothesis' that is entirely consistent.
 
  • #827
Bobby R said:
(QUOTE=Canute) When you say: "I am aware that..." are you not saying "you are conscious that..."? And does this help understand consciousness?
As you say said:
In July of 2004 “Philocrat” asked a reasonable question about whether Physics could explain everything in the whole universe. I’ve watched this thread and made a few comments myself. Each time I see those who cannot respond without using some negative slur toward those to whom they are unable to respond or understand. I wonder about their own ability to think. I especially focus on the “Common” remark. Books, quotes from the intellect and personal experimentation are sources used by knowledge seekers. However, even the smartest of the smart will blend information with “Common Sense” to formulate an opinion. It is wise to remember, those who choose to degrade the common may expose their own ignorance. Further, the only cheap opinion would be the one without thought. …Bobby R.
 
  • #828
I've been trying to follow this thread but, quite frankly, I got p*ssed of with DoctorDicks attitude. Canute, you've got a lot more patience than I :)

One of the questions/debates, whatever you want to call it, referred to the meaning of certain words, one of which was 'understanding'.

I've found this definition through a previous research regarding 'communication':

“The creation of shared understanding through interaction among two or more agents. Communication depends upon interpretation of some message by the listener. Shared understanding is constructed through the detection and repair of misunderstandings (as opposed to a one-way transmission of data). The understanding created through communication can never be absolute or complete, but instead is an interactive and ongoing process in which common ground, i.e., assumed mutual beliefs and mutual knowledge, is accumulated and updated.”[

This, in my opinion, is something that DoctorDick (as well as many other people including myself) has to think about.
 
  • #829
If so, we have no free will
 
  • #830
It's interesting how the original question (Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?) ended up as a debate on communication. Perhaps it's only natural, since the meaning of the question itself is too obscure to have, in my opinion, any relevance. Just thinking about the question from a few different perspectives revealed the potential for confusion, which probably explains why this is the longest running thread here.

Let's start with "can". "Can" everything be reduced to pure physics? Possibly so. "Can" everything be reduced to dogmatic religion? Certainly so. "Can" the whole world be an illusion? Some people say so. The real point for me is, so what? What if something "can" be represented or misinterpreted as being something else? What does that really mean? "Can" the greatest romantic novel, the most profound philosophical teatrise, the most exact scientific theory, be reduced to a collection of the 26 letters of the English alphabet? Of course it can, but the question remains: so what?

I won't even get into the mess of what "everything" is supposed to mean, whether it must be limited to our sensory perceptions of the world or also include abstract ideas such as logic, commonsense, intuition, morals, aesthetics. Or what "reduced" means, whether it means the establishment of a cognitive model for sensory perceptions or the unification of the various academic disciplines. Or what "pure physics" means, whether it is just a bunch of mathematical symbols entirely devoid of meaning in any natural language, such as English, or whether those symbols require an interpretation in terms as vague as "uncertainty", "duality", "relative", which are so often used by modern physicists.

All in all, it's as the old Arab proverb says: "foolish questions beget foolish answers". Something like that.
 
  • #831
Daminc said:
I've been trying to follow this thread but, quite frankly, I got p*ssed of with DoctorDicks attitude. Canute, you've got a lot more patience than I :)
Well, I am certainly sorry that I p*ss you off; it was never my intention!
“The creation of shared understanding through interaction among two or more agents. Communication depends upon interpretation of some message by the listener. Shared understanding is constructed through the detection and repair of misunderstandings (as opposed to a one-way transmission of data). The understanding created through communication can never be absolute or complete, but instead is an interactive and ongoing process in which common ground, i.e., assumed mutual beliefs and mutual knowledge, is accumulated and updated.”
And it is exactly that process which interests me. Two things appear to be true: first, the process must begin with no common ground and secondly it appears that at least some understanding can be achieved. As far as I can see, the problem of understanding one another is precisely the problem of understanding anything. And, I would be very pleased to find anyone willing to think about it. I personally have spent a lot of time thinking about it.
Faust said:
It's interesting how the original question (Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?) ended up as a debate on communication.
Don't you see the similarity between the two questions "can everything be reduced to 'communication'" and all the other possibilities you bring up? Isn't it first essential to establish the pitfalls of comunication before one establishs what is meant by the question? It seems to me we are both talking about the same issue.
Faust said:
All in all, it's as the old Arab proverb says: "foolish questions beget foolish answers". Something like that.
The other side of the coin is, "the first step in finding an answer is asking the right question!" By the way, as physics is often held to be "the mother of all exact science", I interpret the reference "pure physics" to mean "exact science" which must be the intention if one is to allow what is included in "physics" to change. (If you don't allow advances, the answer is clearly "no!") :biggrin:

Have fun -- Dick
 
  • #832
Doctordick said:
Don't you see the similarity between the two questions "can everything be reduced to 'communication'" and all the other possibilities you bring up? Isn't it first essential to establish the pitfalls of comunication before one establishs what is meant by the question? It seems to me we are both talking about the same issue.

I don't know which issue you are talking about, and reading your previous posts hasn't helped me much. In any case, I was only pointing at the vagueness of the question. I think a better-phrased question would have raised a more interesting debate. But that's just my opinion.

I interpret the reference "pure physics" to mean "exact science"...

I interpret "pure physics" to mean "the study of the movement of particles through space and time". I still think the question needs rephrasing.
 
  • #833
Faust said:
It's interesting how the original question (Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?) ended up as a debate on communication.

In my opinion, anytime you see a discussion about something as real as physics turn into a communication debate, then you know rationalistic philosophy has been dominating the dialogue.


Faust said:
Perhaps it's only natural, since the meaning of the question itself is too obscure to have, in my opinion, any relevance. . . . Let's start with "can" . . . I won't even get into the mess of what "everything" is supposed to mean . . . Or what "reduced" means . . . Or what "pure physics" means . . . All in all, it's as the old Arab proverb says: "foolish questions beget foolish answers". Something like that.

I'm going to disagree with you a bit here. I know this is a long thread, but I think early on we established what the question was. It might have degenerated into a semantics battle, but up front I think most everyone was clear that:

"Can" meant is it provable.

"Everything" meant all that exists.

"Reduced" meant, can all that exists be accounted for at this time . . .

"Pure physics" meant physical principles only.


My analysis of the debate is that committed physicalists believe all existence can be explained/accounted for with physical principles alone, but the most honest of the physicalists admit that at this time they can't do it. Those more inclined to exaggerate what physics can explain tried to convince we skeptics physicalism is pretty much a done deal.

My mother didn't raise a dummy, so I ain't buyin' physicalist propaganda. I know, beyond any possible doubt, that physical principles at this time cannot be proven to explain all existence. Further, I doubt that they will EVER account for reality (with proof) in the future, but that's just my personal, unproven opinion. If it's done, then I'd have no choice but to accept the ugly truth :cry: of physicalism.
 
  • #834
Les Sleeth said:
In my opinion, anytime you see a discussion about something as real as physics turn into a communication debate, then you know rationalistic philosophy has been dominating the dialogue.

Wouldn't that be analytic philosophy?

I'm going to disagree with you a bit here. I know this is a long thread, but I think early on we established what the question was.

That may be the case, but it doesn't change the fact that the discussion did degenerate into a debate on communication.

My analysis of the debate is that committed physicalists believe all existence can be explained/accounted for with physical principles alone, but the most honest of the physicalists admit that at this time they can't do it.

It couldn't be different, given that you just stated what defines "physicalists" and "honest physicalists". Sorry for the little digression into semantics :smile:

I see a more important aspect to the debate though. The point is, over time physicalists have consistently triumphed over their opponents. If physicalists get a little arrogant sometimes, we must understand them, after all history is on their side.

Can you recall a single case where a physicalist account for a real phenomenon has been proven false? I wish I could remember one, but I can't.

Those more inclined to exaggerate what physics can explain tried to convince we skeptics physicalism is pretty much a done deal.

It probably is for them. And even though I'm not an enthusiast of physicalism, I do envy the fantastic success of their doctrine. I certainly wish we could have even a fraction of that success using different approaches; it would make for a far more interesting world but alas, hasn't happened so far.

I know, beyond any possible doubt, that physical principles at this time cannot be proven to explain all existence.

You are probably right, but I fail to see what the relevant consequences of that are. Besides the brawls between people in different philosophical camps, what can a neutral observer expect from the physicalist/anti-physicalist debate?

In other words, think of a person who's not into philosophy but is eagerly awaiting for the experts in their fields to find out truths about the universe: what would the failure of physicalism entail to that person? The possibility of miracles? Eternal life? Peace on earth?

I honestly fail to see what the fuss is all about. I would certainly be happy if everything could be reduced to pure physics if pure physics could give me happiness and eternal life in one way or another. Who cares if it's angels or subatomic particles? The ends justify the means.

If it's done, then I'd have no choice but to accept the ugly truth of physicalism.

What is that ugly truth? It's an honest question.

I believe in many things whose existence is denied by physicalists, but I don't see how those things are at odds with physicalism per se. Whereas some (not all) physicalists say "miracles can't possibly happen", I see physicalism as saying "if miracles do happen, then they can be explained". I find that a rather sensible position and, why not, even beautiful.

Of couse, I may be missing the point of physicalism for not being a physicalist :smile:
 
  • #835
Faust said:
Wouldn't that be analytic philosophy?

No. Rationalism would be thinking without sufficient reference to observed facts. It assumes truth can be had by reason alone. Empiricism changed all that by requiring that what one supposes to be true has to be confirmed by experience/observation. So my point was that since rationalists feel little need to actually look at what they are philosophizing about, they tend to over-emphasize the language used in a debate.


Faust said:
That may be the case, but it doesn't change the fact that the discussion did degenerate into a debate on communication.

A thread isn't just the end . . . it is all of it. You can pick some spot in almost any thread and point out how it's off topic. I was trying to suggest what most of the participants recognized as the issue here.


Faust said:
The point is, over time physicalists have consistently triumphed over their opponents. If physicalists get a little arrogant sometimes, we must understand them, after all history is on their side.

Can you recall a single case where a physicalist account for a real phenomenon has been proven false? I wish I could remember one, but I can't.

That seems like a rather one sided view. Physicalists have not triumphed over anything outside their realm. What they have triumphed over is ignorant beliefs about the physical nature of the universe. They have not understood anything I know of about the meaning of life, how to be happy, how to realize the deeper things. Your admiration is like giving a golf pro all the credit for explaining a great athelete because he understands the principles of proper form. Physics explains mechanics, it explains form, it explains processes. Physics doesn't make one wise, loving, compassionate. . . but I suppose it all boils down to what one values most doesn't it.


Faust said:
It probably is for them. And even though I'm not an enthusiast of physicalism, I do envy the fantastic success of their doctrine. I certainly wish we could have even a fraction of that success using different approaches; it would make for a far more interesting world but alas, hasn't happened so far.

I don't get your "envy." I have absolutely no hesitation acknowledging science as the best avenue for studying physical things. Where I balk is when those studying physicalness start to proclaim that's all there is. Well, is it really is a mystery when you look only at physicalness and then wonder why that's all you ever see?

Personally, I've had lots of success meditating. It doesn't stop me from being physical, but I do value the inner me more than anything I've ever done physically. I think it is more lasting, and far more satisfying. I can't see a single reason to envy anyone, but if someone has achieved deeper and more constant happiness than I have, then I hope he/she teaches me how to do it for myself. However, I don't see physicalists as instructive in this respect.


Faust said:
You are probably right, but I fail to see what the relevant consequences of that are. Besides the brawls between people in different philosophical camps, what can a neutral observer expect from the physicalist/anti-physicalist debate?

Sincerity?


Faust said:
In other words, think of a person who's not into philosophy but is eagerly awaiting for the experts in their fields to find out truths about the universe: what would the failure of physicalism entail to that person? The possibility of miracles? Eternal life? Peace on earth?

Personally? I am interested in how I can be fulfilled realistically and NOW. I couldn't possibly care less about miracles or eternal life.


Faust said:
I honestly fail to see what the fuss is all about. I would certainly be happy if everything could be reduced to pure physics if pure physics could give me happiness and eternal life in one way or another. Who cares if it's angels or subatomic particles? The ends justify the means.

I don't think it's about what turns out to be true. The truth is the truth, I have no problem with that. But imagine you find yourself in a world run by accountants, and who insist all philosophy be accountant philosophy. Everything has to add up, everything has to balance, everything has to be fiscally sound . . . Is that an accurate, full representation of reality? Or is the accountants' worldview limited and molded by their particular focus and priorities?


Faust said:
What is that ugly truth? It's an honest question.

The ugly truth is -- a life without feeling, or at least enough of it. Just the mechanics, er facts, ma'am.


Faust said:
I believe in many things whose existence is denied by physicalists, but I don't see how those things are at odds with physicalism per se. Whereas some (not all) physicalists say "miracles can't possibly happen", I see physicalism as saying "if miracles do happen, then they can be explained". I find that a rather sensible position and, why not, even beautiful.

It seems to me you are confusing science and physicalism. They are not the same.

But let's see if we can agree. I love science, totally. I can't get enough of it. I am only disputing the claim that physicalness is all there is to reality. If there weren't reasons to doubt that claim, then I'd be fine with it. But I believe there are glaring exceptions which those committed to physicalism tend to ignore, dismiss, gloss over and generally pretend are just little glitches in their theory when really they are major problems. I say, that a priori commitment to their belief system so biases their view they can't debate objectively.

And me? I am free to accept whatever is true since I'm not committed to anything except discovering the secrets to wisdom and a happy existence.
 
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  • #836
As far as I can see, the problem of understanding one another is precisely the problem of understanding anything. And, I would be very pleased to find anyone willing to think about it. I personally have spent a lot of time thinking about it.

I've been seriously thinking about it since 1991 (when I was 20 :rolleyes: )

Lets take this statement to be true for a moment "Everything CAN be explained by pure physics".

Without the ability to communicate and/or understand the the answer (I've been reliably informed that the answer is 42 :wink: ) then the answer is meaningless.

Also, I believe it is impossible to accurately communicate between 2 humans due to the subjective nature of how we perceive things. We could get really close, but every single person has a unique perception of the world around them and a unique background, combined with a unique genetic makeup, to interperate that perception.

Any answer that has a chance of being correct would have to be calculated by objective reasoning and observation which, I think, would have to be done by computers. Then we can use our subjective reasoning to interperate the answer by a common source of reference (the objective answer).

That way, we can go through the process of communication and attempt to reach understanding.
 
  • #837
Les Sleeth said:
Rationalism would be thinking without sufficient reference to observed facts. It assumes truth can be had by reason alone. Empiricism changed all that by requiring that what one supposes to be true has to be confirmed by experience/observation. So my point was that since rationalists feel little need to actually look at what they are philosophizing about, they tend to over-emphasize the language used in a debate.

The problem is that empiricism cannot be applied to most philosophical questions, certainly not to metaphysics. So when you look at philosophical claims, what else do you have to go by other than the words themselves? Sure, there are the ideas behind the words, but perhaps we haven't been paying enough attention to the words themselves. I don't agree that everything is about language, but I do think there's more to language than we are willing to acknowledge. It's a fact that many of our utterances, when looked at from an analytic perspective, turn out to be no more than tautologies. Not enough attention has been paid to that fact, in my opinion, but then again one can pay too much attention to it.


Physicalists have not triumphed over anything outside their realm. What they have triumphed over is ignorant beliefs about the physical nature of the universe.

That is what I meant anyway. The problem is that those ignorant beliefs were often not recognized as such. And that was my point; I didn't suggest physicalism was closer to the truth, I only pointed out the fact that physicalist arguments are quite powerful. I will give you an example further down.

They have not understood anything I know of about the meaning of life, how to be happy, how to realize the deeper things.

I'm not really sure about this. Clearly our existence has many purposes, but the two most obvious are survival and reproduction. As a result of that, we in the West came to understand that sex is not a sin. I consider that a major triumph over non-physicalist views, and it has everything to do with being happy, the realization of deeper things, etc.

I think it's wrong to portray physicalists as heartless monsters bent on destroying feeling and emotion. I really don't get that from them.

Your admiration is like giving a golf pro all the credit for explaining a great athelete because he understands the principles of proper form.

I do not admire physicalists, I'm just trying to look at all the different philosophical currents from a neutral perspective. I don't really root for one camp or another, I have grown out of the whole debate. I reached a perspective from which it all appears as irrelevant, although I still enjoy talking about it, like someone who likes a sport but is not attached to any particular team.

Physics explains mechanics, it explains form, it explains processes. Physics doesn't make one wise, loving, compassionate. . .

Certainly not, but what does?

I don't get your "envy."

It was just a figure of speech.

Personally, I've had lots of success meditating.

I'm sure you've had. As for me, meditation doesn't seem to offer the things I want. (by the way, neither does physicalism or any brand of philosophy)

It doesn't stop me from being physical, but I do value the inner me more than anything I've ever done physically. I think it is more lasting, and far more satisfying. I can't see a single reason to envy anyone, but if someone has achieved deeper and more constant happiness than I have, then I hope he/she teaches me how to do it for myself.

Well, I don't see my life as a pursuit for happiness, so knowing that a specific doctrine has made someone happy doesn't entice my curiosity.

I don't think it's about what turns out to be true. The truth is the truth, I have no problem with that. But imagine you find yourself in a world run by accountants, and who insist all philosophy be accountant philosophy. Everything has to add up, everything has to balance, everything has to be fiscally sound . . . Is that an accurate, full representation of reality? Or is the accountants' worldview limited and molded by their particular focus and priorities?

Well, nobody likes accountants, but I think it's mostly because what they say cannot be disputed. It has nothing to do with the accountants' worldview itself, but more to do with the fact that you have to agree with what an accountant says even if you're not an accountant yourself.

Same with physicalism. You may not like it, you may think physicalists are heartless nerds, but the fact remains that they're pretty hard to beat at any game, not only their own.

The ugly truth is -- a life without feeling, or at least enough of it. Just the mechanics

You mean physicalists don't have feelings, or enough of them? They don't enjoy nature, appreciate the arts, fall in love, have ideals? That sounds preposterous to me, I'm sure I misunderstood you.

It seems to me you are confusing science and physicalism. They are not the same.

Of course not, but physicalism is the basis of science. You can't have the latter without the former. Three milennia of meditation may have revealed truths about the mind, but only physicalist science is capable of treating epilepsy, schizophrenia, impotence. That is not to say physicalism is a true account of the mind, but it does ring more true than the alternatives.

But let's see if we can agree. I love science, totally. I can't get enough of it. I am only disputing the claim that physicalness is all there is to reality. If there weren't reasons to doubt that claim, then I'd be fine with it. But I believe there are glaring exceptions which those committed to physicalism tend to ignore, dismiss, gloss over and generally pretend are just little glitches in their theory when really they are major problems. I say, that a priori commitment to their belief system so biases their view they can't debate objectively.

I don't think we disagree at all, I just think you're battling a windmill. Nothing is being endangered, nothing is being profaned, the world is not becoming a worse place. There's nothing wrong with the world, nothing wrong with the people in it that can be fixed by changing our philosophies. That is how I see it anyway, and apparently it's the only point of contention between us: you think the world can be a better place if only we thought about it differently, I think that doesn't matter at all.

I am free to accept whatever is true since I'm not committed to anything except discovering the secrets to wisdom and a happy existence.

Well, you do seem committed to a certain worldview which implies some truths about meditation. I am of the opinion that meditation is useless - europeans didn't know about it for centuries, and their lives were not the worse for it. But that's my commitment. No one is free to accept whatever is true, we all have commitments.
 
  • #838
Faust said:
You mean physicalists don't have feelings, or enough of them? They don't enjoy nature, appreciate the arts, fall in love, have ideals? That sounds preposterous to me, I'm sure I misunderstood you.

I meant as a philosophy, it tends to describe humans heartlessly.


Faust said:
Of course not, but physicalism is the basis of science. You can't have the latter without the former.

We have to disagree on this. Physicalism is the belief that all existence is physical or the result of physicalness. Science is the study of the physical universe. One doesn't have to believe all existence is physical in order to study and appreciate the physical aspects of existence.


Faust said:
Three milennia of meditation may have revealed truths about the mind, but only physicalist science is capable of treating epilepsy, schizophrenia, impotence. That is not to say physicalism is a true account of the mind, but it does ring more true than the alternatives.

To not confuse things, it would be better if you'd said "three millennia of contemplation" rather than meditation, which is something different.

In any case, it isn't physicalism that has been successful, it is scientists. The physical account of the mind is the physical part. Just because there is physicalness there doesn't mean that's all there is. Again, I have to say that I see the problem as one of researchers not really knowing themselves. I don't see how one can understand consciousness if one never stops, sits down, and experiences its nature within one's own realm.

If all you do is look at processes, and in looking at processes all you do is be a processing device yourself, then you are not going to find or experience anything but processes. That is exactly why physicalists believe we are nothing but a bunch of physical processes.


Faust said:
. . . I just think you're battling a windmill. Nothing is being endangered, nothing is being profaned, the world is not becoming a worse place. There's nothing wrong with the world, nothing wrong with the people in it that can be fixed by changing our philosophies. That is how I see it anyway, and apparently it's the only point of contention between us: you think the world can be a better place if only we thought about it differently, I think that doesn't matter at all.

Do you really believe it makes no different what people think? I can't remember the name of the tribe I studied years ago in an anthropology class, but in this tribe the main goal of life was to kill people in other tribes. Children were taught this way of thinking and were generally ignored until they were old enough to participate in killing. It was not a nice place to live.

Right now in this world there are some pretty destructive philosophies. That spot in New York where the World Trade Center used to be is the result of someone's philosophy. Obviously physicalism isn't in that league of evil, but I see it as an evil nonetheless. Why? Because it portrays us as "things," and that philosophy is a step toward heartlessness when, IMO, what humanity needs is to step toward the heart.

Yes we are embodied in a thing, which evolved out of a universe of things . . . but is consciousness a thing? That belief, I say, is counterproductive to the further evolution of consciousness because it prioritizes the various aspects of a human incorrectly. The more we accept we are first and foremost a thing, the more we are going to do little more than study things.


Faust said:
Well, you do seem committed to a certain worldview which implies some truths about meditation.

There's no worldview needed for meditation, not for me anyway. I've done it daily for over thirty years because I love how it stills my consciousness, allows me to think better when I decide to think, and because I like the heightened awareness that results. If there is any effect on my "view" it is simple clarity.


Faust said:
I am of the opinion that meditation is useless - europeans didn't know about it for centuries, and their lives were not the worse for it. But that's my commitment. No one is free to accept whatever is true, we all have commitments.

It doesn't sound like you know anything about it, so I'm not sure why you have such an opinion. If you think Europeans haven't known about it, you are quite uninformed. They've practiced it, mostly in monasteries, for nearly 2000 years. I suggest you read Evelyn Underhill's classic "Mysticism" to see just how extensively turning inward has been practiced. Or try the Greek Orthodox collection of writings known as the "Philokalia."
 
  • #839
Understanding
Doctordick said:
On reason I presumed you were backing away is that the last post from me, which you failed to respond to contained a lot of important relationships. I doubt you understood it all and proceeding without understanding is pretty well a waste of time.
You got me! Sorry! :smile: I've printed your last two posts addressing me.

Concreet example
I find the concepts of the sets still a bit difficult. Can you give some concrete examples? Can I take 'warmth' - with all kind of properties - as set A? Excuse me for the layman approach. The discovery of the concept "temperature" would than belong to category B. The discovery of the concept "noise temperature" would again change our knowledge, it's Bj. Both would me members of C. No, I'm at a loss. What's xi exactly in this context? I definitely need a concreet example. This is too abstract for me. :cry:

B \subset A or B \equiv \{A_{some}, A_{other}, ..., A_{another}\}
C \subset A and C \equiv \{\{B_{some}\}, \{B_{other}\}, ..., \{B_{another}\}\}
C is finite, but not "stable".

Message vs label
The elements of C are messages. What would be a message in a concreet example? The elements of B are labels. What is a label in a concreet example? Maybe using some standard mathematical notation - like above - can clear things up too.

Numeric example
Try and follow a thought experiment regarding the following problem: I have some set "A" in my head and I am going to take arbitrary collections of elements of "A" (sets "B") and give them to you. Based on "C" (the entire collection you have so far received) you are to come up with a method of establishing your expectations: i.e., your estimate as to the probability of getting any conceivable specific "B". On a small scale this is a problem given to students all the time: if I gave you a "one" and then gave you a "two" and then a "three", you would probably put a high probability on getting a four.
So a set "B" is in this case "one number" and represents a change in my knowledge of A... So, "B" can be seen as an "sensorial vector", an observation. Based on "C" - that formed my pattern recognition system - I am able to use the new information "B" to adjust my predictions. The labels are assigned to the observed elements of A: numbers.
With B1 = {3, 7}, B2 = {5, 9}, B3 = {7, 11} the difference between the messages (sets Bj) and the labels {3, 7, 9, 11} is clear. Did I got that right? Is the focus on the relationship between the elements of the message, or the relationship between a message and previous messages?

Layman example
I sort of understand the numeric example, but when considering something like 'gravity' or 'temperature' I don't know what A, B and C mean in that context. Can you help me with that? Or does the nature of the problem forbid you to fill on some details?

Predicting an element in a set "B"
Suppose, for the fun of it, someone gave you all the elements but one from some "B" and asked you what element could be added to make that list a valid example of one of the sets you were given. Your table is very close to answering that question. Can anyone out there think of a way to make that result possible in every case?
The next message can be as predicted or it can be a surprise. :devil:

Extrapolation
If the first message is from Newton, and the second is from Einstein, I don't know what the third will be. I'm at a loss what you're exactly extrapolating. :smile:

I hope you don't mind to explain it a bit more. Thanks for your time!
 
  • #840
saviourmachine said:
Concreet example
I find the concepts of the sets still a bit difficult. Can you give some concrete examples?
Sure, anytime you catagoize something, give it a name, you are thinking of a "set". The elements of the set constitutes the entire collection of things which you have decided are included under that name. Lastly, coming up with a name for the set is not required; at least not in the abstract. I like the following comment on the issue of "abstract" from Robert M. Hutchins and Mortimer J. Adler in the "Gateway to the Great Books": "If you have learned to add two and five without asking "Two and five what?" you already have both feet off the ground--higher than you think. You are now air-born. The rest is just a matter of gaining altitude."
saviourmachine said:
Can I take 'warmth' - with all kind of properties - as set A?
Sure; however, if you do then membership in the set would be anything which you would consider satisfying what you mean by 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. I am not at all sure what you would wish to call 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. A coat? A smoldering fire? A friendly girl? Since I defined B to be a finite collection of elements of A, "the discovery of the concept "temperature" would not belong to B unless you would include "the discovery of the concept 'temperature'" as an example of 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. Why would you include this particular discovery as an example of 'warmth' - with all kind of properties?
saviormachine said:
The discovery of the concept "noise temperature" would again change our knowledge, it's Bj.
Not with any meaning of 'warmth' – with all kind of properties I would consider reasonable. Under your example Bj would be a change in the specifc set of things you catagorize as 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. Your mother bought you some warm cloths or some hot (if 'warmth' – with all kind of properties included "hot") girls walked in the room. That is, the collection of things which you regarded to be in that set 'warmth' – with all kind of properties would change. C is the end result of all changes to date and would be everything you currently regard to be 'warmth' – with all kind of properties.

B is not a subset of A, B is a finite collection of elements taken from A. The significant difference is that it is possible for an element which appears only once in A could appear multiple times in B. A subtly which has profound consequences which I won't get into for a while. Likewise, C also being a finite collection of sets B need not be a subset of A.
saviormachine said:
Message vs label
The elements of C are messages. What would be a message in a concreet example? The elements of B are labels. What is a label in a concreet example? Maybe using some standard mathematical notation - like above - can clear things up too.
C is the collection of information available to you (knowledge of the things you consider to be 'warmth' – with all kind of properties as presented above). The elements of C are changes in that information (knowledge of the things you consider to be 'warmth' – with all kind of properties as presented above) which arrive via the addition of new elements to that set C which are labeled Bj. Message just seemed to be a good reference label to put on "change in information". I have no idea what you meant by 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. You could have meant "putting a coat on" as an example of an element of A. B was a collection of elements: perhaps putting a coat on together with three warm girls named susie, joan and kate in front of a low fire in a fireplace. Call it an experience if you wish.

The real problem here is that the moment you begin to put meaningfull labels on these elements, you are proposing a solution (i.e., you know what you are talking about) and not examing the problem (trying to understand what you are talking about). Read my post to Les on the "Are Qualia Real" thread.
saviormachine said:
Numeric example
...
Did I got that right? Is the focus on the relationship between the elements of the message, or the relationship between a message and previous messages?
I really didn't understand what you were getting at. I don't think you understand why I am talking about sets. Given any problem concievable, C constitutes the information available to you to solve the problem. C is not A because we can not know for sure that all the information is available to us even though it is assumed that A is what we are trying to understand. And the set Bis required to provide for the possibility of change. That's really all there is to it.
saviormachine said:
Layman example
I sort of understand the numeric example, but when considering something like 'gravity' or 'temperature' I don't know what A, B and C mean in that context. Can you help me with that? Or does the nature of the problem forbid you to fill on some details?
"Gravity" and "temperature" are meaningfull labels of concepts essential to the modern solution to all those environmental problems ordinararly referred to as "physics". Their very existence means that one is working with a solution, not with the problem. One could ask, what was the problem which lead to that solution? That would be the history of physics or maybe the history of science or perhaps the history of man. At any rate, the path to that solution is far beyond what I could write. What I am trying to do is to look at the fundamental nature of all problems themselves.
saviormachine said:
The next message can be as predicted or it can be a surprise. :devil:
I think you misunderstood what I was asking. First, I was talking about a representation of C (that upon which your solution is to be based). What I had pointed out to you was that, since C was a finite collection of sets B (which I had labeled as Bj) and every B constituted a finite collection of elements of A (by definition) I could put arbitary numerical labels on each element of every B and then have a specific list of all B in C. Possessing this list I could answer the question, "is this specific B (specific in the sense that I have a set of numerical labels which specify the B I am talking about) in the complete set C?"

I should comment about this circumstance. Essentially I have not given those numeric labels any meaning at all and yet I can answer a very specific question; however, my ability to answer that question depends on those numerical labels I have assigned. Again, you need to recognize that meaningfull labels are part of a solution and not a mere formality. As soon as I give two elements somewhere in this set the same label (numerical or otherwise), I am fundamentally asserting they are the same element. How in the world did I know they were the same? For the moment, let us just say I guessed and maybe I guessed right and maybe I guessed wrong. Later I will point out some interesting aspects of having the freedom to label things anyway I wish. At the moment, in order to avoid making presumptions, I must assure that, whenever I make an assertion about C, that the assertion must be true no matter what labeling proceedure was used.

But meanwhile, you have a list of every B you have ever seen (in the problem so far) and, having labeled them, can refer to any specific one via the list of labels assigned to it. Against that backdrop I asked, "suppose, for the fun of it, someone gave you the labels of all the elements but one from some B and asked you what element could be added to make that list a valid example of one of the sets you were given." Your answer, "the next message can be as predicted or it can be a surprise", presumes we are talking about a new message. We are not, we are talking about answering questions about the C which is available to you.

There is a very simple proceedure which will create a set of lists from the lists you have prepared where this second list will asnswer the above question. First, take each list you had to start with and, for any two lists which are identical, add a label which does not exist on any list (since we are using numerical labels and the number of elements already labeled is finite, there exist a plentyful quantity of unused labels). Now, for each of these altered lists, make every list possible which is identical to that list except for the absense of one element. Now repeat the first step above, eliminating any duplicate lists created in step two, Finally, replace the labels which were removed in step two.

The result has a very curious property. That is the fact that no matter what list you choose of the finished collection, you can remove any element and there will be no list in the remainder of the lists which have the same set of numbers you are looking at. This property is achieved no matter what the original label assignment was. Given this new set of lists, if someone gives you the labels of all the elements but one, there is only one possible missing element so the question asked above may be answered.

I suspect you are questioning what value lies in the above performance. The value arrises when you realize that the collection of lists you have constructed can be seen as a mathematical function. The numerical result (the missing label) is given by the table of all lists missing one element (it is not a continuous function as it is only defined for the arguments in the table). It is a function of many variables (the list of B labels missing one element) which results in the label which is missing. Mathematically this can be written:

x_n=f(x_1,x_2, \cdots, x_{n-1})​

If that is true, then it implies there exists a function F, defined by

F(x_1, x_2 , \cdots, x_n)=f(x_1,x_2, \cdots, x_{n-1})-x_n​

where the rule which tells you whether a particular list is valid is given by F=0, a very simple rule. This result was achieved by imagining the existence of some elements which were not part of A: i.e., they were totally made up in order to achieve that simple rule. What I have shown is that the existence or non-existence of any finite collection of elements can be constrained to exactly what has been seen (no matter what that collection is) by the simple rule F=0 and the introduction of imaginary or make believe elements.

Now what does this have to do with reality? Throughout history, scientific hypothicies have consisted of invented entities and invented rules. The rules are supposedly invented to explain what we see and the invented entities are then invented to correct for the problems in what we see. Every time we are able to prove that what we see is consistent with the entities and the rules (we think are true) we consider it proof that that they both exist. If you are going to give me the freedom to invent any entities I want and the freedom to propose any rules I want, you have given me more freedom than I need to explain everything which is known (since "everything which is known" is finite). I can construct a very simple universe based on that simple rule F=0 which is quite interesting. That is, if one is interested in thinking.

Have fun -- Dick
 
  • #841
DoctorDick said:
which is quite interesting. That is, if one is interested in thinking.
I'm sorry, but this highlights why I'm not interested in what you have to write. You imply that if I don't find it interesting then I don't think :bugeye:

I think all the time. Sometimes it becomes bad for my health because I cannot turn my mind of even though my body is crying out for sleep. You have to be one of the most self-centered, egocentric individuals I have come across on the Web.

If your intention was to be listened to then the smart thing to do would be not to alienate your target audience which is something you obviously haven't figured out yet.

I'll read your stuff when you learn a bit of modesty :wink:
 
  • #842
Labels
Doctordick said:
The real problem here is that the moment you begin to put meaningfull labels on these elements, you are proposing a solution (i.e., you know what you are talking about) and not examing the problem (trying to understand what you are talking about). Read my post to Les on the "Are Qualia Real" thread.
Yes, I understand. A message can be a composition/mixture of e.g. {3, red} or {2309.23 €, "bkkkpoi", banana-taste}. To label the elements '3' and 'red' is unwanted and unjustified 'labelism'.

The nature of a 'message'
DoctorDick said:
I don't think you understand why I am talking about sets. Given any problem concievable, C constitutes the information available to you to solve the problem.
Does a message / obervation embed it's whole context {time, place, etcetera}? However, I think your representation is still that abstract that it can account for problem solving in general. I was confused because I'm thinking of neural nets, in which e.g. the order in which messages are received can be important. The elements of the message are unordered, but the messages itself are ordered, are they?

Question: 1 missing label
"suppose, for the fun of it, someone gave you the labels of all the elements but one from some B and asked you what element could be added to make that list a valid example of one of the sets you were given."
...
we are talking about answering questions about the C which is available to you.
That is very simple indeed. I was confused by your use of the word list. That denotes one message in this case.

Look for all B in C, compare every Bj with the Basked and if there is only one that does match, than it's the one.

Basked = {red}

B0 = {5, 2}
B1 = {red, 2}
B2 = {apple, red}
B3 = {apple, 5}
B4 = {red, 2}

Here it is nr. 1, nr. 2 and nr. 4.

Simple procedure
There is a very simple proceedure which will create a set of lists from the lists you have prepared where this second list will answer the above question. 1. First, take each list you had to start with and, for any two lists which are identical. 2. Add a label which does not exist on any list (since we are using numerical labels and the number of elements already labeled is finite, there exist a plentyful quantity of unused labels). 3. Now, for each of these altered lists, make every list possible which is identical to that list except for the absense of one element. 4. Now repeat the first step above, eliminating any duplicate lists created in step two. 5. Finally, replace the labels which were removed in step two.
Odd way. It's amazing how you can obscure a very simple procedure. :blushing: Can you write some programming code please? "5 ... removed in step two?"
It's just providing every entree in the table with an unique keyword / identifier isn't it?

Removing element
The result has a very curious property. That is the fact that no matter what list you choose of the finished collection, you can remove any element and there will be no list in the remainder of the lists which have the same set of numbers you are looking at. This property is achieved no matter what the original label assignment was.
Of course. Even removing the identifier does not lead to another entree (with - still - its own identifier).

The messages are coded
Given this new set of lists, if someone gives you the labels of all the elements but one, there is only one possible missing element so the question asked above may be answered.
Of course, if the messages are coded (and received) that way.

Valid lists
Mathematically this can be written:

x_n=f(x_1,x_2, \cdots, x_{n-1})​

If that is true, then it implies there exists a function F, defined by

F(x_1, x_2 , \cdots, x_n)=f(x_1,x_2, \cdots, x_{n-1})-x_n​

where the rule which tells you whether a particular list is valid is given by F=0, a very simple rule.
Okay, assigning xi numeric value.

Universe
I can construct a very simple universe based on that simple rule F=0 which is quite interesting. That is, if one is interested in thinking.
I'm curious.
 
  • #843
Hi "saviormachine", it's nice to hear from you.
saviourmachine said:
Yes, I understand. A message can be a composition/mixture of e.g. {3, red} or {2309.23 €, "bkkkpoi", banana-taste}. To label the elements '3' and 'red' is unwanted and unjustified 'labelism'.
I am not entirely sure what you have in mind when you use the phrase "unjustified 'labelism'". I suspect you are commenting about my statement, "At the moment, in order to avoid making presumptions, I must assure that, whenever I make an assertion about C, that the assertion must be true no matter what labeling procedure was used." I don't know that I would use the word "unjustified"; what I want you to be aware of is the fact that the very act of labeling introduces a constraint on the interpretations which are possible. The act is essentially the creation of a language and the language itself implies constraints. Constraints are essentially the elimination of possibilities and I have no desire to do that. At the same time, in the final analysis, a real solution requires that we find a set of labels consistent with the information embedded in those "messages", "experiences", "tokens of change" or whatever one wants to call them. For the moment they are no more than the members of the sets Bj which make up C (that which we wish to understand).
saviourmachine said:
However, I think your representation is still that abstract that it can account for problem solving in general.
That is exactly my contention. If you notice any reason at all that my presentation is not totally general, please point it out to me as, if such a difficulty exists, it constitutes a serious flaw in my work.
saviourmachine said:
I was confused because I'm thinking of neural nets, in which e.g. the order in which messages are received can be important. The elements of the message are unordered, but the messages itself are ordered, are they?
Not really; and that is another serious issue with far reaching consequences. The sets B were created to make it possible to represent change in the set C and were created for that reason only. The concept of time is seriously embedded in our understanding of anything (particularly in our understanding of anything involving change). In my general representation the fact that B represents a change in C can not be taken to imply there is any order in that change. C constitutes all the information you have to work with. In a general problem you cannot assume you and another were given the information in the same order even if, at the moment you compare your solutions, you have exactly the same C available to you.

What I am getting at here is that the "j" label attached to that Bj is just another label attached by you. There are some subtle consequences of that fact that won't be evident for quite a while so let's lay the issue of order aside for the moment as any individual certainly has a specific order in mind: the order with which he became aware of the new information. That order is certainly important to him and can have a serious impact on his expectations.
saviourmachine said:
Look for all B in C, compare every Bj with the Basked and if there is only one that does match, than it's the one.
Exactly correct and your example is excellent except for two issues. First, I specified we were going to use numerical labels and you have decided to use "red" and "apple". That is not a serious issue at all as we are only talking about arbitrary labels but it might somewhat confuse the issue of "mathematical functions of those labels". I am presuming you are sufficiently intelligent as to understand that there is no real problem here. Some people might find the concept of something being a functions of words too abstract to comprehend.

The other issue is a little more serious. It has to do with determining the equality of sets B. In your example, you assume the asked set {red} is equal to the observed sets {red, 2}, {apple, red} and {red, 2} ( j = 1, 2, and 4). Under my definitions (as I intended them), you never received the set {red} (that would be "red" in the absence of any other elements). Also, as order is of no significance, your example might be better if you either included {2, red} or explicitly stated that order in your defined sets was not significant (a small issue but it might be confusing to some; the central issue is to avoid any misinterpretation of the instructions). Both these issues are quite trivial and I strongly suspect you have an excellent grasp of what I am talking about.
saviormachine said:
It's amazing how you can obscure a very simple procedure. :blush: Can you write some programming code please? "5 ... removed in step two?"
Sorry about that, in my head the steps you list as 1. and 2. were a single step. That makes your step 3. correspond to my step two (the step where elements were removed which created the possibility of duplicate lists). I apologize sincerely for not expressing the steps clearly. From your further comments I get the impression you understood what I was describing. Thank you for your indulgence.
saviourmachine said:
It's just providing every entry in the table with an unique keyword / identifier isn't it?
That is exactly what it is. The only important issue is that these "invented" elements need to be seen as utterly no different from any other element in B when it comes to solving our problem. They essentially stand as "hypothetical" elements; if we find a usable solution, then we can certainly hold that these "invented" elements need to be there (at least with regard to that solution we found). That is the reason I described it the way I did: that is, I didn't want to use the words "keyword" or "identifier" as that implies a specific status to the entry. I want you to simply regard it as an imagined entry. (What I have called "unknowable data" elsewhere.) The fundamental issue is that there must be no way of differentiating between these imagined entries and the entries derived from "A". Once you include them, they are presumed elements of the Bj in any of your analysis. (Again, any assertion I make about C must be true for any possible "keyword", "identifier" or "unknowable" whatever you want to call this entry.)

I am very sorry that I obscured a very simple procedure. I could write some programming code but it would be pretty worthless as, although the number of elements to be included in any reasonable problem are finite, their number can be expected to be astronomical and there are other much more important issues to be discussed first. Actually, with the memory and speed of modern computers, I think it might be very valuable to write such a program. (Another project for another day.)
saviourmachine said:
Of course. Even removing the identifier does not lead to another entry (with - still - its own identifier).
I think you understand. There is only one point I might make: when you are looking for the Bj (which corresponds to the Basked with an element missing) you must look through the entire list of all B's you have created from the original B's with every possible omission. This expands the problem considerably (though it is still a finite problem).

What I want you to keep in mind is the fact that I have just proved that, so long as the number of elements in C are finite, it is always possible to add "unknowable data" (imaginary information) which will allow a rule F=0 to constrain the elements to exactly what was observed no matter what was observed (by "observed", I mean the specific elements in the B's which make up C).

To continue, we need a universal abstract way of expressing an explanation in order to describe the universe I am going to create. So, the first step is to define an abstract definition of an explanation. I tried to express this definition to Canute a while ago but I don't think he has much interest in exact science. I define "an explanation", from the abstract perspective, to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information. It should be clear to you that the "known information" is the collection of Bjs which go to make up C. If we use numerical labels for the elements of B, then every B can be seen as a collection of numbers. From these numbers (the numbers which define what B we are looking at) we are to supposed to express our expectations. What else are our expectations if they are not the probability that we expect to see that particular B just referred to? It follows that "our explanation" constitutes knowing that probability as a function of those arguments.

If follows that we can express our explanation with the notation:

P(x_1, x_2 , \cdots, x_n)​

If we can discover that function, we know our expectations and thus have an explanation of C. The first thing of interest to us is that our explanation should be consistent with all the B_j (x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n) that go to make up C (it doesn't explain C otherwise). Notice that we are actually talking about the collection of all those B_j and the probability of seeing a particular one can not be a function of our labeling procedure as we were free to label things anyway we please (our labels are fundamentally meaningless). It should be obvious that, in most cases, any change in the labeling procedure will most likely confuse us as to which B's we were talking about before and after the relabeling (the form of that function is very dependent upon the labeling). None the less, there do exist relabeling procedures which will not confuse that identification. Any relabeling procedure which does not confuse the identification of B_j must yield exactly the same expectations after the relabeling as it did before. If it doesn't, the explanation is inconsistent with C.

It is the expectations for the B's which interest us; not the arbitrary labels we happen to put to those B's. Those labels exist for the sole purpose of allowing us to refer to the elements of B. (That is exactly what language is all about.)

I will leave it there for the moment because I want to be sure you understand exactly what I have said. Meanwhile, when I was looking up that post to Canute above, I ran across a post by you which I had apparently missed.
saviourmachine said:
<off-topic>
By the way, it's interesting to see the difference between the texts of DoctorDick and Philocrat. Both of you I find difficult to follow. DoctorDick, because your texts have such a small "definition density". With common words you tackle difficult concepts, without using many terms that are in use in contemporary science and philosophy. It's like you're writing assembly code. :smile: Philocrat, because your texts have such a big "definition density". You use many new definitions that nobody before, ever thought of creating words for. I guess you've immediately a word for the problem I've with understanding you both. :smile: It's like you're writing a high-level programming language that nobody knows.
I am very impressed with the fact that you picked up on that. I would say that my "definition density" is as close to minimal as one can get and your use of the metaphor "assembly code" is very apt. I would also comment that there are other similarities. The problem with the high-level language is that you can only express things which have already been prepared for in the design of the language while, in assembly code, you can express anything. However, expressing simple things in "assembly code" can easily get quite long compared to the same thing in a high-level language. I think I tend to exceed most peoples attention span very quickly. I hope you have the patience to follow my arguments through; the arguments themselves are actually quite simple.

Looking for your response -- Dick
 
  • #844
That is exactly my contention. If you notice any reason at all that my presentation is not totally general, please point it out to me as, if such a difficulty exists, it constitutes a serious flaw in my work.
As problem solving your presentation is general enough. However, like somebody pointed out in another thread, considering the problem of the origin of the apparatus that receives and distinguish as such the messages Bj, and that can contain memory (set C), I don't see how it can account for that. How evolution works is sending indirect messages by destroying the 'owners' of a set C less adapted to their environment. The idea of mutations in combination with natural selection doesn't fall into this scope. Or, if you have any idea how it does fall into this scope, I appreciate to hear that.

Coded messages
The other issue is a little more serious. It has to do with determining the equality of sets B. In your example, you assume the asked set {red} is equal to the observed sets {red, 2}, {apple, red} and {red, 2} ( j = 1, 2, and 4). Under my definitions (as I intended them), you never received the set {red} (that would be "red" in the absence of any other elements).
But how can you make sure that your messages are in the form you need? If you assign an arbitrary label, you can 'calculate' as if every message is coded like that, but 'at the end' it's possible to 'calculate' without this proposed construction, isn't it?

Order & numbers
Also, as order is of no significance, your example might be better if you either included {2, red}
Therefore I added B2 = {apple, red}. I agree with using only numbers, so B2 = {8088, 3945} is fine for me too.

Word 'identifier'
That is exactly what it is. The only important issue is that these "invented" elements need to be seen as utterly no different from any other element in B when it comes to solving our problem.
Yes, you're right. That went also through my mind when I wrote 'identifier', because the way your tabel is coded, every label [column] can be called 'identifier' (whatever element is deleted, the entry [row] is still unique). It's like adding an 'error bit' to make sure the amount of 'ones' in a binary message is even and subsequently not having to know which bit the error bit exactly is.

Hypothetical
They essentially stand as "hypothetical" elements; if we find a usable solution, then we can certainly hold that these "invented" elements need to be there (at least with regard to that solution we found). That is the reason I described it the way I did: that is, I didn't want to use the words "keyword" or "identifier" as that implies a specific status to the entry. I want you to simply regard it as an imagined entry. (What I have called "unknowable data" elsewhere.)
Yes, this is the clue, exactly the doubt I uttered in 'Coded messages'. I'm curious how handy these hypothetical elements will turn out to be. I agree that if there is 'unknowable data', that there is no point to dismiss beforehand the possibility that these hypothetical elements exist.

Expectation
If follows that we can express our explanation with the notation:
P(x_1, x_2 , \cdots, x_n)​
Agreed.

It should be obvious that, in most cases, any change in the labeling procedure will most likely confuse us as to which B's we were talking about before and after the relabeling (the form of that function is very dependent upon the labeling).
Aha! The message are received in code, or there is a 'relabeling' procedure. I thought the label was artificial, but inherently bounded to each message. So, there wouldn't be a 'behore' and 'after'.

It is the expectations for the B's which interest us; not the arbitrary labels we happen to put to those B's. Those labels exist for the sole purpose of allowing us to refer to the elements of B. (That is exactly what language is all about.)
Agreed.

Looking forward for more. :smile:
 
  • #845
saviourmachine said:
As problem solving your presentation is general enough. However, like somebody pointed out in another thread, considering the problem of the origin of the apparatus that receives and distinguish as such the messages Bj, and that can contain memory (set C), I don't see how it can account for that.
I don't account for that. I think you have a very slight misunderstanding of what I am doing. The issue is that we have come from nothing except the universe itself. Somehow, having begun with totally undefined information (what we have come to call the universe or reality) which was delivered to us via a totally undefined mechanism (what we have come to call our senses) we have constructed a very sophisticated mental model of reality which seems to be quite valid (our expectations are pretty much in line with what happens). I take that as evidence that the problem (creating a valid model of a collection of totally undefined information transformed by a totally undefined mechanism) is a solvable problem.

That is the problem I have attacked. I am not claiming that I know how "we" (human beings) did it, I am simply claiming it can be done. That is, it is a problem which can be solved. I analytically solved it over twenty years ago. And I find my solution both very reasonable and very interesting. In fact, my single greatest interest is in talking to someone about the implied consequences of that solution. You are one of the very few people who has had the patience to get this far and I am actually astounded by how well you have managed to comprehend what I am saying. Most everyone else fails to even comprehend there is a problem here. How can one explain a solution to a problem which they refuse to admit exists?
saviourmachine said:
How evolution works is sending indirect messages by destroying the 'owners' of a set C less adapted to their environment. The idea of mutations in combination with natural selection doesn't fall into this scope. Or, if you have any idea how it does fall into this scope, I appreciate to hear that.
I wouldn't say evolution destroys 'owners' of a set C less adapted to their environment. The set C possessed by a rock is probably quite minimal if it exists at all and the rock isn't "destroyed"; it just lays there. What was C again anyway? All the information about the universe it has to work with wasn't it? Or at least that which "it" can "remember". I guess for a rock that would be the collection of interactions it has had with the rest of the universe and it's memory would be in the vibrations and/or make up of the chemicals which are part of it. Really, I think this aspect of the problem is better left to later, after you understand the solution I have discovered.
saviourmachine said:
But how can you make sure that your messages are in the form you need?
I can't. Again this is a simple consequence of your slight misinterpretation of what I am doing. I am solving a very specific problem, not theorizing about how we do it. The problem is to start with totally undefined information and develop a model (or an explanation if you will) which will yield expectations in perfect alignment with the information you have. (I tried to interest the military in this problem about fifteen years ago but got the "quack" response. I actually have a letter from the pentagon signed by a "Captain Nasty" if you can believe that!) The problem is actually a very complex decoding problem.
saviourmachine said:
If you assign an arbitrary label, you can 'calculate' as if every message is coded like that, but 'at the end' it's possible to 'calculate' without this proposed construction, isn't it?
At the end, everything that is possible will be possible; but, for the moment, being able to use mathematics is very valuable tool. As Feynman once said, "mathematics is the distilled essence of logic". My solution is analytic and not at all intuitive. Everything I say could be put into pure logic terms but you have already complained that following me is like following assembly code. I would like a little higher level language. Mathematics is actually little more than a language which has been constrained to internally consistent constructs which have achieved a high degree of acceptance. When I tell you to perform a procedure in mathematics I can be pretty confident you will understand exactly what that procedure is. Actually, in metaphor, it's a little like going from machine language to assembly language.
saviourmachine said:
It's like adding an 'error bit' to make sure the amount of 'ones' in a binary message is even and subsequently not having to know which bit the error bit exactly is.
I think you understand the phenomena exactly. I only comment because I want you to know that I am again impressed with your ability to see the essence of these steps.
saviourmachine said:
I'm curious how handy these hypothetical elements will turn out to be.
They are the essence of understanding itself. Think about the proof that any arbitrary collection can be made the only possibility by requiring F=0. The hypothetical elements were central in bring about that result. I think it will be a lot clearer later.
saviourmachine said:
Aha! The message are received in code, or there is a 'relabeling' procedure. I thought the label was artificial, but inherently bounded to each message. So, there wouldn't be a 'behore' and 'after'.
I am not exactly sure I understand this comment. The labeling procedure is the first step to creating a language capable of expressing the relationships between the elements. I would also comment that "reductionism" is the process of reducing the number of "fundamental" things (labels) required: i.e., once you get to the minimum number of labels required, other important concepts can be explained in terms of those fundamental labels. But you shouldn't worry about that now; it is an issue which arises after the analytical solution is obtained. My process does not require reductionism as it implicitly sets up the minimum number of labels required and we will set up those labels as we proceed.

As I said in my previous post, "any relabeling procedure which does not confuse the identification of B_j must yield exactly the same expectations after the relabeling as it did before". There are two very simple relabeling procedures with very significant consequences: since I am using numerical labels, I can either add some given number to every label in any given B or multiply every given label by an arbitrary number. If the label sets were unique before the labeling they will be unique afterwards. This means that I can write the following equations:

P(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n) = P(x_1+a, x_2+a,\cdots, x_n+a) = P(x_1+b, x_2+b,\cdots, x_n+b)​

P(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n) = P(a*x_1, a*x_2,\cdots, a*x_n) = P(b*x_1, b*x_2,\cdots, b*x_n)​

The consequences of the second will arise later in the presentation. The consequences of the first are important now. Look at what it says if I set b=a+\Delta a. Since the labels refer to exactly the same B_j in all three expressions we know that the correct solution to the original problem (that function P(x_1, x_2 , \cdots, x_n)) must yield the same probability(we haven't changed the B_j, we have only changed the labeling). Thus we know,

\frac{d}{da} P(x_1+a, x_2+a, \cdots, x_n+a) =

\lim_{\Delta a \rightarrow 0} <br /> \frac {P(x_1+a+\Delta a, x_2+a+\Delta a,\cdots, x_n+a+\Delta a) - P(x_1+a, x_2+a,\cdots, x_n+a)}{\Delta a}=0.

Note that the equation is true even when \Delta a is far from zero; the limit is only there to satisfy the definition of a differential. This is a pure consequence of the arbitrariness of the labeling and places utterly no constraint on the actual solution. It can be thought of as the consequence of the fact that the solution can be expressed in different languages; this is just a very specific and very subtle change in language (specific labels) not easily expressed in term of the ordinary concepts used in the translation between human languages I am aware of (other than secret codes that is).

At any rate, we can use that fact to create another very valuable expression. Since what we have above is a well defined mathematical expression, we can also see the addition of a as a simple change of variables z_i = x_i + a. Then we take the well known method of extracting a differential of a function with regard to a variable embedded in the arguments of that function. That is, replace P(x_1+a, x_2+a , \cdots, x_n+a) with P(z_1, z_2 , \cdots, z_n). We can then write

\frac{d}{da}P(z_1,z_2, \cdots, z_n)=\sum_i \frac {dz_i}<br /> {da}\frac{\partial}{\partial z_i}P(z_1,z_2,\cdots,z_n)​

But \frac{dz_i}{da} = 1 for all values of i. It follows as the night the day that

\sum_i \frac{\partial}{\partial z_i}P(z_1,z_2,\cdots,z_n)=0.​

We cannot change that fact by changing the variable from z to x (they are just numerical labels) so it follows that we may write

\sum_i \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i}P(x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n)=0.​

The only reason I changed the variable back to x was to be consistent with my earlier notation. What is above is nothing more than a consequence of the Noether theorem. That is why I brought up her theorem earlier and emphasized the ignorance aspect of symetry. The symetry here (or the ignorance) is the fact that we are free to label things any way we want and that fact has real consequences.

Please, think that all over a little and let me know if you have any problems with it.

Have fun -- Dick
 
  • #846
Derivation
Doctordick said:
There are two very simple relabeling procedures with very significant consequences: since I am using numerical labels, I can either add some given number to every label in any given B or multiply every given label by an arbitrary number.
Yes, how cool! Using numeric labels, adding as well as multiplying is possible.

Adding a number to every label in every B doesn't change the probability P. That's right. P(x1+b, ..., xn+b) should have the same outcome. Differentiating to b (or a) results in zero. I also agree with the ultimate equation [1]:
\sum_i \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i}P(x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n)=0.​

Symmetry, Noether's theorem, equation [1]
The only reason I changed the variable back to x was to be consistent with my earlier notation. What is above is nothing more than a consequence of the Noether theorem. That is why I brought up her theorem earlier and emphasized the ignorance aspect of symetry. The symetry here (or the ignorance) is the fact that we are free to label things any way we want and that fact has real consequences.
Sorry, this is too fast for me. It's difficult for me to connect these two themes: this formula and Noether's theorem. Can you recapitulate shortly?
 
  • #847
We might be getting somewhere here!

saviourmachine said:
Yes, how cool!
My feelings exactly. I will never forget the first time I ever saw it. It is utterly astonishing that no one noticed that prior to the twentieth century. Think of all the math done prior to her discovery. It just goes to convince one that everything has not yet been done (even some mighty simple things).
saviourmachine said:
Symmetry, Noether's theorem, equation [1]
Sorry, this is too fast for me. It's difficult for me to connect these two themes: this formula and Noether's theorem. Can you recapitulate shortly?
It shouldn't be. You seem to understand exactly what I did and that is the very essence of Noether's theorem. The central issue is the relationship between symmetry (which I see as a particular kind of ignorance) and conserved quantities. A "conserved" quantity is something which doesn't change. In mathematics, change is represented by differentials so, "a conserved quantity" means that there is a differential which does not change. If we can show that a symmetry leads to a differential of something which must be zero, then we have an example of Noether's theorem. John Baez (who I think is a member of this forum) has an excellent discussion of Noether's theorem on his website (from the purely conventional perspective).

I admit my view is a bit askew of the norm but it might be worth while for you to review my original post to you on this subject together with selfAdjoint's response and my response to him. I got no further complaint from him so I presume he had no further argument with what I said.

As I said in the post you are responding to:
It can be thought of as the consequence of the fact that the solution can be expressed in different languages; this is just a very specific and very subtle change in language (specific labels) not easily expressed in term of the ordinary concepts used in the translation between human languages I am aware of (other than secret codes that is).
I am pretty sure you have a decent idea of what is going on here because of your "Cool" comment above. It is very much the sign of that little light going on.

Exactly the same relationship can be used to generate a conserved quantity related to that "j" we attached to those B's which represent a change in C. The universe we are trying to explain (with that function which is going to yield our expectations) is derived from all the information embedded in the set C. Certainly no one will argue that the order with which we receive that information is an unimportant aspect of solutions we might propose; however, in the general case, that cannot be a fundamental issue. Remember, it is A we are trying to explain and the only thing we have to go on is C. Again, in the general case, we cannot presume that order is significant. Not unless the fact of that order is implicitly embedded in the data itself. We can assure that is the case by adding "unknowable" data which explicitly sets that order. Since we have already made sure (by adding imaginary entries in the B's we are working with – unknowable data) that all B's are different, we can simply add a numerical label which is to have a different value in every B and will indicate the order significant to the solution.

Now (having added that new label) our solution to the problem contains another (totally imaginary component) numerical label which I will call "time" and represent with the letter t. Again, multiplying that label by a constant or adding a constant to all t cannot alter the order and we once again have a fundamental symmetry in our representation. The fact that we can add any number to that t label yields another conserved quantity represented by the differential expression:

\frac{\partial}{\partial t}P(x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n,t)=0.​

Once again, the critical issue is that the particular B being referred to does not change nor does the order of those sets. These facts are true, no matter what order the information was received in. Since this is an ordering parameter on received changes B, this leads me to some very simple definitions. A particular value of t will be called "the present". Any t less than that particular t will be called "the past" and any t greater than that particular value of t will be called the future. This is the simplest definition of time which can be made and, in the end, I will show that it is also sufficient to all usages known. Since B represents a change in the information we have to work with, the "past" constitutes what we have to work with and the "future" constitutes what is not yet known.

Note that P(x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n,t) is the probability of B being (x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n,t) when t was the present: i.e., if nothing was known about about any B's beyond the one referred to by that "t". Note that "time" as here presented is nothing but a parameter indicating the order in which you came to know things. Note also that "time travel" is pretty well a ridiculous concept under this picture as it amounts to going from knowing what we know to knowing less (the common idea of time travel is to "go into the past" and still know what you know).

If anything I have said confuses you, let me know. I will be happy to clarify anything.

Have fun -- Dick
 
  • #848
Introduction concept 'time'

Doctordick said:
In mathematics, change is represented by differentials so, "a conserved quantity" means that there is a differential which does not change. If we can show that a symmetry leads to a differential of something which must be zero, then we have an example of Noether's theorem.
Aha, it's that simple!

Not unless the fact of that order is implicitly embedded in the data itself. We can assure that is the case by adding "unknowable" data which explicitly sets that order.
Aha, that makes some things clear.

Now (having added that new label) our solution to the problem contains another (totally imaginary component) numerical label which I will call "time" and represent with the letter t. Again, multiplying that label by a constant or adding a constant to all t cannot alter the order and we once again have a fundamental symmetry in our representation. The fact that we can add any number to that t label yields another conserved quantity represented by the differential expression:

\frac{\partial}{\partial t}P(x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n,t)=0.​
That's straightforward.

Note that "time" as here presented is nothing but a parameter indicating the order in which you came to know things. Note also that "time travel" is pretty well a ridiculous concept under this picture as it amounts to going from knowing what we know to knowing less (the common idea of time travel is to "go into the past" and still know what you know).
Yes, that makes sense. Providing the items in reversed order is still in order.

Looking forward, :smile:

Andy
 
  • #849
Hi Andy, it's nice to hear from you. You seem to think about the things I say without getting your ego involved. You are a very rare bird indeed and I appreciate the opportunity to communicate with you. (Note, I have been having a very bad time with the latex interpreter; I think it has some bugs in it. I have been trying various work arounds.)
saviourmachine said:
Aha, it's that simple!
Aha, that makes some things clear.
That's straightforward.
Yes, that makes sense. Providing the items in reversed order is still in order.
Looking forward, :smile:
I always tell people it's simple but they always want to complicate things. The math is not difficult at all. With regard to the issue of mathematics and simplicity, do you have any knowledge of matrix mechanics or matrix multiplication? I am wondering if I will have to teach you the subject as it comes up pretty quickly from where we are at the moment.

Meanwhile, there are three significant steps yet to be undertaken. Again, they are not really difficult but they are rather askew of the typical perspective. The first one has to do with the representation of probability. Probability, when viewed as the output of a mathematical function, constrains that function to have some very specific properties. These constraints come directly from the definition of probability. (Just as an aside, there is an individual out there who has some major difficulties with probability theory and is getting a reception roughly equivalent to the one I manage to generate with authorities. I have a strong suspicion his complaints are very rational.) But that is beside the point as I use none of the sophisticated aspects of probability theory he is referring to.

The first fundamental property of probability is that it cannot be negative and the second is that the sum (or integral if the number of possibilities become infinite) over all possibilities can not exceed unity. If you have been following the details of my approach you should have at least an inkling of the central motivation behind that approach. I have made every effort possible to insure that my representation imposes no constraints whatsoever on the possibilities which can be represented. I want my conclusions to be absolutely general without any presumptions as to where and how success (that explanation we are seeking) is to be found. Since we have established that our solution to any problem can be seen as finding the proper algorithm to apply to the set of numbers representing our knowledge, it is in our interest to remove constraints imposed by issues outside the information itself without making any constraint on the range of algorithms available to our analysis. The fact that probability must be a number between zero and one is just such a constraint. The need to satisfy this superfluous constraint may be removed from consideration via a very simple procedure.

A function can be seen as consisting of two components: the "argument" of the function (the input) and the "value" of the function (the output). Both of these components can be represented by a set of numbers (I think we have already discussed that issue). It follows directly that absolutely any function can be represented by the following shorthand notation.

\vec{G}(\vec{x},t)<br /> \equiv \left {{}G_1(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n,t), G_2(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n,t),\cdots, G_k(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n,t) \right{}}<br />​

(Without this shorthand, the size of the equations which will soon appear will be far to complex to write out in full.) In the interest of obtaining a very specific representation, I will constrain the arguments, x_i, to be taken from the set of real numbers and the results of the algorithm, G_j, to be taken from the set of complex numbers. Note that the common meaning of such an expression, that G rotates like a vector in the space of x is specifically not to be the intended interpretation. Note further that there is no implied relationship between n and k: that is, the number of elements in the two sets is held to be a completely open issue.

Given this totally general representation of an arbitrary functional relationship, we can define (for any specific function) what is called its adjoint function and written \vec{G}^\dagger (\vec{x},t). The adjoint is defined to be exactly the same as the original function except that each and every G_i (the specific complex numbers defining the function) would be replaced with its complex conjugate (G_i = (a+ib) goes directly to G_i ^\dagger = (a-ib)). The central issue is of course the fact that G_i ^\dagger * G_i = a^2 + b^2, a positive definite real number. (If b = 0 then the adjoint is identical to the original which of course means that "self-adjoint" means real; which I suspect everyone here knows.)

Now add to the above the standard definition of a "dot" product of vectors (seen as a definition of a procedure) and the notation \vec{G}^\dagger \cdot \vec{G} results in a sum over a collection of positive real numbers which must be positive definite. Lastly, the sum over all possibilities (or the integral if the number of possibilities is infinite) must be greater than any sum (or integral) over any sub set of possibilities. It follows that

1 \geq <br /> \frac{ { \int \int \cdots \int \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G} \, d^n x} }{ { { \int \int \cdots \int \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G} \, d^n x} } }<br /> \geq 0​

so long as the denominator is summed (or integrated) over all possibilities. That also brings up another shorthand notation I would like to use.

\oint f(\vec{x}) dv \equiv \int \int \cdots \int f(\vec{x}) d^n x​

Ordinarily \oint would denote a line integral but, since I have no need for line integrals in my work, there should be no confusion. If I knew how to do it, I might very well put a capital "V" in the circle to denote that I want a volume integral over the entire represented abstract volume. Meanwhile, I will just hope that anyone who reads this has the attention span to remember that identification.

If follows that, if one defines the function \vec{\Psi} via

\vec{\Psi}(\vec{x},t) \equiv \frac{ \vec{G}(\vec{x},t) }{ { \sqrt{ \oint \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G} dv} } }​

we can "define" the probability of the B_j to be given by

<br /> P(\vec{x},t) = \vec{\Psi}^\dagger(\vec{x},t)\cdot\vec{\Psi}(\vec{x},t)dv<br />​

where dv \equiv d^n x.

The really important issue here is that \vec{\Psi} is an absolutely unconstrained functional relationship; absolutely any possible function can serve the roll of \vec{\Psi} as it is identical to \vec{G} except for the numerical factor \sqrt{\oint \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G}dv}. There is to be no constraint on \vec{\Psi} other than the fact that the probability generated by the definition given above be a correct representation of our expectations. If our expectations can be generated, \vec{G}, must be a member of the set of "all possible algorithms".

Two possible problems might exist. Both involve extreme values of that numerical factor \sqrt{\oint \vec{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G}dv}. The case where the factor is zero (and division would be undefined) is trivial. In that case, \vec{G} will serve the purpose of \vec{\Psi} and the division is unnecessary. The second case, where the factor is infinite is a little more problematical. In that case, the defined probability becomes zero. This case obviously occurs when the number of possibilities become infinite and the probability of any specific B becomes zero. This becomes a very real possibility as we will soon be dealing with the limit as n approaches infinity; however, in this case also, the division once again becomes immaterial. In this second case, our interest will be in comparing probabilities of various collections of B's and the ratios of those probabilities are the important factor (the denominator being the same in all cases, the division is immaterial).

The only factor of interest is that the output obtained from the definition can be interpreted as a probability.

The net effect of all this is that, in order to keep the representation totally open, we want to work with \vec{\Psi} instead of working directly with the probabilities defined by \vec{\Psi}. If I can make it clear one more time, the set up I have arranged makes utterly no restrictions on the form or character of the method of arriving at expectations. The only constraint being put on the method is that it must yield satisfactory results; an issue not to be discussed until the notation is fully proscribed.

Finally, since we want to work with \vec{\Psi}, we need to re-express the relationships developed earlier in terms of the probability. The relationships already written may be rewritten as

<br /> \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i}\vec{\Psi}\,=\, i \kappa \vec{\Psi}\,\,\,and\,\,\frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi}\,=\, im\vec{\Psi}

This can be proved quite simply. The complex conjugates of the above expressions are,

<br /> \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i}\vec{\Psi}^\dagger\,=\, -i \kappa \vec{\Psi}^\dagger \,\,\,and\,\,\frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi}^\dagger\,=\, -im\vec{\Psi}^\dagger .

This, together with the chain rule of calculus guarantees that any \vec{\Psi} which satisfies the above relations also satisfies the relation on the probability stated earlier. In the interest of saving space, I will show the result explicitly for the time derivative (the derivatives with respect to the arguments x_i go through exactly the same.

\frac{\partial}{\partial t}P(\vec{x},t)

=\,\, \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi}^\dagger \right) \cdot \vec{\Psi}+\vec{\Psi}^\dagger \cdot<br /> \left( {\frac{ \partial}{ \partial t}} \vec{\Psi} \right)

=\,\, -im \vec{\Psi}^\dagger \cdot \vec{\Psi}+im \vec{\Psi}^\dagger \cdot \vec{\Psi}\,\,=\,\,0.​

If you have any questions about anything I have put down, please let me know. If all this makes sense to you, I will establish the final two steps and then state the ultimate conclusion.

I hope I have not run you off – Dick
 
  • #850
This seems OK to me, although I have a couple of questions.
1. Can you justify your basic assumption of functions: Rn -> Ck?

2 Your definition of adjoint is pretty limited, in agreement with your generality concerns. As you undoubtedly know, the output variables could be a matrix algebra, in which case the adjoint would involve a transpose as well as conjugation, or it might be a general algebra of linear transformations over the complexes, in which case adjointness would have a definition involving the outer product (which in your general plan you have not required). In any case it would be prudent to call your operation conjugation rather than adjoint, to avoid misunderstanding.
 
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