Is time an illusion? Exploring the concept of time as a constant state of change

[Fra]

My observer question wasn't intented to restrict itself to human observers. It coul be anything. Even a molecule. Sure it's unclear what I mean with a molecule observing and responding, but I see it as relabeling the words in a "molecule interacting". There are reasons to think that a molecule can not encode arbitrary amounts of information unless getting extremely energetic.

I am just trying to find a practical realistic application of your thinking. I don't care if we call it physics or mathematics or biology, but for me I am interested in understanding reality. My understanding must have a place, and function in the setting of actual reality.

/Fredrik

 

[Doctordick]

( I don't mind if you want to spellcheck - go ahead )

Thank you for your kindness to my compulsions.

I am well aware that I may misinterpret your intentions, but that's what the questions are for.

I had no intention for you to take my comment as a rebuke; I was merely pointing out the source of your difficulty.

You somewhere (I forgot where) defined an "explanation" as a method for obtaining a expectation? This sounds interesting, but I am still not sure if you mean what I think you mean.

The basic reference can be found http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm

Question on definition of expectation: Do you with expectation mean like some probability in [frequentness?] interpretation, define on the current known fact? ie history or past, or whatever is part of your known facts?

Essentially yes.

I will suggest that what an explanation does for information is that it provides expectations of subsets of that information. That is, it seems to me that if all the information is known, then any questions about the information can be answered (in fact, that could be regarded as the definition of "knowing"). On the other hand, if the information is understood (explainable), then questions about the information can be answered given only limited or incomplete knowledge of the underlying information: i.e., limited subsets of the information. What I am saying is that understanding implies it is possible to predict expectations for information not known; the explanation constitutes a method which provides one with those rational expectations for unknown information consistent with what is known.

What I am saying is that your explanation of something (no matter what that explanation is about) is the source of your expectations. If I understand your explanation, I will be able to estimate your expectations as a probability attached to the various possibilities. In particular, you need to recognize that the correctness of your expectations is not the issue here. The issue is defining exactly what “an explanation” is and, in my opinion, it is a mechanism for generating expectations. I am defining "an explanation", not "a good explanation". A good explanation would be one with few flaws. An explanation which yields expectations perfectly consistent with the known facts would be a "flaw-free" explanation (what we would all like to find).

In fact many scientific discussions revolve around the inaccuracy of one's expectations. If a scientist understands your explanation of something and is of the opinion that your explanation is wrong, his standard attack will be to point out an expectation implied by your explanation does not fit the facts (i.e., is not very probably correct).

Or does expectation refer to the unknown? ie. that what you know, induce an expectation on the unknown? ie. future?

Your expectations are whatever you expect. The easiest way to express your expectations in a precise mathematical way is to give the probabilities of various possibilities. Have you ever heard of the game “20 questions”? Think of your expectations as your answers to a game of “an infinite number of questions with yes/no answers”. A complete description of your expectations could consist of a probability distribution for your answers: i.e., a number bounded by zero and one for each and every question. If I understood your personal explanation of the pertinent information, I could use that explanation to create an estimate of those probabilities: i.e., I would know what to expect from you with regard to that subject (the pertinent information).

If you _define_ a probability pretty much like some relative frequency on a given, fixed set of facts, then the "expectation" applied to that set is of course exact by definition? Is this what you mean?

Or do you suggest, that the expectation provides us with educated guesses in cases where we lack information?

I would say that the idea includes both; the exact expectations are defined by probabilities zero and one, the educated guesses are represented by numbers elsewhere in the range.

You said somewhere I think that you make no predictions? But isn't an expectation a kind of prediction? I mean the expectation is not exact, it doesn't tell us what will happen, but it gives us a basis for bet placing - thus there are good and bad expectations. Do you somehow claim that your expectation is the optimum one?

Once again, you are clearly misinterpreting what I am doing. I am making no predictions of any kind; I am analyzing the problem of making predictions (estimating the probabilities your explanation should yield). Take a quick look at this response to Anssi.
Understanding the issues presented in that response will go a long way in explaining my approach.

Let me ask this: What is the benefit, someone would have, adapting your models, over someone that uses the standard model? Would they somehow be more "fit" (thinking of the analogy of natural selection here).

We are talking about explanations here (epistemological constructs designed to explain reality). I am looking for logical constraints on those constructs. I take your use of the term “standard model” to imply you are misunderstanding what I am doing. When it comes to setting constraints on explanations, the “standard model” is, “it has to make sense”, a very vague and imprecise statement. Every professor I have ever heard define “an explanation” seldom does more than give a few example explanations and then comment something like “I'm not going to waste my time explaining things to you if you can't understand what an explanation is”. It appears to be an unexamined concept: i.e., what I am talking about is something no one looks at carefully.

Over two years ago I made a post to the thread, "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics" which I think is worth understanding.

To put it another way, knowing is having facts available to you (the facts come from the past, not the future) and understanding allows discrimination between good and bad answers (facts you might expect to become available to you in the future). Now the human race has become quite good at this discrimination since all we living things first crawled out of the sea. We are the undoubted leaders in the realm of "understanding" the world around us. And yet no one has come up with a good argument to dismiss the Solipsist position. The fact that we have come so far without being able to prove what is and what is not real should make it clear to you that understanding reality can not possibly require knowing what is real. This is why every serious scientist (I except myself of course) has vociferously argued against any rational consideration of the question. Their position is: if we don't know what's real, how can we possibly dream of understanding reality. They hold that we must assume we know what's real. You can see that position promulgated all over this forum! Why do you think they label me a crackpot? :rofl:

I am just trying to find a practical realistic application of your thinking. I don't care if we call it physics or mathematics or biology, but for me I am interested in understanding reality.

Well, I was interested in answering the question “What can we know?” If you cannot answer that question, how can you have any direction to your attempts to understand reality. Again, in my opinion, the “standard approach” to understanding reality is a “guess and by golly” approach with little or no thought given to logical direction. I had proved the validity of my equation over ten years prior to unraveling the first solution to that equation. Prior to discovering a method of finding solutions, it just seemed reasonable to me that, if I could find a solution, that solution should have practical application. When I finally figured out how to solve it, I discovered practical realistic applications up the wazzo (so to speak). For the moment, why don't we not worry about that; we should first comprehend the defense of the definition and the deduction of the equation itself.

It might benifit you to look at this response to some of Anssi's other questions

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Fra]

Perhaps you also misinterpret some of my questions too ;) some were provocative in order to probe your responses on key points. For obvious reasons I can never be sure I hold the same information as you, but I can say as much that at least some of the things you say makes perfect sense to me and seems closely related to my thinking - this is the part of your explanation or current facts as you put it, implies expectations on the unknown - this bears striking resemblance to optimal inference methods, where one might try to device a relative probability, which I personally call an expectation of the probability becaues you know what you know, but you can only guess what you don't know, thus sometimes the definition of the proper probability space itself gets unclear. Though I have a feeling from first skimming our writings that we have had similarity in thinking early one, but then later on... I am not sure.

For the moment, why don't we not worry about that; we should first comprehend the defense of the definition and the deduction of the equation itself.

Ok, I'll again at that later.

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

Ok I'll try to look at http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm ...in small pieces

Just to make sure I get it...

Let's for a second ignore the definition of probability itself...

will define the expectations to be the probability that a particular B(tk) will become a member of C: written as P(B(tk)).

So you basically take the expectation of B(tk) to be a probability conditional on C, right? So using the notions of conditional probabilities a bit loosely, do you object if I write $$P(B_{t_k}|C)$$ to be read as the conditional probability of $$B_{t_k}$$ given C? Where this definition of probability includes your eplanation and it's exploit as inducing a probability?

Loosely speaking, this make sense, but there are still issues here. The question is what we mean by probability - my personal main objection to standard QM, is that not even the probability is known exactly, it is only an expectation of the probability, basically probability of probability.

Reflections?

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

I'm not sure I understand how you introduce tau. My associations is an absolute frequency of x, or something else?

Edit: Frequency in B that is.

? no?

/Fredrik

 

[AnssiH]

Sign of life

I thought I'd drop in sign of life to the thread before leaving for a week again (albeit I'll have some access to internet, but probably very little time).

I'm little bit disappointed that I haven't had time to cook up a reply in a while, but then I can't be too disappointed since I've spent hours today and the other day going through the older posts reeaally carefully, and I can say it has been beneficial; I have been able to answer some of my questions all by myself.

Later!
-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Perhaps you also misinterpret some of my questions too ;) some were provocative in order to probe your responses on key points.

Perhaps I do and, if so, I would like to be corrected as communications with common language is difficult at best; I much prefer mathematics as meanings are usually quite universal and generally precise.

For obvious reasons I can never be sure I hold the same information as you, but I can say as much that at least some of the things you say makes perfect sense to me and seems closely related to my thinking - this is the part of your explanation or current facts as you put it, implies expectations on the unknown - this bears striking resemblance to optimal inference methods, where one might try to device a relative probability, which I personally call an expectation of the probability because you know what you know, but you can only guess what you don't know, thus sometimes the definition of the proper probability space itself gets unclear.

One problem we are apparently having here is that you are thinking in terms of epistemological constructs themselves whereas I am concerned with “representation” of epistemological constructs. I have found that the difference between these two issues is very difficult to communicate. That is one of the reasons I keep bringing up my conversation with Anssi; I am pretty well convinced that he has managed to get his mind past that barrier.

The concept “optimal inference method” is itself the result of an epistemological construct (it is a concept defined within your world view). In order for you to communicate to me what you mean by that phrase, you would have to do your best to define what you mean by the expression. That act itself would involve my coming to understand what you mean and accomplishing that result (to the satisfaction of both of us) would require a great many assumptions on my part. Essentially, in order for me to understand what you are saying, requires me to solve the problem which I have posed to examine. Now, I am not saying that I don't understand what you are saying; what I am saying is that my understanding of anything must be held as suspect. My intention was to “make no assumptions” and, under that constraint, all I have to work with is my definition of “reality” (which I define to be the set of “valid ontological elements” on which my world view is built) and my definition of “an explanation” ( which I define to be “a method of obtaining expectations from given known information”).

Certainly, the issue of “epistemological constructs” has already reared it's ugly head but I will suggest that that is only because you want those terms in my definitions defined. Ontology is commonly defined to be the study of “being” (which is most often taken to be “what exists”: i.e. reality). What I am saying is that I am going to use those symbols, “reality” and “valid ontology”, to reference what it is that I want to understand (as my meanings seem to be at least quite similar to the common intention of those words). This evades being an epistemological construct by the very fact that I have specified it to be undefined (it only becomes defined with regard to a specific epistemological construct). The “given known information” is to be taken to be that “valid ontology” which constitutes reality. Or rather, symbolic reference to those “valid ontological elements”.

That leaves the issue of “expectations”. In this case, I use the concept of probability as used by mathematicians (I have earlier said that I will use the constructs of mathematics as given: i.e., defined abstract systems and operations well understood by many people).

I will make much use of Mathematics without defense or argument. In essence, it is quite clear that mathematicians are very concerned with the exactness of their definitions and the self consistency of their mental structures. I suspect mathematics could probably be defined to be the study of self consistent systems. At any rate, their concerns are exactly those which drive my work; I am merely attacking a slightly different problem.

You were concerned with my definition of probabilities. As you said, one can only guess what they don't know; however, that is of no concern to my analysis in any way. All I am saying is that expectations can be seen in terms of the mathematical concept of probability. It makes utterly no difference how those expectations were arrived at; probability gives us a symbolic way of expressing them; it is a well understood method of communicating expectations.

That is to say, if you have explained something to me and I come back with a statement of what I would presume was the probability distribution of a set of consequences of your explanation; and you agreed with me that the distribution was consistent with your explanation, we would both conclude we were communicating: i.e., that I appeared to understand your explanation. This is, in essence, exactly what stands behind my definition of “an explanation”: i.e., it provides a mechanism for generating that probability distribution. It is essential that the means of developing that distribution be kept as an open unconstrained issue.

What is important here is recognizing that actually generating a probability distribution of any kind requires an explanation and the explanation usually requires an epistemological construct (a theory). What I want to do is proceed as far as possible without resorting to any epistemological construct of any kind.

That is why I introduced the idea of the ”what is”, is “what is” explanation of reality. It is the only explanation of reality of which I am aware which requires no epistemological construct of any kind. Wanting you to understand that issue was a strong reason I gave the earlier link to my note to Anssi

I'm not sure I understand how you introduce tau. My associations is an absolute frequency of x, or something else?

I do not understand your question. First of all “how” I introduce tau is a pretty insignificant issue, I just throw it in as an index referring to “invalid ontological element” (a convenient figment of my imagination). Why I introduce it is a much more pertinent question. You need to look at another communication I had with Anssi which I think would clear the issue up a bit. Consider the following excerpt:

Another good example would be that family tree of the primates I brought up. How would you show multiple entries for the same species? You already use horizontal displacement to indicate different species and vertical displacement to indicate time and you would have to include another axis if you wanted to show the time change in populations.

I hope you know that the little blue carrot to the right of the person being quoted is a link to the quote? I say that because it would be worthwhile for you to read that whole post.

Tau is an index providing the power to indicate multiple occurrences with the same x, t indices. This we need in order to be able to represent an arbitrary explanation.

I have been able to answer some of my questions all by myself.

That strikes me as highly probable; I suspected getting you over the hump of seeing my perspective was the real issue. Actually, once you understand where I am coming from, what I am saying is quite simple. Perhaps you could help me communicate with Fredrick? I can certainly use the help.

Also, don't worry about not responding quickly; your life is a much more important problem than this stuff. This is for the fun of understanding.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Fra]

The concept “optimal inference method” is itself the result of an epistemological construct (it is a concept defined within your world view). In order for you to communicate to me what you mean by that phrase, you would have to do your best to define what you mean by the expression.

Of course, you are absolutely right. This is something I'm working on... but I think it would get messy for my to describe my theories here. At least in this thread I suggest we stick to your theory. My main curiosity here is if we share some thinking here or not. From my first reading I think we do, but still differ.

Not go into this now, but briefly, the basic idea of "optimal inference method", is that once you acknowledged that the problem is your incomplete knowledge, and you can't ever KNOW about the future. This reduces the problem to, make a guess about the future. This is what physics does, we guess and let experiment discriminate the good guesses from the bad guesses.

However in the optimal inference methods you go one step further, and try to somehow define the "best possible guess", or best possible "probability distribution" given your prior information, and moreover one tries to find the optimum way to update the expectations in response to additional information. (think bayes rule in bayesian probability, but generealise it). The generalisation can also produce expectation of "dynamics" and can define time and space in terms of degrees of distinguishability between events. One can also try to define time in terms of this. But I can't explain this now.

In my thinking there are some key components:
(1) Representation of expectations
(2) Communication with environment

The representation is changing in response to communications. I'm trying to find the best solution to this, using minimum assumptions.

The dynamics arises as there is communication between the known and the unknown.

But I rather not get into this now, and not in this thread. I just wanted to say that I've got some own thinking, and I did see similarities to your thinking at first glance. But I'm still working on the formalisations so I don't yet have any paper of site to point you to. This is why it's too early for me to explain the details of this. But others are working on related things, Ariel Caticha is one.

For me to really even try to explain this, it will be a big paper. And I hope it will come, but I've got a lot of work yet.

Certainly, the issue of “epistemological constructs” has already reared it's ugly head but I will suggest that that is
only because you want those terms in my definitions defined.

There is clearly a universal problem of choosing definitions. You may choose yours differently than mine, and there is no problem. I guess still, the ultimate proof of success is in the survival and fitness of any ideas. This goes for mine as well as yours. There is IMO no need for use to agree on this.

This is why I don't see much point in spending all my time explaining my thinking to others. I spent more times arguing on the internet some years ago, but the feedback was poor. My strategy is to work out my ideas in silent, and when I convinced myself I'll make sure to find an application for it. There are many things you can do if you've got a nice model. Artificial intelligence software, information processing. It would be much easier to convince by showing success.

Not to ignore yor other comments(!) I might get back later... I actually also appreciate a slower pace in the discussions here... since I've got a normal job and physics is a hobby for me... I constantly fight ot get time :)

I appreciate your depth of thinking at any rate (even if we end up disagreeing).

/Fredrik

 

[Doctordick]

Of course, you are absolutely right. This is something I'm working on... but I think it would get messy for my to describe my theories here.

Again, you have totally missed the point of my response. When I said, “one problem we are apparently having here is that you are thinking in terms of epistemological constructs themselves whereas I am concerned with “representation” of epistemological constructs”, I was referring to the fact that you are not even considering the fundamental problem under discussion. The fundamental problem is, how does one construct “a rational model of a totally unknown universe given nothing but a totally undefined stream of data which has been transcribed by a totally undefined process”. The issue is that you are beginning with the assumption that you have already solved that problem (which is totally equivalent to ignoring it). You start by assuming your world view is valid.

At least in this thread I suggest we stick to your theory.

Again I seem to have great difficulty communicating the fact that what I am presenting is not a theory (theories are epistemological constructs). I tried to make that clear in that private note I sent you but apparently you misunderstood what I was saying.

The first comment I would like to make is that what I present is not a theory (a fact which seems to be impossible to communicate). It is no more or less than a way of organizing what we know without knowing what it is that we know. Somewhat analogous to the Dewy decimal system of organizing a library; the point being that the Dewy decimal system does not depend on knowing what will come to be in that library: it is no more than a procedure for handling the information when it gets there.

The fact is that I have discovered an analytical solution to “the problem of constructing a rational model of a totally unknown universe given nothing but a totally undefined stream of data which has been transcribed by a totally undefined process”. I am trying to communicate that solution to you so that you can evaluate the logic of the solution for yourself.

A profound issue of significance here is that my solution to the problem must include your theory. In fact, no theory of anything is to be excluded by my attack. This is the reason for my comment that, “In order for you to communicate to me what you mean by that phrase, you would have to do your best to define what you mean by the expression.” What I meant was that, in order to represent your theory under my definitions, I would need all of the required communications necessary to define absolutely all of the significant issues in that theory (I was not asking you to clarify these issues). I would need to be able to construct your communications as a specific ”what is”, is “what is” table of information which was to be “understood”. The only other option is to make assumptions and, if assumptions are to be made it is quite possible that those assumptions would be wrong. My construct is a logical exact construct and has some very specific consequences.

I think I made the central issue clear to Anssi back in April of this year: post #398 in this thread.

There is clearly a universal problem of choosing definitions. You may choose yours differently than mine, and there is no problem.

The problem in “choosing definitions” is communicating what is meant: i.e., that process itself means we are immediately dealing with epistemological constructs (see my above post to Anssi); ergo,

My intention was to “make no assumptions” and, under that constraint, all I have to work with is my definition of “reality” (which I define to be the set of “valid ontological elements” on which my world view is built) and my definition of “an explanation” ( which I define to be “a method of obtaining expectations from given known information”).

Certainly, the issue of “epistemological constructs” has already reared it's ugly head but I will suggest that that is only because you want those terms in my definitions defined. Ontology is commonly defined to be the study of “being” (which is most often taken to be “what exists”: i.e. reality). What I am saying is that I am going to use those symbols, “reality” and “valid ontology”, to reference what it is that I want to understand (as my meanings seem to be at least quite similar to the common intention of those words). This evades being an epistemological construct by the very fact that I have specified it to be undefined (it only becomes defined with regard to a specific epistemological construct).

I guess still, the ultimate proof of success is in the survival and fitness of any ideas. This goes for mine as well as yours. There is IMO no need for us to agree on this.

With regard to your ideas, I would agree with you. With regard to my presentation, I would not. I am presenting a logical deduction, not a theory. Either that deduction is a logically valid deduction or it is not. If we disagree on the validity of a logical step, one of us is wrong! There is no room for opinion there. I would love to discuss any error in my deductions which you might find. To date, every case I am aware of has been simple misinterpretation of what I am saying (the “theory” thing being a case in point).

It is my opinion that my real difficulty here is the fact that I am dealing with “denial” on the part of the intellectual community. Most everyone seems incapable of comprehending the fundamental problem of intelligence itself. It may be simply too abstract for them to deal with.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Fra]

Hey Doctordick, I completely missed your private message to me sorry! (Noticed it now when you drawed my attention to it) I hardly expect any private messages on here so my distribution of attention was close to null on the message message box ;) I'm sorry for overlooking this...

I have now read the link you offered and actually find little in his thoughts which impact on my analysis. The first comment I would like to make is that what I present is not a theory (a fact which seems to be impossible to communicate). It is no more or less than a way of organizing what we know without knowing what it is that we know. Somewhat analogous to the Dewy decimal system of organizing a library; the point being that the Dewy decimal system does not depend on knowing what will come to be in that library: it is no more than a procedure for handling the information when it gets there.

Ok, it's not a theory. Thus I assume it is meant to follow from pure reason/logic alone, right?

The fundamental problem is, how does one construct “a rational model of a totally unknown universe given nothing but a totally undefined stream of data which has been transcribed by a totally undefined process”.

Ok, I think I see. But I also suspect that you will tell me I got it all backwards again :)

Anyway:

Since you are talking about streams of data, I assume that your description is formed from a subject, and observer or what you may label it, without getting into the issues of what an observer really "IS". Somehow the observer is an implicit condition.

So, you somehow picture the situation where this observer, is faced with a stream of data. Why or how this data comes about is not known. It's somehow just a matter of fact. And now you take as the problem to make a rational model for data/facts as it arrives?

If that's close, my first questions is what to do you mean by rational model? What would for example an irrational model be like, in your terminology?

( I deliberately try to keep the posts short for clarity, especially until I nderstand each other, to prevent draining of attention from multiple focuses. Also, please don't let me disturb your parallell discussion with Anssi.)

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

With regard to your ideas, I would agree with you. With regard to my presentation, I would not. I am presenting a logical deduction, not a theory. Either that deduction is a logically valid deduction or it is not. If we disagree on the validity of a logical step, one of us is wrong! There is no room for opinion there. I would love to discuss any error in my deductions which you might find. To date, every case I am aware of has been simple misinterpretation of what I am saying (the “theory” thing being a case in point).

To be honest, even if you are right, I think your categorical tone may reject some people and make them think you are not serious. Personally I don't care as much, but I think many people select from such apperances.

It is my opinion that my real difficulty here is the fact that I am dealing with “denial” on the part of the intellectual community. Most everyone seems incapable of comprehending the fundamental problem of intelligence itself. It may be simply too abstract for them to deal with.

Your touching of this is exactly what drawn my attention to this thread. I'm well aware of these issues, I don't think that's the problem. I think I just don't understand what you yet. And before I do to a higher degree of confidence, I'm neither going to tell you that I think you are wrong, or that I agree. I don't know yet. All I know is that my current impression motivates further continuation of the discussion a litte longer. So far it's civilized and nice.

/Fredrik

 

[Doctordick]

I'm sorry for overlooking this...

Don't worry about it. I have done as much or worse myself.

Thus I assume it is meant to follow from pure reason/logic alone, right?

Yes, what I have done is defined exactly what the problem is and then found an analytical solution to that exact problem. What you need to do is, first accept my initial definitions (or at least agree to work with them as if they are valid). That would be my definition of “reality” (i.e., reality is an undefined valid ontology, defined only after a specific epistemology is defined) and my definition of “an explanation” (i.e., a method of generating expectations given some valid ontology or essentially what could be described as a flaw free epistemology).

Philosophers long ago divided the subject of “metaphysics” (a term Aristotle invented to refer to what lies beneath or behind “physics”) into two fields: ontology and epistemology. Essentially, epistemology is the philosophers perspective on scientific methodology: the scientific method, how doe one validate theories, etc (which I refer to as “an explanations”). Ontology is the study of what exists; in essence, the axiomatic assumptions (what exists) behind the epistemological constructs (the theories).

The problem here is that this division is very much a chicken and egg conundrum: which comes first, ontology or epistemology. One cannot construct an epistemology (an explanation) without “knowing” what is to be explained. It should be clear to you that what is commonly called your “world-view” is an epistemological construct (a theory) presumed to be valid. The problem is that one simply cannot define an ontology in the absence of a world-view. The only solution to the problem is actually rather obvious: one must find a method of handling the ontological elements as unknowns. (Philosophers seldom have any training in the concept of “working with unknowns” and the idea is simply foreign to them.) That is essentially what I have done and the attack has led me to the equation

$$\left{\sum_i \vec{\alpha}_i \cdot \vec{\nabla}_i + \sum_{i \neq j} \beta_{ij} \delta(\vec{x}_i - \vec{x}_j) \right}\vec{\Psi}= K \frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi} = iKm \vec{\Psi}.$$
​

My paper, http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm is a fairly succinct derivation of that equation; however, following that derivation requires a good understanding of advanced calculus and a little help. I apologize for the fact that I have made some major changes in the vocabulary I use since writing that paper. To a great extent, I have changed the vocabulary I use in order to better accommodate subtle philosophical complaints with my attack. I think the best way to achieve an understanding of what I have done is to first go through that derivation line by line with clarification of any step which bothers you (including expressing the statements in the more philosophical vocabulary I currently use when you don't find the translation obvious).

Once you understand the derivation of that equation and the relevant vocabulary (what is referred to by the symbols) we can then examine the general solutions of the equation.

Ok, I think I see. But I also suspect that you will tell me I got it all backwards again :)

No, I think we may be starting off on the right foot this time.

However, I do have some comments.

Since you are talking about streams of data ...

You need to recognize that the concept of a “stream of data” is already an epistemological construct (it is something defined in your world-view). Before we can use that concept, we must first make sure it is universally applicable: i.e., that no circumstance can possibly exist which can not be so represented. The object here is to explain reality given a valid ontology. Since you can not prove you are all knowing (that all of reality is available to your musings), our representation must allow for change in what is known (this is essentially the reason for the “stream of data” you have in mind). This possibility of change in knowledge leads me to the definition of two new terms: “the past”, which will refer to the known “valid ontology” and “the future”, which will refer to the unknown “valid ontology”. It should be clear to you that no constraints whatsoever have been put on these categories; either may in fact vanish (if “the past” doesn't exist, we are talking about solipsism, if “the future” doesn't exist, we are talking about being “all knowing”).

This representation allows for changes in “the past” (what is known) and thus allows me to introduce a third universally applicable term: “the present” which I will use to refer to a change in “the past”. From this perspective, “the past” can be seen as a finite collection of “presents”. Being finite, they can be ordered and I define the index of order to be t which I will refer to as time. Now we can speak of the past as a “stream of data”. What is important here is that you understand exactly why I had to go through this complex chain of logic.

I assume that your description is formed from a subject, and observer or what you may label it, without getting into the issues of what an observer really "IS". Somehow the observer is an implicit condition.

Fundamentally, “the observer” has nothing to do with the problem posed. The problem is to come up with a method of going from “a past” (a collection of valid ontological elements) to an explanation of that past. This is a mechanical problem of analysis and has absolutely nothing to do with how that “past” was established. Again, you are speaking of an epistemological construct: an explanation, a solution to the problem. Essentially, the fact that you bring it up implies you want a solution to the problem before you can think about how you are going to solve it; a step which is explicitly disallowed.

If that's close, my first questions is what to do you mean by rational model? What would for example an irrational model be like, in your terminology?

An irrational model of an explanation would be a model which failed to provide one with a method of obtaining the expectations yielded by the explanation.

To be honest, even if you are right, I think your categorical tone may reject some people and make them think you are not serious. Personally I don't care as much, but I think many people select from such appearances.

I am sure you are right with that. I am an old man and I do get a little testy at times; especially when I see what strikes me as incompetent people using authority to quash thought. I have a sign over my desk which says: Knowledge is Power in large letters. Underneath, in small letters it says, The singular most popular abuse of that power is to use it to hide stupidity.

Sometimes I just decide that ignorance is its own reward and just walk away from the situation. I have no intention of being uncivilized; so long as I believe you are seriously trying to understand what I am saying, I will answer any questions you have to the best of my ability.

By the way, you have made no comments about your training in mathematics. Anssi's mathematics training is somewhat limited and it would be nice to have someone here who had a good understanding of advanced mathematics.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

Philosophers long ago divided the subject of “metaphysics” (a term Aristotle invented to refer to what lies beneath or behind “physics”) into two fields: ontology and epistemology.

? This is just false. Epistemology is NOT a topic of Aristotle metaphysics--nor do philosophers divide metaphysics in such a way. As discussed here, there are three branches of traditional metaphysics and none are called epistemology:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics

Aristotle's Metaphysics was divided into three parts, in addition to some smaller sections related to a philosophical lexicon and some reprinted extracts from the Physics, which are now regarded as the proper branches of traditional Western metaphysics:

Ontology
The study of Being and existence; includes the definition and classification of entities, physical or mental, the nature of their properties, and the nature of change.
Theology
The study of God; involves many topics, including among others the nature of religion and the world, existence of the divine, questions about Creation, and the numerous religious or spiritual issues that concern humankind in general.
Universal science
The study of first principles, which Aristotle believed to be the foundation of all other inquiries. An example of such a principle is the law of noncontradiction and the status it holds in non-paraconsistent logics.

The problem here is that this division is very much a chicken and egg conundrum: which comes first, ontology or epistemology. One cannot construct an epistemology (an explanation) without “knowing” what is to be explained.

But, this is only a "problem" in your mind Doctordick--there is in fact no such problem, since there is in fact no such division of metaphysics that your mind has invented. In fact, if you read Aristotle you would see that he some + 2000 years ago already provided the answer to your mental conundrum, as read here:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/

Aristotle distinguished between things that are “better known to us” and things that are “better known in themselves,”[1] and maintained that we should begin our study of a given topic with things better known to us and arrive ultimately at an understanding of things better known in themselves.

So, I hate to burst your bubble, but it would appear that you have found a so-called solution:

"The only solution to the problem is actually rather obvious: one must find a method of handling the ontological elements as unknowns."

where in fact no problem exists.

Now, given that your solution is a solution to no"thing" having to do with metaphysics, the results you have derived from your solution, including your equation, explain no"thing" having to do with metaphysics, nor how one should begin a study of any given topic, for as explained by Aristotle, one must always begin a study of any topic (including your equation) with things better known to us [e.g., the man-made] to arrive at understanding of things better known in themselves [e.g., the metaphysical given].

 

[Fra]

Hello Dick, I've been usuallally busy lately. Here are some comments meanwheile...

The problem here is that this division is very much a chicken and egg conundrum: which comes first, ontology or epistemology.

It's true that at some level this is an issue. This is I think related to issues like background independence that is popularly discussed nowadays. Ie. where do we start?

Perhaps the question is not where we start, the question is how we move on, given whatever is given. I am thrown into this world, I am not in the position to question why, but I am certainly in the position to make he best out of it.

This representation allows for changes in “the past” (what is known) and thus allows me to introduce a third universally applicable term: “the present” which I will use to refer to a change in “the past”. From this perspective, “the past” can be seen as a finite collection of “presents”. Being finite, they can be ordered and I define the index of order to be t which I will refer to as time. Now we can speak of the past as a “stream of data”. What is important here is that you understand exactly why I had to go through this complex chain of logic.
Fundamentally, “the observer” has nothing to do with the problem posed. The problem is to come up with a method of going from “a past” (a collection of valid ontological elements) to an explanation of that past. This is a mechanical problem of analysis and has absolutely nothing to do with how that “past” was established. Again, you are speaking of an epistemological construct: an explanation, a solution to the problem. Essentially, the fact that you bring it up implies you want a solution to the problem before you can think about how you are going to solve it; a step which is explicitly disallowed.
An irrational model of an explanation would be a model which failed to provide one with a method of obtaining the expectations yielded by the explanation.
I am sure you are right with that. I am an old man and I do get a little testy at times; especially when I see what strikes me as incompetent people using authority to quash thought. I have a sign over my desk which says: Knowledge is Power in large letters. Underneath, in small letters it says, The singular most popular abuse of that power is to use it to hide stupidity.

Anywy...With observer I mean loosely, the one making reflections or asking questions. In a sense, at minimum, You are the observer to your own ideas here. This is in fact exactly why we have communication issues. This is all relative to your thinking.

So, the way I think, for me to understand your ideas. Doesn't mean that I will agree. It means that I try to understand you, and see why you have these ideas. Then our disagreement, could be explained by the difference between you and me in the first place.

So suppose I come up with some "truth". What reason do I have to assume that this "truth" is "truth" also in your mind? First we have the problem of even comparing my thinking with yours. We have to someone "transport" my ideas to you, by some kind of connection, to even be able to compare the ideas.

With observer, I mean the refernce to which your entire formalism refers (implicitly).

If we talk about probability, this means we should be talking about relative or bayesian probabilities. Probability of an unkown ontology as you might put it, relative the known ontology?

By the way, you have made no comments about your training in mathematics. Anssi's mathematics training is somewhat limited and it would be nice to have someone here who had a good understanding of advanced mathematics.

This doesn't worry me. You'r math seems rather simple, just sums, sets, probabilit and standard analysis.

We are having communication problems still, and considering that I don't have that muhc time to comment I wonder if it's a way to do this communication more efficiently. I generally find discussions that is just defining a common terminology unrewarding.

Really, this has nothing todo with lack of interest. It's reality. I need rewards to motivate my brain to pursure investigation in a initiated direction, or my best bet is to look elsewhere.

Perhaps better pre-processing on both parties is needed. Even on my side! Note that this isn't a complaint, it's a general observation. This is really what I am doing on my thinking. I am not attempting to explain it until I can show that it flies. Then you'd have no choice but to ask yourself the question how come it flies, and then we've got an intrinsic motivation for searching an undestanding.

For me, the motivation comes before anything. This is what I started out originally asking, what your thinking may provide for kind of benefits? This (even if you are beeing right) is not an irrelevant question. This is of primary importance. It's not just about doing it right, it's more about doing as good as possible in the given time.

To give you an example. When I am ready to present my thinking, I hope to be able to simplify current world view (which I consider to be a bit like a patch work), and this in itself will allow more efficient progress and probably allow for better expectations.

I would never expect any opponent to take my word for the correctness of my thinking. It's my job, to make my ideas fly. I will still take interest in other peoples "ideas", but I will never invest(at the expense of my own ideas) a major part of my attention to something, unless they have proven it to fly - to a point I can't possibly ignore. I think this is basic psychology and the way things work.

Do you understand what I mean when I ask you to explain, what is the benefit of your thinking? Is that a relevant question in your opinion? I say thinking here, because I think you don't want me to use the word theory. But you can replace the word what any string, I hope you get the quesiton.

/Fredrik

 

[Doctordick]

? This is just false. Epistemology is NOT a topic of Aristotle metaphysics--nor do philosophers divide metaphysics in such a way.

Well I apologize; my Ph.D. is in theoretical physics and not philosophy. The only “formal philosophy” I have ever read, I read only recently because of comments made to me on philosophical forums. Many people have told me that I what I was dealing with was “metaphysics” and apparently they were wrong to so advise me. With regard to your post, I meant only to give the Aristotle credit for seeing that there had to be things beyond “physics”. As far as the divisions I gave, ontology and epistemology. In my opinion, there is utterly no difference between “Theology” and “Universal science” as are both epistemological constructs, differing only in their respective ontologies.

But I will bow to authority, I guess my question does not lie in your conception of the field of “metaphysics”.

Sorry again. -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

Hi Fredrik, I have been slow to respond because it is quite clear to me that I am having a very difficult time communicating with you. I simply don't know how to communicate to you the exact nature of the problem I have solved.

Do you understand what I mean when I ask you to explain, what is the benefit of your thinking? Is that a relevant question in your opinion?

I think I understand what you mean and I guess my answer is essentially that it is not a relevant question. Many of the things I bring up are issues that led me to both the problem and my interest in solving that problem; however, they are really immaterial to the problem itself.

Somehow, we have all managed to solve the problem of starting with absolutely nothing and achieve a mental view of reality which makes sense to us and, more remarkable than that, for the most part we all seem to agree (essentially we have reached the same general conclusion; we agree about one hell of a lot). The question is, how can such a result be accomplished.

If, like Rade, you cannot comprehend a problem there, you are certainly not in a position to understand a solution; that is to say, before one can comprehend a solution, one must first comprehend the problem: “how does one build an epistemological solution to explain information which has not been defined in any way?” Everybody I talk to, and I am afraid that includes you, wants to start with some given knowledge and I don't know how to get them around that stance. I think Anssi has managed to comprehend what I am talking about but I think a lot of his insight was already there before we began (I won't take credit for explaining it to him).

I will make another attempt to communicate my difficulties with your questions.

It's true that at some level this is an issue. This is I think related to issues like background independence that is popularly discussed nowadays. Ie. where do we start?

The absolute only place to start is to first answer the question, “What are we looking for?” As I see it, “how” ... “, is asking for a method of some sort which is commonly called an explanation. It follows that our very first step has to be to define exactly what “an explanation” is (we need to set down exactly how one determines an acceptable “method” as opposed to an unacceptable “method”. This I have done. I have essentially defined what "I" will accept as “an explanation”. You like the definition, you don't like the definition; that issue is really of no significance; it is a communication issue only. I am telling you what "I" consider “an explanation to be”.

So far as the problem I have solved is concerned, ”an explanation”” is a method of obtaining expectations from undefined information. The single most important factor being that the source data (the information to be explained) is totally undefined (what it actually is is totally unknown). One could say “undefined data”, “an unknown reality”, “a valid undefined ontology”, etc., etc. ... . The important fact being, we must start with the position that we have utterly no idea of what it is that we are talking about; it is absolutely “undefined”. Somehow we manage to achieve a state which allows us to “understand”, “comprehend”, “know”, “feel”, “believe”, etc., etc., ... ; which I refer to as “having expectations”: being not surprised by additional data, information, etc., etc., ... . Some how, when we have an explanation, we have a way of developing those expectations, a method of establishing what they are: somehow we can get from one to the other. That is my definition of an explanation.

The result is that we understand something which, prior to applying some procedure, was totally unknown to us.

As I have said before, if our purpose is to "understand", the first concept we must have in our mind is "an explanation". Without a concept of "an explanation", how can we possibly understand anything? My definition of "an explanation" is quite simple: I define "an explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information. Can you work with that definition?

As I said to Anssi, the question is, can you work with it? The answer is a simple yes or no and agreement has nothing to do with it.

Perhaps the question is not where we start, the question is how we move on, given whatever is given.

So the next question is, “exactly what is given?” And the answer is absolutely unavoidable: “whatever it is, we certainly don't know what it is", as “it has not been defined in any way!” Ergo, my problem. I agree that the English references I give for the terms of the problem are quite vague and indistinct but they have to be as that is the very nature of the problem. The results (the method or procedure) must be applicable to all possible epistemological solutions. I say to you that I solved the problem and that the solution leads to profound insights. I don't ask you to believe me, I merely ask you to look at an analytical proof that the equation,

$$\left{\sum_i \vec{\alpha}_i \cdot \vec{\nabla}_i + \sum_{i \neq j} \beta_{ij} \delta(\vec{x}_i - \vec{x}_j) \right}\vec{\Psi}= K \frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi} = iKm \vec{\Psi},$$
​

follows directly from my definitions by straight forward logic and nothing more. Our major problem in communications is that you want to bring more to the table. This is a very simple problem and most everyone buries its simplicity in inconsequential issues.

My problem with your questions is that they all essentially amount to wanting to start with defined information. I say that “expectations” can be represented by “probability” and you ask me to define what I mean by probability. What you fail to realize is that what is meant by “probability” must be contained in the explanation being modeled: i.e., it is part and parcel of the epistemological structure which yields those “expectations”. All I am saying is that it can be represented by a number bounded by zero and one. Any number so bounded can be interpreted as “a probability”; zero being no, it's not possible, and one being yes, it is true. Any other number implies some doubt. The important point being that the concept “understanding” can be cast as such a result.

You bring up this concept “an observer”. Surely you can understand that we cannot start with “an observer” without making a whole slew of assumptions. In order to do so, you must clarify to me exactly how I am to know what portion of that “undefined information” constitutes “an observer” and what part is excluded from the meaning of that reference.

... all I am saying is that "something" lies beneath our knowledge and part of our problem is to figure out what that something is; at least some way of scientifically expressing it which does not make assumptions about what it is.

How would you propose to scientifically express the concept of “an observer” without making any assumptions? What you have to understand here is that language itself constitutes a structure which essentially explains itself. In order to learn a language, you must build the meanings from undefined information. That is always done under the assumption that your interpretations to date are valid. Now, without a language, we cannot communicate at all. It is because of this problem that I propose the language of mathematics as a mechanism of describing the method we are looking for.

Since, as you have already commented, you cannot archive all the data on which that belief is based, you must allow for the fact that you have possibly attached an incorrect meaning to a term: i.e., the possibility always exists that you have discarded information which would invalidate your beliefs. (Note my post to Rade above.) That is why I continually bring up mathematics as the only communication system we can really depend on (mathematicians have spent thousands of years in an attempt to eliminate any inconsistencies). When one uses mathematics, the probability of inconsistencies arising in the interpretation of described procedures is minimal and the methods being specified are much more apt to yield the same results for you that they yield for me. This cannot be taken to be true with regard to common language instructions. As you just said,

I generally find discussions that is just defining a common terminology unrewarding.

and I agree with you one hundred percent, that's why I wish to get to the mathematical representation (we can use numbers as labels for the unknown data and numbers for our expectations thus the “method” can be seen as a mathematical function). You should take a quick look at post #466. It might clarify to you what I have in mind by “numerical labels”.

All other languages used by mankind are actually rather vaguely defined entities. Which reminds me of a post I made almost two and half years ago on the value of ambiguity. You ought to take a quick look at it as it might help you see where I am coming from. I believe your rational for communications problems is actually quite vague and inexact although I would agree that “this is all relative to your thinking”. I just see it from a totally different perspective.

So, the way I think, for me to understand your ideas. Doesn't mean that I will agree.

No, of course not; however, if you do understand my construct and don't agree with my conclusions, it means you think I have made an error and I would certainly like to be made aware of what you think that error was. My results are nothing more than a rather simple logical construct.

It means that I try to understand you, and see why you have these ideas. Then our disagreement, could be explained by the difference between you and me in the first place.

Actually, why I have “these ideas” is rather immaterial.

So suppose I come up with some "truth". What reason do I have to assume that this "truth" is "truth" also in your mind? First we have the problem of even comparing my thinking with yours. We have to someone "transport" my ideas to you, by some kind of connection, to even be able to compare the ideas.

Well, perhaps we have different meanings for the word “truth”. The only one I would seriously worry about would be the issue of proof itself. Under the common definition of a proof, the steps are essentially if “A” is true then “B” is true, under the common rules of logic. If you don't consider such a thing to be possible we are probably wasting our time.

I generally find discussions that is just defining a common terminology unrewarding.

The number of definitions required to follow my logic is probably less than a dozen terms (all fully specified in terms of the data being referred to as underlying the explanation in question). The only definitions of any import here will be specifically defined when they come up. The only definitions I would expect you to know would be common mathematical definitions; however, for convenience, I sometimes use non-standard notation, but I will explicitly point that out as we proceed.

Perhaps better preprocessing on both parties is needed. Even on my side! Note that this isn't a complaint, it's a general observation.

You see, I think too much preprocessing is already impeding the communications. You need to get down to the simple issues here.

I would never expect any opponent to take my word for the correctness of my thinking. It's my job, to make my ideas fly. I will still take interest in other peoples "ideas", but I will never invest(at the expense of my own ideas) a major part of my attention to something, unless they have proven it to fly - to a point I can't possibly ignore. I think this is basic psychology and the way things work.

This appears to me to be a direct admission of the fact that you want authoritarian support: i.e., it seems to me that, by “proven to fly”, you mean that the authorities have verified my logic. Back in '84 I tried very hard to get my work published. After being rejected by a number of journals (this isn't physics; it's philosophy) I tried to get my Ph.D. thesis advisor to use his influence to help. His only comment was, “no one will ever read your stuff, because you haven't paid your dues” (after I got my degree, I didn't pursue the “number crunching” career and hadn't published for fifteen years). He even refused to look at it. At the time I thought he was being ridiculous but it turned out that his opinion was quite correct. I was reminded of another comment he made when I was a graduate student and I brought up some of the issues which bothered me: he said the physics community wasn't interested in “truth”; he said it was a social club and one had to play by the rules and, once you are recognized, they will listen to what you say.

If his attitude represents your attitude, then we are probably wasting our time. I hope you are more open than that.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

Hi mosassam, I was looking for a certain post I made to Anssi when I ran across this post from you. Apparently I missed it at the time and I apologize; I did not intend to be rude to you.

This is a perfect example of a mock fight. "What is causing this experience?", is an ontological question but all the proposed solutions laid out are epistemological in nature: i.e., explanations. Before any of these kinds of things can be discussed, one needs to develop a serious science of ontology.

Dr.Dick, I've tried with all my might to get to the heart of what you say but it is beyond me. In the above quote you say that 'all the proposed solutions ... are epistemological in nature", can you give an example where the proposed solutions to the question "What is causing this experience?" are ontological in nature. Or are you saying that no questions can be asked because any answer constitutes a solution/explanation and is therefore epistemological in nature?

The issue here is that “cause” itself is a fundamental element of epistemological constructs. The idea that, if you have A you will also have B, is an essential statement of the property of causality. Ontology is the simple statement that you have A and you have B; it makes no statement about them being related. Any relationship is an epistemological construct. Essentially the only question which can be asked in ontology is, (does A exist?) and, more importantly, the question can not be answered. The only question about ontology which can be asked is, does your explanation require A to exist and I have to understand your explanation before I can answer that question.

Sorry if you find me confusing -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Hi, I'm back finally.
Still little bit jetlagged. Actually have my daily rhythm completely upside down :P

I think all you really lack is a good understanding of mathematics but we can cover that (though it may not be a quick thing).

Yeah, that I certainly lack. I'm sure I can get a hold of all the necessary mathematical concepts over time.

I think we need to go back to that post where I first began adding “invalid ontological elements”. The fact that we can add these invalid ontological elements gives us the power to organize or represent that ”what is”, is “what is” table in a form which allows for easy deduction. In that post, I said I wanted to add three different kinds of “invalid ontological elements”, each to serve a particular purpose. You need to understand exactly why those elements are being added and how the addition achieves the result desired.

I've been really scrutinizing that old post lately. The actual procedure of adding those elements is simple and easy to understand, but the reasons for describing these procedures were not completely straightforward to figure out. It was essentially to prove that such and such functions are possible, right?

The first addition is quite simple. As I said, that ”what is”, is “what is” table can be seen as a list of numbers for each present which specify (or refer to) exactly what “valid ontological elements” went to make up our past at each defined time (what we know being “the past”). The output of our probability function (which defines what we think we know) is either zero or one depending upon whether a specific number is in that list or not.

That was, whether a specific number is at a specific present?

I have to build a world-view in my own head and that world view has to be logical coherent, I can not do that without making assumptions.

Yeah. I am certainly making a lot of assumptions right now :)

Just as an aside, from a philosophical perspective, that first addition (making the number of ontological elements the same for all B(t)) is essentially presuming these valid ontological elements exist even when we are not directly dealing with them. That is to say, the ordinary concept of “ontological elements” behind that epistemological construct is that they exist in the past, the present and the future. No one presumes they come and go (actually, there is a subtle point there which comes up in the solution possibilities with regard to explicitly invalid ontological elements, but that will come up later).

Hmm, right I see, I think...

At first you talked about adding arbitrary "invalid elements" because you were just proving that adding them can be useful, but in any real case they would not be arbitrary but would have everything to do with the specific epistemological construct then?

You also said this addition was done for mathematical convenience. Does this also refer to it being similarly a convenience for epistemological solutions? (i.e. without adding those elements the epistemological "rules" would be horribly complex)

The second addition of invalid ontological elements was to make sure that “t” (the “time” index) could be extracted from the ”what is”, is “what is” table so that it could be a viable parameter usable in an explanation. That was done in the following manner. Anytime there existed two or more identical presents (in that specifically defined ”what is”, is “what is” table in your right hand), invalid ontological elements were added and given references sufficiently different to make those presents different. At the time you expressed understanding of that procedure.

Yes I think I did, but I'm wondering in which cases two presents could be identical?

Perhaps it is irrelevant to this procedure, but I am also wondering whether your "existing knowledge" should or would be part of each present?

I mean, suppose an observer who is observing identical days go by. i.e. the high noon at day 1 looks exactly the same as the high noon at day 2.

Obviously if the observer was counting days by drawing lines on the ground, the "presents" would be different. But I wonder if the fact that at "noon 2" there exists memories about "noon 1" would be enough to make these presents different. In which case just the fact that an observer remembers the old presents makes each present different.

Well I'll continue from here soon... (jetlag...)

-Anssi

 

[Fra]

Do you understand what I mean when I ask you to explain, what is the benefit of your thinking? Is that a relevant question in your opinion?

I think I understand what you mean and I guess my answer is essentially that it is not a relevant question.

If that's not a relevant question, I see part of the communication issues.

Somehow, we have all managed to solve the problem of starting with absolutely nothing and achieve a mental view of reality which makes sense to us and, more remarkable than that, for the most part we all seem to agree (essentially we have reached the same general conclusion; we agree about one hell of a lot). The question is, how can such a result be accomplished.

If, like Rade, you cannot comprehend a problem there, you are certainly not in a position to understand a solution

I see a problem, the thing is what I see my not be quite what you see, thus your solution may not match my question.

that is to say, before one can comprehend a solution, one must first comprehend the problem: “how does one build an epistemological solution to explain information which has not been defined in any way?” Everybody I talk to, and I am afraid that includes you, wants to start with some given knowledge and I don't know how to get them around that stance.

Part of the problem is that it is almost impossible to start from scratch, becase even the _representation_ of something, must be implemented somewhere. In this case it's realtive to your brain at minumum. Everything we talk about, are related to yourselves here. How can I possibly make a statement and claim thta statement has no connection to me? That makes little or no sense to me.

This implies a kind of nonlinear feedback between ontology and epistemology. Of course I have my own ideas on this. But I will not ask you to accept my thinking. I will make it work on my own to the point where it should be obvious wether it is successfull or not.

My thinking is that we can start from an arbitrary starting point. This way we do away with the problem of making an ambigous starting point. Instead I focus on the evolution of the state. I am not predicting the initial state - thta is prior given. But it's obvioulsy different in each case. So the model must be able to "handle" a "generic" prior state.

I would never expect any opponent to take my word for the correctness of my thinking. It's my job, to make my ideas fly. I will still take interest in other peoples "ideas", but I will never invest(at the expense of my own ideas) a major part of my attention to something, unless they have proven it to fly - to a point I can't possibly ignore. I think this is basic psychology and the way things work.

This appears to me to be a direct admission of the fact that you want authoritarian support: i.e., it seems to me that, by “proven to fly”, you mean that the authorities have verified my logic.

No that's not what I mean. I mean, you are free do to what you want, come up with and truth's or anything. The question is what your goal is. If you want other people to acknowledge this, a minimum of psychology is needed in the real world. After all, other people have their own projects and thinking. If you have a really abstract idea, that no one seem to understand on the conceptual stage, with "proven to fly" I mean that you should try to implement the applications of your thinking into real amazing action. What kind of action? Well that is up to you to specify, as it's your thinking. If you suggest that there are no implications or applications, then I don't understnad you. I still do suspect that you have something in mind that you aren't spelling out. If you have some amazing implications that will come when your equation is solved, then I think you should try to solve the equation, make the realisations and blow us off the chairs.

After being rejected by a number of journals (this isn't physics; it's philosophy) I tried to get my Ph.D. thesis advisor to use his influence to help. His only comment was, “no one will ever read your stuff, because you haven't paid your dues” (after I got my degree, I didn't pursue the “number crunching” career and hadn't published for fifteen years). He even refused to look at it. At the time I thought he was being ridiculous but it turned out that his opinion was quite correct.

On the psychology part, I think you need to - apart from doing your thing - also need to "sell your ideas" to others, if that's what you want. I would suggest a one or two page / 5 minute papers, that put it's from the point of view or your opponents, and explain to them why they should take the time to analyse your stuff in details. What hands on benefits are in it for them, if they understand it? After all, this is a real life issue. Everyone makes judgments on where to place bets and spend time.

The purpose of this paper, would be to motivate to the reader why they should invest time, thought or money in looking further in the direction.

I think anyone can spare 5 minutes for no particular reason at all.

This is exactly what I have realized on my own part. I am not going to spend time convincing others on my own thinking until it's mature. When it's mature in my thinking, it "will fly". Noone will question that a bird in the sky flies, it's close to obvious to most people.

Anyway, I'm not coming up with ideas for other people. I do it to satisfy myself.

If I don't understand your thinking, let that be my loss, not yours.

Anyway, for myself, briefly reading your posts originally supplied me motivation for a little further communication. You start out nice, but then I think I lost your logic a bit.

If his attitude represents your attitude, then we are probably wasting our time. I hope you are more open than that.

I really can't grasp that there are no benefits :) Maybe my words are confusng... let's suppose that we reached an agreement... as a thought experiment here... then what? What can we do, build, predict, or gain from your ideas? (I am not beeing ironic here).

You say

I say to you that I solved the problem and that the solution leads to profound insights.

Now we are closing up on a benefit! If only we can see we need insights for? ;) "survival and growth"? If you take this is the indirect benefit... then I think "to fly" in this case would mean to make an application of your ideas, and show the power of the insights... and show how it outperforms it's competitors which lack the insight? This should in principle lead to testable ideas. One can device complex observations, that aren't instant.

I'll comment more later on the other parts... hang on

/Fredrik

 

[Doctordick]

Hi Anssi, it's good to have you back. I have been spending a lot of my time on ZBrush. Right now the learning curve is pretty steep; the system is just too powerful and it's hard to keep all the methods in mind.

Still little bit jetlagged. Actually have my daily rhythm completely upside down :P

Well, we will have that experience a week from now. My wife has booked a River cruse on the Danube and we will be in Prague a week from Monday. I probably won't be able to access the Internet for some three weeks. You might talk to Fredrik while I am gone. I think you understand what he is missing and maybe you could communicate it better than I can.

Yeah, that I certainly lack. I'm sure I can get a hold of all the necessary mathematical concepts over time.

I don't think you will have any real problems; as Richard Feynman used to say, “mathematics is the distilled essence of logic” and logic is your strong point.

I've been really scrutinizing that old post lately. The actual procedure of adding those elements is simple and easy to understand, but the reasons for describing these procedures were not completely straightforward to figure out. It was essentially to prove that such and such functions are possible, right?

In a word, yes! Such “mathematical” relations can always be constructed.

That was, whether a specific number is at a specific present?

Again yes; however, you need to keep in mind the fact that, when we have a specific number and/or a specific present, we have a specific explanation being represented. There is a very subtle thing going on here.

What you need to do is comprehend that we are dealing with two rather different issues here. First there is that collection of “valid ontological elements” underlying our world view (you can think of this as a basic, undefined, ”what is”, is “what is” table in your left hand) and, secondly, there is that epistemological solution which is our world-view itself. That world view (and that would be any explicitly defined explanation) includes the assumption of certain “invalid ontological elements” necessary to that epistemological solution. Thus that “defined” representation must include those “invalid” elements (you can think of this as a second, explicitly defined, ”what is”, is “what is” table in your right hand). What I am going to do is add some rather arbitrary “invalid ontological elements” to that second table. You should certainly ask, how do I justify these specific additions?

These additions represent assumptions which have been made in order to “understand” (make coherent) a specific explanation. The important part here is that the character of those “assumptions” and the purpose they serve (the role they play in developing the “method” of the explanation). What you really know is in your left hand and the structure you need to defend the explanation is in your right hand.

Yeah. I am certainly making a lot of assumptions right now :)

I'm afraid that's part of the process. One cannot understand anything without making assumptions. What we want to do is, in our representation, keep careful accounting of exactly what these assumptions are.

At first you talked about adding arbitrary "invalid elements" because you were just proving that adding them can be useful, but in any real case they would not be arbitrary but would have everything to do with the specific epistemological construct then?

Once again, life gets subtle. I am adding totally arbitrary “invalid elements” (arbitrary in that “what they are” is as undefined as are the “valid ontological elements”) but they are being added to accomplish some very specific results. What will happen, when we solve that equation,

$$\left{\sum_i \vec{\alpha}_i \cdot \vec{\nabla}_i + \sum_{i \neq j} \beta_{ij} \delta(\vec{x}_i - \vec{x}_j) \right}\vec{\Psi}= K \frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi} = iKm \vec{\Psi},$$
​

is that identification of these “invalid elements” with specific ontological elements of the explanation will become quite obvious: i.e., your explanations, if they are flaw-free, will indeed make use of exactly these invalid ontological elements. It turns out that it has to do that or the specific explanation will contain exactly the flaws these elements were introduced to eliminate. This is something you will understand down the line.

You also said this addition was done for mathematical convenience. Does this also refer to it being similarly a convenience for epistemological solutions? (i.e. without adding those elements the epistemological "rules" would be horribly complex)

In essence, yes!

Yes I think I did, but I'm wondering in which cases two presents could be identical?

Ah, again, subtly rears its ugly head. First two presents can only be identical if the ontological elements making them up are the same which means we are speaking of a specific epistemological construct (the reference labels have been defined). On the other hand (that would be your left hand; see above) this epistemological construct was created to explain those “valid ontological elements” in the original ”what is”, is “what is” table in your left hand. The point being that your coherent world-view will contain exactly the “invalid ontological elements” necessary to eliminate the problem.

Perhaps it is irrelevant to this procedure, but I am also wondering whether your "existing knowledge" should or would be part of each present?

I think that, here, you are confusing the meaning of “existing knowledge” (English is not a very precise language for expressing these ideas). We are talking about the existence of ontological elements on which the explanation rests; not exactly equivalent to the full range of what can be meant by the English term “existing knowledge”.

But I wonder if the fact that at "noon 2" there exists memories about "noon 1" would be enough to make these presents different. In which case just the fact that an observer remembers the old presents makes each present different.

Here, you are obviously working with a world-view, a solution to understanding the universe (at least partial if not total), and you are essentially defending my statement that the world view will contain certain required ontological elements. Whether they are memories, marks on the ground or whatever, they are necessary to that world view which has been created. Are they valid or invalid ontological elements? There is no way to tell as both must be consistent with the explanation or the explanation is flawed. The real point is that they have to be there, valid or invalid (i.e., the ability to differentiate the circumstances must exist), in order to construct a coherent world-view.

It's good to have you back -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

I see a problem, the thing is what I see my not be quite what you see, thus your solution may not match my question.

I do not understand what you are trying to say here. Are you saying that “how?” does not ask for a procedure? Or are you saying that your procedure might differ from mine?

Part of the problem is that it is almost impossible to start from scratch, becase even the _representation_ of something, must be implemented somewhere. In this case it's realtive to your brain at minumum.

You are confusing the problem with what you think the problem is. The problem is quite simple and exists as a problem even within your world-view. If you were given a stream of numbers and nothing else, how would you go about creating a method of explaining that stream of numbers? Is such a problem inconceivable to you or is it rather that solving such a problem is inconceivable to you? I suspect it is the latter; that the only solution you can conceive of is what I call the “guess and by golly” approach. My position is that this problem can be attacked logically if one is careful.

This implies a kind of nonlinear feedback between ontology and epistemology.

Yes, it certainly does. All epistemological constructs depend on a set of ontological elements and the explanation (or definition) of those ontological elements are part and parcel of the explanation of that epistemological construct.

If you suggest that there are no implications or applications, then I don't understand you.

A logical proof produces nothing not contained in the axioms on which the proof is based. What I am trying to communicate to you is that, under the definitions I lay out, that equation,

$$\left{\sum_i \vec{\alpha}_i \cdot \vec{\nabla}_i + \sum_{i \neq j} \beta_{ij} \delta(\vec{x}_i - \vec{x}_j) \right}\vec{\Psi}= K \frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi} = iKm \vec{\Psi},$$
​

has to be true. That is a logical deduction and subject to analysis on a purely objective abstract level. That fact has utterly no physical content. Physical content arises when the equation is related to reality; in order to provide that content, the solutions must be found and examined.

I still do suspect that you have something in mind that you aren't spelling out. If you have some amazing implications that will come when your equation is solved, then I think you should try to solve the equation, make the realizations and blow us off the chairs.

I have solved that equation and discovered some very interesting facts. First, it is a many body equation and, as I sure you are well aware, many body equations are always difficult to solve. However, there is a subtle way to extract a one body equation out of that relationship by presuming the solution for all elements but one is known (essentially, what might be seen as a Dirac delta function interaction allows the necessary integrals to be mathematically represented in terms of those known solutions). When that process is performed (with three very specific approximations), the result is exactly Schroedinger's equation and, identification of it with Schroedinger's equation turns out to define those approximations to be exactly the common approximations behind the standard applications of Schroedinger's equation.

Using Schroedinger's equation to define how the elements of the solutions relate to reality and then removing the approximations, the one body solution can be clearly identified with Dirac's equation in detail. That step identifies Electromagnetic terms. When that identification is put back into the original many body equation and the equation is solved for the behavior of those elements, one obtains exactly Maxwell's equation. At that point, another subtle element comes into play having to do with http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm (pull down to the last of that paper and you will find the comment at the top of the display). That shift in perspective was required to make my equation valid (http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/appendex/notethre.htm ). That shift in perspective results ends up requiring special relativistic transformations between different “center of mass” solutions.

Just as Newtonian mechanics simplify to F=ma when one uses an "inertial frame", the constraints on a self consistent explanation simplify to the given fundamental equation when one works in the "center of mass system". It should be seen as nothing more than a mathematical convenience.

In order to obtain Maxwell's equations, I had to assume the interaction was mediated by massless ontological elements. The algebra does not actually require that assumption and, if the assumption is not made, one obtains a form of Maxwell's equations which essentially allows massive exchange elements. One then gets a summation over Yukawa radial forms for the short range “??electro-magnetic forces??” (if one wants to call them such).

In that process, the exchange elements are identified with various complex collections of ontological elements. If one examines the consequences of a gradient in the long range tail of these implied interactions, one obtains another effect due to the change in probability over the microscopic extent of the involved entity (what could be seen as a refraction effect). The consequence of that factor almost exactly matches the predictions of Einstein's theory of general relativity. There is one additional (very small term which would be almost unmeasurable) which would make its appearance in common physics as a very small additional attractive radial force. (?The reason for “dark matter” perhaps?) The whole realm of physics becomes unified under one quite simple relationship.

Now I am sure I have made errors in those deductions as none of them have ever been carefully examined by competent mathematicians; however, the supposed errors put forth by http://www.scienceforums.net/forum/showthread.php?p=277255#post277255 are not among them. Either he has no grasp of my definitions (he has merely scanned what I said without close attention) or his training in mathematical physics is woefully inadequate. (They locked the thread before I could point out the errors in his final post.) He claims to be a professor of graduate physics but I find that quite difficult to believe.

Now we are closing up on a benefit! If only we can see we need insights for? ;) "survival and growth"? If you take this is the indirect benefit... then I think "to fly" in this case would mean to make an application of your ideas, and show the power of the insights... and show how it outperforms it's competitors which lack the insight? This should in principle lead to testable ideas. One can device complex observations, that aren't instant.

Ninety nine percent of the testable observations have already been done! My equation is essentially a summary of the physics relationships already put forth to explain everything via the “guess and by golly” method of traditional physics. What is significant here is that I have deduced my equation as a necessary component of any flaw-free explanation of anything. Would you prefer it just be conjured up my dreams? A “perhaps” relationship put forth as Maxwell put forth his equations? Maxwell is an excellent example of what I call the “guess and by golly” attack. Remember, what he actually did was to add a term to what was already known because it made the relationships look symmetric and embodied all of the other results already known. He did not deduce it from fundamental logic. It was a guess and, by golly, it turned out to be right.

With regard to “mode of attack” I would say that my approach is more akin to the explanation of the spectrum of Black body radiation. When I was a student, that subject was introduced as a solution to dynamic scattering which left the velocity distribution stable. (Scattering out of a state must exactly balance scattering into the state.) It turns out that there is only one velocity distribution which satisfies that constraint so one can start with a totally unknown solution and, by internal consistency, find exactly what that distribution had to be. The logic is good, the fact that only one solution exists was a discovery. I start with a totally undefined ontology and discover that, if we wish to have a flaw-free explanation, there exists a mathematical constraint on the probability distribution of references to those ontological elements.

It is interesting to note that the physics community, by talking about a TOE, has essentially already accepted the idea that everything might be deducible from fundamental logic; they just haven't done it yet. Either I have shown you how to do it or I have made an error in my logic. No one points out any errors in my logic; instead, they just refer to my work as “moronic” philosophy.

I hope I have not upset anyone -- Dick

 

[Fra]

Ok, I'll go to your numbers... and see if it makes it clearer. I'll try to go through this with comments, let me konw if I get you right. I'll do it step by step, in case you have comments, se we can keep the responses short.

I don't ask you to believe me, I merely ask you to look at an analytical proof that the equation,

$$\left{\sum_i \vec{\alpha}_i \cdot \vec{\nabla}_i + \sum_{i \neq j} \beta_{ij} \delta(\vec{x}_i - \vec{x}_j) \right}\vec{\Psi}= K \frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi} = iKm \vec{\Psi},$$
​

follows directly from my definitions by straight forward logic and nothing more. Our major problem in communications is that you want to bring more to the table. This is a very simple problem and most everyone buries its simplicity in inconsequential issues.

From http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm

1. A is a set. "What is to be explained."
2. B(tk) is a finite unordered collection of elements of A. "A hypothetical collection of information obtained from A."
3. C is a finite collection of sets B(tk). "What is known about A: i.e., our given known information."

So whatever it is we don't know at some point, you consider this to form a set. But this set remains undefined since it's elements are undefined. So all we do is assigning a symbol A, to denote this unkonwn set. So far we know nothing of A, regarding countability, representation of elements, or anything. I'm not even sure we know the set exists, because it's not defined yet. We just assigned it a symbol. It's elements are undefined.

B is hypothetical information we imagine we might possibly come into possession of? But the set of all possible B, is defined as subets of A - which is unkonwn, this means the B's are also unknown?

C represents what we know, which is considered to form an finite ordered set of B-sets. So far C is the only thing that we defined and determined completely (since by definition, C is given).

how does that look? take your tie to respong, I'm on vacation ymself... I am not very active online. So I don't mind at all if it takes a few days to respond.

/Fredrik

 

[AnssiH]

Hi Anssi, it's good to have you back. I have been spending a lot of my time on ZBrush. Right now the learning curve is pretty steep; the system is just too powerful and it's hard to keep all the methods in mind.

Heh, yes it is. They are using it on many expensive movie productions, so it is fairly powerful. The newest version (3?) has got much more intuitive UI than the earlier versions I hear.

Well, we will have that experience a week from now. My wife has booked a River cruse on the Danube and we will be in Prague a week from Monday. I probably won't be able to access the Internet for some three weeks. You might talk to Fredrik while I am gone. I think you understand what he is missing and maybe you could communicate it better than I can.

Heh, yeah probably, just haven't had much time to read his posts too carefully yet. Maybe you are also able to help me out with the math Fredrik?

I don't think you will have any real problems; as Richard Feynman used to say, “mathematics is the distilled essence of logic” and logic is your strong point.

Well funny thing, when I finished the 9-year comprehensive school I was inches away from receiving the best grade in math. My teacher said she spent a lot of time thinking really long and hard whether to give it to me or not, but decided not to in the end. Had she done it, I would have been the only one from the whole school to get it (I think some 100 people graduated). Still, I take it I was the only one they had trouble deciding :)

Anyway, imagine her shock when she realized I wasn't going to continue studying math. Just didn't care, you know. And I have forgotten a lot of that stuff since (plus it really wasn't too advanced math at that time). Also let it be mentioned that a lot of the credit does go to that teacher. She really knew how to explain things properly. A teacher who actually knew how to make people learn. Go figure.

Again yes; however, you need to keep in mind the fact that, when we have a specific number and/or a specific present, we have a specific explanation being represented. There is a very subtle thing going on here.

Oh yeah, you know I remember wondering about this at some point. So for example when two different epistemological solutions have defined simultaneity differently, they could be having the "same" ontological elements in different presents? Is this the way the epistemological solutions always define "simultaneity"?

Hmm, if one were to represent some system in a relativistic spacetime with this scheme, how would they represent a single "present"? Just from an arbitrary inertial frame? I.e. they could represent the same system with many tables that at the face of it look different, and be explicitly aware of them being the same system?

These additions represent assumptions which have been made in order to “understand” (make coherent) a specific explanation. The important part here is that the character of those “assumptions” and the purpose they serve (the role they play in developing the “method” of the explanation).

The last sentence seems to be cut short at a critical point... :P
Their purpose is to make reality understandable? I take it this is another way to put the issue that we must assume certain identity to "noumena" around us (in an undefendable manner) to make sense of the "their behaviour" (to put into words what "phenomena" exist).

What you really know is in your left hand and the structure you need to defend the explanation is in your right hand.

And in essence my thoughts about reality are the structures found from the table on the right hand, right? The left hand table was the one including only the undefined elements, or only the "valid ontological elements", wasn't it? Is it a good idea to describe that as "what I really know"; isn't it rather the table that is (fundamentally) hidden underneath "what I think I know". I.e. beyond my direct sight. I need to ask because there's a good chance I've made more subtle invalid assumptions somewhere in here :)

Once again, life gets subtle. I am adding totally arbitrary “invalid elements” (arbitrary in that “what they are” is as undefined as are the “valid ontological elements”) but they are being added to accomplish some very specific results. What will happen, when we solve that equation,

$$\left{\sum_i \vec{\alpha}_i \cdot \vec{\nabla}_i + \sum_{i \neq j} \beta_{ij} \delta(\vec{x}_i - \vec{x}_j) \right}\vec{\Psi}= K \frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi} = iKm \vec{\Psi},$$
​

is that identification of these “invalid elements” with specific ontological elements of the explanation will become quite obvious: i.e., your explanations, if they are flaw-free, will indeed make use of exactly these invalid ontological elements. It turns out that it has to do that or the specific explanation will contain exactly the flaws these elements were introduced to eliminate. This is something you will understand down the line.

I hope so... I have yet to go through post #471 properly.

Ah, again, subtly rears its ugly head. First two presents can only be identical if the ontological elements making them up are the same which means we are speaking of a specific epistemological construct (the reference labels have been defined).

Right... Each element in the undefined table has got to be unique, that's how it was? That's how it must be I guess. No single element can be found from two different presents if no identity to anything has been defined.

I think that, here, you are confusing the meaning of “existing knowledge” (English is not a very precise language for expressing these ideas). We are talking about the existence of ontological elements on which the explanation rests; not exactly equivalent to the full range of what can be meant by the English term “existing knowledge”.

Yeah, I thought that could be the case. That at least makes the problem far easier!

Also, perhaps it would be easier to think about these tables in terms of only including the ontological elements of a "single system" rather than including a full "present". I'm just saying that because one difficulty in trying to figure out your treatment comes from trying to imagine the mind boggling amount of information we could gather about every present. So if that is okay, I think it would be easier to explain this to people that way.

I figure this treatmet should work (to certain extent) when just limited to explaining a single system (however one wants to draw the boundaries of that system), since we are always working with limited amount of information about the universe anyway.

I'll try to get back to those older posts soon...

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Well Fredric, you seem to begin alright but I get a sense (from your last statement) that you are missing a subtle but very important fact. It is an issue apparently difficult for others to comprehend. I think I finally managed to communicate it to Anssi but even he regularly slides back to not recognizing it (or at least not taking it into account in his thoughts). I guess it is a concept for which English just has not yet provided us with a label. In our conversation, Anssi and I essentially get around the problem with the idea of a ”what is”, is “what is” tabular explanation. That works only because it requires no epistemological construct.

As far as the issue of definition goes, you need to understand my earlier post to Anssi.

What you need to do is comprehend that we are dealing with two rather different issues here. First there is that collection of “valid ontological elements” underlying our world view (you can think of this as a basic, undefined, ”what is”, is “what is” table in your left hand) and, secondly, there is that epistemological solution which is our world-view itself. That world view (and that would be any explicitly defined explanation) includes the assumption of certain “invalid ontological elements” necessary to that epistemological solution. Thus that “defined” representation must include those “invalid” elements (you can think of this as a second, explicitly defined, ”what is”, is “what is” table in your right hand). What I am going to do is add some rather arbitrary “invalid ontological elements” to that second table.

The table in your left hand is a totally undefined issue and the reference labels are not defined in any way. The second table, in your right hand is defined only in the sense that specific numerical labels have been given. What those labels refer to is still undefined. The second table includes all the information necessary to represent a specific explanation. The problem of understanding that explanation is still extant. The only difference is that the second table includes references to “invalid ontological elements” presumed to exist by the explainer. Anssi is still having problems understanding this issue and I will try to clear it up for him below.

Ok, I'll go to your numbers... and see if it makes it clearer. I'll try to go through this with comments, let me konw if I get you right. I'll do it step by step, in case you have comments, se we can keep the responses short.

I will do my best. First, I start by noticing that you begin below my definition of “an explanation”. I will take that to indicate you are willing to work with that definition.

So whatever it is we don't know at some point, you consider this to form a set.

I only used the term “set” because I wanted a way to refer to it. The use of that term brought about a significant amount of complaints as to what the definition of a set was so I don't tend to use it any more. Instead, I define reality to be the “valid ontological elements” the entirety of which I call A, what is to be explained. And, yes, until an explanation is produced, it is undefined. And yes, the initial state is “we know nothing of A”; all we have done is assigned it a symbol. (Just as an aside, if it doesn't exist, we are talking about Solipsism but that is really of no concern to my analysis.)

There is a little confusion with regard to the definition of B and C. When I originally wrote this document, I presumed that the idea that the initial C and the first B(t) were identical was obvious; however, that issue seems to be in question. Since that date, I have taken to presenting C as the data (or information or valid ontological elements behind our epistemological solution or whatever you want to call it) as what lies behind our explanation (whatever that happens to be). Two things need to be understood. First C is always exactly what lies behind our solution. I define that to be “the past”. Exactly what constitutes the past only becomes defined when an explanation is presented. It follows that, from the perspective of the problem to be solved, C is no more defined than is A. The past is thus defined to be what is known of A (an undefined collection of information, data, whatever ...). The future is defined to be what is not known of A.

The index t was introduced for the explicit purpose of allowing the past (what is known of A to change). B is defined to be a change in C. One very important issue comes into play here. That is the fact that C and changes in C (otherwise known as B) cannot be infinite. By definition, infinite means that no matter how much information we have, there is more. It follows that any explanation must be based on a finite amount of information: i.e., both C and B must be finite. Since the number of changes in C (and that would be specific B's) must be finite, it follows that they may be ordered. The symbol “t” (which I define to be time – because I know where this thing is going) is defined to be an index of that order. I finally define a change in the past (as defined) to be the “present”. Under these definitions, B(t) becomes the representation of a specific present.

Clearly, once that aspect is understood, it should be clear to you that C can be seen as finite collection of presents. As I call it, our given “known information”. What needs to be held in mind is the fact that this known information is still not actually defined. In order to define it, we need an explanation from whence we can deduce the definitions (not at all a trivial task). The important point is that an explanation, no matter what that explanation is, can be expressed in terms of those ontological elements: i.e., it is the explanation which provides us with the data necessary to actually create definitions of those elements.

There is a very important (but perhaps subtle) error in this statement:

B is hypothetical information we imagine we might possibly come into possession of? But the set of all possible B, is defined as subets of A - which is unkonwn, this means the B's are also unknown?

B's are only defined via a specific explanation so, from our perspective (analyzing the the problem), exactly what B is, must be undefined. You are absolutely correct there; however, B(t) is not defined as subsets of A. B(t) is defined to be a finite unordered collection of elements of A. There are two important aspects of that definition: first, it is defined to be unordered as all order is to be indicated by the “t” index. Secondly, B(t) is defined to be a collection of elements of A. Under the common definition of sets, duplicates are not allowed so there should be no duplicates in A; however, under the definition of B, duplicate elements are certainly possible. A subtle but important point: the collections B(t) can not be seen as subsets of A.

C represents what we know, which is considered to form an finite ordered set of B-sets. So far C is the only thing that we defined and determined completely (since by definition, C is given).

C is no more defined (other than being the information our solution is based upon) than are either A or B. These are no more than abstract categories which I use in my deduction. What you must keep in mind is the fact that only explanations can define what these things are and explanations are epistemological constructs (theories) and could very well be in error.

That brings me to the definition of another term: “Flaw-Free”. I define an explanation to be “Flaw-Free” if and only if there exists no information within C which can invalidate that explanation. That is to say, it is totally consistent with “the past” (what is known). You should understand that the only “flaw-free” explanation which does not require a epistemological construct is the ”what is”, is “what is” tabular explanation.

I hope I have cleared a few things up.

Looking to hear from you -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

Hi Anssi, once again, I am delighted with your post. You express your confusion very clearly and well. By the way, I have both version 2 (which I bought) and version 3 which was sent as an upgrade on my purchase. The “practical manual” on version 3 is over 700 pages PDF pages. I finally got into “sculpting” on 3 this morning; there are some important changes from 2.

I am not surprised by either of your statements, doing well in math and not continuing with it. In many respects studying math is much like doing logic puzzles, really not very much fun unless you are into it. It reminds me of my math professor in graduate school (for some strange reason, I took all my graduate mathematics from the same fellow). He was born in the 1880's and often made some delightful comments. In differentiating, Newton introduced using a dot above a variable to indicate time differentials whereas Leibniz introduced the d/dx notation. My professor said he “preferred deism to dotism because, when he was a student, flies often created unwanted differentiation when one used dotism”. He was the one who told me that “mathematics was the invention and study of self consistent systems”. As I am sure you are well aware, exponents essentially tell you how many times you are to multiply something by itself (well define for an integer). The extension to fractional exponents is an exercise in logic. The only reason I bring that up is that, when I was a graduate student, I thought about extending differentiation and integrating to fractional operations: i.e., can one create an internally consistent definition of a fractional derivative?

[tex]\frac{d^{3.141592}}{dx^{3.141592}} = ? [/itex]
​

Well, I managed to define such a thing in a consistent manner and I took it to show it to him. He looked at it; then turned around to his book shelf and pulled down a book, opened it and pointed to the definition of fractional differentiation. The guy knew a lot of stuff. He kind of left me with the impression that most anything that could be thought of already had but he never did it in a way that discouraged one from thinking. Even that time, it was really sort of a compliment that I had done it correctly. But I really had no interest in “doing mathematics” so I think I know how you felt.

Oh yeah, you know I remember wondering about this at some point. So for example when two different epistemological solutions have defined simultaneity differently, they could be having the "same" ontological elements in different presents? Is this the way the epistemological solutions always define "simultaneity"?

In a sense, yes; but let us not get into that issue right now as my perspective is quite alien to the norm. My definition of time has to do with the information available to be used to create your world-view not the common concept, “time is what clocks measure”. Just as an aside, you should realize that “clocks” are quite complex objects from the perspective of fundamental ontological elements. We will get into the issue of relativity when we begin to look at solutions to my equation. It arises in a manner quite different from the way the issue arose in common science and it turns out to be a required phenomena in any flaw-free explanation.

Their purpose is to make reality understandable? I take it this is another way to put the issue that we must assume certain identity to "noumena" around us (in an undefendable manner) to make sense of the "their behaviour" (to put into words what "phenomena" exist).

I sense a little confusion here. When I say, “their purpose is to make reality understandable”, what I mean is that they are necessary to a flaw-free explanation. The real issue here is “causality”. Note that there is no causality in the ”what is”, is “what is” tabular explanation. Causality is a very central issue of epistemological constructs; causality is the answer to the question “why?” and that is how “understanding” gets into the picture. The common concept is that you understand something when you know “why” it happens and you only know that when it has been explained to you: i.e., that explanation has arisen again and we are outside the problem of interest here. For the moment, the only thing you know about any explanation is that there is enough information in that “right hand” ”what is”, is “what is” table for you to figure it out. As far as we are concerned here, it is still nothing more than a table.

And in essence my thoughts about reality are the structures found from the table on the right hand, right? The left hand table was the one including only the undefined elements, or only the "valid ontological elements", wasn't it? Is it a good idea to describe that as "what I really know"; isn't it rather the table that is (fundamentally) hidden underneath "what I think I know". I.e. beyond my direct sight. I need to ask because there's a good chance I've made more subtle invalid assumptions somewhere in here :)

I think the real problem here is that you are trying to figure out epistemological consequences of what I am explaining. At the moment, there can be no epistemological consequences as, if there were, it would imply that there exists a solution which cannot be represented in my model and that makes the model “wrong”. That is why I stick so carefully to that ”what is”, is “what is” representation. In other words, even when you are given a specific solution, it is given to you in a form which can be put into a ”what is”, is “what is” table and you still have the problem of figuring it out. In order to keep “ALL” possibilities open, we must also keep the possibility that you are misinterpreting the explanation itself (you see the fundamental problem exists on all levels and we have no reason to bring “understanding” into the discussion as that is a theoretical hypothesis).

Think again about my question, how do you tell a Volkswagen from an electron. Suppose you were given the data for a ”what is”, is “what is” table and found the same label being used in two different places could you use that to defend the fact that the explanation being represented referred to the same thing in both places? Suppose you had come to the conclusion that the label referred to what you had decided to call a beetle. Does the question not still exist as to whether that is a “bug” or a “vehicle”? (I was very tempted to say “was that a bug or a bug” which might or might not clear up my comment.) Let us not get into those issues. The only issue of interest to us is, does the model allow representation of any data set of any kind.

I suspect the problem here is that you are trying to understand my solution in terms of your general epistemological solution: i.e., your current world-view. What you have to understand is that we are working with a pure deduction based on the definitions I put forth. I give you reasons for those definitions and for the “invalid ontological elements” I decide are convenient to my representation: i.e., make that representation more convenient. What you need to do is to understand those definitions in terms of the problem, not in terms of the solution.

I hope so... I have yet to go through post #471 properly.

From your comments, I would say we shouldn't worry about that post for the moment.

Right... Each element in the undefined table has got to be unique, that's how it was? That's how it must be I guess. No single element can be found from two different presents if no identity to anything has been defined.

What you need to remember is that this situation still exists when “invalid ontological elements“ are introduced: i.e., when you are attempting to interpret another's explanation; the one somewhat in your right hand. That is to say, even when you are dealing with a specific explanation (unless it is your own explanation) two labels being the same can not be taken to mean the references are the same (exactly what is meant by the word “bug” anyway).

Also, perhaps it would be easier to think about these tables in terms of only including the ontological elements of a "single system" rather than including a full "present".

What ever they are, they are what your explanation is to explain and nothing is to be left out; not if the explanation is to be flaw-free.

I'm just saying that because one difficulty in trying to figure out your treatment comes from trying to imagine the mind boggling amount of information we could gather about every present. So if that is okay, I think it would be easier to explain this to people that way.

The problem is that “in trying to figure out” my treatment, you are not referring to my logic. Instead you are trying to apply your world view to the logic. I am deducing a relationship required by my defined entities. This deduction is simply a logical deduction derived from my definition of “an explanation”, it has absolutely nothing to do with reality unless you can cast your picture of reality in my definitions. For the moment you shouldn't be worrying about that issue.

Read my comments to Fredrik.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[d_jnaneswar]

Interesting debate!

Time as an experience and time as an entity "defined" are slightly different I feel. I mean, time as an experience is not the "t" in the equations. Time as a "universal" and time as a perception are just as different as "my view point" and "fact".

My view point states that Earth is stable and that the skies are moving. Fact says that Earth is revolving.

To question which is true requires definition of "truth".

Besides, "changes" are also perceptions, just like time. So, whether you say "time is an illusion" or that "changes are an illusion", i think both are not different, but that both are perceptions. Perception itself is a function of time, ini the sense that you percieve "in time". Sleep for example, you don't percieve anything and so, you can't "feel" time.

in that sense, time is certainly an illusion, more of a "delusion", in the sense that its our way of seeing something that exists. Its a phenomenon rather than a nuomenon.

But time as an entity, as that thing that keeps the world running even when we are sleeping and not percieving is quite different. It is a "fact" of life so to speak.

Thus, at one level, time is just a delusion, on another level, its a fact of life without which we cannot live.

Thus, I think truth to be of different levels. One level is the sensory perception level, and the others being different levels of "existence". One is certainly delusional in the light of a more fundamental level of truth, but nonetheless, without our sense of "time", our perception of "time", there's no thinking, being or non-being, isn't it? Without that perception, there's no "life".

Hence, at its own level, time as a perception is a fact of life, just like the time as entity. Similarly, at its own level, time as the entity is also delusional when seen with the point of view of the illusion of perception.

And so, no one can ever say whether time, either as perception or as an entity, is an "illusion" or not. Its just a matter of view point. And never that a single view point can give a complete picture. In that sense, it can't be "proven" as to what it is.

DJ

 

[Doctordick]

Hi d_jnaneswar, I googled your name and found the animator d_jnaneswar quite interesting. If you are he, I think you have what it takes to succeed (of course, with that endorsement and a dollar, you can get a cup of coffee ).

I appreciate your post although I think it is a bit facile. You are absolutely right,

To question which is true requires definition of "truth".

and the only truth you can be sure of is that you personally mean what you mean when you use a symbol to represent what you mean. (A rather esoteric expression of “truth by definition”. :tongue: ) The problem being, the rest of us have to figure out what you mean! What I am saying is that truth by definition is the only truth worthy of rational logic and it is a very personal thing. What you mean and what I mean by the same symbol can be very different things even when we think we are agreeing. Life is tough all over. :yuck:

Thus, at one level, time is just a delusion, on another level, its a fact of life without which we cannot live.

Now here you have to define “live”. My position is quite simple: without the concept of time (an idea and thus an illusion created by you, meaning what you mean) you could not “understand” reality. Reality being what exists. In other words, without a concept of time nothing could be understood and understanding is the fundamental goal of life. (We can talk about that if you want to.)

It's nice to talk to you -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

My professor said he “preferred deism to dotism because, when he was a student, flies often created unwanted differentiation when one used dotism”.

Hoh :)

In a sense, yes; but let us not get into that issue right now as my perspective is quite alien to the norm. My definition of time has to do with the information available to be used to create your world-view not the common concept, “time is what clocks measure”. Just as an aside, you should realize that “clocks” are quite complex objects from the perspective of fundamental ontological elements. We will get into the issue of relativity when we begin to look at solutions to my equation. It arises in a manner quite different from the way the issue arose in common science and it turns out to be a required phenomena in any flaw-free explanation.

Well I'm intrigued. But yeah, let's not get into it yet.

I sense a little confusion here. When I say, “their purpose is to make reality understandable”, what I mean is that they are necessary to a flaw-free explanation.

Heh, I sense a little confusion here too and I am sorry I only added to it by not being very clear :)

"Their purpose is to make reality understandable" was my guess as to what was the message of your half a sentence: "The important part here is that the character of those “assumptions” and the purpose they serve." (...is...?)

So I take it I guessed the missing part correctly. So another way to put it is that specific epistemological solutions add (assume) specific elements (that are required by just that specific solution). I.e. they add elements that make explanations possible/simple. That would sound very much reasonable in that that's how I view (semantical) worldviews with my common sense logic as well, so when we have this treatment of yours that explores "internal coherence" of worldviews, that ought to become an explicit fact rather than just my assumption. Am I correct?

The left hand table was the one including only the undefined elements, or only the "valid ontological elements", wasn't it? Is it a good idea to describe that as "what I really know"; isn't it rather the table that is (fundamentally) hidden underneath "what I think I know". I.e. beyond my direct sight. I need to ask because there's a good chance I've made more subtle invalid assumptions somewhere in here :)

I think the real problem here is that you are trying to figure out epistemological consequences of what I am explaining.

Hmmm, I'm not sure what this is referring to... Perhaps my question was posed in a confusing manner. I made that comment because I was surprised about the sentence; "What you really know is in your left hand" (= a basic, undefined, ”what is”, is “what is” table = collection of “valid ontological elements” underlying our world view). I suppose there was a logical reason to refer to it as "what you really know", but it can certainly be misleading to people when it's still confusing to me too.

I finally got around reading Fredrik's posts, and I think the same misinterpretation occurred there, that the undefined "what is, is what is"-table would be something that we could first construct somehow "correctly" and then carry on to define it. That's leading the focus away from where it should be; on the necessary relationships between any unknown elements no matter how one might choose to define them. Am I making sense?

Think again about my question, how do you tell a Volkswagen from an electron. Suppose you were given the data for a ”what is”, is “what is” table and found the same label being used in two different places could you use that to defend the fact that the explanation being represented referred to the same thing in both places? Suppose you had come to the conclusion that the label referred to what you had decided to call a beetle. Does the question not still exist as to whether that is a “bug” or a “vehicle”? (I was very tempted to say “was that a bug or a bug” which might or might not clear up my comment.)

Heh, I think it would :) That's a good comment anyway.

The problem is that “in trying to figure out” my treatment, you are not referring to my logic. Instead you are trying to apply your world view to the logic. I am deducing a relationship required by my defined entities. This deduction is simply a logical deduction derived from my definition of “an explanation”, it has absolutely nothing to do with reality unless you can cast your picture of reality in my definitions. For the moment you shouldn't be worrying about that issue.

Yeah I get that, and I am not supposing that the treatment would give us an unambiguous way to think about the system (like tell us how to interpret a dual slit experiment or anything).

I can tell you that you have very much convinced me that your treatment is very useful for a lot of things and so I am very much interested in figuring it out myself (and I would be surprised to find a fatal flaw from it).

When I say "figuring it out myself" I mean really understand the reasons behind every step (and consequently understand different ways to perform similar steps).

Oftentimes how new ideas are presented to people/students is they are simply told what the solution is, and like you say, they need to take it on faith without understanding why things are so. I suppose that's how a lot of relativity and quantum mechanics are taught even today (I know that is how they are explained to the general public, which IMO is doing more harm than good). When I study something myself, or when I try to explain something to someone, I try to begin with the problem, and then try to go through the steps towards the full solution (which almost always includes a host of small solutions that introduced new problems and their solutions)

I know you started with the grand chicken-egg problem with Fredrik (and I suppose he had a decent grasp at that problem), but when you go to the "what is, is what is"-table, the reasons for having that table will not be cleared until waaay down the line. And until they are, people are forced to make a lot of false assumptions; there are just too many possibilities open to them. (That is why I went back to the old posts recently, and this time around I could make better assumptions)

Although, I'm not saying I'd know a better way to explain the treatment (especially not yet) since teaching things really is not the most trivial thing to do. Most professional teachers I know simply can't do it (So I like to study things myself), and when I try to explain something to people it is usually very time-consuming process to put my own thoughts in such order that others can understand them at all.

Anyway, next time I'll continue with the post #477...

-Anssi

 

[d_jnaneswar]

Hi d_jnaneswar, I googled your name and found the animator d_jnaneswar quite interesting. If you are he, I think you have what it takes to succeed (of course, with that endorsement and a dollar, you can get a cup of coffee ).

I appreciate your post although I think it is a bit facile. You are absolutely right,
and the only truth you can be sure of is that you personally mean what you mean when you use a symbol to represent what you mean. (A rather esoteric expression of “truth by definition”. :tongue: ) The problem being, the rest of us have to figure out what you mean! What I am saying is that truth by definition is the only truth worthy of rational logic and it is a very personal thing. What you mean and what I mean by the same symbol can be very different things even when we think we are agreeing. Life is tough all over. :yuck:
Now here you have to define “live”. My position is quite simple: without the concept of time (an idea and thus an illusion created by you, meaning what you mean) you could not “understand” reality. Reality being what exists. In other words, without a concept of time nothing could be understood and understanding is the fundamental goal of life. (We can talk about that if you want to.)

It's nice to talk to you -- Dick

Hey Dick!

Yeah, i understand what you mean. Firstly, I am that animator, hehe. True that communicating what is "truth" is awful hard, everyone has their own meanings and symbols. Life is tough all over.. well said!

Hmm.. I meant "live" in the normal sense of the word, going about one's life.

My position is quite simple: without the concept of time (an idea and thus an illusion created by you, meaning what you mean) you could not “understand” reality. Reality being what exists.

Well, given that you have time, can one ever understand the reality - reality as what exists? Can one understand the nuomenon? Or just the phenomenon?

I think we are bound by our sensory perception, and our logical abilities, and as long as we are within those bounds, as long as we use any of those, we are stuck to observe only the phenomenon -- What appears to be. Isnt it?

And time is also a phenomenon. It is something we observe. Something we experience. But, when we sleep, we don't experience it. Why? Because, it is a perception of the senses and the mind - mind as in that which relates and creates images from what our senses supply it.

In other words, when changes are said to be perceived by the senses, mind registers it as passage of time. But changes themselves are nothing but what our limited senses (or our limited mind) percieves. Thus they are also just perceptions and perceptions can't be reality - reality as in what exists.

In that case, with-in time too, we can't "understand" reality.

On another note, reality, if it means what "exists", it will bring into question "existing when?" Thus, the question is whether the existence of anything is bound by time or not. Not just whether we percieve it or not, but whether time is fundamental to "existence" or not. If it were not, then the world wouldn't "RUN" when we are asleep. So, it does underly that reality which we percieve as this world. It does underly even our perception of Time! Thus, it must "exist".

Truth, (meaning a fact) thus, is of two levels here. Truth about time, is of two levels. At one level, time is purely experiential. At another level, time is purely existential. Both of these truths are based on one another.

Since the world (our perception of what exists) appears to change constantly, we conclude that it changes. And change is what we attribute to what exists, especially when we "assume" changes even when we don't percieve them (like in sleep). But change is also just a perception, based on our limited sensory abilities. So, change is also of those two levels of truth. One level based on the other.

In either cases, it makes it clear that we humans cannot percieve reality at all, but only an approximation of it, but we can deduct what might exist as the foundation of our experience. Since experience is a "sequential" phenomenon, it is bound by the perceived time and also the existential time (which is a logical assumption). Thus, as long as one is bound "with in" time, one can only glimpse parts of perception at a time and never the whole.

Undertanding, thus, doesn't come as long as we are bound by sensory perception, or assumptions based on our limited minds which make judgements based on previous perceptions.

Then how can reality be known? Be understood?

The question comes back sharply as to "Be understood by whom?" Without understanding the self, there is no way unlocking the mystery of time. Much similar to this is the fact that until one knows the specs of a micro scope, one can't estimate the size of what's being seen through it. Without knowing the ability of the microscope, how much this particular piece scales things up at this moment, there's no way to estimate what the actual scale/size of the things that this microscope seems to show. Similarly, without understanding the perciever, perception can't be accurately deciphered. But the concept of self, self-awareness, consciousness and all of that good stuff belongs in another thread, may be.

I am not a professional philosopher or anything. I am just a computers guy trying to make sense of things that i see. So, please do correct me if I go wrong and please allow certain lapses in language and take the spirit of it rather than the letter of it.

Thanks a lot for everyone for keeping such a wonderful forum and such lively discussions.

DJ

 

[Doctordick]

Anssi, you are so coherent! I read a number of forums but seldom post (I have been told that the behavior marks me as a “Troll”).

CHALMERS: "Why should a physical system, no matter how complex and well-organized, give rise to experience at all?"

I tried to correspond with Chalmers for a while a number of years ago. I am sure he wouldn't remember me as he insisted on pushing the idea that he knew a lot more about the problem than I did (I took it to be pretty well an emotional reaction sans thought). I could not get it across to him that the problem he was trying to solve was actually a consequence of presuming his world-view was a valid representation of reality: i.e., he was presuming his question had meaning when, if fact, it was “completely up to how one wants to understand the situation”. By the way, it's easy to write an AI program which will claim to have experiences; the problem is that, after we interact with the thing for a while, we will probably dismiss it as “unintelligent”.

Many years ago, I read an article which was titled (I think), “First program written which passes the Turing test; and it's paranoid!” When I read the article, it turned out that somebody at a psychology department had written a program to provide psychology students with practice handling typical paranoid behavior. It turned out that the program worked quite well: trained psychologists couldn't tell the difference between the programs reactions and typical paranoid reactions. When I read it, it seemed to me that what they had actually proved was that “paranoids” don't think.

But back to your last post on this thread; all in all I think you pretty well understand what I am doing. I think your only confusion seems to be from trying to extend what I am saying beyond what I am actually saying. The sole purpose of the current discussion is to convince you that my equation,

$$\left{\sum_i \vec{\alpha}_i \cdot \vec{\nabla}_i + \sum_{i \neq j} \beta_{ij} \delta(\vec{x}_i - \vec{x}_j) \right}\vec{\Psi}= K \frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi} = iKm \vec{\Psi},$$
​

does indeed follow directly from my definitions. Trying to interpret what those definitions mean (beyond the meanings required by the deduction itself) isn't really an important issue. Not now anyway and I think my being drawn into such a discussion really isn't beneficial though such things will arise later. The meanings required by the deduction will become an important issue when it comes to interpreting the solutions to that equation. It is at that time that I will start defining other things. What is important is that these additional definitions must not conflict with those definitions already established.

Well I'm intrigued. But yeah, let's not get into it yet.

A wise choice; however, you are making it clear that you will not be satisfied until you understand the solutions so we do have some work ahead of us.

... that ought to become an explicit fact rather than just my assumption. Am I correct?

If you mean by this comment that these “added invalid ontological” elements correspond to “explicit facts” required by your explanation you are totally correct. But just as the existence of the Gods (or God) is a fact required by a typical theological explanation, you must always remember that an explanation might exist which would not require these elements. A subtle point (not important now) which is very important for any philosophical interpretation of my results.

I suppose there was a logical reason to refer to it as "what you really know", but it can certainly be misleading to people when it's still confusing to me too.

Yes, I agree with you. What is happening is that I am thinking about interpreting the solutions to the equation and I should not be bringing any of that up now. There is an important issue which will arise with that solution having to do with the existence of those “valid ontological elements” (valid and invalid ontological elements will end up being handled in a slightly differentl manner). For the moment, that isn't an issue we should be worrying about.

That's leading the focus away from where it should be; on the necessary relationships between any unknown elements no matter how one might choose to define them. Am I making sense?

Absolutely! I apologize for being confusing. Down the road (when we begin to work with solutions), you will come to understand that there is a subtle difference in the “necessary relationships” required of valid and invalid ontological elements. For example, the number of “valid ontological elements” underlying your explanation must be finite whereas the number of “invalid ontological elements” can easily be infinite as they are mere intellectual concepts presumed to represent reality. You cannot tell the difference between them, but the mathematics of their representation becomes subtly different. I really shouldn't be bringing this up now but I trust you won't start worrying about it until we get to the issues.

That's a good comment anyway.

Why am I not surprised that you understood exactly what I meant. Essentially I agree with everything you said in your post. Explaining something new is not an easy job and I think you are doing an excellent job of picking up my intentions.

Anyway, next time I'll continue with the post #477...

I have just reread both #477 and #478 (the two are actually one post) and there is quite a bit of the important issues covered there. If you do manage to figure out the details of those two posts, I think you will be close to being convinced that my equation is a valid representation of the most important logical constraints on a flaw-free explanation.

I am sure you will have some questions so I will figure on ironing those out when I get back. My wife has found a note in the cruise information which indicates there will be no Internet access on the boat. I am going to bring my portable anyway so I can work on picking up ZBbrush and, if I do happen to run into access, I might check you guys out. Meanwhile, maybe you and Fredrik can make some headway with each others help.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

Firstly, I am that animator, hehe.

Are you familiar with ZBbrush? It is a astonishingly powerful program which Anssi introduced to me.

Well, given that you have time, can one ever understand the reality - reality as what exists? Can one understand the nuomenon? Or just the phenomenon?

The only thing anyone can understand are “explanations”. Belief that you understand anything beyond some specific explanation is no more than self delusion. Your senses themselves constitute an explanation. “Time” itself is an explanation which is simply poorly understood. See if you can follow my paper, “http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm ”. That is essentially what we are presently talking about here. My wife and I are off to the Danube come Monday and will be back in about a month.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

...The only thing anyone can understand are “explanations”...

I completely disagree with this statement.

What "thing" does Doctordick refer to ? It is clear that he claims that an "explanation" is a thing. But this is folly, an "explanation" is not a "thing", for a "thing" is a "metaphysical given", and all "explanations" are man made. Priori to any explanation must first be a thing to be explained, and it is the fact that some thing in general must be priori to any explanation of it that is the only thing anyone can understand, and thus I conclude in opposition to Doctordick philosophy that:

The only thing anyone can understand is that existence exists​

 

[d_jnaneswar]

hey doctor!

i am familiar a bit with z brush, but its not my department. I am a character animator, not a modeler, and zbrush is primarily for modelers.

Anyways, coming back to "explanations", I really feel that I understand what you mean.

Heres what Sir James Jeans said : " We can know nothing of the universe beyond the effects that its happenings produce on our senses, either directly or through the intervention of instruments - telescopes, spectroscopes, etc. All that science of any period can legitimately set out to do then, is to devise a scheme or model that shall account for much of the effects as are known to the period in question".

A great line by an Indian philosopher "The mystics the world over had ever recognized that Reality is ultimately veiled by the very make and mode of functioning of our senses and of the conscious mind which can respond only to the sense perceptions."

But I wonder why you chose to call them "explanations". Explainations of science? Can you explain?

DJ

 

[d_jnaneswar]

ooops,

I just started reading the paper that you put a link for.. And I think it explains what you mean by "explanation".
Ill read it.

DJ

 

[ZapperZ]

The only thing anyone can understand are “explanations”. Belief that you understand anything beyond some specific explanation is no more than self delusion. Your senses themselves constitute an explanation. “Time” itself is an explanation which is simply poorly understood. See if you can follow my paper, “http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm ”. That is essentially what we are presently talking about here. My wife and I are off to the Danube come Monday and will be back in about a month.

Have fun -- Dick

Can you please show the full reference on where this paper has been published?

Zz.