I won't debate on the wavefunction collapse

[lalbatros]

I won't debate on the "wavefunction collapse" ...

... since this is just a lazy debate started from a misunderstanding.

Clearly when a small system interacts with a measuring device, the wave function of the small system just loses any meaning.
There is only one "larger" wavefunction for both systems together.
Why then should we say it has "collapsed"?
Well ok, I know we need this probability rule, but let's say it is a practical rule.
This collapse question has been debated since every long now, in different flavours, but this debate has really been sterile.

 

[setAI]

the collapse of the wavefunction is merely a demon hand-waved into existence who's purpose was only to ease the minds of some who were uncomfortable with the existence of parallel universes

 

[Hurkyl]

... since this is just a lazy debate started from a misunderstanding.

Clearly when a small system interacts with a measuring device, the wave function of the small system just loses any meaning.
There is only one "larger" wavefunction for both systems together.
Why then should we say it has "collapsed"?
Well ok, I know we need this probability rule, but let's say it is a practical rule.
This collapse question has been debated since every long now, in different flavours, but this debate has really been sterile.

When you seek the probability of something happening "given that this other event happened", that's essentially a collapse.

There isn't really an observable difference between "the state of the universe collapsed onto the branch where that event happened" and "Since I remember that event happened, the future probabilities I see will be derived from that branch".

In fact, you can go so far as to say that the choice of whether to collapse the wavefunction or to compute conditional probabilities is simply a matter of choice; it's unphysical, much like your choice of coordinate axes has no bearing on reality.

 

[nrqed]

... since this is just a lazy debate started from a misunderstanding.

Clearly when a small system interacts with a measuring device, the wave function of the small system just loses any meaning.
There is only one "larger" wavefunction for both systems together.
Why then should we say it has "collapsed"?
Well ok, I know we need this probability rule, but let's say it is a practical rule.
This collapse question has been debated since every long now, in different flavours, but this debate has really been sterile.

But, in my humble opinion, this is simply replacing one mystery with another mystery. How does this "interaction" occurs? What is the physical process behind it? When does it occur? Etc etc.

saying that "hocus-pocus, the wavefunction of the particle becomes entangled with the the measurement device when we do the measurement" is as mysterious as saying "the wavefunction collapses".

I am not saying I disagree with your point. I do agree that a formalism in which the collapse never occurs is more satisfying than the collapse approach. I am just pointing out that saying this opens up as many questions as it answers, IMHO.

 

[rewebster]

But, in my humble opinion, this is simply replacing one mystery with another mystery. How does this "interaction" occurs? What is the physical process behind it? When does it occur? Etc etc.

well, someone just needs to answer those questions then--that's all!

 

[quetzalcoatl9]

does it not suffice to say that there should be a solution to the SE for the system containing the entire universe? in which case, both measurement apparatus and the system-to-be-measured would be described by this wavefunction, and hence there would be no collapse. the prospect of collapse enters the picture when we make the decomposition of system and bath. i believe this is what the OP is asking?

 

[Mentz114]

The wave function is not physical and so cannot collapse. I know I don't have to remind people of this, but it seems some still think the wave function has a physical existence.
Probability is not a physical quantity either, and probabilty amplitude even less so.

Looking for physical meaning in the wave function is sterile, it cannot be otherwise.

 

[meopemuk]

There is nothing mysterious in the wave function collapse. Any probability distribution is supposed to collapse upon observation. This is just a part of definition of the probability distribution (or wave function).

Suppose you've closed your eyes and thrown a die on the table. Before you opened your eyes the state of the die is described by a probability distribution. The probability is 1/6 for each of the faces. When you open your eyes (make the observation) this probability distribution "collapses" and you get a single outcome.

Now, how this classical collapse if different from the quantum collapse? The only difference is that in classical physics you can in principle know exactly all the details of the prepared state of the die and predict exactly which face will be up. For microscopic quantum systems you cannot make such a prediction even in principle.

So, the main mystery of nature is not the collapse of the wave function, but the fact that micro-systems behave unpredictably, randomly. There is no way to predict which spot on the screen will be hit by the next electron passing through the slit. There is no way to predict when a given radioactive nucleus will decay. These events can be described only probabilistically. So, there is some element of indeterminism in nature. Nobody knows why it is there, and I suspect we will never know that. At least, quantum mechanics doesn't provide an answer. QM simply accepts this indeterminism as a fact and incorporates this fact in its mathematical structure. You may think that there can be a theory more fundamental than QM, which will deterministically explain all quantum probabilities. However, as far as I know there was zero progress along this line of thought for the last 80 years.

Eugene.

 

[dlgoff]

"These events can be described only probabilistically. So, there is some element of indeterminism in nature."
How does decoherence fit in? Isn't there something to pointer states; that shows a little determinism?

 

[meopemuk]

"These events can be described only probabilistically. So, there is some element of indeterminism in nature."
How does decoherence fit in? Isn't there something to pointer states; that shows a little determinism?

As far as I understand, decoherence is the result of interaction between quantum system and its environment. I don't know much about this subject. Perhaps others can shed more light on it. I would prefer to discuss isolated quantum systems, where quantum effects can be seen in their pure form. An electron passing through a single or double slit is a good example of such a system. An unstable nucleus is another good example.

Eugene.

 

[strangerep]

"These events can be described only probabilistically. So, there is some element of indeterminism in nature."

How does decoherence fit in? [...]

Decoherence is a word for how quantum indeterminacy (superposition of states)
becomes classical indeterminacy (not knowing which way the dice fell until you
open your eyes). It is thought to occur via interaction of a system with its environment.

In math terms, this means getting rid of any off-diagonal terms in the density
matrix of the system. There were some papers by Ford et al a few years ago that
showed (for simple examples) how powerful this effect could be. Even the miniscule
gravitational interactions between a system and its environment could cause
decoherence very quickly.

BTW, the distinction between quantum and classical indeterminacy described above
heuristically is the essence of what is expressed quantitatively by Bell's inequalities.

- strangerep.

 

[Mentz114]

meopemuk :

So, the main mystery of nature is not the collapse of the wave function, but the fact that micro-systems behave unpredictably, randomly. There is no way to predict which spot on the screen will be hit by the next electron passing through the slit. There is no way to predict when a given radioactive nucleus will decay. These events can be described only probabilistically. So, there is some element of indeterminism in nature. Nobody knows why it is there, and I suspect we will never know that. At least, quantum mechanics doesn't provide an answer. QM simply accepts this indeterminism as a fact and incorporates this fact in its mathematical structure. You may think that there can be a theory more fundamental than QM, which will deterministically explain all quantum probabilities. However, as far as I know there was zero progress along this line of thought for the last 80 years.

Well said. It's pretty obvious we can never know our initial conditions in any setup because the quantum phase is admitted to be unobservable and beyound our influence.
It is this which makes me believe that wave functions have no actual existence.

 

[rewebster]

There is nothing mysterious in the wave function collapse. Any probability distribution is supposed to collapse upon observation. This is just a part of definition of the probability distribution (or wave function).

Suppose you've closed your eyes and thrown a die on the table. Before you opened your eyes the state of the die is described by a probability distribution. The probability is 1/6 for each of the faces. When you open your eyes (make the observation) this probability distribution "collapses" and you get a single outcome.

Eugene.

I think the problem is that most think that when you open your eyes, there's a banana laying there, instead of a die.

 

[jostpuur]

There is nothing mysterious in the wave function collapse. Any probability distribution is supposed to collapse upon observation. This is just a part of definition of the probability distribution (or wave function).

Suppose you've closed your eyes and thrown a die on the table. Before you opened your eyes the state of the die is described by a probability distribution. The probability is 1/6 for each of the faces. When you open your eyes (make the observation) this probability distribution "collapses" and you get a single outcome.

Now, how this classical collapse if different from the quantum collapse? The only difference is that in classical physics you can in principle know exactly all the details of the prepared state of the die and predict exactly which face will be up. For microscopic quantum systems you cannot make such a prediction even in principle.

So, the main mystery of nature is not the collapse of the wave function, but the fact that micro-systems behave unpredictably, randomly. There is no way to predict which spot on the screen will be hit by the next electron passing through the slit. There is no way to predict when a given radioactive nucleus will decay. These events can be described only probabilistically. So, there is some element of indeterminism in nature. Nobody knows why it is there, and I suspect we will never know that. At least, quantum mechanics doesn't provide an answer. QM simply accepts this indeterminism as a fact and incorporates this fact in its mathematical structure. You may think that there can be a theory more fundamental than QM, which will deterministically explain all quantum probabilities. However, as far as I know there was zero progress along this line of thought for the last 80 years.

Eugene.

I don't agree that the prediction problem is the key difference.

With a classical dice, the reality is that the dice has some particular side up after the throw, and the probabilities arise from our lack of knowledge. If we have not seen the dice after the throw, from our point of view there is 1/6 probability for each face, because we don't know it better.

In quantum mechanics the reality is that a system has complex amplitudes to be in different states. The amplitudes are not only our tool to describe the system, but the amplitudes are the objective reality.

That is a big difference.

As consequence of this difference, also the nature of the collapse is fundamentally different too.

 

[jostpuur]

... since this is just a lazy debate started from a misunderstanding.

Clearly when a small system interacts with a measuring device, the wave function of the small system just loses any meaning.
There is only one "larger" wavefunction for both systems together.
Why then should we say it has "collapsed"?
Well ok, I know we need this probability rule, but let's say it is a practical rule.
This collapse question has been debated since every long now, in different flavours, but this debate has really been sterile.

So you have understood that there is no collapse, but instead the wave function looses its meaning, and there is a larger wave function that describes the system, and the probability rule comes out of this.

And now you are confused, that why are so many folks still wondering what the collapse is? Why can't they see that this debate arises from misunderstandings?

That's life, man.

 

[vanesch]

But, in my humble opinion, this is simply replacing one mystery with another mystery. How does this "interaction" occurs? What is the physical process behind it? When does it occur? Etc etc.

This is in fact nothing of a mystery. The interaction between the observer and the observed is entirely defined by "standard" physics, which can in principle be written down in a hamiltonian. The entanglement then follows from the simple application of Schroedinger's equation to the overall observer-observed system. Although for a genuine observer (say, a human body and so on) this is untractable, for toy systems this is easy to do. In fact, even von Neumann did that already in his monumental 1932 work (mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics) where he introduces the "pre-measurement interaction" which is nothing else but the normal physical interaction between the measurement apparatus and the system, and out of it comes that each "measured state" ends up entangled with a distinct "pointer state" of the apparatus. This really follows from standard Schroedinger evolution.
The point is now, that we now end up with an overall wavefunction which says:
"particle was in state |a> and pointer is "1" " plus "particle was in state |b> and pointer is "2" " in the sense:
( |a> + |b> ) |0> evolves into (|a> |1> + |b> |2> )

This is normal unitary evolution.
The mystery is not here. It is what is expected. The mystery resides in the fact that we don't see ourselves in a superposed state, where we see "one world" where the particle was in state a and the pointer was 1 and at the same time see another world where the particle was in state b and the pointer was in state 2.

The "standard" way is to say that the OVERALL state somehow collapsed into |a>|1> or into |b> |2> according to a probability rule.
The MWI way is to say that "we" are just one of the observer states, randomly picked amongst the different existing ones.
So the question is whether it is "we" who "collapsed" (or dedoubled?), or "nature".
If the concept of a "we" is just limited to classically-looking states, and a previous "we" (classical) state evolves into a superposition, then this amounts to saying that the single "we" became multiple "we's". And we're one of them. This kind of stuff always leads to strange phrases because language and grammar hasn't integrated such a concept (in the same way as it would be difficult to do some grammar in 2-dimensional time...)

saying that "hocus-pocus, the wavefunction of the particle becomes entangled with the the measurement device when we do the measurement" is as mysterious as saying "the wavefunction collapses".

No, really not. This is given by the physics of the measurement-system interaction.

The "hokus pokus" resides in the "why don't we see this superposition".

 

[vanesch]

The wave function is not physical and so cannot collapse. I know I don't have to remind people of this, but it seems some still think the wave function has a physical existence.
Probability is not a physical quantity either, and probabilty amplitude even less so.

Looking for physical meaning in the wave function is sterile, it cannot be otherwise.

This is a standard view on the issue (mainly Copenhagen's doctrine). Now, it is all fine and well to say that the wavefunction is NOT a description of "reality". Fine. So comes the next question: then WHAT IS a description of reality ?

Bohr "answered" this question by saying that one shouldn't ask that question, but I find that a bit cheap. Of course, "reality" is philosophically always a matter of hypothesis, for you can do without, in a strong form of solipsism. But my answer to this issue is: if you haven't gotten any better than to tell me that I *shouldn't* talk about reality, but that we have a formalism that "pretends to describe reality but doesn't", then I find it still better to take as a (preliminary ?) hypothesis of ontology that that formalism IS describing reality, rather than telling me that I shouldn't make any hypothesis about reality. After all, making hypotheses about reality (even when wrong) has always helped us move on. Saying that one shouldn't make hypotheses about reality to avoid weird conclusions amounts to me to nothing else but mysticism. But we should stay modest, and recon that it is not because with what we know and found out TODAY about physics, and with our ability today to make ontological guesses, that these must be graved in stone for ever.
Nevertheless, as of today, if we want to make a guess about reality on the quantum level, the best thing IMO to do is to give some status of ontology to the wavefunction. In the same way as we give some status of ontology to the banana on the table, just because that corresponds to our theoretical construct that our brain set up as a function of the sensations that we have (sight, feeling, taste,...).
In other words, it seems to me that it is a good ontological guess (hypothesis) to take for real the best formal description that we have. We're not obliged to, but at least, it shouldn't be forbidden (what Bohr wanted us to believe).
It's always better to have a strange reality, than no reality at all IMO.

 

[nrqed]

This is a standard view on the issue (mainly Copenhagen's doctrine). Now, it is all fine and well to say that the wavefunction is NOT a description of "reality". Fine. So comes the next question: then WHAT IS a description of reality ?

Bohr "answered" this question by saying that one shouldn't ask that question, but I find that a bit cheap. Of course, "reality" is philosophically always a matter of hypothesis, for you can do without, in a strong form of solipsism. But my answer to this issue is: if you haven't gotten any better than to tell me that I *shouldn't* talk about reality, but that we have a formalism that "pretends to describe reality but doesn't", then I find it still better to take as a (preliminary ?) hypothesis of ontology that that formalism IS describing reality, rather than telling me that I shouldn't make any hypothesis about reality. After all, making hypotheses about reality (even when wrong) has always helped us move on. Saying that one shouldn't make hypotheses about reality to avoid weird conclusions amounts to me to nothing else but mysticism. But we should stay modest, and recon that it is not because with what we know and found out TODAY about physics, and with our ability today to make ontological guesses, that these must be graved in stone for ever.
Nevertheless, as of today, if we want to make a guess about reality on the quantum level, the best thing IMO to do is to give some status of ontology to the wavefunction. In the same way as we give some status of ontology to the banana on the table, just because that corresponds to our theoretical construct that our brain set up as a function of the sensations that we have (sight, feeling, taste,...).
In other words, it seems to me that it is a good ontological guess (hypothesis) to take for real the best formal description that we have. We're not obliged to, but at least, it shouldn't be forbidden (what Bohr wanted us to believe).
It's always better to have a strange reality, than no reality at all IMO.

Very interesting points (yoru posts are always extremely informative and thought provoking).

The important point (that you also made) is, in my opinion, to keep in mind that what we use as ontology is not set in stone. All of physics is based on mapping observations to some mathematical framework 9with an ontology attached to it) and to map back the framework to observations. (Or, in some cases, to try to get the framework directly without any experimental input to map from, using arguments of elegance, unfication power, etc).

The only danger is to start believeing so much in the mathematical framework and ontology assigned to it as to stop "thinking outside the box". The notion of absolute time is a good example. It became so part of the fundamental way of thinking of physicists that the ontology became set in stone, at least for the vast majority of physicists (philosophers were more open-minded :-) )

The wavefunction concept is even more deeply abstract than time so that if it has used to build an ontology of the quantum world, it must be done with caution.

I think that you agree with this. My main point i sthat it is nfortunately not emphasized enough to studentsof the field.


Aside: In the end, the only measurements that are ever made are measurements of relative position between different objects, with time being a parameter specifying a rate at which relative position between certain "things" is updated. I always have wondered if a full theory should not simply use these data as the fundamental ingredients of the theory and nothing else.

 

[meopemuk]

With a classical dice, the reality is that the dice has some particular side up after the throw, and the probabilities arise from our lack of knowledge. If we have not seen the dice after the throw, from our point of view there is 1/6 probability for each face, because we don't know it better.

In quantum mechanics the reality is that a system has complex amplitudes to be in different states. The amplitudes are not only our tool to describe the system, but the amplitudes are the objective reality.

I think it is dangerous to pretend that we know what happens to the system "in reality", i.e., while we are not watching. This is a sure way to logical paradoxes. The whole point of complex amplitudes in quantum mechanics is to refuse any statements about "reality" and concentrate only on (probabilities) of measurable outcomes of experiments.

Eugene.

 

[Hurkyl]

The mystery is not here. It is what is expected. The mystery resides in the fact that we don't see ourselves in a superposed state

I never found that mysterious: if wee see one state, we cannot see the other state!

 

[meopemuk]

The "hokus pokus" resides in the "why don't we see this superposition".

This is exactly because superposition is an abstract mathematical construct rather than physical reality.

Eugene.

 

[Hurkyl]

This is exactly because superposition is an abstract mathematical construct rather than physical reality.

Eugene.

It's certainly not an "abstract mathematical construct" on the microscopic level; why should it become so at the macroscopic level?

 

[meopemuk]

It's certainly not an "abstract mathematical construct" on the microscopic level; why should it become so at the macroscopic level?

I think quantum superposition is an abstract concept at all levels. The reality is that experiment may have many different outcomes. It is impossible to say which outcome will be realized in each particular instance, and we can know only their probabilities. In order to "explain" this fact we invented this abstract notion of a system existing in a superposition of various states with complex coefficients. This superposition exists only in our heads and it cannot be observed.

My opinion is that the random behavior of quantum systems does not require explanation. This is just a fundamental law of nature. Complex superposition of states is just a mathematical trick, which is needed for calculations of probabilities.

Eugene.

 

[Hurkyl]

In order to "explain" this fact we invented this abstract notion of a system existing in a superposition of various states with complex coefficients. This superposition exists only in our heads and it cannot be observed.

And in order to "explain" the fact that objects tend to fall to the floor, we invented the abstract notion of gravity. Was that just a mathematical trick?

 

[meopemuk]

And in order to "explain" the fact that objects tend to fall to the floor, we invented the abstract notion of gravity. Was that just a mathematical trick?

Yes, this may sound silly, but there is a grain of truth in this. It is very important to distinguish between physical reality (i.e., things that are directly observed, like object falling on the floor, or photon leaving a mark on the photographic plate) and abstract notions that are invented by people to put these observations in some order, called physical theory. There is a large number of such abstract concepts in physics (distance-dependent forces, curved space-time, quantum wave functions, etc.), and it is often tempting to pretend that they are parts of physical reality, rather than parts of mathematical formalism used to describe and make sense of physical reality.

Eugene.

 

[Hurkyl]

It is very important to distinguish between physical reality (i.e., things that are directly observed, like object falling on the floor, or photon leaving a mark on the photographic plate) and abstract notions that are invented by people to put these observations in some order, called physical theory.

How do you make the distinction?

e.g. I certainly didn't directly observe an object falling on the floor... although my brain inferred it by postprocessing some chemical reactions that took place in my eyes and some reverberations I picked up in my ears.

Heck, even the notions that there is an object and a floor are simply abstraction notions my brain cooked up...

And a photon leaving a mark on the photographic plate? Not only is my observation of the mark indirect, but I certainly didn't see the photon in the act of leaving it there. I didn't even see the photon!

 

[meopemuk]

How do you make the distinction?

e.g. I certainly didn't directly observe an object falling on the floor... although my brain inferred it by postprocessing some chemical reactions that took place in my eyes and some reverberations I picked up in my ears.

Heck, even the notions that there is an object and a floor are simply abstraction notions my brain cooked up...

And a photon leaving a mark on the photographic plate? Not only is my observation of the mark indirect, but I certainly didn't see the photon in the act of leaving it there. I didn't even see the photon!

As our discussion demonstrates, reasonable people may reasonably disagree about where to draw the line between observations and theoretical models. In my opinion, it makes more sense to regard "quantum superposition" as a part of theoretical model, because nobody has ever observer the "superposition" of the dead and alive cat.

Eugene.

 

[Micha]

What it is so weird about the wavefunction, is, that it has the properties of a probability and of an amplitude at the same time.
Clearly if you only look at the probability aspect of it, the "collapse of the wave function" is nothing else as the well known fact from probability theory, that the probability, that B happens, might change, if you already now, that A has happened. It is a triviality then really.
On the other hand, the possible paths of a physical process are amplitudes, which means, they can interfere. Observation removes this possibility and this is, what is called the collapse of the wave function. And for me it is as scandalous, as it has ever bin.

 

[meopemuk]

What it is so weird about the wavefunction, is, that it has the properties of a probability and of an amplitude at the same time.
Clearly if you only look at the probability aspect of it, the "collapse of the wave function" is nothing else as the well known fact from probability theory, that the probability, that B happens, might change, if you already now, that A has happened. It is a triviality then really.
On the other hand, the possible paths of a physical process are amplitudes, which means, they can interfere. Observation removes this possibility and this is, what is called the collapse of the wave function. And for me it is as scandalous, as it has ever bin.

There is a deep reason for using complex amplitudes in quantum mechanics instead of probabilities. This reason is explained by "quantum logic" developed by Birkhoff, von Neumann, Mackey, and Piron. This theory says that quantum mechanics is, basically, a generalization of classical probability theory. In this generalization two (tacit) postulates of classical probability are rejected.

One rejected postulate says that "any two observables can be measured simultaneously with arbitrary precision". The other rejected postulate is: "one can always prepare an ensemble of systems in which measurements of all observables are reproducible". Without these postulates one arrives to a generalized probability theory based on complex Hilbert spaces, where the probability is calculated as a square of a complex amplitude.

Eugene.

 

[Hurkyl]

As our discussion demonstrates, reasonable people may reasonably disagree about where to draw the line between observations and theoretical models.

You are certainly entitled to your own opinion. But it's another thing entirely to foist that opinion upon others... especially when you make it sound as if it's an objective truth!

In my opinion, it makes more sense to regard "quantum superposition" as a part of theoretical model, because nobody has ever observer the "superposition" of the dead and alive cat.

Sure, we haven't observed the superposition of a dead and alive cat, but we have seen photons, electrons, and even macroscopic currents in superpositions of our favorite basis states.

 

[Hurkyl]

There is a deep reason for using complex amplitudes in quantum mechanics instead of probabilities.

There's an algebraic path as well. Quantum states are, by definition, things that produce values for observables. (Which we call the 'expectation' of that observable)

This means that quantum states are a certain kind of functional on the algebra of observables. It is known that such functionals can be represented as vectors in a suitable unitary representation of your algebra of observable.

In fact, if we assume each observable has a bounded spectrum, then every possible algebra of observables is isomorphic to an algebra of operators on some Hilbert space. (I'm not as familiar with the theory of unbounded spectra)


In other words, no matter what we choose for our algebra of observables, and no matter what our state space is... everything can be represented in the Hilbert space formalism. And since the Hilbert space formalism is rather convenient, we might as well use it!

 

[meopemuk]

You are certainly entitled to your own opinion. But it's another thing entirely to foist that opinion upon others... especially when you make it sound as if it's an objective truth!

I am sorry for creating this wrong impression. Everything I am writing here is just my personal opinion. If this opinion happens to coincide with objective truth, it's just a coincidence. I am adding qualifiers like "I think", "in my opinion" in my posts. Possibly, I should do it more often.

Sure, we haven't observed the superposition of a dead and alive cat, but we have seen photons, electrons, and even macroscopic currents in superpositions of our favorite basis states.

I don't agree with that. When we observe a single electron we always find it in a definite state, not in a superposition. For example, when the electron interacts with a scintillating screen it hits one particular point on the screen and does not create a diffuse image. The idea of superposition and wave function arises only when we need to explain theoretically why different electrons hit different places on the screen. This is a purely theoretical idea. In my opinion.

Eugene.

 

[Hurkyl]

I don't agree with that. When we observe a single electron we always find it in a definite state, not in a superposition.

Of course, a definite "spin up about the z axis" is a superposition of "spin up about the x axis" and "spin down about the x axis".

For example, when the electron interacts with a scintillating screen it hits one particular point on the screen and does not create a diffuse image. The idea of superposition and wave function arises only when we need to explain theoretically why different electrons hit different places on the screen. This is a purely theoretical idea. In my opinion.

But you agree, at least, that there is a real 'interference' pattern produced when I fire thousands of electrons through the double slit, right? The superposition hypothesis has a real, observable effect that differs from the lack of superposition hypothesis.

 

[meopemuk]

But you agree, at least, that there is a real 'interference' pattern produced when I fire thousands of electrons through the double slit, right? The superposition hypothesis has a real, observable effect that differs from the lack of superposition hypothesis.

Yes, of course, the theory of quantum superposition is, in my opinion, the best creation of theoretical physics in the 20th century. It would be silly to deny that. But I tried to make a different point. I tried to reply to vanesch who (if I understood correctly) was surprised that superposed states (of individual systems, not ensembles) are not seen in experiments. I wanted to say that individual systems can be only found in a definite state (dead or alive; spin up or spin down) and they are never found in a complex superposition. The idea of quantum superposition is needed only when we try to describe an ensemble of identically prepared states and to "explain" why measurements in such an ensemble are not reproducible (sometimes we find a dead cat other times the cat is alive; sometimes we measure spin up and other times the spin is down).

Quantum mechanics doesn't say that it is possible to see half-dead half-alive cat. This superposition is a necessary and important ingredient of theory, but not something that can be directly observed. I hope I made myself clear now.

Eugene.

 

[vanesch]

Yes, of course, the theory of quantum superposition is, in my opinion, the best creation of theoretical physics in the 20th century. It would be silly to deny that. But I tried to make a different point. I tried to reply to vanesch who (if I understood correctly) was surprised that superposed states (of individual systems, not ensembles) are not seen in experiments.

I'm not really "surprised", but it is the "surprise" of the theory in a way, when we think too naively that what we observe is real and is all there is. As, according to the theory, there is a "superposition" of outcomes, then the "naive" question that arrises is "then why don't I see them ?" ; but as Einstein said: it is the *theory* that says what is to be observable and what isn't. So one can clearly understand why we can't, at the same time, *observe* a superposition of outcomes and at the same time be subject to a linear dynamics, and have an "illusion of free will". Indeed, otherwise it would be possible to (have the illusion that we can) change the evolution according to the different observed superpositions, which would imply a non-linear time evolution.
To make this clear, imagine that I could somehow subjectively observe both branches, in which a state (|a> + |b>) evolved (after measurement interaction) into (|a>|pointer1> + |b> |pointer2>). That means that subjectively I would be able to observe both pointer1 and pointer2 outcomes. I could now decide to push the red button when I see BOTH outcomes, but push the green button when I only see ONE outcome.
But that would mean that I somehow have an evolution:
(|a> + |b>) ---> |red button>
|a> ----> |green button>
|b> ----> |green button>

This cannot be linear and unitary. As such, the price to pay for my subjective observation and my illusion of free will means that I will never be able to subjectively experience the superposition of states in a unitary evolution dynamics.

I wanted to say that individual systems can be only found in a definite state (dead or alive; spin up or spin down) and they are never found in a complex superposition.

Consider polarisation states. Is |45 degrees> a superposition of |90 degrees> and |0 degrees > ? Is "spin along X" not a superposition of "spin along z up" and "spin along z down" ? Isn't "short light pulse" not a superposition of "red light" "green light" "blue light", "yellow light" ... ?

The idea of quantum superposition is needed only when we try to describe an ensemble of identically prepared states and to "explain" why measurements in such an ensemble are not reproducible (sometimes we find a dead cat other times the cat is alive; sometimes we measure spin up and other times the spin is down).

No, not really. In 100% destructive interference, you cannot explain, without superposition, why the particle NEVER hits a certain place, for instance.

Quantum mechanics doesn't say that it is possible to see half-dead half-alive cat. This superposition is a necessary and important ingredient of theory, but not something that can be directly observed. I hope I made myself clear now.

I agree with you that quantum mechanics (together with some other hypotheses, such as the illusion of free will) explains why macroscopic superpositions are not experienced as such. It only comes as a naive "surprise" when we stop taking quantum theory seriously along the path and think that somehow we should have a "god's eye" viewpoint on "what is" and exclude our proper observation from a quantum-mechanical description.

Mind you, I don't say that nature is "really" like that ; but quantum theory, when taken seriously all the way (which is maybe a good or a bad thing to do) explains entirely consistently WHY we don't observe "superpositions". As such, the very fact that we don't observe macroscopic superpositions is NOT an argument against taking quantum mechanics as ontological hypothesis. You may, for other reasons, have other arguments not to do so. But the fact that we don't see superpositions of macroscopic classical states isn't an argument. Quantum theory, by itself, is entirely capable of explaining WHY we don't see them.

 

[Mentz114]

Vanesch, your posts are well argued and backed by knowledge and understanding. But I have one question I'd like to raise,

But the fact that we don't see superpositions of macroscopic classical states isn't an argument. Quantum theory, by itself, is entirely capable of explaining WHY we don't see them.

Is quantum theory the first physical theory where things exist consistently within the theory ( probability amplitude, superposed states ..) but which, the theory itself tells us, cannot be observed ? Does this very idea not conflict with the notion of objective reality ?

 

[meopemuk]

Consider polarisation states. Is |45 degrees> a superposition of |90 degrees> and |0 degrees > ? Is "spin along X" not a superposition of "spin along z up" and "spin along z down" ? Isn't "short light pulse" not a superposition of "red light" "green light" "blue light", "yellow light" ... ?

Yes. "Spin along x" state in quantum mechanics is a superposition of "spin along z up" and "spin along z down" states. But what this superposition means for experiment? Does it mean that somehow we can see both "spin along z up" and "spin along z down" states simultaneously? No, not at all. That's not what quantum mechanics says. It says that if we perform measurements in the "spin along x" state, then sometimes we will find its "spin along z" up and sometimes the "spin along z" will be down. We will always find a definite value of "spin along z". However, it is impossible to say which of the two possible values (up or down) will be found each time. We can only predict the probabilities by taking squares of superposition coefficients.

This is what we see in experiment. Now you may say: "these experiments indicate that before the spin has been measured it was in a superposition state in which both "spin along z up" and "spin along z down" states coexisted together. Our measurement induced a random collapse of this superposition state to one of its components." This is Copenhagen interpretation. It tells you something about the system before the measurement was performed. So, you have a good reason to be sceptical about this statement, because it is impossible to verify it experimentally, even in principle.

Eugene.

 

[lightarrow]

I wanted to say that individual systems can be only found in a definite state (dead or alive; spin up or spin down) and they are never found in a complex superposition. The idea of quantum superposition is needed only when we try to describe an ensemble of identically prepared states and to "explain" why measurements in such an ensemble are not reproducible (sometimes we find a dead cat other times the cat is alive; sometimes we measure spin up and other times the spin is down).

Quantum mechanics doesn't say that it is possible to see half-dead half-alive cat. This superposition is a necessary and important ingredient of theory, but not something that can be directly observed. I hope I made myself clear now.

Eugene.

I agree with you and I would add: could a "measurement" have any meaning if it wouldn't be described by a well defined state?

 

[Hurkyl]

I agree with you and I would add: could a "measurement" have any meaning if it wouldn't be described by a well defined state?

Why not? I consider a CNOT gate to be the most basic example of a measuring device.

 

[lightarrow]

Why not? I consider a CNOT gate to be the most basic example of a measuring device.

Hello Hurkyl.
Sorry but I would ask you to explain better what exactly it's measured in that case.

 

[vanesch]

Is quantum theory the first physical theory where things exist consistently within the theory ( probability amplitude, superposed states ..) but which, the theory itself tells us, cannot be observed ?

No, the very first theory that did this was Newtonian mechanics, where the concept of force was introduced, but force cannot be observed, only displacement (and derivatives) can. It gave a lot of headaches to Newton himself, and his "action at a distance" which was so different than what one would intuitively think of a force, such as a push or a pull. So you could argue that Newtonian mechanics is just a tool which helps us calculate the observed displacements of objects, and uses a mathematical tool for that which is "force" (or one of its equivalents, potential energy, interaction, ...) but that this is nothing physical. We only observe displacements of things. Things don't really "interact" because we cannot observe directly their "interaction" but only their displacements, and it seems to be a convenient thing in the theory to talk about interactions (forces, or interaction potentials or whatever), but in "reality" the sun doesn't attract the Earth physically, and there is no force of gravity or electrical forces or whatever, all these are constructions of a theory. We only have that objects suffer displacements, period.
Newtonian theory tells us that forces cannot be observed. Only positions, velocities and accelerations can. The reason that a force cannot be observed in Newtonian physics, is that it suffers vector addition. As such, a force plus its opposite force has exactly the same consequence as no force at all. There's no "preferred decomposition" of zero force, and hence its components cannot have the slightest observable effect.

A stronger form of "non-observability", which prompted Einstein to his statement, is found in general relativity. The typical trap in doing GR is to take one's coordinate system too seriously, and to think that because one has introduced x,y,z,t, that these are things that can be observed. In GR, you cannot observe directly the spacetime manifold, and certainly not a coordinate system over it. You can only measure such things as eigentimes, and other intervals.

Does this very idea not conflict with the notion of objective reality ?

No, this idea conflicts with the notion of naive realism: that reality is what is observed, and that it is all there is to it.

 

[vanesch]

It tells you something about the system before the measurement was performed. So, you have a good reason to be sceptical about this statement, because it is impossible to verify it experimentally, even in principle.

This is true in a way. But the problem with that attitude is that, when applied to the extreme, you end up in solipsism. Indeed, the whole point of an ontological hypothesis is to have a claim of objective existence of something loose from observation. If you insist on only taking for real what is observation, then you run into the following problem: you cannot even take for real the banana on the table. Indeed, you don't observe "a banana", you only observe some yellow light in your eye. But then, you don't observe "yellow light in your eye", your brain only observes some nerve pulses coming from your eye.
You can say: yes but I can touch the banana. True. But how do you know that you touch the banana ? Because receptors under your finger skin send out nerve pulses to your brain. So you're not really observing the touch of the banana, your brain only observes nerve pulses from your fingers.
You can also eat the banana. You will taste it, but I can set up the same story, that the entire sensation of "eating a banana" is just the result of nerve pulses arriving in your brain. And then, do you really observe your brain ? Or do you assume you have a brain because you have read about it, and you've seen motion pictures or even bodies being dissected etc... ?

So why do you think that there really is a banana on the table ? Because it is a (small piece of) theory which is consistent with all your observations. You have the theory "there's a banana on the table" and that theory gives rise to some ontology (a REAL banana on a REAL table), and from it, you can deduce a lot of observations: if you touch it, you will feel something that feels like a banana ; if you look at it, you will see some yellow light ; if you eat it, it will taste like a banana etc...
So this theory "there's a banana on the table" explains very well, in a consistent way, many observations. As such, it is a good theoretical construct. But of course, it is only that: a construct. You could just as well argue that "banana's" are of course useful theoretical constructs, which are very useful to explain observations, but that they are only that, and don't, of course, correspond to a genuine ontology, because you can never verify experimentally that a banana really exists! You can only verify experimentally that you have subjective experiences which probably result from nerve pulses on something you probably have, which is a brain. But there's no way that the observation of these nerve pulses proves that there is really a banana on the table.

 

[Mentz114]

Vanesch:

No, this idea conflicts with the notion of naive realism: that reality is what is observed, and that it is all there is to it.

Agreed.

No, the very first theory that did this was Newtonian mechanics, where the concept of force was introduced, but force cannot be observed, only displacement (and derivatives) can.

I'd like to say that a quantity that can be calculated using experimental data is 'observable'. For instance by measuring times, distances and masses, I can in principle put a number on F=ma for a given situation.

Is it not the case that in principle there is no experiment that would allow me to calculate what the quantum phase was at the time of measurement ?

So why do you think that there really is a banana on the table ? Because it is a (small piece of) theory which is consistent with all your observations. You have the theory "there's a banana on the table" and that theory gives rise to some ontology (a REAL banana on a REAL table), and from it, you can deduce a lot of observations: if you touch it, you will feel something that feels like a banana ; if you look at it, you will see some yellow light ; if you eat it, it will taste like a banana etc...
So this theory "there's a banana on the table" explains very well, in a consistent way, many observations. As such, it is a good theoretical construct. But of course, it is only that: a construct. You could just as well argue that "banana's" are of course useful theoretical constructs, which are very useful to explain observations, but that they are only that, and don't, of course, correspond to a genuine ontology, because you can never verify experimentally that a banana really exists! You can only verify experimentally that you have subjective experiences which probably result from nerve pulses on something you probably have, which is a brain. But there's no way that the observation of these nerve pulses proves that there is really a banana on the table.

No, I don't like this. It is sophisticated ( in the worse sense) and goes against experience. There's an easy test for the reality/existence of a banana.

 

[Hurkyl]

Is it not the case that in principle there is no experiment that would allow me to calculate what the quantum phase was at the time of measurement ?

You can't get complete information, but you can get partial information.

No, I don't like this. It is sophisticated ( in the worse sense) and goes against experience.

That doesn't make it wrong.

There's an easy test for the reality/existence of a banana.

Please elaborate: propose an experiment that distinguishes between a real banana and the solipsist hypothesis.

 

[Mentz114]

Hurkyl:

You can't get complete information, but you can get partial information.

Ok. I'm doing some reading about this.

No, I don't like this. It is sophisticated ( in the worse sense) and goes against experience.

That doesn't make it wrong.

But it doesn't make it physics.

Please elaborate: propose an experiment that distinguishes between a real banana and the solipsist hypothesis.

You cannot be serious ! Solipsism is a ridiculous idea and not worth discussing.

My point is that QM is different from earlier theories, that's all, but we stray into pure philosophy. We have to accept that we can believe our senses and that there is an objective reality or physics has no meaning or purpose.

Another thing worth mentioning about the original topic 'wave function collapse' is that it is possible to start with the SE and correctly predict the dynamics of quantum particles without mentioning probablity amplitudes, Hilbert space or wave function collapse. So these things do not have the special position they seem to have assumed.

 

[Hurkyl]

But it doesn't make it physics.

If we were discussing physics, the discussion would have ended with "QM predicts superpositions, and is supported by empirical evidence". This has been a debate of metaphysics for quite some time.

You cannot be serious ! Solipsism is a ridiculous idea and not worth discussing.

You're the one who claimed that there was an easy test to tell the difference between the solipsist hypothesis and the real banana hypothesis.

 

[vanesch]

You cannot be serious ! Solipsism is a ridiculous idea and not worth discussing.

Mmmm... doesn't sound like a very convincing argument to me

My point is that QM is different from earlier theories, that's all, but we stray into pure philosophy. We have to accept that we can believe our senses and that there is an objective reality or physics has no meaning or purpose.

But that's the whole point ! This is a statement that one should adhere to naive realism and that it is forbidden to think of the consequences of not doing so. Rather dogmatic, no ?

Personally, I don't find solipsism "unworthy of discussion" ; I only find it not a very useful ontology hypothesis, because we stop immediately. Ontology should be useful (although, and that is what the possibility of solipsism illustrates, up to a point arbitrary and fixed by convention). As such, the question is: what's the most useful ontology hypothesis that we can make, that helps us "understand" (= give us an intuitive feeling) for our subjective observations ?

"there's a banana on the table" is a very useful ontology hypothesis in daily life.
When doing quantum mechanics, what we take as "real" (to help our intuition) may be set differently.

Another thing worth mentioning about the original topic 'wave function collapse' is that it is possible to start with the SE and correctly predict the dynamics of quantum particles without mentioning probablity amplitudes, Hilbert space or wave function collapse. So these things do not have the special position they seem to have assumed.

Ah ? We can use the SE without the entire hilbert space mechanism ?

 

[meopemuk]

If you insist on only taking for real what is observation, then you run into the following problem: you cannot even take for real the banana on the table.

This example makes clear that one needs to carefully draw the line between what is considered observable effects and what is "stuff" of theory. You vividly demonstrated that drawing this line inside our brain leads to solipsism. But it would be just as silly to draw this line in such a way that all theoretical stuff gets promoted to the rank of observable effects. Shall we say that forces are real? what about electromagnetic fields? wave functions? Hilbert spaces? quantum fields? curved space-time..?

I think that you provided an excellent example of the separation observable/theoretical in your previous post:

Newtonian theory tells us that forces cannot be observed. Only positions, velocities and accelerations can.

I basically agree with this Newtonian philosophy: Experiment tells us about certain observables of material particles (position, velocity, spin, momentum,...). This is what objectively exists. The rest of physics (forces, wave functions, Hilbert spaces...) is just mathematical stuff that we invented to describe these observations.

Eugene.

 

[Mentz114]

From: Wiki

Solopsism is the philosophical idea that "My mind is the only thing that I know exists". Solipsism is an epistemological or metaphysical position that knowledge of anything outside the mind is unjustified.

A weak form of epistemological solipsism states that the agent has no proof of anything beyond the senses. This can be raw observation, at the level of "I see red", "I am not aware of a proof". A stronger form states "No proof exists", this is falsifiable in as far as anything is. In order to falsify it, a proof must be provided.

This is what I understand by Solopsism and I admit I only vaguely see what is meant, while finding it offensively ilogical. I don't want to get into metaphysics, not my bag.

You're the one who claimed that there was an easy test to tell the difference between the solipsist hypothesis and the real banana hypothesis.

No, you misunderstand me. I would not try and answer any question that relates to or involves Solopsism any more than count angels on pinheads.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Mentz114

You cannot be serious ! Solipsism is a ridiculous idea and not worth discussing.

Mmmm... doesn't sound like a very convincing argument to me.

You are right, of course. May I amend it to

"Solipsism is a ridiculous idea and not worth discussing further as a useful ontological model"

This is a statement that one should adhere to naive realism and that it is forbidden to think of the consequences of not doing so. Rather dogmatic, no ?

If Maxwell, Planck, Lorentz and Einstein were 'naive' realists, I'm proud to be counted in their company. What's wrong with being dogmatic in keeping physics grounded in experiment ?

Ah ? We can use the SE without the entire hilbert space mechanism ?

Well, yes. It's De Broglie-Bohm theory.

I appreciate the time and trouble you've taken to put me right on the metaphysics, it has been stimulating and edifying. Now it's back to the equations (reality !) for me.

 

[rewebster]

I basically agree with this Newtonian philosophy: Experiment tells us about certain observables of material particles (position, velocity, spin, momentum,...). This is what objectively exists. The rest of physics (forces, wave functions, Hilbert spaces...) is just mathematical stuff that we invented to describe these observations.

Eugene.

let's see---do I agree with Newtonian/Galilean philosophy, or is it that my philosophy is Newtonian/Galilean physics?