Andre
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Sorry for ressurecting this old one. It appears that we never finalized it.
The essential mistake was almost certainly a very old mistake, a wrong altimeter setting.
From the report (p 14):
So as altimeters are working on local barometric pressure, it has to 'know' the ground pressure. There is a dial to put that in. However there are three different settings QFE, pressure for field elevation, giving 0 at ground level, which is hardly used anymore (in the west), QNH, pressure Nautical Height, (sea level) giving the field elevation on the ground, which is used for low altitude parts of the flight, and standard altimeter setting (1013.25 hPa or 29.92 inches) which is used above a certain altitude (transition height), obviously to ensure altitude separation between flights, all being on the same setting.
In the log you can read that the altimeter was indeed changed both in the climb to standard setting and later in the descend to local QFE(?), which was much lower at the time.
p: 213:
But then suddenly:
And that caused the accident almost certainly. Obviously the person who made that mistake was under great stress. He checked the altimeter setting, did not mentally process the indicated value maybe and changed it maybe to a setting that was familiar to him. A 20 hPA error equals 540 feet/ (165 meter) 28 ft per milibar, the wrong way. Obviously that was enough to make the accident unavoidable.
The essential mistake was almost certainly a very old mistake, a wrong altimeter setting.
From the report (p 14):
...A moment later, CC set his WBE-SWS altimeter to the standard pressure of 1013 hPa. It caused TAWS to receive wrong data and, in effect, the system inhibited generation of warnings, assuming that the aircraft was higher up than in reality.
So as altimeters are working on local barometric pressure, it has to 'know' the ground pressure. There is a dial to put that in. However there are three different settings QFE, pressure for field elevation, giving 0 at ground level, which is hardly used anymore (in the west), QNH, pressure Nautical Height, (sea level) giving the field elevation on the ground, which is used for low altitude parts of the flight, and standard altimeter setting (1013.25 hPa or 29.92 inches) which is used above a certain altitude (transition height), obviously to ensure altitude separation between flights, all being on the same setting.
In the log you can read that the altimeter was indeed changed both in the climb to standard setting and later in the descend to local QFE(?), which was much lower at the time.
p: 213:
At 0628:47, at an altitude of 2,176 m, the aircraft commander‘s VBE-SVS altimeter was switched from standard pressure to another setting (judging by the discussion between crew members, to 993 hPa, which was the barometric pressure at airfield level, and from that point barometric altimeters read altitudes in reference to the runway)
But then suddenly:
At 0640:14.5 at an RA altitude of 366 m (297m above airfield level, at a distance of 4,768 m from RWY 26 threshold), at a speed of 309 km/h, the VBE-SVS altimeter of the aircraft commander was switched to standard pressure of 1,013 hPa.
Immediately afterwards, at 0640:15 – at RA altitude of 366 m, 295 m above airfield level, at 4,724 m from RWY 26 threshold, TAWS stopped generating the TERRAIN AHEAD message.
And that caused the accident almost certainly. Obviously the person who made that mistake was under great stress. He checked the altimeter setting, did not mentally process the indicated value maybe and changed it maybe to a setting that was familiar to him. A 20 hPA error equals 540 feet/ (165 meter) 28 ft per milibar, the wrong way. Obviously that was enough to make the accident unavoidable.
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