Chapter 13: The Consciousness Hypothesis

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hypnagogue

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It's not my book, it's Gregg Rosenberg's book. You can't access the book online, however I have written chapter summaries that are available in this forum. To see them all you may have to change the forum display options. In the box titled "Display Options" at the bottom of this forum's main page, click on the drop-down box titled "From the:," and select the option titled "Beginning."

edit: Also, please see the stickied thread titled Introduction, Guidelines, and Format for the group discussion for more general information on what the book is about and what guidelines to keep in mind for this forum.
 
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SR, DR and other possibilities

hypnagogue said:
The last sentence should read, "But in DR this is only true for indeterminate individuals which have a receptive field." Your mistake might have been a slip of the tongue (so to speak) rather than a real misunderstanding, but it's important to clarify it in either case.
Thank you, hypnagogue for your exact reading. In DR is the qualitative field of an individual falls together with its receptive field (p. 253), but not in SR.

What effective/phenomenal properties can be experienced by an individual of level n? There are five simple possibilities (and additional the combinations of these)
a) the effective properties of its level n-1 parts which put causal constraint in the nexus
b) that the level n receptivity puts a constraint on the causal connections of the level n-1 parts
c) the experience of being a unity besides other individuals of the same level
d) the effective constraints working on the level n individual by other level n individuals
e) that these effective properties are constraint by a level n+1 receptivity (if existing).​
The included individuals in the five levels are beside the experiencing level n individual:
a) its level n-1 parts
b) no other individuals (Context: the level n-1 parts)
c) no other individuals (Context: other level n individuals)
d) other level n individuals
e) a level n+1 individual from which the n individual is part​
The options (b) and (c) correspond to experiencing/receptive dimension of the individual. What is experience more like? Be (b) a unity out of parts or to be (c) a unity in contact with other unities? I’m not sure about this and think that both aspects are relevant.
The possibilities for the phenomenal experiencing are:
• Single Receptivity SR, i.e. (a, b) or (a, b, c)
• Dual Receptivity DR, i.e. (c,d) or (b, c, d)
• the proposed third solution, let’s call it dual phenomenality DP, i.e. (a, b, c, d).
• and the last two option with an addition MMM of the experience of the individual of the level above (e).​

DP proposes two kinds of receptivity. What duality of phenomenal properties could correspond two the duality of receptivity?
- the duality of active and passive: It is implemented in the system jet (via asymmetric constraints) and it is therefore no good candidate for a duality of phenomenal properties
- the duality inside/outside: As you have noticed in your last post concerning these themes, even all perceptions are inside in some sense so that there are no experiences of the outside. But something in the outer world has to correspond to some experiences if you want to give realism a good foundation.
- the duality whether the contents of experiences are accuracy conditions from the inside or the outside of the level n individual. But does this fit to the causal story of e.g. a perception?

Thank you, hypnagogue, for strengthening my argument with the second compositional circularity that could save DR against the argument that there is no parallel of circularity in the effective/receptive distinction of DR. I describe the second circularity that remains on one level as follows:
For an (indeterminate) natural individual to exist, it must have effective properties; and for effective properties to exist, there must be individuals that bear these properties.

The remaining defence of your argument against DR is the following:
However, at least on my reading of the text, the dominant compositional circularity is that which obtains between level n effective properties and level n+1 receptive properties. This circular relationship is required for the very existence of the relevant effective and receptive properties, rather than merely their completion. And it is also the case (as we have discussed) that the intra-level transitivity of effective and receptive properties is dependent upon the existence of inter-level binding of level n individuals into a level n+1 receptivity, and in this way the former is ontologically subordinate to the latter.
One can characterize this ontological dominant compositional circularity as part/whole-circularity and the second as subject-attribute-circularity. In my opinion the examples of compositional circularity that Rosenberg detects in the sciences (p. 235-6) belong to the second kind of circularity: E.g. in economics “goods and services” are more properties of “consumers and producers” as they are there parts of them. A compositional circularity of the kind you prefer would be between an economy and its goods and services. But Rosenberg chooses not your “circularity”. (Your "circularity" is not a circularity at all in the economical analogy.)

P.S. The whole economy puts some constraints on the consumers and producers. Do they experience them less then the concrete goods and services that are too less or too much? If not, this analogy would argue that (e) has to be integrated in the scope of phenomenal experience. But I know that this analogy is only a week argument.

Are there some further good arguments for SR or DP?

again to the knowledge paradox:
1) Let us make the assumption that the physical world is causally closed. Chalmers' intuition is that a Zombie would make the same second order phenomenal judgments (in “The Conscious Mind”). In TNI no Zombies exist and the phenomenal and experimental properties are the carriers which allow widening their responsibility. I like your anti-Chalmersian intuition
that phenomenal experience must make a direct difference to the brain's effective dynamics in order to justify second- and third-order phenomenal judgments, but it has not completely eroded those intuitions.
2) You share with Chalmers the intuition that effective causality is not a link intimate enough for second-order judgments.
Rosenberg's analysis provides a causal link between phenomenal experience and utterances about experience, but it's not as intimate as my intuitions might like-- it seems somewhat too loose and coincidental. For instance, take the case where some cognitive decoder C uses the information in some phenomenal carrier R to represent R itself. It seems that C's access to information about R is underwritten by effective causal interactions between the two. If that is the case, there seems to be a disconnect between the intrinsic phenomenal information in R, and the effective, structural information in R. C seems to be accessing R's effective structure rather than its intrinsic phenomenal content, and we've argued at length that the former cannot entail the latter. So it seems that even though C is using R to represent R itself, this still does not put C in position to send out neural signals on the basis of R's intrinsic phenomenal content.
I two another possibilities: C can be an aspect of a receptive property that constitutes the (human) individual that has R as phenomenal property or the individual of the level above. Hence no causal interaction is necessary for an second order judgment “I experience R” but only actualization.
One can answer that the effective side of the representational vehicle R is something like “the truck is red”, “is red” or something similar but it is impossible that a phenomenal property carries more then one effective properties. But this possibility is at least in a DR-like model (if your refutation were wrong) realized in an easy way. One can have the same phenomenal quality as a result of a real perception or as a result of an illusion. Hence there are two possibilities for different knowledge of the phenomenal carrier R. (1) The individual that realizes R does sometimes integrate C in its receptivity and sometimes not. (This would be only a shifting of your argument against Rosenberg’s solution of the knowledge paradox.) (2) The individual of the level above (roughly: the environment) makes different constraints which both help to constitute an effective constraint in the human individual which is carried by R. And these implementations in the environment correspond to different kinds of knowledge on the side of the human individual.

May this all be as I propose: Is this knowledge that is known with certainty and how can second order-judgments be known with more certainty as first-order judgments? The certainty comes from the acquaintance with phenomenal properties in both kinds of judgments. I shifted the difficulty of certainty to different kinds of receptivity. Of course I cannot solve all problems but perhaps the problem has become smaller.
 

hypnagogue

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Sorry for another long delay-- I've been quite busy gearing up for the school year and doing various other projects here on PF, among other things. I'll have a summary for chapter 14, and will be able to resume discussion in this thread, within the week.
 

hypnagogue

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Hey all-- Thanks to those of you who are still following along. My apologies, but I've been very busy and haven't had much time to write up a chapter summary to my satisfaction. As it stands I won't be able to have one up until Wednesday at the earliest. In the meantime, if you wish, remember that you can always start up a new thread here-- you don't have to wait for me. But I will do my best to have the next summary up before next weekend.
 

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