Study Favors Q-Mind - Support for quantum consciousness?

[testingus]

I've read a lot of posts talking about quantum consciousness, and it seems the general consensus is that it is crack, woo, psuedoscience etc. But then I found a news feed that pointed to this,

Travis John Adrian Craddock, Douglas Friesen, Jonathan Mane, Stuart Hameroff, and Jack A. Tuszynski. The feasibility of coherent energy transfer in microtubules. J. R. Soc. Interface, 2014; 11(100): 20140677; DOI:10.1098/rsif.2014.0677 1742-5662

It comes from Hameroff, the purveyor of the infamous Orch OR quantum theory of consciousness. However, it's published in a respectable journal. I'm not sure what to believe. If this is published work, why is quantum computing in microtubules considered woo?

I've asked this elsewhere, but have not received a straight response. Any insight would be appreciated.

Note: original newsfeed http://www.newswise.com/articles/new-study-favors-quantum-mind

 

[Doug Huffman]

I am intrigued by the quantization of entropy information at the root of the Holographic Principle and will attend to developments associating it with ego/consciousness.

 

[Choppy]

It's important to make the distinction between a study that investigates the coherent energy transfer in microtubules and the implication that orchestrated objective reduction is the basis for consciousness.

One is a small, incremental step. The other is a giant leap.

Knowing the difference is very important when you're standing on a cliff.

 

[testingus]

But this opens the door to it being a possibility, doesn't it? While it doesn't confirm quantum consciousness, it does provide a mechanism that could support quantum computation in the brain.

 

[madness]

Personally, I don't see where the link between quantum computation and consciousness is supposed to be. The quantum computation part is a reasonable scientific hypothesis which should be amenable to experiments and falsification, but I don't know whether quantum consciousness could be confirmed even in principle.

 

[Pythagorean]

But this opens the door to it being a possibility, doesn't it? While it doesn't confirm quantum consciousness, it does provide a mechanism that could support quantum computation in the brain.

Well... it doesn't overcome the chief criticisms of Quantum Mind: namely that the processes associated with neural events are on time scales and over spatial distances too long and far for unique QM effects to be significant (I mean, obviously you can argue that all the classical things happening are actually QM underneath, but that's not what Quantum Mind is saying - it's saying that phenomena unique to QM is playing a role).

Another objection is that there are plenty of classical based theories of consciousness that have been more fruitful:

http://www.biolbull.org/content/215/3/216.full

the fruit:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23946194
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16195466

 

[testingus]

Well... it doesn't overcome the chief criticisms of Quantum Mind: namely that the processes associated with neural events are on time scales and over spatial distances too long and far for unique QM effects to be significant (I mean, obviously you can argue that all the classical things happening are actually QM underneath, but that's not what Quantum Mind is saying - it's saying that phenomena unique to QM is playing a role).

Another objection is that there are plenty of classical based theories of consciousness that have been more fruitful:

http://www.biolbull.org/content/215/3/216.full

the fruit:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23946194
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16195466

I understand that this is the case. These effects would need to be propagated to timescales of milliseconds, and I'm not sure how this could be done. However, excited tryptophan can radiate by both fluorescence, and phosphorescence, with the later taking place on time scales of 1 ms or greater. There is no proof for this, but could this not provide a link between picosecond quantum calcs, and ms neuron firings?

I'm new to the work of Tononi, but it looks intriguing. As far as I know it's based on the idea of integrated information, and depends on how the complexity of the system is defined i.e. where the "cruelest cuts" may be made. However, I don't think that spatio temporal scales are well defined. He makes a hypothesis that this is at the scale of neurons on the timescale of milliseconds, but why not the microtubule cytoskeleton in neurons?

I would also like to see how PCI measures are affected by hallucinogens like psylocibin, a so-called consciousness enhancing drug. The following show decreased activity in brains under psylocibin in an fMRI study. This is not EEG, but if the trend holds it would suggest that the PCI value would be closer to unconscious.

http://www.pnas.org/content/109/6/2138.abstract

 

[testingus]

Personally, I don't see where the link between quantum computation and consciousness is supposed to be. The quantum computation part is a reasonable scientific hypothesis which should be amenable to experiments and falsification, but I don't know whether quantum consciousness could be confirmed even in principle.

This is true for all theories of consciousness, isn't it (Tononi's work not excluded)? I think the link between quantum computation, and consciousness comes in the transition. While computing the quantum state would be unconscious (i.e. superpositions, unmeasured system etc.), the realization of a specific state of the system (through measurement, decoherence or some sort of objective collapse) would then be considered a conscious event.

 

[Pythagorean]

I would also like to see how PCI measures are affected by hallucinogens like psylocibin, a so-called consciousness enhancing drug. The following show decreased activity in brains under psylocibin in an fMRI study. This is not EEG, but if the trend holds it would suggest that the PCI value would be closer to unconscious.

http://www.pnas.org/content/109/6/2138.abstract

I think it depends on context. The brain has break systems and accelerator systems. If you disable a break system, you could be enabling other systems. The paper you cite indicates as much (using the term "unconstrained cognition"). Other research has indicated enhancement of memory recall, which is useful for the reversal of cognitive biases:

http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/200/3/238.short

But "conscious-enhancing" the way a spiritual/recreational user might define it is different than how a neuroscientist like Tononi would define it. In meditation practices, taoism, and many sects of buddhist, conscious minimalism (emptying your mind of thoughts) is a step to enlightenment - (an enhanced cognitive state). To some extent, the loudness of your own consciousness is a distraction from development of that same consciousness. A person suffering a paranoid schizophrenic anxiety attack must be experiencing a high degree of consciousness, but that's not really helpful to them. Being overly self-conscious can inhibit development of your social cognition. So when we transcribe laymen claims like this, we have to be careful to separate a "consciousness" in general as measured by information complexity vs. the quality and kind of consciousness the laymen are talking about.

 

[madness]

This is true for all theories of consciousness, isn't it (Tononi's work not excluded)? I think the link between quantum computation, and consciousness comes in the transition. While computing the quantum state would be unconscious (i.e. superpositions, unmeasured system etc.), the realization of a specific state of the system (through measurement, decoherence or some sort of objective collapse) would then be considered a conscious event.

To some extent, yes, but in some quite important ways, no. Tononi's theory has specific frameworks for predicting the degree of consciousness (phi) and the quality of consciousness (the "qualia complex"). I don't think theories of quantum computation do that at the moment. Of course, the fundamental question of "why?" still remains, just as it still remains in any scientific theory.

 

[testingus]

I think it depends on context. The brain has break systems and accelerator systems. If you disable a break system, you could be enabling other systems. ...

So when we transcribe laymen claims like this, we have to be careful to separate a "consciousness" in general as measured by information complexity vs. the quality and kind of consciousness the laymen are talking about.

Could you please describe the relevance of break systems and accelerator systems.

The fMRI psylocibin seems to quiet the brain, would this not result in a lower PCI?

 

[Pythagorean]

Could you please describe the relevance of break systems and accelerator systems.

The fMRI psylocibin seems to quiet the brain, would this not result in a lower PCI?

Less break may result in less activity measured, but is actually letting another system do more. Coffee, for instance, disables a break system.

Not necissarily. Twenty violins all playing the same note are louder but less complex than two violins playing harmonic melodies.

But my point was that even if it leads to a lower PCI, it's still erroneous to equate the recreationalist's "enhanced consciousness" with a higher consciousness score the way Tonini defines it.

 

[testingus]

... Twenty violins all playing the same note are louder but less complex than two violins playing harmonic melodies.

But my point was that even if it leads to a lower PCI, it's still erroneous to equate the recreationalist's "enhanced consciousness" with a higher consciousness score the way Tonini defines it.

I'm assuming that two violins in discord would be less complex, while twenty violins in harmony be greater. So, does this mean that PCI/Integrated information relies on things being coordinated?

I see your point regarding the recreationalist's "enhanced consciousness", however in the Sci Transl Med paper you link to they show that REM sleep has a PCI near equivalent to normal wakefulness. This suggests that we are conscious in our dreams (without necessarily being lucid). I don't see why psylocibin, which produces vivid hallucinations, would potentially lead to a lower PCI, if REM dreams result in PCI similar to being awake.

 

[Pythagorean]

I'm assuming that two violins in discord would be less complex, while twenty violins in harmony be greater. So, does this mean that PCI/Integrated information relies on things being coordinated?

I see your point regarding the recreationalist's "enhanced consciousness", however in the Sci Transl Med paper you link to they show that REM sleep has a PCI near equivalent to normal wakefulness. This suggests that we are conscious in our dreams (without necessarily being lucid). I don't see why psylocibin, which produces vivid hallucinations, would potentially lead to a lower PCI, if REM dreams result in PCI similar to being awake.

If you think in terms of the entropy in the state space of the violins, there's no reason discord would be more or less complex than harmony. In some aspects, it may be more complex (caused by beating between the notes).

As noted in the paper you cited, psylocibin dissociates two regions of the brain that are normally not so dissociated. As I was saying about break systems, you're essentially removing a break (presumably the PFC). It changes the quality of the conscious experience in a dramatic way, but that doesn't indicate how the quantity of consciousness (here measured by PCI) might change. That's what I've been trying to explain, qualitative aspects of consciousness vs. quantitative aspects. PCI measures quantity, our subjective experience is all that can measure quality.

 

[testingus]

...It changes the quality of the conscious experience in a dramatic way, but that doesn't indicate how the quantity of consciousness (here measured by PCI) might change. That's what I've been trying to explain, qualitative aspects of consciousness vs. quantitative aspects. PCI measures quantity, our subjective experience is all that can measure quality.

Then why is PCI considered a good measure of consciousness? What does quantity of consciousness even mean? For arguments sake, let's say that PCI is reduced in psylocibin use, but subjectively a user has a profound experience, then PCI is not a good measure of consciousness. Equating integrated information with consciousness can be considered a semantic spook, if it does not reflect the subjective experience.

Back to the OP, can this be interpreted in terms of quantum computation? If one considers unconscious experience the same as the quantum computation, and conscious experience as the measurable (i.e. experienced) end result, then I don't see why not.

 

[testingus]

If you think in terms of the entropy in the state space of the violins, there's no reason discord would be more or less complex than harmony. In some aspects, it may be more complex (caused by beating between the notes).

I think that this would result in a loss of information overall. I mean if the signal is lost in the noise, then how is the information integrated?

 

[Nugatory]

But this opens the door to it being a possibility, doesn't it? While it doesn't confirm quantum consciousness, it does provide a mechanism that could support quantum computation in the brain.

That newsfeed article is greatly overstating the case - "Provides a mechanism" is a much weaker statement than "favors", and a more accurate headline would be "New study nether conforms nor denies quantum consciousness" This is fairly typical of bad science journalism, unfortunately.

There's a related thread in the QM subforum: What are the problems with the Orch-Or Consciousness Theory?

 

[Pythagorean]

Then why is PCI considered a good measure of consciousness? What does quantity of consciousness even mean? For arguments sake, let's say that PCI is reduced in psylocibin use, but subjectively a user has a profound experience, then PCI is not a good measure of consciousness. Equating integrated information with consciousness can be considered a semantic spook, if it does not reflect the subjective experience.

There's two chief reasons why quantifying consciousness is important: 1) measuring consciousness in coma patients for medical purposes and 2) measuring consciousness of animals for ethical purposes in animal research. The point is to determine whether the subject of the test has a conscious experience at all, not the quality of it. The quality of consciousness is basically described (or rather, correlated with neural structures and dynamics) by the fields of cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology.

 

[testingus]

There's two chief reasons why quantifying consciousness is important: 1) measuring consciousness in coma patients for medical purposes and 2) measuring consciousness of animals for ethical purposes in animal research. The point is to determine whether the subject of the test has a conscious experience at all, not the quality of it. The quality of consciousness is basically described (or rather, correlated with neural structures and dynamics) by the fields of cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology.

I'm not saying that knowing if a subject is conscious or not, is not important. In fact I believe that it is deeply important. However, I think that merely attributing consciousness to some measure that does not account for the subjective feel of an experience is dangerous ground. If my integrated information was through the roof, but inwardly I felt nothing, then who cares. Vice versa if my integrated information is near the floor, but I vivdly experience my own dissection that would be a downright shame.

For a viewpoint on why integrated information is not a good measure of consciousness see:
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799

It's long, and gets in deep to some computational math, but I think his point is valid.

 

[testingus]

That newsfeed article is greatly overstating the case - "Provides a mechanism" is a much weaker statement than "favors", and a more accurate headline would be "New study nether conforms nor denies quantum consciousness" This is fairly typical of bad science journalism, unfortunately.

There's a related thread in the QM subforum: What are the problems with the Orch-Or Consciousness Theory?

I agree, the journalism is sensational. I took a look in the other post and saw a statement that said the Orch OR model could not be falsified as is therefore invalid. However, I thought that there were 20 testable predictions made by Hameroff that could invalidate it.

 

[Pythagorean]

I'm not saying that knowing if a subject is conscious or not, is not important. In fact I believe that it is deeply important. However, I think that merely attributing consciousness to some measure that does not account for the subjective feel of an experience is dangerous ground. If my integrated information was through the roof, but inwardly I felt nothing, then who cares. Vice versa if my integrated information is near the floor, but I vivdly experience my own dissection that would be a downright shame.

For a viewpoint on why integrated information is not a good measure of consciousness see:
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799

It's long, and gets in deep to some computational math, but I think his point is valid.

What is his point?

If I google "integrated information theory criticism" or "problems with integrated information theory" it's google's first result. How do I know you are not simply looking for something that confirms your preconcieved beliefs? It would be helpful if you outlined his point instead of just posting link and requiring readers to read the whole thing.

Anyway, I am not an IIT advocate, I can neither confirm nor deny, etc. But I do like that people are thinking about the problem.

 

[Nugatory]

However, I thought that there were 20 testable predictions made by Hameroff that could invalidate it.

Do you have a source for that?

 

[testingus]

Do you have a source for that?

http://www.alice.id.tue.nl/references/hameroff-1998.pdf

See page 23.

 

[testingus]

What is his point?

If I google "integrated information theory criticism" or "problems with integrated information theory" it's google's first result. How do I know you are not simply looking for something that confirms your preconcieved beliefs? It would be helpful if you outlined his point instead of just posting link and requiring readers to read the whole thing.

Anyway, I am not an IIT advocate, I can neither confirm nor deny, etc. But I do like that people are thinking about the problem.

My apologies. I don't think that I can do justice to his point (that would require reading the actual information), but to try and sum it up, systems that rationally would not be considered conscious, or even intelligent, can be shown to have an enormous amount of integrated information (ie. large quantity of consciousness).

I would also like to point out that I do not have any "preconcieved beliefs" in either IIT or quantum consciousness, and hope you are not insinuating that I do. I am posting out of curiosity and the hope for intelligent discussion. It is good that people are thinking, and talking about these issues. I find too often these types of discussions turn to people digging in their heels and refusing to hear what the other side has to say. I hope this won't be the case here.

 

[madness]

systems that rationally would not be considered conscious, or even intelligent, can be shown to have an enormous amount of integrated information

This is a slippery issue. Which systems would rationally be considered conscious? Searle's Chinese room? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room ... Or the China brain? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_brain

What I'm getting at, is that nobody agrees on what would "rationally be considered conscious". Functionalists think that the population of China would become a conscious system if they organised themselves in such a way as to mimic the actions of neurons in a brain. Similarly, proponents of information theory think that any system with high integrated information will be conscious.

 

[testingus]

This is a slippery issue. Which systems would rationally be considered conscious? Searle's Chinese room? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room ... Or the China brain? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_brain

What I'm getting at, is that nobody agrees on what would "rationally be considered conscious". Functionalists think that the population of China would become a conscious system if they organised themselves in such a way as to mimic the actions of neurons in a brain. Similarly, proponents of information theory think that any system with high integrated information will be conscious.

Yes, nobody agrees, so how can this be reconciled? Panpsychism? Everything is conscious at some level? Philosophers have debated this years on end.

What about only life can support consciousness (yes, this open the question of what does it mean to be living)? I may be wrong, but I think we can agree at least that animals have an inner subjective consciousness. No?

 

[Pythagorean]

The functionalists have some kind of clout though, since many aspect of consciousness are social constructs - masculinity, morality and religion, even perception of the self is modulated through a social lens. Some even go as far as to say consciousness IS a social construct:

http://journals.cambridge.org/actio...age=online&aid=30921&fileId=S0140525X99001806

And the integrated information approach is reasonable from a monist point of view: the basic fact is that matter can have consciousness; not all matter, but at the very least matter in the configuration of humans. If you accept that it must fit within the confines of cause and effect like every other phenomena we study in nature, then it must have to do with how the matter is arranged and the dynamics of the statespace of that matter. If that's the case, then why should it be unique to brains in living organisms? If we can set up the same interactions in another material, that material should have consciousness. Otherwise, we're accepting dualism - that there's some kind of special ethereal plane from which consciousness comes - and somehow it only can take up the vessels of living organisms, and that wouldn't be consistent with the trend of every other phenomena we studied (that it all comes down to physics).

As to the consciousness of animals, scientists use what they know about human consciousness and associated neural structures to define ethical guidelines for when animals might be capable of suffering. You have to, under anesthesia, remove the forebrains of amphibians before performing experiments to minimize their suffering. The general consensus is that invertebrates (like insects) lack the neural structures required for a conscious experience - it's still a debate whether lower vertebrates, like fish, "have feelings". It is not a completely informed consensus, lacking a robust theory of consciousness, but it's the best guess we have right now. Thus, why approaches like Tonini's are welcome - even if they may be flawed, finding those flaws and addressing them is the next step.

 

[testingus]

The functionalists have some kind of clout though, since many aspect of consciousness are social constructs - masculinity, morality and religion, even perception of the self is modulated through a social lens. Some even go as far as to say consciousness IS a social construct:

http://journals.cambridge.org/actio...age=online&aid=30921&fileId=S0140525X99001806

And the integrated information approach is reasonable from a monist point of view: the basic fact is that matter can have consciousness; not all matter, but at the very least matter in the configuration of humans. If you accept that it must fit within the confines of cause and effect like every other phenomena we study in nature, then it must have to do with how the matter is arranged and the dynamics of the statespace of that matter. If that's the case, then why should it be unique to brains in living organisms? If we can set up the same interactions in another material, that material should have consciousness. Otherwise, we're accepting dualism - that there's some kind of special ethereal plane from which consciousness comes - and somehow it only can take up the vessels of living organisms, and that wouldn't be consistent with the trend of every other phenomena we studied (that it all comes down to physics).

As to the consciousness of animals, scientists use what they know about human consciousness and associated neural structures to define ethical guidelines for when animals might be capable of suffering. You have to, under anesthesia, remove the forebrains of amphibians before performing experiments to minimize their suffering. The general consensus is that invertebrates (like insects) lack the neural structures required for a conscious experience - it's still a debate whether lower vertebrates, like fish, "have feelings". It is not a completely informed consensus, lacking a robust theory of consciousness, but it's the best guess we have right now. Thus, why approaches like Tonini's are welcome - even if they may be flawed, finding those flaws and addressing them is the next step.

Okay, let's changes gears here for a second. What if the integrated information of the microtubule cytoskeleton shows a high "quantity" of consciousness? What would that mean for quantum views of consciousness?

 

[madness]

Okay, let's changes gears here for a second. What if the integrated information of the microtubule cytoskeleton shows a high "quantity" of consciousness? What would that mean for quantum views of consciousness?

There are a couple of important things to consider here. Firstly, the microtubules would have to show a high level of integrated information globally across the brain, not individually (otherwise each would be a separate conscious entity). Secondly, there is what David Chalmers calls the "coherence between consciousness and cognition" - i.e., there is some kind of isomorphism between cognitive apparatus and conscious experience. For example, there is a strong isomorphism between the quality of colour experience and the neural firing properties in the visual cortex which is processing this colour information. For the microtubule theory of consciousness to work in conjunction with integrated information theory, there would have to be both a global integration of information across microtubules in the brain, and this information would have to somehow represent the cognitive processes associated with our subjective experience. I don't think either of those are true.

 

[Pythagorean]

Okay, let's changes gears here for a second. What if the integrated information of the microtubule cytoskeleton shows a high "quantity" of consciousness? What would that mean for quantum views of consciousness?

Well, first, I'm not sure how you would translate the measurement from a classical system to a quantum system to be able to make a valid comparison of a consciousness index. But ignoring that and assuming IIT is a true and correct theory (which I don't assert):

It would still be a question of "who" it belonged to. If it doesn't correlate with the timescales (or spatial scales as madness indicated above) of human experience (and their neural correlates) it's hard to make the case that the system's alleged consciousness could be attributed to the human conscious experience. If consciousness is something that emerges from physical interactions, then it may show up to varying degrees in different subsystems that make up one whole subsystem that has a quantity of consciousness. If IIT is a true theory, then highly coupled conscious systems would make a superconscious system (so long as the coupling doesn't disrupt the consciousness score of the contributing components). Thus, the collective consciousness of a culture or society is made up individual conscious beings. A conscious being may be made of individual conscious components.

 

[testingus]

Firstly, the microtubules would have to show a high level of integrated information globally across the brain, not individually (otherwise each would be a separate conscious entity).

From your previous post, IIT posits that a single neuron could be a conscious entity, but what I think you and Pythagorean are saying is that to create the human conscious experience these individual entities would themselves need to be integrated. If the brain is already rich in IIT at the neuron level then the later is a given. What is then required is for IIT in the microtubule cytoskeleton to be both rich, and relevant timescale wise to neuron function. Is this correct? But isn't function of the microtubule network already relevant at the timescale needed to allow neurons to work properly (i.e. ion channel function, neurotransmitter trafficking etc.)? This would only leave showing that this function of the cytoskeleton possesses a significant IIT.

Secondly, there is what David Chalmers calls the "coherence between consciousness and cognition" - i.e., there is some kind of isomorphism between cognitive apparatus and conscious experience. For example, there is a strong isomorphism between the quality of colour experience and the neural firing properties in the visual cortex which is processing this colour information.

Do you have a source for this?

For the microtubule theory of consciousness to work in conjunction with integrated information theory, there would have to be both a global integration of information across microtubules in the brain, and this information would have to somehow represent the cognitive processes associated with our subjective experience.

I'm not suggesting divorcing the neuron level involvement in cognitive function from microtubule function, but rather saying that the function of the microtubule cytoskeleton supplements the neuron function providing for a deeper level of integrated information (ie. higher IIT for the brain overall). Alluding to Pythagorean's statement, each neuron could function as a conscious entity, but join to some super entity which is the brain. This would not separate standard neuroscience from the microtubule level, but would extend it.

I don't think either of those are true.

In the words of Pythagorean, is this some sort of "preconceived belief" or do you have backing for this statement. I'm not saying that there is proof for the alternative, but simply dismissing it out of hand without evidence would be unscientific.

 

[testingus]

Well, first, I'm not sure how you would translate the measurement from a classical system to a quantum system to be able to make a valid comparison of a consciousness index.

I believe that quantum phenomena have little IIT (I believe Tegmark states this). However, as I've stated above the quantum computation portion would be unconscious. When a specific measurement of this system is made (by some mechanism: Orch OR, decoherence or something else) it moves to the classical level, which given a high IIT would be a conscious event.

But ignoring that and assuming IIT is a true and correct theory (which I don't assert):
It would still be a question of "who" it belonged to. If it doesn't correlate with the timescales (or spatial scales as madness indicated above) of human experience (and their neural correlates) it's hard to make the case that the system's alleged consciousness could be attributed to the human conscious experience. If consciousness is something that emerges from physical interactions, then it may show up to varying degrees in different subsystems that make up one whole subsystem that has a quantity of consciousness. If IIT is a true theory, then highly coupled conscious systems would make a superconscious system (so long as the coupling doesn't disrupt the consciousness score of the contributing components). Thus, the collective consciousness of a culture or society is made up individual conscious beings. A conscious being may be made of individual conscious components.

Please see my reply to madness, but I think I'm in agreeance with you here.

 

[madness]

From your previous post, IIT posits that a single neuron could be a conscious entity

I'm not sure where I said that. I wouldn't generally consider this to be true, except in the trivial sense that everything has some nonzero value of integrated information.

to create the human conscious experience these individual entities would themselves need to be integrated. If the brain is already rich in IIT at the neuron level then the later is a given.

I don't understand. Why could information rich individual components necessarily be integrated as a system?

Do you have a source for this?

http://cogprints.org/316/1/consciousness.html - specifically, "Take color sensations as an example. For every distinction between color experiences, there is a corresponding distinction in processing. The different phenomenal colors that we experience form a complex three-dimensional space, varying in hue, saturation, and intensity. The properties of this space can be recovered from information-processing considerations: examination of the visual systems shows that waveforms of light are discriminated and analyzed along three different axes, and it is this three-dimensional information that is relevant to later processing. The three-dimensional structure of phenomenal color space therefore corresponds directly to the three dimensional structure of visual awareness. This is precisely what we would expect. After all, every color distinction corresponds to some reportable information, and therefore to a distinction that is represented in the structure of processing."

In the words of Pythagorean, is this some sort of "preconceived belief" or do you have backing for this statement. I'm not saying that there is proof for the alternative, but simply dismissing it out of hand without evidence would be unscientific.

I just mean that there's no evidence that microtubules are performing the computations underlying the cognitive processes with which consciousness experience is associated with, and that there's no evidence that microtubules have a high level of global information integration across large networks of the brain.

 

[my2cts]

We do not understand quantum mechanics. We do not understand consciousness.
To some this means that the two are connected.
Personally I think no two subjects are further apart.

 

[.Scott]

There are a couple of important things to consider here. Firstly, the microtubules would have to show a high level of integrated information globally across the brain, not individually (otherwise each would be a separate conscious entity).

There have been attempts to locate the "seat" or "seats" of consciousness, but they are directed as much by what can be measured rather than what must be measured. Here is an example:
http://authors.library.caltech.edu/40352/

I am not a microtubule fan, but I think this "globally" remark needs some qualification.

The essential item I think we can agree on is that when we are conscious, the information we are conscious of can be quite elaborate. However, it is not everything we sense or know about in that moment. Also, note that even with extensive cerebral damage, people can still be conscious of information processed by unaffected parts of their brains.

My point is that there doesn't have to be a single "seat of consciousness". More likely, there are lots and lots of places in the brain where conscious thought can reside - each with its own specialty. Our self perception of their being only a single seat suggests only that only one of these seats is "in charge" at a time - and that is the one that can record its thoughts in memory and offer its intentions for possible motor implementation.

So we won't need to show a "high level of integrated information globally".

Secondly, there is what David Chalmers calls the "coherence between consciousness and cognition" - i.e., there is some kind of isomorphism between cognitive apparatus and conscious experience.

Agreed - to a limited extent. I would suggest two other signs.
First, that the "some kind of isomorphism" be between the "apparatus" and the creation of an intention. The reason for this is that a QM mechanism for data processing may be used for several purposes in the brain. But the one that we are talking about is the one that is in a position to report its own sense of qualia. What we should expect to find is many "seats", some specializing in articulating or reflecting recent thoughts. Since we would normally be using animal models, we might not find one that's set up to say "I think therefor I am", but once we identify the type of circuitry that where intentions are generated, we will at least be in the right category.

Second, the real coupe will be to demonstrate that the information processing of the "apparatus" is of the sort that can benefit from QM processing. If it is not, then why would Darwinian selection favor a relatively expensive QM mechanism when normal neural activity would work as well.

 

[.Scott]

This is a slippery issue. Which systems would rationally be considered conscious? Searle's Chinese room? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room ... Or the China brain? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_brain

What I'm getting at, is that nobody agrees on what would "rationally be considered conscious". Functionalists think that the population of China would become a conscious system if they organised themselves in such a way as to mimic the actions of neurons in a brain. Similarly, proponents of information theory think that any system with high integrated information will be conscious.

It doesn't really need to be reconciled. If different people want to look for different things, all that needs to be done is for each to describe their objective in distinctive terms.

Personally, I am convinced that other people are conscious because they have the same basic brain design as I do, they report their own conscious experience, and it reflects what I experience in myself. I would be convinced of an entity having "human consciousness" if it was shown that internally it was using equivalent mechanisms and processing the same basic symbols, and externally behaved as if was a human. Of course, since that mechanism has yet to be identified, I don't expect to see non-human examples of human consciouness any time soon.

 

[DiracPool]

We do not understand quantum mechanics. We do not understand consciousness.
To some this means that the two are connected.
Personally I think no two subjects are further apart.

Lol. Chalmers recognized this too and dubbed it the "Law of the minimization of mystery." From: http://www.imprint.co.uk/chalmers.html , " The attractiveness of quantum theories of consciousness may stem from a Law of Minimization of Mystery: consciousness is mysterious and quantum mechanics is mysterious, so maybe the two mysteries have a common source." When I learned of Smolin's idea that the big bang was a "blowthrough" from a black hole in another universe a couple years back I instantly thought of Chalmers' remark. I even mentioned it in a post here on PF at the time. The black hole singularity is mysterious and the big bang singularity is mysterious, therefore they must be related. A classic example of the law of minimization of mystery, which is really all this quantum consciousness and "information integration" stuff is, IMHO

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi DiracPool. You're correct about Chalmers, but I disagree with his conclusion that you mention. The problem with classical mechanics has been recognized by many. The problem is that it's a separable type of physics which leads to all sorts of logical dilemas. It's one of the primary reasons we don't have a theory to explain conscious phenomena. Basically, the question is how can 'information' be integrated when each neuron works only by what neurotransmitters and electrical charges operate on it? Neurons interact as described first by Hodgkin and Huxley which is to say they interact because of what happens to the neuron locally. They would do what they do (in principal) regardless of whether or not you test them in vivo or in vitro. The fundamental problem has been recognized by Hillary Putnam, Tim Maudlan, Mark Bishop, Stapp, Longinotti, Sevush, Hameroff, and many others. Some of these people don' t see the connection but some do. Quantum mechanics is a nonseparable theory which should at least get around the logical dilema produced by a separable one. However, there are lots of other problems.

Chalmers recognizes the problem also, but was responding in a disparaging way as he did. The problem is, he doesn't understand how classical phyisics works very well. To defend computationalism (classical descriptions of mind) he wants to define what a computer is or what it can be. Per Chalmers, if something doesn't meet the definition of a computer, it can't be consicious. By doing this, he sidesteps the problem of separability. There are other ways people have proposed to get around this problem, but they require classical mechanics to violate separability. Classical mechanics has to become holistic or nonseparable in some way.

Putnam, H., & Putman, H. (1988). Representation and reality (Vol. 454).
Maudlin, T. (1989). Computation and consciousness. The journal of Philosophy
Bishop, J. M. (2009). A cognitive computation fallacy? Cognition, computations and panpsychism. Cognitive Computation (or just about anything by Bishop)
Stapp, H. P. (1995). Why Classical Mechanics Cannot Naturally Accommodate Consciousness But Quantum Mechanics Can.
Longinotti, D. (2009). Computationalism and the Locality Principle. Minds and Machines
Sevush, S. (2006). Single-neuron theory of consciousness. Journal of theoretical biology
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton?. Synthese
Chalmers, D. J. (2012). The Varieties of Computation: A Reply. Journal of Cognitive Science

 

[Pythagorean]

The problem is that it's a separable type of physics which leads to all sorts of logical dilemas. It's one of the primary reasons we don't have a theory to explain conscious phenomena. Basically, the question is how can 'information' be integrated when each neuron works only by what neurotransmitters and electrical charges operate on it?

This thread has slowly been derailed by a (more interesting) discussion and I think it would be worthwhile to split it into a new thread. Consciousness is a subject that does require a careful combination of philosophy and science to discuss. I would also really appreciate it if you cited your claims more thoroughly in-line so it's easier to separate actual cited assertions from personal assertions (I see this particular claim comes from Stapp). I don't think the community that studies consciousness (including philosophers and scientists) has a consensus that there is a problem with separability. It's still a controversial and contentious topic. I do think that many philosophers of mind like Chalmers and Dennet tend to be lacking the appropriate scientific background. Many of the dilemmas brought against classical physics (especially in defense of quantum physics) are short-sighted [1][2].

We know that replacing and removing individual components of the brain can either do absolutely nothing to the conscious experience or have a notable effect on concsiousness - depending on the magnitude of the change. For instance, placing an electrode in the brain may or may affect the conscious experience in subtle ways depending on what the electrode is doing and where it is placed [3], but removing a whole hemisphere from the brain can change the conscious experience (as well as cognitive abilities) in a dramatic way. Likewise, we can incapacitate certain brain structures and see a relative loss in consciousness (i.e. we lose components of visual consciousness when we ablate the visual cortex [4]) - so removing a brain component does indeed, remove a component of consciousness.

Many philosophers argue that separability means that you could replace each component with one that does the exact same job as the neuron or astrocyte it's replacing, one at a time, until you're a robot and it shouldn't affect your conscious experience and this this is so surprising and shocking that it must be wrong. Yet, in the neuromedical fields, we continue to replace different components of the nervous system with machines and, as we'd expect, the effects on consciousness support an integrated information framework (again, not arguing for Tonini's implementation of IIT).

I suppose, since we haven't replaced every part of the brain yet, it is possible that we could one day precisely replace a component of the brain and find that consciousness is lost (or at least, appears to be lost in the subject)... then we may be able to argue for a seat of consciousness. But research tends to indicate a more global view - at least two brain regions that tend to dominate what gets perceived subjectively from all the stimulus processing that is happening unconsciously [5]. (Note that the prior reference only pertains to visual consciousness).

[1] http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v440/n7084/full/440611a.html
[2] http://journals.aps.org/pre/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevE.61.4194
[3] http://books.google.ca/books?id=eSrIZf3HdTEC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
[4] http://www.jneurosci.org/content/29/21/6917.full
[5] http://www.mpg.de/8425992/seat-of-consciousness

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi Pythagorean, Threads like this naturally tend to meander a bit so I'm trying not to get too far off topic. My only intention was to address the point Chalmers makes regarding minimizing mystery. The less detail on that one, the less we get off topic. I would readily go along with the paradigm of mind that claims the interactions between neuron interactions are classical in nature meaning that brains do not seem to exploit any of the special features of quantum mechanics as explained by Koch for example. In fact, so would the neurologist Steven Sevush (mentioned above) who proposes a single neuron theory of consciousness.

Regarding my list of references, what I've found from reading philosophers, biologists and physicists is that they never use the same language. In fact, they generally don't read each other's papers. Separability as it pertains to classical mechanics is a topic analogous to specialized topics in biology or chemistry. Although some philosophers, biologists and others might be aware of "separability", they don't all use the same terminology. However, you'll find these people all seem to have an intuitive understanding of separability and would largely agree with it if they were to see the definition: “Intuitively, a separable process is one which is wholly determined by what happens locally – by what is happening at each spacetime point where that process is going on. … More precisely, a physical process will be said to be spatio-temporally separable in spacetime region R if and only if it is supervenient upon an assignment of qualitative intrinsic physical properties at spacetime points in R.” (Healey) We could use any term (Longinotti calls it 'locality' instead) but I'll stick with separability because I think that's the best word for it.

Chalmers denies seperability when he comes up with definitions surrounding what a computer is. He claims a system requires "conterfactual sensitivity" but doesn't use the term "separability" at all. Similarly, many philosophers use the term "counterfactual" to reference the need for a system to be together and functional in order for phenomenal consciousness to emerge. The reason they do that is because there's an obvious problem if the parts aren't connected, even if the parts undergo identical physical states when disconnected.

Take your example - we remove a part of a brain and replace it with a microchip. How does the microchip 'know' it is part of the brain and not doing something else entirely? There are no 'special signals' that tell the brain or the microchip that they are even connected and functioning. The component parts of a computer or a brain don't have information about what the other component parts are doing. The information they have is what is acting on them at some point in time. Having that information is sufficient for a computer to function. It's also sufficient for us to interpret the results. But each chip or switch in a computer is in it's 'own little world' so to speak. These are component parts of a system which act together to produce what we recognize as a 'computation'. This concept is counterintuitive to many and takes some thinking about.

DeMarse wrote an interesting paper about a living neuronal network connected to a computer such that the neurons were 'trained' to fly an aircraft straight and level. Note that the aircraft in this case was nothing more than a flight simulator that was on the computer. However, I don't see any way the neuronal network could know it was flying straight and level or doing barrel roles. It couldn’t know if it was flying an aircraft simulator or operating an industrial plant converting oil to gasoline. The reason it couldn’t know that is because the neuronal network (and in fact, each of the individual neurons) are separable. They act only according to what happens locally, just like transisters in a computer. The point is, none of the component parts of a classical system can do this integration of information necessary without having some physical way to distinguish the difference between separable parts. But classical mechanics has no need for this special signal that can distinguish between the system being together or being apart and there would be no way to know if it existed. The special signal would be a ghost that somehow was able to distiguish between the two states but couldn't even make itself known because everything would happen the same way regardless of whether it was there or not.

So to return to the original point and to try and keep from getting off topic, there are logical dilemas with asserting classical mechanics is the basis for conscious phenomena, and one of those dilemas regards separability. Many people seem to recognize it but don’t use the same terminology because they don’t work in the same areas and read the same papers. But it seems fairly obvious from reading those papers that they are all talking about the same problem but using different terminology. A bit like the tower of babble I guess.

Koch, C., & Hepp, K. (2006). Quantum mechanics in the brain. Nature
Healey, R. (1994). Nonseparable processes and causal explanation. Studies In History and Philosophy of Science
DeMarse, T. B., & Dockendorf, K. P. (2005). Adaptive flight control with living neuronal networks on microelectrode arrays. In Neural Networks, 2005. IJCNN'05. Proceedings. 2005 IEEE International Joint Conference on (Vol. 3, pp. 1548-1551). IEEE.

 

[Pythagorean]

Thanks for your reply, Q_Goest. There is some evidence in neuroscience for support of this:

The special signal would be a ghost that somehow was able to distiguish between the two states but couldn't even make itself known because everything would happen the same way regardless of whether it was there or not.

As we know from Libet's, and follow-up experiments on free-will, when we have the subjective feeling that we've made a conscious decision about something, it turns out that the physical neural activity that precedes it can be used to predict the decision making. This evidence supports the idea that separability can still be unviolated (the physical components of the system still obey classical physics) but places no constraints on the (presumably) weakly emergent result (consciousness). Of course, this means no ethereal free will - it means that our actions do not evade cause and effect and are a product of our biology and our environment (which, in terms of evidence from human behavioral biology, isn't surprising). The "ghost", then, would not make choices, but experiences the choice-making process of the system.

Proponents like Tononi suggests that it is the complexity of the information (encoded in the states of the system) that result in the phenomenological experience, and cites some split-brain research [1].

such patients do indeed experience the left half of the visual field independently of the right side, but then the surgery has created two separate consciousnesses instead of one. Mechanistically then, underlying the unity of experience must be causal interactions among certain elements within the brain. This means that these elements work together as an integrated system, which is why their performance, unlike that of the *camera, breaks down if they are disconnected.

Tononi later says:

It is worth remarking that the last example also shows why specific qualities of consciousness, such as the “redness” of red, while generated by a local mechanism, cannot be reduced to it. If an achromatopsic subject without the r connections lacks precisely the “redness” of red, whereas a vegetative patient with just the r connections is essentially unconscious, then the redness of red cannot map directly to the mechanism implemented by the r connections. However, the redness of red can map nicely onto the informational relationships specified by r, as these change dramatically between the null context (vegetative patient) and the full context (achromatopsic subject).

Of course, Tononi's proposal does not violate locality in terms of physics, since (presumably Einstein's) locality has nothing to say about the relationship between information and consciousness. It does say that consciousness itself is a nonseparable phenomena, but if we accept that consciousness doesn't cause anything, then the theory is consistent with the observation.

[1] http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v6/n8/full/nrn1740.html

 

[testingus]

I just mean that there's no evidence that microtubules are performing the computations underlying the cognitive processes with which consciousness experience is associated with, and that there's no evidence that microtubules have a high level of global information integration across large networks of the brain.

Thanks madness for your points.

When you say "there's no evidence" for microtubules performing computations, I wonder what you mean. Brain function depends on neuron information processing, on this I think we can agree. For each neuron to function incoming signals must be "interpreted" to determine if a neuron will fire (i.e. the integrate and fire notion). What does this integration? It must be the internal components of the neuron. Ion channel opening and closing is well accepted, but placement of ion channels (which determines synaptic strength), as well as ion channel function is regulated by the cytoskeleton and associated proteins [1].

I'll concede the point that there is no evidence for a high level of global information integration across the brain, however there is evidence for neural synchrony. If neuron's are synchronized an argument could be made that their internal workings are also synchronized. Additionally, while there is currently no evidence (that I know of) it doesn't rule out the possibility.

Priel, A., Tuszynski, J. A., & Cantiello, H. F. (2006). The dendritic cytoskeleton as a computational device: an hypothesis. In The Emerging Physics of Consciousness (pp. 293-325). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

 

[testingus]

Quantum mechanics is a nonseparable theory which should at least get around the logical dilema produced by a separable one. However, there are lots of other problems.

Q_Goest, could you elaborate on the problems with quantum theories of consciousness. Thank-you.

 

[madness]

When you say "there's no evidence" for microtubules performing computations, I wonder what you mean. Brain function depends on neuron information processing, on this I think we can agree. For each neuron to function incoming signals must be "interpreted" to determine if a neuron will fire (i.e. the integrate and fire notion). What does this integration? It must be the internal components of the neuron. Ion channel opening and closing is well accepted, but placement of ion channels (which determines synaptic strength), as well as ion channel function is regulated by the cytoskeleton and associated proteins [1].

What I mean is that there is no correspondence (or "isomorphism") between the content of conscious experience and the information processing properties of microtubules. On the other hand, it does appear that there is such an isomorphism between electrical activity of populations of neurons and conscious experience. Importantly, the electrical activity occurs at the same timescale as conscious experience, while ion channel regulation by microtubules occurs at a much longer timescale.

 

[DiracPool]

When you say "there's no evidence" for microtubules performing computations, I wonder what you mean. Brain function depends on neuron information processing, on this I think we can agree. For each neuron to function incoming signals must be "interpreted" to determine if a neuron will fire (i.e. the integrate and fire notion). What does this integration? It must be the internal components of the neuron. Ion channel opening and closing is well accepted, but placement of ion channels (which determines synaptic strength), as well as ion channel function is regulated by the cytoskeleton and associated proteins [1].

You are looking at the issue from the wrong scale. You are never going to find consciousness at the level of the neuron or microtubule. Perceptual pattern recognition, introspective reports of qualitative experience, brain patterns of self-awareness related to first person versus 3rd person identity are decidedly mesoscopic and macroscopic effects. Consciousness arises from the collective action of 100's of million of neurons all acting cooperatively in the formation of a near limit cycle chaotic attractor at several scales of neurodynamic function. There is the primary cortex which spans several cms and oscillates or phase-locks at 40 hz, there is inter-areal phase coherence in the beta range at 12-25 hz, and there is hemisphere-wide synchrony in the alpha-theta range roughly 10 hz. We can distinguish topological patterns in the EEG tracings at each of these scales and tease out topographic maps over the geography of cortex and compare that to psychophysiological questionaires.

So, from what we know now, consciousness is a property of classical electromagnetic phase coherence that operates through a roughly 3 level hierarchy. That's about all we know right now. Is there some quantum mechanical "aspect" to conscious experience? Almost certainly. But you're not going to find it in any contemporary discourse on the matter, because the vast majority if not all quantum treatments of the consciousness issue invariably eschew a discussion of the functional anatomy of the human brain and especially its differences from that of other mammals and vertebrates in general.

 

[testingus]

...ion channel regulation by microtubules occurs at a much longer timescale.

Can you please provide sources for this. Thank you.

 

[testingus]

You are looking at the issue from the wrong scale.

I am no expert here but, does not the brain (and biology in general) operate using scale free dynamics? See:

Boonstra, T. W., He, B. J., & Daffertshofer, A. (2013). Scale-free dynamics and critical phenomena in cortical activity. Frontiers in physiology, 4.

Quote from article, "Multiple experiments have identified neural processes without a preferred timescale in the avalanche-like spatial propagation of activity in cortical slices and in self-similar time series of local field potentials."

You are never going to find consciousness at the level of the neuron or microtubule.

This is just your opinion. I'm not saying you are wrong, but to simply rule this out because it seems unpalatable would be unscientific.

Perceptual pattern recognition, introspective reports of qualitative experience, brain patterns of self-awareness related to first person versus 3rd person identity are decidedly mesoscopic and macroscopic effects. Consciousness arises from the collective action of 100's of million of neurons all acting cooperatively in the formation of a near limit cycle chaotic attractor at several scales of neurodynamic function. There is the primary cortex which spans several cms and oscillates or phase-locks at 40 hz, there is inter-areal phase coherence in the beta range at 12-25 hz, and there is hemisphere-wide synchrony in the alpha-theta range roughly 10 hz. We can distinguish topological patterns in the EEG tracings at each of these scales and tease out topographic maps over the geography of cortex and compare that to psychophysiological questionaires.

I completely agree with you here. All I'm suggesting (in a devil's advocate position) is that if "Consciousness arises from the collective action of 100's of million of neurons all acting cooperatively" then the collective action of 100's of millions of subneural components (including the cytoskeleton) can only add to the richness and complexity of this process. At some point the quantum threshold is reached. Are quantum effects trivial? That's the debate! Accordingly Koch and Hepp suggest that there isn't even a mechanism to suggest how this would work. What the OP is putting forward is that there is a feasible quantum mechanism (see Craddock et al. in OP) that could support quantum computation in microtubules.

Koch, C., & Hepp, K. (2006). Quantum mechanics in the brain. Nature, 440(7084), 611-611.

Is there some quantum mechanical "aspect" to conscious experience? Almost certainly.

Again this is opinion, and seems to contradict your earlier stance.

But you're not going to find it in any contemporary discourse on the matter, because the vast majority if not all quantum treatments of the consciousness issue invariably eschew a discussion of the functional anatomy of the human brain and especially its differences from that of other mammals and vertebrates in general.

I don't think even Hameroff, the proponent of the infamous Orch OR, suggests divorcing the quantum treatment from standard neuroscience so I'm not sure where this argument is going.

 

[atyy]

@testingus, just a comment about Orch-OR - it is not standard quantum mechanics, and in fact violates quantum mechanics, so the "quantum effects" in Orch-OR should be taken with a pinch of salt. Orch-OR violates quantum mechanics because it relies on Diosi-Penrose collapse. As long as quantum mechanics holds exactly, Orch-OR cannot be said to be "favoured" by any evidence. However, if the violation of quantum mechanics is small, then Diosi-Penrose collapse can be consistent with current evidence. Tests of Diosi-Penrose collapse are discussed in http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.2868 and http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.6460 (the latter is not in a peer-reviewed journal, but I am including it, because the authors have many papers about collapse models in peer-reviewed journals).

 

[testingus]

@testingus, just a comment about Orch-OR - it is not standard quantum mechanics, and in fact violates quantum mechanics, so the "quantum effects" in Orch-OR should be taken with a pinch of salt. Orch-OR violates quantum mechanics because it relies on Diosi-Penrose collapse. As long as quantum mechanics holds exactly, Orch-OR cannot be said to be "favoured" by any evidence. However, if the violation of quantum mechanics is small, then Diosi-Penrose collapse can be consistent with current evidence. Tests of Diosi-Penrose collapse are discussed in http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.2868 and http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.6460 (the latter is not in a peer-reviewed journal, but I am including it, because the authors have many papers about collapse models in peer-reviewed journals).

Thank-you atyy. I understand that Diosi-Penrose collapse is not standard quantum mechanics, but I don't think it violates quantum mechanics. The collapse mechanism is an addition to try and resolve so-called wavefunction collapse by giving it a objective mechanism. In standard QM no such mechanism is given leading to multiple interpretations of how this takes place (Copenhagen, von Neumann-Wigner, etc.), if it takes place at all (Multiple Worlds, Multiple Minds etc.).

The original post (OP) wasn't concerned with Orch OR per se, but rather a feasible mechanism to support quantum computations in the brain. While the Diosi-Penrose mechanism is questionable, other authors have pointed out that quantum mind via quantum computation in microtubules could be achieved with decoherence, rather than Objective Reduction (see Rosa et al.).

Rosa, L. P., & Faber, J. (2004). Quantum models of the mind: Are they compatible with environment decoherence?. Physical Review E, 70(3), 031902.

 

[DiracPool]

I don't think even Hameroff, the proponent of the infamous Orch OR, suggests divorcing the quantum treatment from standard neuroscience so I'm not sure where this argument is going.

I never said that Hameroff et al. suggested "divorcing the quantum treatment from standard neuroscience." Why divorce yourself from something you don't really even address. It took me 7 years to master the connectional neuroanatomy of the brain, why take the time to do that when you can just wave your quantum de-coherence wand and solve the problem in one fell swoop?