Causally Closed Physics & Rosenberg's Argument for Dualism

[selfAdjoint]

In his opening post on Chapter Seven of Gregg Rosenberg's A Place for Consciousness, Hypnagogue says this:

If physicalism is false, and if the world is causally closed under physics, it appears as if there is no room for p-consciousness to make a causal contribution to brain events. But clearly, our knowledge claims about p-consciousness (e.g. "I know that I am conscious right now") are driven by physical brain events. If p-consciousness is irrelevant to the causal dynamics of the brain, then, it seems that it can play no role in producing our knowledge claims about it. In short, it seems as if our knowledge claims about p-consciousness should bear no relevance to the phenomenon itself; we should have no way to really know that we are p-conscious, even though we claim that we are.

It appears as if the knowledge paradox forces the Liberal Naturalist to be caught on the dual horns of interactionist dualism and epiphenomenalism. We can escape the conundrum of the knowledge paradox if we deny the causal closure of the physical and claim that non-physical p-consciousness really does directly influence the physical dynamics of the brain. The resulting interactionist dualist ontology presents significant further problems, however, and there is no strong evidence that the world is not causally closed under physics. If we reject interactionism, we can bite the bullet and propose that p-consciousness is epiphenomenal on brain events. On this view, p-consciousness is lawfully correlated with brain events, but still does not make any contribution to their causal dynamics. Epiphenomenalism is not much better than interactionism, as it still presents us with significant problems. While knowledge claims about p-consciousness would be true under epiphenomenalism, it seems they would not be justified. Rather, they would be more like lucky coincidences, since there would be no mechanism by which we could attain reasons for making these claims. Our physical brains would cause us to utter that we are p-conscious, and mere serendipity would have it that we were in fact correct. If the laws enforcing the epiphenomenal correlation between brain events and p-conscious events were to somehow be shut off, we would go on (falsely) claiming that we are p-conscious, none the wiser.

Now there have already been several replies to this on the original thread, and most of them seem delighted that the unwarranted claim of physicalism that nature is causally closed under physics is being challenged. I want to open the opposite conclusion for discussion.

It seems that what Rosenberg is doing here is denial of his, and the qualists' problems. He has come close to admitting that if nature is causally closed under physical interactions, then the qualist position is just what they have accused the physicalist position of being: incoherent. On the horns of a dilemma between epiphenomenalism and dualism, as he says.

Now if your premises lead you to a false conclusion, you should reject those premises. This is the basis of the famous proof technique called reduction ad absurdam in logic and contrapositive in mathematics. And the only reason to suppose that natrue is not causally closed under physics is that the qualist premises require it!

Do a thought experiment; leave the qualist position out, and try to imagine any evidence for non-closure under physical causes. Science is often accused on these boards of ignoring everything outside of physical causes, but it does that because it works! No experiment has ever shown any force or energy flow other than physical ones. And indeed if there are non-physical forces, that are truly causal, then you are back at dualism in all but words, since you have posited an independent principle required to explain the world.

 

[loseyourname]

It gets pretty crazy when you have people stating that the law of conservation of energy and the law of conservation of momentum are just guesses that must be thrown out in order to accommodate an antiphysicalist view, which has happened in this very forum. I don't even know what to say at that point, but I certainly do try. At least hypnagogue is willing to admit that this is a genuine problem.

 

[hypnagogue]

selfAdjoint, you seem to have misunderstood the point (perhaps I did not write it clearly enough). Rosenberg does not reject causal closure of the physical. He says that if we choose to do so and adopt interactionist dualism, then we seem to have a way out of the knowledge paradox (only to open a host of other problems, of course). However, Rosenberg does not want to reject causal closure of the physical at all, and in fact, this is his primary reason for rejecting interactionist dualism. In fact, you might notice that Paul Martin has taken Rosenberg to task for precisely this in the thread for chapter 7. Martin thinks Rosenberg is rejecting interactionist dualism dogmatically and out of hand. We would not see such a reply if Rosenberg were suggesting that we really should consider rejecting causal closure of the physical.

Now if your premises lead you to a false conclusion, you should reject those premises. This is the basis of the famous proof technique called reduction ad absurdam in logic and contrapositive in mathematics. And the only reason to suppose that natrue is not causally closed under physics is that the qualist premises require it!

This seems to pose a unique problem for the Liberal Naturalist. Neither epiphenomenalism or interactionist dualism are appealing options. This leads to the natural conclusion that perhaps we should reject the premises that forced us to choose between these two in the first place. But doing such would mean accepting physicalism, which the Liberal Naturalist already has strong reasons for rejecting. It seems that nothing will work. However, the framework Rosenberg develops in his book allows us to escape this dilemma. On Rosenberg's framework, one can deny that p-consciousness is physical, but also coherently deny both epiphenomenalism and interactionist dualism.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Since I don't have the book I depend on your summaries, hypnagogue. I will go back and reread what you posted. But I may have more questions after that. Right now, off the top of my head, I can't think how Rosenberg could do that trick.

 

[loseyourname]

Since I don't have the book I depend on your summaries, hypnagogue. I will go back and reread what you posted. But I may have more questions after that. Right now, off the top of my head, I can't think how Rosenberg could do that trick.

I have to admit that I haven't kept up with the reading, as I've had quite a bit of other reading to do, but from what I could tell, Rosenberg postulates that the intrinsic experiential capacity of his "carriers" of causation are what dictate physical causal properties. It's actually similar to Hobbes' view of causation; that we have "Agents," or effective properties, and "Patients," or receptive properties. The nature of the agents and patients is what shapes the causal relations between physical objects.

Honestly, I don't think this view is really all that different from epiphenomenalism. It just makes epiphenomenalism coherent. A conscious agent still cannot change the natural course of causation. It just happens to be that what we experience are the very properties that dictate this natural course.

 

[StatusX]

Now if your premises lead you to a false conclusion, you should reject those premises. This is the basis of the famous proof technique called reduction ad absurdam in logic and contrapositive in mathematics. And the only reason to suppose that natrue is not causally closed under physics is that the qualist premises require it!

Usually that method starts by assuming the claim it is trying to prove false is true and then makes a number of valid logical deductions to reach a contradiction from it. In this case, the steps are something like this:

1. We believe in (as in "talk about") non-physical qualia.
2. Non-physical qualia exist.
3. The physical world is causally closed, in that every physical event is only a result of other physical events.
4. Since talking is physical and caused by the physical brain, we would talk about non-physical qualia whether or not they exist.
5. Qualia exist even though we can't be justified in believing they exist.

Strictly speaking, the conclusion (5) isn't a paradox, it's just unsettling enough as to be unacceptable. This is actually working a proof by reductio ad absurdum backwards, because we know we've reached a contradiction but we don't know which step is the flawed one, just that one of them must be. You feel (2) is the only reasonable one to deny. But I think Rosenberg will argue that it is possible that (3), or maybe (4) are more subtle than they appear, and could be incorrect. Those of us who take the existence of qualia as an empirical fact need to expore these steps in greater detail.

 

[hypnagogue]

But I think Rosenberg will argue that it is possible that (3), or maybe (4) are more subtle than they appear, and could be incorrect. Those of us who take the existence of qualia as an empirical fact need to expore these steps in greater detail.

Rosenberg doesn't argue that the world is not causally closed under physics. But he does argue that the physical causal story is not the complete causal story. He sees physics as being a description of effective causation (that which places causal constraint), but also argues that we need some notion of receptivity (that which receives causal constraint) that is not included in physics.

I'd prefer to wait on the details until the group discussion reaches that point. But for now, I'd like to emphasize that Rosenberg does not propose anything that is incompatible with existing physical laws or principles. He doesn't seek to rewrite physics, only to add to it. In fact, his framework winds up resonating with certain things such as determinism/indeterminism, non-locality, and the fundamentally relational structure of spacetime in a rather satisfying and reassuring way.

 

[Canute]

Do a thought experiment; leave the qualist position out, and try to imagine any evidence for non-closure under physical causes.

I've done that experiment. It shows that the idea that the universe is causally closed gives rise to undecidable metaphysical questions relating to the the first cause (and last effect). For this reason the doctrine of causal closure in incoherent in my opinion. The explanatory gap to which the doctrine gives rise seems to me pretty good evidence that it is not the case.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I've done that experiment. It shows that the idea that the universe is causally closed gives rise to undecidable metaphysical questions relating to the the first cause (and last effect). For this reason the doctrine of causal closure in incoherent in my opinion. The explanatory gap to which the doctrine gives rise seems to me pretty good evidence that it is not the case.

I think the spacetime view, with time STARTING at the big bang and no preceding cause because no preceding time, just as nothing is south of the south pole, is a coherent view. What leads you to find it incoherent?

 

[selfAdjoint]

Rosenberg's Gateway site

Rosenberg doesn't argue that the world is not causally closed under physics. But he does argue that the physical causal story is not the complete causal story. He sees physics as being a description of effective causation (that which places causal constraint), but also argues that we need some notion of receptivity (that which receives causal constraint) that is not included in physics.

I'd prefer to wait on the details until the group discussion reaches that point. But for now, I'd like to emphasize that Rosenberg does not propose anything that is incompatible with existing physical laws or principles. He doesn't seek to rewrite physics, only to add to it. In fact, his framework winds up resonating with certain things such as determinism/indeterminism, non-locality, and the fundamentally relational structure of spacetime in a rather satisfying and reassuring way.

Searching for another source for Rosenberg's views, I found this site, http://ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/book.html . He summarizes his proposed additions to the concept of causality. I suppose the reading hasn't got far enough to reach this, but it seems his qualist addition to causality is key to his argument in chapter seven.

The introduction of a new paradigm for understanding causality called Causal Significance. The Causal Significance of a thing is the difference its existence makes to the space of possible ways the world can be

What does everybody think of it?

 

[hypnagogue]

it seems his qualist addition to causality is key to his argument in chapter seven.

I'm not sure what you mean by this; could you clarify?

 

[Canute]

I think the spacetime view, with time STARTING at the big bang and no preceding cause because no preceding time, just as nothing is south of the south pole, is a coherent view. What leads you to find it incoherent?

I don't entirely disagree with the notion of causal closure, and agree that spacetime is not fundamental. However, to say that there is no cause for the existence of spacetime is a cop-out imho (iow an appeal to ignorance). It is saying that the universe is causally closed - once it exists. To me this proviso is the undoing of the causal closure idea. (I know (vaguely) all that Hartle, Hawking et al stuff about the south pole. However in my layman's opinion it smacks of desperation, and does not explain the existence of the south pole).

 

[selfAdjoint]

What desperation? The "South Pole" is just an intrinsic feature of GR cosmology; it wasn't brought in for any special purpose. For that matter you can say that desiring an explanation for the universe is a category error; the universe is the theater of causality, and "The sovereign is no subject."

 

[Q_Goest]

If we don't know how the universe was started, then isn't this the same as saying we don't know if it is causally closed or not?

Regardless of the beginning of the universe, I believe the original post was intended more towards philosophy of mind.

Do a thought experiment; leave the qualist position out, and try to imagine any evidence for non-closure under physical causes. Science is often accused on these boards of ignoring everything outside of physical causes, but it does that because it works! No experiment has ever shown any force or energy flow other than physical ones. And indeed if there are non-physical forces, that are truly causal, then you are back at dualism in all but words, since you have posited an independent principle required to explain the world.

I take that to mean, in the universe today, "try to imaging any evidence for non-closure under physical causes."

Isn't this same philosophy the reason Einstein said "God doesn't play dice" when he referred to the lack of a 'cause and effect' in quantum mechanics? He assumed there were simply some hidden variables within nature and physicsts would soon find them and cause and effect would once again reign as the most fundamental concept in physics. But despite decades of experiments, physicists have come up empty handed in their efforts to find hidden variables. I believe that at this point in history, hidden variable theories have largely been relagated to the trash can.

Nevertheless, we assume, because quamtum phenomena occur at such a microscopic level, and because their seemingly random nature statistically cancel out any gross randomness in this universe, that cause and effect govern all phenomena larger than a few hundred molecules*. Yet we can't apply cause and effect to the very building blocks themselves. As an engineer, that doesn't bother me. I can design structures and thermodynamic systems without concern that they won't act as I'd expect. But from a philisophical viewpoint, I find the lack of cause and effect at the microscopic level fascinating.

*Have you seen that these quantum phenomena actually occur on molecules as large as C60 and C70 Buckyballs? So even fairly large chunks of matter seem to be governed by something which is NOT cause and effect related.

 

[selfAdjoint]

You keep saying that there is no cause and effect in quantumland, but it is there! A Josephson junction is a macroscopic quantum device; its behavior depends crucially on its QM nature. But Josephson junctions can be designed! Squid devices amploying them can be designed and built and their behavior is predictable! You just mistake your own disquiet over counter-intuitive ideas for a lack of causality.

Please, people, stop using "quantum randomness" as a mantra. Learn what the QM formalism really says, and learn how experiments are reliably, causally, designed to show off its counter-intuitive properties.

 

[Q_Goest]

You keep saying that there is no cause and effect in quantumland, but it is there! A Josephson junction is a macroscopic quantum device; its behavior depends crucially on its QM nature. But Josephson junctions can be designed! Squid devices amploying them can be designed and built and their behavior is predictable!

Yep, there are things man has designed and built which take advantage of quantum phenomena. Not sure the point there.

Perhaps I'm missunderstanding what you mean by "causal closure". If that means, if a physical event has a cause, then it has a physical cause then I would have to ask, what is the physical cause of any given atom which undergoes radioactive decay?

Radioactive decay of any given atom is a strictly random event. We can find a "cause" in that we my find that some nucleus is unstable. But what is the cause of atom A decaying in 5 minutes, and an identical atom B decaying in an hour? Why does atom A decay now, and atom B decay 55 minutes later? Both atoms are identical, right up to the point in time that one decays and the other doesn't. I fail to see how such a phenomena is a causally closed system.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Radioactive decay of any given atom is a strictly random event. We can find a "cause" in that we my find that some nucleus is unstable. But what is the cause of atom A decaying in 5 minutes, and an identical atom B decaying in an hour? Why does atom A decay now, and atom B decay 55 minutes later? Both atoms are identical, right up to the point in time that one decays and the other doesn't. I fail to see how such a phenomena is a causally closed system.

This is often stated, but I think it's just an epistomological problem. You say the atoms are identical, but we can't prove that; we don't know what antineutrons are flying around, capable of catalyzing the weak interaction. After all, an atom, in quantum terms, is very much a collective system.

 

[Canute]

Q Guest

If we don't know how the universe was started, then isn't this the same as saying we don't know if it is causally closed or not?

I'd say so. As Paul said it is either not causally closed or not explanatarily closed, depending on which way we look at it. If it is not explanatorily closed then we have to take it on faith that it is causally closed.

However there is a possible subtlety in all this. Self-Adjoint seems to right in saying that causation only operates in time. So perhaps the universe arises from 'something' which provides the contingent condition necessary to the existence of space and time but which, strictly-speaking, does not cause them. If so then the doctrine of causal closure is neither quite right or wrong.

 

[Q_Goest]

... we don't know what antineutrons are flying around, capable of catalyzing the weak interaction.

Isn't this and any concept like it simply a hidden variable theory?

 

[Q_Goest]

I googled "explanatorily closed" and only came up with seven links, one of which was here at this forum. So maybe a short discussion on the concept is worth while for those of us without the philosphy background and knowledge of terminolgy that comes with it.

Does "causally closed" refer only to 3 linear dimensions and time, such that all matter, energy, dark or otherwise, is governed by cause and effect relationships? Or does this term assume cause and effect relationships which occur not just in 4 dimensions, but in all dimensions (whatever that may mean)?

If a single extra dimension is added, can one say that all possible quantum phenomena occur in these 5 dimensions? Then perhaps one can consider those 5 dimensions as causally closed. Similarly, string theory suggests 10 or 11 dimensions. What is the basis we're using for "causally closed"?

 

[Steve Esser]

My ideas is that there is no gap in causality, but that we need a new theory of causation. I've been frustrated by the fact that when debating the issue of causal closure (and free will/determinism), it seems most people on both sides have in their minds a world of classical mechanics. I believe there are several reasons to think we need a new treatment of causality:

1. quantum mechanics has overthrown the classical picture, but philosophical treatments oversimplify by assuming it is a simple probablistic version of the classical.

2. complex non-linear systems resist classical reduction, but no one has offered a new explanation, except to say higher level features somehow emerge.

3. remember also the difficulty we have of finding an adequate physical description for the asymmetrical "flow" of time, in which causality takes place.

Let’s take the case of QM, where the causal process is indeed richer than the classical one (SelfAdjoint, please correct mistakes in what follows if you have the time and patience):

We have a unitary process of evolution described by the wave function, then we have a second process: measurement. There is obviously more going on here than in the classical picture of billiard ball ‘A’ effecting billiard ball “B”. One or both systems involved in a measurement need to have an additional (natural) property in order to have a quantum causal event. This “ability to measure” or “ability to observe” or “ability to receive information” property is an integral part of the picture.

I know it seems that many folks get overly enthusiastic about the implications of QM for ontology (Tao of Physics, etc.), but I see the door as open to efforts to create a more detailed description of causality which makes this “ability to measure” property explicit and theorizes about the role it plays in construction of natural systems, including complex macroscopic ones like us.

 

[Tournesol]

This is often stated, but I think it's just an epistomological problem. You say the atoms are identical, but we can't prove that; we don't know what antineutrons are flying around, capable of catalyzing the weak interaction. After all, an atom, in quantum terms, is very much a collective system.

But we know from Bell's theorem and the Aspect experiment that there
are no local hidden "causes" of at least some putatively random events.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I completely accept the standard QM view of the entanglement correlations and the Aspect and similar experiments. Would you please state some specific "randomness" at the elementary level, not at the compound level like radioactive atoms? Then we can discuss that. Recall I distinguish "randomness", i.e. acausality, from the unpredictability of which eigenvalue will be observed, where QM has given you the probabilities of the different possiible cases.

 

[StatusX]

Are "The physical world is causally closed" and "The laws of physics are correct" equivalent statements? In classical physics, the answer must be yes. If a particle changes velocity, it is because a force is acting on it. If no force acts on it, it won't change velocity. The force will either be gravitational, electromagnetic, strong, or weak, and the source of all these forces is also known and completely physical. So if these laws are correct, there is no room for outside influence. Is this an accurate assessment?

So if there is any room for consciousness to interfere, it must do so quantum mechanically. Now, the two ways a QM system can evolve are (1) deterministically according to the schroedinger equation and (2) by random wavefunction collapse. The first leads to the same conclusion as before: if the laws are correct, there are no causal gaps. The second is very strange. We still don't know exactly what constitutes a measurement. But the "random" part seems to imply that even if a measurement is precisely a conscious observation, it can do nothing to affect the physical behavior in a way that would cause us to say things like "I am conscious". Could it? It seems to me that either the laws of physics are correct or that we can justifiably say things like "Qualia are not physical". This is the biggest paradox for me, because I believe both. Maybe someone who's read the Rosenberg book can hint at whether he chooses one of these options or if he finds a loophole.

 

[Tournesol]

Then we can discuss that. Recall I distinguish "randomness", i.e. acausality, from the unpredictability of which eigenvalue will be observed, where QM has given you the probabilities of the different possiible cases

The unpredictability of eigenvalues on the basis of either the known
information or local hidden variables is the very essence of the
issue of quantum randomness as far as most people are concerned. If it is not
for you, I can only conclude that you are using the word 'random' in an unusual way.

I completely accept the standard QM view of the entanglement correlations and the Aspect and similar experiments. Would you please state some specific "randomness" at the elementary level, not at the compound level like radioactive atoms?

The unpredictability of eigenvalues on the basis of either the known
information or local hidden variables. The Aspect experiment uses spin-correlated photons.

You appeal to the "compound level" seems to be a plea to some additional
piece of causal machinery (you suggeted antineutrons in the case of radioactive atoms) which, if included, would render the event determinate
and predictable. Any such additional factor woudl constitute a local
hidden variables, and LHV's as a class are excluded by the Aspect experiment.

 

[Pensador]

So if there is any room for consciousness to interfere, it must do so quantum mechanically.

Sometimes it's very difficult to see something because it is too close to us, because it's too obvious to appear to have much significance.

There is no room for consciousness in any law of physics. If there appears to be room in QM, that only means QM must be refined. (I don't think QM must be refined since it agrees with experiment, but I do think it needs correct interpretations that leave no room for consciousness to sneak in misperceived gaps)

What's so obvious to me in all this is, where do the laws of physics come from? Why, they come from consciousness itself! The laws of physics are nothing more, nothing less than the attempt by conscious beings to understand the aspect of reality which lies beyond their conscious awareness. The laws of physics exclude consciousness not because there is no room in the physical world for it, but precisely because the study of physics is the study of what lies outside consciousness.

If we find consciousness in physics, it only means somebody goofed.

 

[Tournesol]

So if there is any room for consciousness to interfere, it must do so quantum mechanically. Now, the two ways a QM system can evolve are (1) deterministically according to the schroedinger equation and (2) by random wavefunction collapse. The first leads to the same conclusion as before: if the laws are correct, there are no causal gaps. The second is very strange. We still don't know exactly what constitutes a measurement. But the "random" part seems to imply that even if a measurement is precisely a conscious observation, it can do nothing to affect the physical behavior in a way that would cause us to say things like "I am conscious". Could it?

But to be precise, we don't know that collapse (if it exists at all) is random;
what we know is that it is not determined by local hidden variables. The hypothesis that consc. is (or appears from the perspective of QM to be) a non-local hidden variable fits well with some subejctive aspects of consc.
such as its 'holistic' nature and the 'binding' issue.

 

[Tournesol]

There is no room for consciousness in any law of physics.

There is not, de facto, or there should not be ?

If there appears to be room in QM, that only means QM must be refined.

Is any kind of causal gap a problem, or a specifically consciousness-shaped
one ?

(I don't think QM must be refined since it agrees with experiment,

It doesn't agree with the fact that only one eigenvalue is observed. That's the whole problem.

What's so obvious to me in all this is, where do the laws of physics come from? Why, they come from consciousness itself! The laws of physics are nothing more, nothing less than the attempt by conscious beings to understand the aspect of reality which lies beyond their conscious awareness. The laws of physics exclude consciousness not because there is no room in the physical world for it, but precisely because the study of physics is the study of what lies outside consciousness.

Your brain is outside my consiousness, and vice versa. If your brain
counts as physical for my consciousness, why doesn't your consciousness ?

 

[Pensador]

There is not, de facto, [room for consciousness in physics] or there should not be ?

Sorry, I meant "there should not be". As I said later on the same post, if there seems to be, then it's a mistake.

Is any kind of causal gap a problem, or a specifically consciousness-shaped one ?

Well, any sort of causal gap can be seen as a potential candidate for consciousness to interfere in the physical world. If we are to be true to the tradition of physics, we cannot fill those causal gaps with notions derived from mysticism, we need concepts which don't require allegiance to a particular set of beliefs.

It doesn't agree with the fact that only one eigenvalue is observed. That's the whole problem.

I think the "whole problem" of QM is that it doesn't make much sense. Even physicists agree with that. We are forced to accept the theory without understanding it, and that gives rise to all sorts of nonsense.

Your brain is outside my consiousness, and vice versa.

Actually, even my own brain is outside my consciousness. I have no idea what those neurons are doing, and I only know they exist because I was told so. I cannot experience my brain the way I experience my arms or my legs, except perhaps when I have a headache.

If your brain counts as physical for my consciousness, why doesn't your consciousness ?

The simple answer is that I don't have to equate your brain with your consciousness. I may do so, but I'm not forced to it by any compelling reason. I may simply choose to ignore your consciousness entirely, and focus only on your brain. I can even apply that knowledge to my own brain, with the caveat that I cannot ignore my own consciousness, but then neither can I say much about it.

 

[Tournesol]

Well, any sort of causal gap can be seen as a potential candidate for consciousness to interfere in the physical world. If we are to be true to the tradition of physics, we cannot fill those causal gaps with notions derived from mysticism, we need concepts which don't require allegiance to a particular set of beliefs.

And if we persistently fail to find anything suitably physical to plug the gaps with we should just live with them, and not plug them with consciousness...even if that would help us understand consciousness.

Actually, even my own brain is outside my consciousness. I have no idea what those neurons are doing, and I only know they exist because I was told so. I cannot experience my brain the way I experience my arms or my legs, except perhaps when I have a headache.

Actually, you have quite a lot of insight into what your brain is doing (or it has insight inot itself) -- it's just that you don't have it in the format of nerual firings.

The simple answer is that I don't have to equate your brain with your consciousness. I may do so, but I'm not forced to it by any compelling reason. I may simply choose to ignore your consciousness entirely, and focus only on your brain. I can even apply that knowledge to my own brain, with the caveat that I cannot ignore my own consciousness, but then neither can I say much about it.

Well *you* can't because you refuse to contemplate any realtionship between consciousness and the physical, but there must be some sort of relationship.
Others are not going to be convinced by your lack of enthusiasm for the issue.

 

[Pensador]

And if we persistently fail to find anything suitably physical to plug the gaps with we should just live with them, and not plug them with consciousness...even if that would help us understand consciousness.

What makes you think that hiding consciousness behind quantum indeterminacy will help us understand it? And what makes you think that once we understand what lies behind quantum processes, we will look at it and exclaim, "ah, this is consciousness!"

Actually, you have quite a lot of insight into what your brain is doing (or it has insight into itself) -- it's just that you don't have it in the format of neural firings.

That is not correct. I cannot equate my subjective experience of looking at the moon with a bunch of neural firings; that would open the door for the possibility that the moon does not exist. There must be more to our subjective experiences than what goes on in our bodies, otherwise even the notion that we have bodies goes out the window.

Well *you* can't because you refuse to contemplate any realtionship between consciousness and the physical, but there must be some sort of relationship.

Of course there is a relationship between consciousness and the physical. All I have to do is try and move my arm to see that. That is not what I was talking about.

Others are not going to be convinced by your lack of enthusiasm for the issue.

Lack of enthusiasm? What I see is people misapplying the concepts of physics, and that is not the first time in human history. Ever since people burnt sacrifices to their gods, humanity has this tendency to see more in the world than what's really there. But the fact is that the gods were not paying attention to the sacrifices, and quantum processes are not connected to consciousness for the simple reason that they were not conceived with that end in mind.

 

[Tournesol]

What makes you think that hiding consciousness behind quantum indeterminacy will help us understand it?

Quantum indeterminacy allows us to see how consc. can influence the brain
without breaking physical laws. It may not explain other mysteries of consc.
or of QM.

And what makes you think that once we understand what lies behind quantum processes, we will look at it and exclaim, "ah, this is consciousness!

"

I see no reason why we should in all cases.

That is not correct. I cannot equate my subjective experience of looking at the moon with a bunch of neural firings; that would open the door for the possibility that the moon does not exist. There must be more to our subjective experiences than what goes on in our bodies, otherwise even the notion that we have bodies goes out the window.

True, but trivial. Obviously neural firings connect to a wider world.

quantum processes are not connected to consciousness for the simple reason that they were not conceived with that end in mind.

IF QM is correct, quantum processes are surely connected to everything that exists, however implicitly.

 

[Pensador]

True, but trivial. Obviously neural firings connect to a wider world.

It's not trivial at all, and it's not obvious that neural firings connect to a wider world. If your subjective experience of the moon is caused by neurons firing, and not by the moon itself, except indirectly, what reason do you have to believe the moon might not be an illusion? What is preventing your neurons from firing in the absence of a real moon?

I'm not saying the moon is an illusion, I'm convinced it is not, but I'm saying you have to explain consciousness in a way that makes it impossible for the moon to be an illusion. Saying "it's all neurons firing" doesn't seem to qualify, as exemplified by those brain-in-a-vat ideas so popular these days.

 

[Tournesol]

It's not trivial at all, and it's not obvious that neural firings connect to a wider world. If your subjective experience of the moon is caused by neurons firing, and not by the moon itself, except indirectly, what reason do you have to believe the moon might not be an illusion?

Whatever reason I had to believe in neurons in the first place, since I do
not have direct subjective expreience of them. You can't base solipsisim on science.

What is preventing your neurons from firing in the absence of a real moon?

The fact that I am not hallucinating, etc.

I'm not saying the moon is an illusion, I'm convinced it is not, but I'm saying you have to explain consciousness in a way that makes it impossible for the moon to be an illusion.

Sometimes it is. In any case, once you have started from a position that
acknowledges the validiy of science you cannot, without inconsistency,
lapse into subjectivism.

 

[Pensador]

Whatever reason I had to believe in neurons in the first place, since I do
not have direct subjective expreience of them. You can't base solipsisim on science.

I'm not trying to base solipsism on science, I'm trying to show that science alone does not exclude the possibility of solipsism, as those brain-in-a-vat ideas clearly demonstrate. Your claim that "you can't base solipsisim on science" comes from the fact that scientists don't like solipsism, not because science has completely ruled it out.

I'm not a solipsist, but I'm convinced we need more than science to exclude solipsism as a logical possibility. We need science too, but it alone is not enough.

In any case, once you have started from a position that acknowledges the validiy of science you cannot, without inconsistency,
lapse into subjectivism.

I'm not "lapsing into subjectivism", just claiming there's more to reality than objective facts. Or do you think your subjective experiences are not real?

 

[selfAdjoint]

It's not trivial at all, and it's not obvious that neural firings connect to a wider world. If your subjective experience of the moon is caused by neurons firing, and not by the moon itself, except indirectly, what reason do you have to believe the moon might not be an illusion? What is preventing your neurons from firing in the absence of a real moon?

I'm not saying the moon is an illusion, I'm convinced it is not, but I'm saying you have to explain consciousness in a way that makes it impossible for the moon to be an illusion. Saying "it's all neurons firing" doesn't seem to qualify, as exemplified by those brain-in-a-vat ideas so popular these days.

But what about all the experiments that connect brain states to events outside? They have even produced what a monkey sees on a computer monitor, by tapping into his visual neurons, and then to prove it was real they fed what they saw back into his neurons and the monkey was able to use that factored stimulus to guide his hand to a target.

Of course you could say that it's all just a dream and that's part of it, but once you accept that there is an outside world and that there are other people with minds in it, then you no longer have the freedom that Hume had, to imagine no link from the inside to the outside.

 

[Canute]

Pensador

You make some good points imo. However, I'm not sure the argument that - if consciousness is neurons firing then the moon might be an illusion - really works. This is not because what you said is wrong, in fact it seems to be right as far as it goes. But couldn't the moon be an illusion even if our experience of it is not caused by neurons firing? If so then it's possible illusoriness doesn't seem to be an argument for either side.

And if we persistently fail to find anything suitably physical to plug the gaps with we should just live with them, and not plug them with consciousness...even if that would help us understand consciousness.

I think Pensador's point was that we must make up our minds. If the currently most orthodox scientific model is correct then consciousness is not a scientific topic. But if consciousness is a scientific topic then the scientific model is not correct. To attempt to study something scientifically which is defined by science as non-causal but physically caused, non-physical but existent, not observable nor measurable except second-hand and on hearsay, not deducable or inferable from studying the brain yet epiphenomenal on it, not in any way the cause of our behaviour yet inferable from our behaviour, and so on, is absurd. To say that consciousness is not a scientific topic is fair enough, (and I'd agree), but to define it such a way that science cannot study it and then to argue that science can explain it is a very odd thing to do, and this is what is being done all the time.

Peansador argues that science cannot find consciousness because science, by its very definition and methodology, studies only what consciousness is not. Until this assertion can be shown to be false then consciousness remains beyond science, and unless it can be shown false then consciousness will be permanently beyond science. Sir Arthur Eddington, I think it was, who wrote "There is no phenomenal way out of the phenomenal world". This seems precisely equivalent to Pensador's point.

Descartes reached the same conclusion. "I could suppose that I had no body and that there was no world or place where I was, but I could not by the same token suppose that I did not exist . . . From this I knew that I was a substance the essence or nature of which simply was to think; and which, to exist, needs no place and has no dependence on any material thing. Consequently, I, that is to say my mind --- what makes me what I am --- am entirely distinct from the body; and, furthermore, the former is more easily known than the latter, while if the latter did not exist the former could be all that it is." (Rene Descartes - Discourse on the Method IV)

This may be an epistemilogical point only, I don't know Descartes well, and I wish he'd said "simply to be" instead of using "think" but as long as we do not know whether it is false it may as well be an ontological point also. If so then it is true to say that science cannot study consciousness.

I also agree with Pensador that QM makes no sense without an extra ingredient in the mix. At present we have to agree with Feynman, who started one of his famous lectures by saying "…as I explained in the first lecture, the way we have to describe Nature is generally incomprehensible to us."

Actually, you have quite a lot of insight into what your brain is doing (or it has insight inot itself) -- it's just that you don't have it in the format of nerual firings.

It is perfectly possible to be conscious and have no idea that one even has a brain. We have no insight whatsoever into what our brains are doing. In fact there is no scientific evidence that insight exists. We have some second-hand reports from neuroscientists and that is all. It might be argued that as brain causes consciousness we have some 'insight' into brains, but that's playing with words. In any case, perhaps consiousness is caused by brain and perhaps it isn't, or perhaps it not quite so simple as saying that it is or it isn't. The scientific evidence leaves the question open since, to parody the situation a little, according to science consciousness is a verbal report and not a scientific entity.

Well *you* can't because you refuse to contemplate any realtionship between consciousness and the physical, but there must be some sort of relationship. Others are not going to be convinced by your lack of enthusiasm for the issue.

I think you may have misunderstood Pensador's point, which seemed a quite thought-provoking one to me.

 

[hypnagogue]

If your subjective experience of the moon is caused by neurons firing, and not by the moon itself, except indirectly, what reason do you have to believe the moon might not be an illusion?

Our best science and philosophy certainly leads us to believe that our subjective experiences are directly related to neural firings in the brain and not events in the external world. Your proposal to the contrary here seems like an appeal to naive realism.

As to the question of illusions, what exactly do you mean by illusion? We can certainly intersubjectively agree that the moon is in the sky, if we simply both observe the night sky and compare our observations. And at bottom, there is not much more to the notion of objectivity than such intersubjective agreement.

What is preventing your neurons from firing in the absence of a real moon?

Nothing, of course. The proper stimulation of my brain, I believe, indeed very well could induce a subjective experience as of the moon hovering in the night sky (although it would need to be a quite sophisticated stimulation, well beyond our current means of inducing activity at the neural level directly). It's unlikely, but yes, perhaps such a pattern of activation in my brain might occur spontaneously. But it's extremely unlikely that the same thing would happen to another observor close by to me at the exact same time. So verification via intersubjective agreement seems to undercut your worries about radical skepticism here.

 

[hypnagogue]

It is perfectly possible to be conscious and have no idea that one even has a brain. We have no insight whatsoever into what our brains are doing.

I think you overstate the case here. Tournesol claimed, "Actually, you have quite a lot of insight into what your brain is doing (or it has insight inot itself) -- it's just that you don't have it in the format of nerual firings." Obviously, as I sit here and write this, I do not know what is going on in my brain in the sense that I could sketch out what an fMRI of it would look like, or in the sense that I know certain neural assemblies are firing and others are being suppressed, etc.

But in an indirect sense, I know a lot about what is going on in my brain. In particular, there is good reason to believe that every aspect of my phenomenal experience is systematically covarying with certain features of my brain activity. To the extent that I know anything about my phenomenal experience, and to the extent that my experience is isomorphic to some features of my brain activity, I do indeed know quite a bit about at least some parts of my brain. What is at issue, I think, is not that this link exists, but the nature of the link and the intimacy or 'directness' between experience and brain activity that it implies: e.g., whether it's closer to an identity relation (eg, the brain 'is' the p-consciousness in some sense), or two completely ontologically distinct systems that are just correlated by some unknown mechanism, etc.

 

[Pensador]

You make some good points imo. However, I'm not sure the argument that - if consciousness is neurons firing then the moon might be an illusion - really works. This is not because what you said is wrong, in fact it seems to be right as far as it goes. But couldn't the moon be an illusion even if our experience of it is not caused by neurons firing? If so then it's possible illusoriness doesn't seem to be an argument for either side.

From a purely logical perspective, I think you are right. I don't think anyone has conclusively shown that solipsism is false, which is not the same thing as saying it is true.

I think my arguments on this thread have been misunderstood by some people. I have not made any claims for solipsism or naive realism or any position on metaphysics. I started out by saying we don't have to postulate the existence of consciousness in the physical world of atomic particles, as that would violate the spirit of physics and turn it into a mishmash of mystic ideas.

I didn't foresee that the discussion would turn to neurons in the brain, because I don't see that as relevant to physics. Everything that happens in the brain can be explained either in terms of known forces or in terms of random behavior. What lies behind randomness can certainly be interesting, but it's definitely not science.

Pensador argues that science cannot find consciousness because science, by its very definition and methodology, studies only what consciousness is not.

That is exactly my argument. The laws of physics are already full of consciousness - the consciousness of the people who create and understand them. But to postulate the existence of consciousness as implied by the laws themselves seems silly to me, not unlike postulating that the characters in a story have a mind of their own, when the truth is that the only minds in a story are the minds of the writer and the readers.

What is physics anyway, other than the story of the physical world, in which the characters are given life by the ideas of the writers and readers?

 

[hypnagogue]

That is exactly my argument. The laws of physics are already full of consciousness - the consciousness of the people who create and understand them.

There is a finer grain to the problem of consciousness that you seem to overlook. If the laws of physics have the fingerprints of human consciousness on them, then it's only the fingerprints of access consciousness. There is no in principle reason that a physicalist account cannot give us a complete account of access consciousness-- hence, no need to propose a 'mishmash of mystic ideas,' as you say, in order for the theory to subserve the theory makers (at least, to give a complete account of how the theory makers come to make their theories through the faculties of access consciousness). So there does not appear to be a deep problem here along the lines of what you are proposing.

 

[Canute]

I think you overstate the case here. Tournesol claimed, "Actually, you have quite a lot of insight into what your brain is doing (or it has insight inot itself) -- it's just that you don't have it in the format of nerual firings." Obviously, as I sit here and write this, I do not know what is going on in my brain in the sense that I could sketch out what an fMRI of it would look like, or in the sense that I know certain neural assemblies are firing and others are being suppressed, etc.

But in an indirect sense, I know a lot about what is going on in my brain...etc.

I can't see anything in what you say that contradicts what I wrote originally. Sure we know from MRI scans and so on that brain states and conscious states correlate in some way. But this does not constitute insight into what is happening in ones own brain at any time, not if we are using 'insight' in the same way as we would when we say we have insight into out conscious states at any time. This is why I said that to use 'insight' in both these ways is playing with words, using 'insight' with two different meanings.

There is a finer grain to the problem of consciousness that you seem to overlook. If the laws of physics have the fingerprints of human consciousness on them, then it's only the fingerprints of access consciousness. There is no in principle reason that a physicalist account cannot give us a complete account of access consciousness-- hence, no need to propose a 'mishmash of mystic ideas,' as you say, in order for the theory to subserve the theory makers (at least, to give a complete account of how the theory makers come to make their theories through the faculties of access consciousness). So there does not appear to be a deep problem here along the lines of what you are proposing.

Again I cannot quite see your objection. Pensador is making a point that has been made by many physicists. Science cannot study the thing that is doing the studying, cannot include in the model the thing that is making the model. The task is too self-referential. Heisenberg stated the same, that we cannot explain the world scientifically and fully since we (the explainer) must of necessity sit outside of the explanation. Similarly Eddington wrote "The symbolic nature of physics is generally recognised, and the scheme of physics is now formulated in such a way as to make it almost self-evident that it is a partial aspect of something wider."

This seems an uncontentious idea to me. Surely there must be more to reality than scientific symbols, since symbols are concepts requiring consciousness for their conception. The question is who or what is doing the conceiving. Clearly this question cannot be answered by doing more and more conceiving and symbolising. At some point the buck has to stop and consciousness in its own right, as what it is, must be studied rather than some scientific symbol standing for it. To study a symbol or concept standing for consciousness is to study what consciousness is not. To study what can be observed and measured in the third-person is to study what consciousness is not. Hence science studies what consciousness is not. Of course it has to do this in order to see how consciousness relates to the rest of the scientific model, but this is is studying relationships and functions, not the thing itself.

 

[Tournesol]

I'm not trying to base solipsism on science, I'm trying to show that science alone does not exclude the possibility of solipsism, as those brain-in-a-vat ideas clearly demonstrate.

Earlier you were claiming that associating experienes with neural activity
would entail solip. There is a big difference between entailing and failing to exclude.

Your claim that "you can't base solipsisim on science" comes from the fact that scientists don't like solipsism, not because science has completely ruled it out.

No, it comes from the fact that science makes poists about a world beyond personal expeience.

I'm not a solipsist, but I'm convinced we need more than science to exclude solipsism as a logical possibility. We need science too, but it alone is not enough.

Occam's razor then.

I'm not "lapsing into subjectivism", just claiming there's more to reality than objective facts. Or do you think your subjective experiences are not real?

I don't think there is a metaphysical divide between opbjective and subjective
existence. What's subjecive for me is objective for you. Hence there is nothing too subjecive for science or physics

 

[Pensador]

Surely there must be more to reality than scientific symbols, since symbols are concepts requiring consciousness for their conception. The question is who or what is doing the conceiving. Clearly this question cannot be answered by doing more and more conceiving and symbolising.

Exactly. This question can only be answered by introspection, and the answer cannot be communicated, because doing so would require that the insight you gained through introspection be converted to... more conceiving and symbolizing.

Any attempt to study consciousness is self-defeating. Anything that can be communicated through symbols has nothing to do with the thing that gives meaning to those symbols, as the symbols cannot possibly contain meaning in themselves.

To study a symbol or concept standing for consciousness is to study what consciousness is not.

As a corollary, it can also be said that it's possible to have the illusion that you are studying consciuosness. All you have to do is come up with a lot of words which make some sense, and stick the word consciousness in the middle. Some people actually make a living out of it.

To study what can be observed and measured in the third-person is to study what consciousness is not. Hence science studies what consciousness is not.

In fact, it took civilization thousands of years to learn how to separate the subjective from the objective, so that our subjective knowledge could be shared with other people. Now there is this attempt to insert subjectivity back into science; that would be a giant leap to the past.

 

[Pensador]

Earlier you were claiming that associating experienes with neural activity would entail solip. There is a big difference between entailing and failing to exclude.

I don't recall using the word "entail". I do recall saying it "opens the door".

Your claim that "you can't base solipsisim on science" comes from the fact that scientists don't like solipsism, not because science has completely ruled it out

No, it comes from the fact that science makes poists about a world beyond personal expeience.

Now I find that very amusing. If science claims that personal experience happens in the physical world, how can there be a world beyond personal experience?

I'm not a solipsist, but I'm convinced we need more than science to exclude solipsism as a logical possibility. We need science too, but it alone is not enough.

Occam's razor then.

What does Occam's razor have to do with logical possibility?

If we are to choose an explanation for reality based on its simplicity, then solipsism is in fact our best choice: "it's all a dream". It doesn't get any simpler than that, and it's certainly far simpler than this whole thing about quarks and primordial soups and big bangs and spacetime curvatures and deoxyribonucleic acids and particle-wave duality and... yikes! Where did I leave my Occam's razor?

(as a point of humor, while solipsism can be expressed as "it's all a dream", science could simply be expressed as "it's all a nightmare" )

I don't think there is a metaphysical divide between opbjective and subjective existence. What's subjecive for me is objective for you. Hence there is nothing too subjecive for science or physics

So tell me, what am I thinking now?

 

[Tournesol]

Now I find that very amusing. If science claims that personal experience happens in the physical world, how can there be a world beyond personal experience?

I find that very puzzling. It looks like a non-sequitur to me.
If personal experience is "in" the rest of the world,
the rest of the world is "outside" or "beyond" experience.

What does Occam's razor have to do with logical possibility?

It has a lot to do with plausability. Is you beef with solip. only that it
is logically possible ?

If we are to choose an explanation for reality based on its simplicity, then solipsism is in fact our best choice: "it's all a dream".

if we are to reject an explanation because of its complexity, we should reject the B.I.V hypothesis.

Any attempt to study consciousness is self-defeating.

Even purely introspective ones ?

Anything that can be communicated through symbols has nothing to do with the thing that gives meaning to those symbols, as the symbols cannot possibly contain meaning in themselves.

Symbols about purely physical entities do not "contain meaning in themselves"
so that is a red herring. And anything that can be communicated must
have *something* to do with symbols, or no form of communication would be possible.

 

[hypnagogue]

But this does not constitute insight into what is happening in ones own brain at any time, not if we are using 'insight' in the same way as we would when we say we have insight into out conscious states at any time. This is why I said that to use 'insight' in both these ways is playing with words, using 'insight' with two different meanings.

Well, we don't have insight to anything in the same way we have insight to our subjective experiences. We know experience directly and phenomenally, and all else we know indirectly via structural and functional characterizations. But certainly, that which we know phenomenally gives us some kind of insight into what is structurally/functionally going on in our brains in a more direct sense than for phenomena outside of our brains/bodies.

Again I cannot quite see your objection. Pensador is making a point that has been made by many physicists. Science cannot study the thing that is doing the studying, cannot include in the model the thing that is making the model. The task is too self-referential.

I don't see any reason why this must be the case, at least as regards humans as theory makers. What is mysterious is experience itself, not our behavioral dispositions to study nature and make theories about it. The latter can, in principle, be thoroughly understood in the backdrop of a physicalist ontology, while the former cannot.

This really just falls back to the distinction between the easy problems of consciousness and the hard problem. The way we observe and interact with nature and come to make theories about it depends on perception, reasoning, memory, etc.-- all features of access consciousness, all susceptible to scientific understanding. I certainly agree that phenomenal consciousness eludes this approach and transcends understanding via a structural/functional analysis (or as you say, via symbols), but p-consciousness does not figure into an intractible Godel-esque self-referential problem. Self reference is nothing but a type of function in a given structure; it's access consciousness, and therefore lies outside of the scope of the hard problem (or at least, is not that aspect of consciousness that makes the hard problem truly hard).

It would be helpful to invoke zombies here. By definition, there is no hard problem for zombies. But Pensador's dilemma applies just as much to zombies as it does to us. Essentially, Pensador is claiming that physicalists could not even fully explain zombies. I disagree with this claim, and I must also point out that whether this claim is true or false, it certainly is not getting at the heart of the hard problem.

 

[Tournesol]

I think Pensador's point was that we must make up our minds. If the currently most orthodox scientific model is correct then consciousness is not a scientific topic.

Huh? Of course it is a topic for pschology and related sciences.

But if consciousness is a scientific topic then the scientific model is not correct.

Because it doesn't include consc.? Here you seem to be following Pesc. in
thinking that "to be included scientifically" means "to be included explicitly in physics".

To attempt to study something scientifically which is defined by science as non-causal but physically caused, non-physical but existent, not observable nor measurable except second-hand and on hearsay, not deducable or inferable from studying the brain yet epiphenomenal on it, not in any way the cause of our behaviour yet inferable from our behaviour, and so on, is absurd.

That isn't a scientific defintion,that is a rag-bag of philosophical opinion.

To say that consciousness is not a scientific topic is fair enough, (and I'd agree), but to define it such a way that science cannot study it and then to argue that science can explain it is a very odd thing to do, and this is what is being done all the time.

By some people. Have you noticed how I have been arguing against absolute ineffability, the causal closure of the physical, etc ? Why do you think that is?

Peansador argues that science cannot find consciousness because science, by its very definition and methodology, studies only what consciousness is not.

You could hardly say that about psychology.

For the sake of charity I will read that as "physical science studies only what consciousness is not".

Until this assertion can be shown to be false then consciousness remains beyond science, and unless it can be shown false then consciousness will be permanently beyond science.

I have already argued that it is incoherent to suppose that there is
a realm of subjectivity, and another, distinct, realm of objectivity;
what is subjective for you is objective for me.

Descartes reached the same conclusion. "I could suppose that I had no body and that there was no world or place where I was, but I could not by the same token suppose that I did not exist . . . From this I knew that I was a substance the essence or nature of which simply was to think; and which, to exist, needs no place and has no dependence on any material thing. Consequently, I, that is to say my mind --- what makes me what I am --- am entirely distinct from the body; and, furthermore, the former is more easily known than the latter, while if the latter did not exist the former could be all that it is." (Rene Descartes - Discourse on the Method IV)

Since then we have learned that logical possibility does not entail acual truth.

In any case, perhaps consiousness is caused by brain and perhaps it isn't, or perhaps it not quite so simple as saying that it is or it isn't.

The evidence is that it is.

The scientific evidence leaves the question open since, to parody the situation a little, according to science consciousness is a verbal report and not a scientific entity.

I have never heard of a scientist who thinks that, although some philosphers
wish they would.

 

[Tournesol]

It would be helpful to invoke zombies here. By definition, there is no hard problem for zombies. But Pensador's dilemma applies just as much to zombies as it does to us. Essentially, Pensador is claiming that physicalists could not even fully explain zombies. I disagree with this claim, and I must also point out that whether this claim is true or false, it certainly is not getting at the heart of the hard problem.

Hear, hear!

 

[Pensador]

It would be helpful to invoke zombies here. By definition, there is no hard problem for zombies.

Well, then that definition is incoherent. You mean, zombies couldn't possibly talk about "the hard problem"? They could talk about cosmology, astrology, angels, extra-sensorial perception, out-of-body experiences, but they could not talk about "the hard problem of consciousness"?

This is nonsense. You could perhaps argue that if zombies talk about the hard problem then they wouldn't know what they would be talking about, that they would just be playing with words whose meaning they think they understand but actually don't. I can certainly agree with that, far more than you realize!

Pensador's dilemma applies just as much to zombies as it does to us. Essentially, Pensador is claiming that physicalists could not even fully explain zombies. I disagree with this claim, and I must also point out that whether this claim is true or false, it certainly is not getting at the heart of the hard problem.

I do not claim that physicalists cannot fully explain zombies, quite the contrary. You clearly don't understand my point.

When Newton thought about apples falling from trees, he conceived of an impersonal, non-conscious entity he gave the name 'gravity'. Newton could just as well have invoked some sort of conscious entity to describe the same phenomenon. At the end of the day, all we have is an apple falling, and to this day no one has verified the existence of the "force" of gravity other than by, essentially, watching apples fall. Ascribing "consciousness" to physics would be just as safe as postulating the existence of "forces", since either one of them can only be known by their effects.

But Newton didn't postulate the existence of a conscious entity, and he had good reason why. That reason is being ignored by those who insist we must postulate the existence of consciousness behind physical processes, quantum or otherwise.

As to this talk about zombies and hard problems, I don't know what it has to do with this. Just because we are not zombies are we required to ultimately resort to some sort of pan-psychism to explain the world? What is the exact reason why consciousness can't possibly be left out of the picture?