The matter of N-16 was mentioned in my initial post. I should also mention that a motivation to use noble metal chemistry addition (used in order to produce a more negative electrochemical potential (ECP in the upper core) is to reduce the H required for HWC, which reduces the carryover of N-16 to the steam lines.
Cobalt activity is a problem with any LWR - Co-60 and Co-58. Reducing the Co-content of Ni-alloys and steels was one factor, replacing Co-bearing alloys like Stellite was another, as was reducing quantity of Inconel in the core. Beyond that, controlling crud transfer and Ni dissolution from heat transfer or structural surfaces (e.g. steam generators in PWRs) has been a major factor in controlling dose. That was the reason Zn-injection was adopted first in BWRs and subsequently in PWRs. Some plants seem to have more effective dose reduction/crud control programs. Depleted Zinc (depleted in
64Zn) was introduced to mitigate effects of Zn-activation.
I've been involved with most plants (Ps and Bs) with degraded fuel. Fuel reliability has improved greatly over the last two decades, but the early 90s had some problematic cases with severely degraded fuel with off-gas rates in the 20k-100k uCi/sec at the SJAE. I know of one plant where those working in containment had to degas before leaving - they had to exhale the Kr and Xe they absorbed while in containment. BWR operators now generally suppress failures with one or more control blades and do mid-cycle outages to remove failed fuel.
The previous company where I worked had extensive records on most NPPs operating in the 60's through 80's. In the 1970's there were some plants that huge numbers of failures due to CILC, and possibly PCI, debris and primary hydriding. Those plants had off-gas activities of several 100k uCi/sec. That was before people started getting serious about preventing fuel failures.
In the early 90s, one PWR was hours from shutdown because the DEI was approaching 0.5 uCi/ml in their coolant. Plant personnel were restricted in some areas because radiation fields. That was from one failed rod, which just happened to be close to one of the peak rods in the core.
More than two decades ago, one plant had problems with fuel particles (fleas) getting on personnel.
I got involved in one case during the early 90s where a plant was draining the reactor cavity when the rad alarms went off. They reflooded the cavity and took a look. There were fragments of fuel rod by the fuel handling machine by the RV. They eventually found 4 pieces including one about 5-6 feet long that was split down one side. It had contained about 1 kg of fuel, but all of that had washed out into the primary circuit. I'd indicated months earlier from the coolant activity, particularly the Np-239, that they had a severally degraded failure. For some reason, they just assumed they had some crud burst that released some tramp, and they didn't inspect for failed fuel. The fuel rod that had fractured actually broke outside of the core when they were retrieving the assembly from the fuel handling machined. There had been a guillotine break near one of the upper grids. The broken rod leaned out of the assembly far enough to catch on the machine and it was pulled out through the grids, and broke in two other places. They had reloaded the fuel assembly with the broken grids and minus the broken rod.
This is old but historical - Characteristics of fuel crud and its impact on storage, handling, and shipment of spent fuel.
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/purl.cover.jsp?purl=/6164184-i2i6ob/
or -
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=6164184
Here is a good set of references on radiation protection and monitoring:
http://hps.ne.uiuc.edu/natcisoe/brookhaven.htm
Brookhaven used to publish an journal called ALARA. I don't know if they still do. There was also a journal entitled Nuclear Safety that examined a lot of the same issues.