Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

AI Thread Summary
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant is facing significant challenges following the earthquake, with reports indicating that reactor pressure has reached dangerous levels, potentially 2.1 times capacity. TEPCO has lost control of pressure at a second unit, raising concerns about safety and management accountability. The reactor is currently off but continues to produce decay heat, necessitating cooling to prevent a meltdown. There are conflicting reports about an explosion, with indications that it may have originated from a buildup of hydrogen around the containment vessel. The situation remains serious, and TEPCO plans to flood the containment vessel with seawater as a cooling measure.
  • #801
AtomicWombat said:
UCS details on SFPs:

http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/4008511524/more-on-spent-fuel-pools-at-fukushima"

I now read their http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/3964225685/possible-source-of-leaks-at-spent-fuel-pools-at" . And I am flabbergasted by how these things are designed: the gates are sealed with an inflatable thing that needs to be kept pressurized by electrical power. Without electricity, water will be running out. And this had happened in the US at the Hatch nuclear plant in Georgia in 1986. There someone had closed a valve. They cought it in time, but if water levels had fallen further, radiation levels would have made it difficult to fix the problem.

So maybe there is no structural damage or cracks in the concrete caused by the quake or the tsunami. The leaks in all these pools are a consequence of design, almost guaranteed to happen when electrical power is lost. That is very worrisome.
 
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  • #802
REACTOR UNIT 3 BUILDING ORIENTATION?

Starting with the diagram found here:
http://modernsurvivalblog.com/wp-co...ral-electric-boiling-water-reactor-mark-I.jpg

1) If this general schematic is correct (and I realize it may not be), then the north-south axis of the core's center is located west of the central north-nouth axis of the building, but the east-west axis of the core is centered.

2) It appears that a tunnel structure at ground level is located where the well shaft for the fuel assembly lift with the crane takes place. A very similar tunnel exits the southwest corner of Bldg 3 and, this appears to coincide with where, on the west side of Bldg 3 the refueling trucks were parked.

3) It appears that the upper portion of the shaft (intact, or largely intact) and a portion of a pool, severely damaged, can be seen on the helicopter fly-over photos. The helicopter spends a long time looking at the southeast corner of the building.

4) The location of the overhead crane is not a constant reference as it can be moved north-south

5) From this information, I have concluded that the SFP in Unit three is nearest the southeast corner of Bldg 3, and that appears to me to be the epicenter of the blast, directed upward and to the south, toward Bldg 4.

(see attached annotated diagram, NorhtSouthOrientation.jpg)

Any errors in this logic?
OOPS! the original NorthSouth diagram was incorrectly annotated. I have corrected it. Sorry!

After the explosion, from the helicopter fly over, this is the view from the southeast corner. One can see part of a tunnel structure exiting the back (west side, southwest corner) of the building, a part of the well shaft, what appears to be a blown out SFP in the southeast corner and steam venting from where the head of the primary (dry) containment of the reactor core might be.

(see picture38)

Part of Building 4 is included. In closer detail, it is apparent that the top of the north face of Bldg 4 has been blasted inward (not melted as earlier posted). If you look closely at several of the views of the northeast corner of Bldg 4, you can even see that the concrete pillar at the northeast corner of Bldg 4 buckles inward, presumably also from the blast. Although it has been posted that the north side of Bldg 4 was intact after the blast (at least it lacked the large, square hole we later concentrated on), it appears to me that blast damage occurred to Bldg 4. In fact, shrapnel from Bldg 3 may have penetrated the exterior of Bldg 4, not been visible by satellite, and may have been responsible for the later fire and additional damage at Bldg 4. Note also that a portion of the roof of Bldg 4 is peeled back.

(see pictre 37)

Does anyone find any error with these observations?

More later as I have time today.
 

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  • #803
Place of SFP is confirmed by Japanese authorities and mentioned in CNN and BBC
 
  • #804
artax said:
how do you screen grab from you tube?

i'll try this
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z9fKtXDaQVc&feature=player_detailpage#t=54s

no just starts playing the vid there I'll photo my screen!

BUMP!

Not a very good image I know, but the vid has been pulled from you tube japan, and these fuel rods are s'posed to be a few cm thick and four metres long, and I assume very stiff as they're ceramic (?) or is that just the pills inside?
Anyway, would anyone else like to suggest what these are falling out the back (seaward or eastern side of unit 3
 

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  • #805
TCups said:
REACTOR UNIT 3 BUILDING ORIENTATION?

Starting with the diagram found here:
http://modernsurvivalblog.com/wp-co...ral-electric-boiling-water-reactor-mark-I.jpg

1) If this general schematic is correct (and I realize it may not be), then the north-south axis of the core's center is located west of the central north-nouth axis of the building, but the east-west axis of the core is centered.

2) It appears that a tunnel structure at ground level is located where the well shaft for the fuel assembly lift with the crane takes place. A very similar tunnel exits the southwest corner of Bldg 3 and, this appears to coincide with where, on the west side of Bldg 3 the refueling trucks were parked.

3) It appears that the upper portion of the shaft (intact, or largely intact) and a portion of a pool, severely damaged, can be seen on the helicopter fly-over photos. The helicopter spends a long time looking at the southeast corner of the building.

4) The location of the overhead crane is not a constant reference as it can be moved north-south

5) From this information, I have concluded that the SFP in Unit three is nearest the southeast corner of Bldg 3, and that appears to me to be the epicenter of the blast, directed upward and to the south, toward Bldg 4.

(see attached annotated diagram, NorhtSouthOrientation.jpg)

Any errors in this logic?

TCups, SFP has been stated to be in SE corner of building, At fukushima reactor 1 is north of reactor 4, you have North South interchanged

(By the way you can image link and attachment) as I have done here by clicking on the thumb twice)
https://www.physicsforums.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=33373&d=1300788049

https://www.physicsforums.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=33373&d=1300788049
 
  • #806
AntonL, I think youre wrong. Servicetunnel goes towards the Northwest.

Reactor 1 is at the North?

And landside is on the West?

Then Servicetunnel goes to the Northwest?
 
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  • #807
AntonL said:
TCups, SFP has been stated to be in SE corner of building, At fukushima reactor 1 is north of reactor 4, you have North South interchanged

(By the way you can image link and attachment) as I have done here by clicking on the thumb twice)
https://www.physicsforums.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=33373&d=1300788049

https://www.physicsforums.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=33373&d=1300788049

Yes (darn it) and I didn't catch it immediately. I re-uploaded a correct annotation. I think the diagram matches the text now. SFP is at the SOUTHEAST corner of Bldg 3 as best I can tell.

I MUST be off to work. Will read all replies later.
 
  • #808
jensjakob said:
AntonL, I think youre wrong. Servicetunnel goes towards the Northwest.

Reactor 1 is at the North?

And landside is on the West?

Then Servicetunnel goes to the Northwest?

jensjakob, I do think the IAEA will have it correct http://www.slideshare.net/iaea/aerial-schematic-view-of-fukishima-daiichi-19-march-2011" top left hand corner of slide 1
 
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  • #809
AntonL said:
jensjakob, I do think the IAEA will have it correct http://www.slideshare.net/iaea/aerial-schematic-view-of-fukishima-daiichi-19-march-2011" top left hand corner of slide 1

Yes, apologies again. My typing fingers didn't keep up with my mind. Unit 3 is north of Unit 4. Unit 3's SFP is on the southeast corner of the building, more or less, but the buildings do not set on a true North-South-East-West axis as my diagram would seem to suggest. Obviously the ocean side is to the east. None the less, the "anatomy" of the building with respect to the location of the shaft, SFP, and core containment and therefore, the logic of the blast coming through the SFP, NOT the equipment pool holds up, which is the point I was, in my imperfect way, trying to make here.
 
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  • #811
Quoting http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/asia/22nuclear.html:
In 2000, a whistle-blower at a separate company that was contracted
to inspect the reactors told regulators about
cracks in the stainless steel shrouds that cover reactor
cores at Fukushima?s Daiichi plant.
But regulators simply told the company to look into the issue,
allowing the reactors to keep operating.
[...] He said the prefecture itself
and the communities hosting the nuclear plants did not learn about the
cracks until regulators publicized them
in 2002, more than two years after the whistle-blower reported the cracks. [...] whistle-blowers gave
information to Fukushima Prefecture showing
that the company had falsified inspection records and hid flaws over
16 years to save on repair costs.
 
  • #812
jensjakob said:
The picture is rotated.

I google mapped it. Please review the orientation.

http://maps.google.dk/maps?f=q&sour...157&t=h&z=16&iwloc=A&cid=17060867344567820820

REGARDING THE DAMAGE AND MECHANISM OF DAMAGE TO UNIT 3

How unfortunate that my error on the N-S label (now corrected) or whether or not the buildings are in a true N-S-E-W orientation or somewhat askew misdirects the discussion. In general, the MAJOR POINT is that it is the corner nearest the SE of Building 3 where the SFP is located.

If one assumes that the long-distance video of the explosion was taken from high ground to the west, instead of out to sea, to the east, then the initial explosion was directed to the right, or generally to the south and toward Bldg 4, then it is the south wall of Bldg 3 that is blown out by the initial explosion and the north wall of Bldg 3 that is destroyed by the overhead crane.

If we agree on those points, then the pictures of the damage I see seem to make sense and reinforce the sequence of events I suggested and outlined earlier:

1) the hydrogen & oxygen from hydrolysis of hot steam in the presence of zirconium comes from the core of the reactor, and indicates at least some damage to the core.

2) the hydrogen accumulated in the primary (dry wall) containment and at relatively low pressure, could escape from the drywell cap.

3) the force of the earthquake alone could have sloshed out significant amounts of water from the SFP, irrespective of boiling, evaporation, or loss of circulation pumps

4) there is a transfer chute and a mechanical gate mechanism connecting the drywall containment to the SFP used to transfer fuel rods, underwater, from the core to the SFP.

5) the pneumatic seals on the gate are inflatable and would be compromised by a prolonged loss of power.

6) a lower water level in the SFP, and thus, loss of hydrostatic pressure behind the gate (outside of the primary, drywall containment) would further compromise the strength and integrity of the gate if a blast occurred from within the drywall containment

7) If the force of a blast exiting the primary containment were directed sideways, through that gate and the transfer chute, then the reinforced floor and walls of the SFP would function as an acoustic lens, directing much of the force of the blast (and perhaps a large, expanding volume of steam from the vaporized water which remained in the lower portion of the SFP) upward.

8) there may or may not have been a secondary explosion of hydrogen leaked into the upper portion of Bldg 3. (A primary explosion of that sort, external to the containment in the upper portion of the building, probably occurred in Bldg 1).

9) the blast blew portions of the south wall of Bldg 3 into Bldg 4's north wall. "Shrapnel" from the Bldg 3 blast may have initially damaged Bldg 4 leading to the fire(s) that occurred in Bldg 4 thereafter. (questionable, not confirmed by satellite photos. See Anton's later post, #820)

10) Blast damage from Bldg 3 can also be clearly seen involving the roof of the steam turbine buildings to the east and to at least one of the additional buildings to the west. A large portion of the crane fell, damaging the adjoining building structure below, to the north.

11) It is not possible to tell with certainty if the drywell containment plug atop Reactor 3 has been blown skyward. Perhaps not, the evidence being lack of conclusive damage to the roof girder structure directly over the apparent location of the plug, but instead, primarily over the SFP.

12) If there are fuel rods in the photos of the damage and debris atop Bldg 3's east side, then it appears more likely to me that they came from the SFP of 3, not the reactor core. Certainly any remaining water in the SFP would act to transfer the force of the blast (shock wave) more efficiently into the submerged portion of the pool and the rods therein, and the floor of the pool would reflect that shock wave, water, steam, and maybe spent fuel rod assemblies skyward.

13) Steam appeared to be venting, in a jet, into the region of the damaged SFP of Unit 3 after the blast (the helicopter flies through this cloud of steam). The pressure in the primary containment of Unit 3 has dropped. Radioactivity levels especially around unit 3 have risen. Black smoke was later seen rising from the same region.

14) It is very likely that the primary drywall containment of Unit 3 and not unlikely that the Unit 3 reactor vessel or pipes or valves connected to the RV have been damaged, initially venting steam, then, perhaps something else burning within the RV.

15) from the available photos, such as they are, I cannot confirm that there are fuel rod assemblies or water remaining in the SFP of unit 3.

Oyster-Creek-reactor.gif


BlastMechanism.jpg


Comments or corrections?
 
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  • #813
TCups - quite plausible I would say.
 
  • #814
FORCE OF EXPLOSION AT UNIT 3?

Does anyone have a source for seismographic recordings at the time of the explosion at Unit 3? If so, it may be an objective way to assess the size of the explosion relative to, perhaps, the explosion at Unit 1.
 
  • #815
just found some more video:

 
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  • #816
TCups said:
9) the blast blew portions of the south wall of Bldg 3 into Bldg 4's north wall. "Shrapnel" from the Bldg 3 blast may have initially damaged Bldg 4 leading to the fire(s) that occurred in Bldg 4 thereafter.
Comments or corrections?

First: regarding 9 - Reactor 4 looks in a pretty good shape to me after explosion of reactor 3
attachment.php?attachmentid=33382&stc=1&d=1300797779.jpg
 

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  • #817
Blast mechanism at fukushima

BLAST MECHANISM AT FUKUSHIMA

Observed are three catastrophic explosions Unit 1, 3 and 4 with pretty much the same
consequence and Unit 2 had a small Hydrogen explosion that was contained with little
damage and thus I propose that the cause of the Hydrogen Blast is not from Hydrogen
produced in the reactor and somehow leaked from the containment vessel into the building, but
instead all three buildings where destroyed by hydrogen produced in the spent fuel pools
This would then be a common cause of failure and most likely.

Why the SPF water level went low, certainly wave action initiated by the earthquake are a
cause, the Earth shook for minutes instead of seconds, I believe 5 minutes, Kobe earthquake
was 15 seconds. Other reasons like leakage or borrowing water for cooling reactor to avoid
meltdown, we can speculate.
 
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  • #818
AntonL said:
First: regarding 10 - Reactor 4 looks in a pretty good shape to me after explosion of reactor 3
attachment.php?attachmentid=33382&stc=1&d=1300797779.jpg

Yes it does. OK, thanks Anton. What to you think about the possibility of shrapnel damage that might not be obvious as the etiology of the fire at Unit 4?

Refresh my memory -- only one major explosion at Unit 3, and as far as I remember, no major explosion that I can immediately recall reported at Unit 4, right?

Is it possible that the shock wave could have done internal damage to the inside of Unit 4 or to the structural integrity of Unit 4 that might not be immediately visible in the satellite photo? Certainly the roof isn't peeled back as it appears to be in later photos.

Maybe there was distortion or spherical aberration from the camera lens shooting through the helicopter window that makes one of the structural columns at the NE corner of Unit 4 look slightly bucked inward. Hmmm. . .

All of my fly over image frames are on the home computer and I am at work. More to study this evening.

Suggestions?
 
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  • #819


AntonL said:
BLAST MECHANISM AT FUKUSHIMA

Observed are three catastrophic explosions Unit 1, 3 and 4 with pretty much the same
consequence and thus I propose that the cause of the Hydrogen Blast is not from Hydrogen
produced in the reactor and somehow leaked from the containment vessel into the building, but
instead all three buildings where destroyed by hydrogen produced in the spent fuel pools
This would then be a common cause of failure and most likely.

Why the SPF water level went low, certainly wave action initiated by the earthquake are a
cause, the Earth shook for minutes instead of seconds, I believe 5 minutes, Kobe earthquake
was 15 seconds. Other reasons like leakage or borrowing water for cooling reactor to avoid
meltdown, we can speculate.

IMO, the overall force demonstrable from collateral damage, and vertical component of the blast at Unit 3, demonstrable from the videos of same, are, I contend, much stronger and much different from any at Units 1 and 4. Do you agree?

Is there any video of a catastrophic blast at Unit 4? If so, I have overlooked it and need to review it. Thanks.
 
  • #820


TCups said:
IMO, the overall force demonstrable from collateral damage, and vertical component of the blast at Unit 3, demonstrable from the videos of same, are, I contend, much stronger and much different from any at Units 1 and 4. Do you agree?

Is there any video of a catastrophic blast at Unit 4? If so, I have overlooked it and need to review it. Thanks.

I agree Unit 3 has spectacular column of dust rising, Unit 1 also has a similar vertical
component but without dust, Unit 1 has a steel upper structure with bolted on steel panels,
Unit 3 has a concrete upper structure with concrete panels, these are stronger so the roof
gave first in Unit 3 instead of the side panels as in Unit 1

I have not seen any video of 4 exploding. All 4 reactors are reported to have had hydrogen
blast with various force and damage. The force is equivalent to the amount of hydrogen
accumulated. If the SFP are boiling the air O2 would have been displaced by the steam and
furthermore would have been sucked up by the zirconium first before it extracted the oxygen
from the H20, Thus the atmosphere in the empty pool would be H20 and H2, only separating
outside the pool and fate determined how much H2 would accumulate in the building before
the bang.

Here is a time line of the explosions.
Unit 1 - 12.03.2011 at 15:36
Unit 3 - 14.03.2011 at 11:01
Unit 4 - 15.03.2011 at 06:14
Unit 2 - 15.03.2011 at 06:20

In all the reactors 1 to 3 the containment vessels where vented after reactor venting.
 
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  • #821
artax said:
just found some more video:



Have we not seen this vid already.
In any case, there are some interesting features :

At 1:14 we can possibly see the green crane over the SFP?
attachment.php?attachmentid=33385&stc=1&d=1300800912.jpg

What is this feature? It looks like the top of a whiskey distillery. Note the round opening at the top.
attachment.php?attachmentid=33383&stc=1&d=1300800912.jpg


Any idea what the brown/orange stuff is ?
attachment.php?attachmentid=33384&stc=1&d=1300800912.jpg
 

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  • #822
Yes but they've been pulled from you tube so thought I would re-post! your obs. are interesting, that whisky thing could be the top of reactor vessel, and yes... no idea what the brown stuff is but don't know what those pipes were carrying before, steam probably as they run to the chimney stacks. there's a lot of info in these vids so I'm surprised no 'experts' have analysed them.

THERMAL IMAGE OF REACTORS for those interested there's a discussion on housepricecrashforum, where one poster has posted this recent thermal image:
http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/bernanke/heatAll.jpg

This is a very interesting science/engineering problem and the lack of information is just so frustrating.
 
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  • #823
artax said:
Yes but they've been pulled from you tube so thought I would re-post! your obs. are interesting, there's a lot of info in these vids so I'm surprised no 'experts' have analysed them.

Of course! Sorry if I sounded out of turn!
 
  • #824


AntonL said:
I agree Unit 3 has spectacular column of dust rising, Unit 1 also has a similar vertical
component but without dust, Unit 1 has a steel upper structure with bolted on steel panels,
Unit 3 has a concrete upper structure with concrete panels, these are stronger so the roof
gave first in Unit 4 instead of the side panels as in Unit 3

?
I can't quite understand what you are saying.

Unit 1 has a (weaker) steel upper structure with bolted on steel panels (OK)
Unit 3 has a concrete upper structure with concrete panels, these are stronger (than Unit 1?)
The roof (of Unit 4?) gave first
The side panels of Unit 3 gave first (because?)

Can you clarify, I don't think I follow completely. Thanks.
 
  • #825


TCups said:
?
I can't quite understand what you are saying.

Unit 1 has a (weaker) steel upper structure with bolted on steel panels (OK)
Unit 3 has a concrete upper structure with concrete panels, these are stronger (than Unit 1?)
The roof (of Unit 4?) gave first
The side panels of Unit 3 gave first (because?)

Can you clarify, I don't think I follow completely. Thanks.
TCups like your North South
Unit 3 has a concrete upper structure with concrete panels, these are stronger (than Unit 1)
The roof (of Unit 3) gave first as concrete structure side panels are stronger putting more force on the roof.
The side panels of Unit 1 gave first (because?) as seen in video.

I have edited original post accordingly
 
  • #826


AntonL said:
BLAST MECHANISM AT FUKUSHIMA
Why the SPF water level went low, certainly wave action initiated by the earthquake are a cause, the Earth shook for minutes instead of seconds, I believe 5 minutes, Kobe earthquake was 15 seconds. Other reasons like leakage or borrowing water for cooling reactor to avoid
meltdown, we can speculate.

Consider again the effects of the initial earthquake:

(1) Report from worker inside #4 at the time of the earthquake describing equipment (likely heavy) brought in for inspection toppling over (large potential for damage to key systems).

(2) The tectonic plate under the area dropped, now leaving several coastal areas subject to flooding due to high tide. Take a rectangular container of water (full near to the top) and drop it 5 cm to a hard flat surface and see how much water is lost. Now grab hold of that same container and shove it 5cm to the side and measure how much additional water is lost.

(3) What was the height (above sea level) of the plant before and after the earthquake?

(4) How far to the east did the entire land mass shift?

Obviously (4) is an oversimplification, but one could get an idea of how much energy was transferred into wave motion in the SFP. The energy was transferred over approx. 5 min. so there's no way to be sure if the wave amplitude of successive motions were more additive or had the effect of canceling out, but since the local effect was to drop down and move toward the east it would not be unreasonable to expect significant water loss (in all SFP's) and that kind of wave motion could damage the transfer gates regardless of power loss and seal failure. Add to that a loss of circulation (cooling system) and the rate of evaporation increasing with temperature rise and you don't need any other explanation for reactor #4's SFP.
 
  • #827
Busy minds and good speculation. Would like to know just what vent path was used by the operators to vent the reactor and primary containment (PC)? The space between the shield plugs anbd the PC Dome Cap (Steel) probably would not contain enough hydrogen to blow the shield plugs off, but just displace them and open another vent path.

Just some idle thoughts.
 
  • #828
Not a nuclear engineer here, and maybe I have some fundamental misunderstanding that needs to be corrected, but . . .

What the heck is the whole "torus" design and function about if not for containment of pressure vented from the reactor vessel?

If there is a pressure containment function implied by the torus design, under normal circumstances, why wouldn't the RV be vented into the primary containment and torus?

If there were some unusual or emergent circumstance, why might the RV be vented elsewhere (ie to the outside of the primary containment?)

If hot hydrogen gas, under pressure, were accumulating in the torus and drywall containment, wouldn't it tend to rise, accumulate under the drywell cap, potentially leak from under the drywell cap and then spontaneously vent externally?

If the accumulated hydrogen within the drywell and torus containment were to ignite and explode, wouldn't the exit path of the explosion "vent" through this same pathway?

I am obviously somewhat confused here.

DrywellTorus.jpg
 
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  • #830
Here is a time line of the explosions and reported CV venting
Unit 1 - 12.03.2011 at 15:36 : CVv 15:00 on 12.03.11
Unit 3 - 14.03.2011 at 11:01 : CVv 09:20 on 13.03.11
Unit 4 - 15.03.2011 at 06:14
Unit 2 - 15.03.2011 at 06:20 : CVv 11:55 on 13.03.11

There is a correlation between Unit 1 CV venting and Hydrogen blast.

Below SFP data FU = fuel units followed by pool volume and heat load of the FU
Unit 1 - 292 FU 1200m3 60kW
Unit 2 - 587 FU 1425m3 400kW
Unit 3 - 514 FU 1425m3 200kW
Unit 4 - 1331 FU 1425m3 2000kW + 200 brand new FU (yes 2MW not a typo)

This sets a new light on my earlier proposal
Unit 1 exploded due to H2 leak of venting system - possibly Earth quake damage
Unit 2 to 4 exploded due to hydrogen generation from equipment pools.
 
  • #831
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  • #832
Re M Bachmeier comments in Post 830:

For anyone who's in any doubt about what a strong ground wave looks like, how fast it travels, and what it can do to objects of any weight, it's worth looking at a rather grisly video of an underground H-bomb test for Project Cannikin in Amchitka, Alaska. Blast was magnitude 7.0 on Richter scale. Detonation was 2 km below surface. Video is just 0:47 long.



Imagine this going on for 5 mins! Are the Fukushima plants "anchored" directly to the ground/rock (i.e. they take the full force of the bucking), or do they have some kind of disconnect to absorb strong ground movements, as one understands quake-"proofed" buildings in Japan do?

Re 5 mins: From memory, seismic trace of the main M9 quake as recorded by the British Geol Survey in Edinburgh can actually be seen continuing for around 50 minutes, though this was recorded the other side of the planet (echoes, reverbs?) and the after-events obviously tail off in magnitude after the main shock.
 
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  • #833
And sorry, I should add to that last message (836) that I saw somewhere that the force of the quake at Fukushima -- what actually hit it, as opposed to the magnitude 9 over the epicenter -- was around M7.
 
  • #834
I bought my Iodide tablets for me and my family! Being prepared is important! Do not be fooled by the Iodate tablets, Iodide is the way to go! They are good for a 14 day protection!
Get some everyone and be prepared, or just spend 1000's and build yourself a fallout shelter?
 
  • #835
TCups said:
Not a nuclear engineer here, and maybe I have some fundamental misunderstanding that needs to be corrected, but . . .

What the heck is the whole "torus" design and function about if not for containment of pressure vented from the reactor vessel?

If there is a pressure containment function implied by the torus design, under normal circumstances, why wouldn't the RV be vented into the primary containment and torus?
[/PLAIN]

Under 'normal' circumstance steam is vented from RV into the torus and bubbled through the hopefully cool water so condensation can take place and CV pressure should not rise only the torus water level would rise.

Under 'meltdown' condition steam and H2 is vented from RV into the torus. If CV pressure rises CV contains steam and compressed H2 and N2 - no O2.

Torus is part of the primary containment and in later models no longer used as in the Mark 3 reactor
Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 to 5 are Mark 1 and Unit 6 is a Mark 3
[PLAIN]http://www.atom-fukushima.or.jp/qa/qa-164/img/qa-1.gif

When a melt-down takes place you want no water near it otherwise you will have a steam explosion.
The torus, in mark 1, and meltdown containment in mark 3 keep the water well away from the hot meltdown
 
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  • #836
donvance said:
I bought my Iodide tablets for me and my family! Being prepared is important! Do not be fooled by the Iodate tablets, Iodide is the way to go! They are good for a 14 day protection!
Get some everyone and be prepared, or just spend 1000's and build yourself a fallout shelter?

Taking them without a reason is dangerous for your health. I guess someone made a perfect deal selling you something you don't need.
 
  • #837
donvance said:
I bought my Iodide tablets for me and my family! Being prepared is important! Do not be fooled by the Iodate tablets, Iodide is the way to go! They are good for a 14 day protection!
Get some everyone and be prepared, or just spend 1000's and build yourself a fallout shelter?

Iodine levels at 100 times background is not dangerous at all. BTW, I assume your doctor told you about the possible serious side affects of taking KI? Can you imagine being in a underground shelter during a 9 magnitude earthqake?

The off site contamination is being blown way out of proportion. They should be discussing the actual relative low risks of eating foods with only slightly higher than background radionuclide contamination. Tens of thousand of nuclear works and bomb testing fallout survivors that received thousands of times hight doses, did not suffer any serious consequence over their exposures. Very low concentrations of long live primordial Uranium is present in most of our water and food stuffs anyway.
 
  • #838
AntonL said:
Under 'normal' circumstance steam is vented from RV into the torus and bubbled through the hopefully cool water so condensation can take place and CV pressure should not rise.

Under 'meltdown' condition steam and H2 is vented from RV into the torus. If CV pressure rises CV contains steam and compressed H2 and N2 - no O2.

Torus is part of the primary containment

OK, so . . .

1) In unit 4, it is beyond dispute -- if the explosion was a hydrogen explosion, then the hydrogen came from spent (and possibly un-spent) fuel rods in the SFP, not in the empty RV.

2) In units 1, 2, 3, if hydrogen exploded, it would need oxygen and therefor, the source of the explosion was not within the RV

3) In units 1, 2, 3, hydrogen could have been and was likely to have been produced by both an overheating reactor core in the RV and by overheated fuel rods in the SFP.

4) With loss of cooling, the hot cores in the reactor were, IMO, the more likely first source of trouble and first source of hydrogen production (correct?)

5) If a RV's steam and hydrogen were vented into the drywell torus, bubbling through the suppression pool of cool water, would the hydrogen then be in an atmosphere of air or of nitrogen, flooding the torus?

6) Is it possible for hydrogen (or hydrogen and oxygen) to have accumulated in the upper portion of the drywell containment, near the drywell cap, under pressure (for example if the normal venting system -- ducts, pipes -- had been damaged?

7) Except for Unit 4, why IYO, is the source of exploding hydrogen more likely from the SFP than, somehow, from the RV via leakage into the primary containment?

8) Is it not possible or even likely, that whichever came first, if an explosion occurred in Unit three, then both accumulated hydrogen in the upper building, external to the primary containment, and hydrogen leaking from under the drywell cap, would have ignited and led to explosions both inside the drywell containment and inside the upper building structure?

9) Why do you think the SFPs were the primary source of all explosions?
 
  • #839
donvance said:
I bought my Iodide tablets for me and my family! Being prepared is important! Do not be fooled by the Iodate tablets, Iodide is the way to go! They are good for a 14 day protection!
Get some everyone and be prepared, or just spend 1000's and build yourself a fallout shelter?

Yes, I think it's a 'miracle' that there haven't been more attempts to advance questionable remedies, concoctions, 'medicines' and alike associated with fears of radiation. What do you think??

Sorry for being off topic... I just couldn't help myself.
 
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  • #840
TCups said:
9) Why do you think the SFPs were the primary source of all explosions?

By demonstration of Unit 4
 
  • #841
Now German tabloid Bild reports that unit 1 reactor temperature has risen to 380 to 390 degrees C, normal operating temperature is 300 degrees C, for days we had no temperature indications. I conclude that batteries must be recharging so control room function is coming online.
 
  • #842
AntonL said:
By demonstration of Unit 4

But Unit 4 was unique in that the unspent fuel from the core was removed from the core and put in either the SFP (most likely) or as some suggested, in the equipment pool. Either way, the rods in Unit 4 wold have been "hotter", and yet, the explosion in unit 4 came last. That could have been a difference precipitated by earlier or greater loss of coolant in Units 1, 2, and 3. Possible, but not entirely likely, IMO -- unless coolant "borrowing" was somehow in play.
 
  • #843
artax said:
BUMP!

Not a very good image I know, but the vid has been pulled from you tube japan, and these fuel rods are s'posed to be a few cm thick and four metres long, and I assume very stiff as they're ceramic (?) or is that just the pills inside?
Anyway, would anyone else like to suggest what these are falling out the back (seaward or eastern side of unit 3

At a rough count there seems to be about 30 to 40 of those rods scattered about which is about a full fuel rod assembly. Most of them seem to have fallen and come to rest as a loose bundle with the rods almost in parallel.

That's as if they'd slid out together through a hole in the building wall. With the cask lorries parked outside it's possible they're new fuel rods decanted out of an open transport cask during inspection after delivery. Maybe a transport cask overturned? Or a new fuel rod storage canister might have overurned and spilt part of its fuel rod contents. It doesn't explain how the wrapping bands around the assemblies might have broken but maybe they're not as tightly bound together as they appear in photographs.

It's speculation of course.
 
  • #844
Spent fuel pool watering method

Fluctuating radiation and isotope levels are making ground work dangerous and slow, with a potential to completely cease work (of which there appears considerable cooling system work) and ground based watering, at least for some time.

Discharged water from ground based watering trucks substantially disperses on its course over building walls up to about 150 feet in height, and suitable positioning of watering trucks is also limited.

Water volume needed to mitigate each spent fuel pool is substantial, in the hundreds of thousands of gallons, which, along with counteracting pool water loss, necessitates sufficient and reliable gallons per minute filling pool fill rate (of water actually received by pools).

Apparent lack of experimentation to find a more effective watering method (perhaps due to lack of anticipation and thought in nuclear industry for present situation) is concerning.

Thermal imaging (Figure 1) reveals rising temperatures likely in spent fuel pools, as well as critical planning information for placement of new watering method.

Critical to re-establish water in spent fuel pools, which hold most of the nuclear material, the material susceptible to break down over time without water and has no containment if aerosolized.

Based on careful analysis, most effective watering method (of many) involves deploying hose with grappling hook like structure at outflow end, to be caught at top of building structure near a hotspot location.

System is best deployed by helicopter lift operation, and due to relatively low level of precision needed and natural stabilization (see below), 1) lift cable can be in excess of 500 feet (long line lifting), optionally without nearby vertical reference ground spotter, and 2) completion of lift operation, during which building is approached from air, can be done in minimal time (minutes), substantially limiting radiation dose of air crew (JSDF carried out helicopter watering operation on 17th with short line; that day about 88 millisieverts per hour was measured at 300 foot elevation and about 4 millisieverts per hour at 1000 foot elevation).

In simplest deployment method, for completion of lift operation, hose is laid over side of building (Figure 2A) with outflow end (having grappling hook structure, not necessarily drawn to scale) lowered into area above spent fuel pool/hot spot (Figure 2B). Lift line release and helicopter departure can then occur.

When water is pumped through the inflow end of the hose at a relatively safe location (assume 1 mile hose length for calculations), the weight of the water in the section of hose ascending up the wall will create hose tension that pulls the outflow end back (Figure 2C), causing the relatively simple steel grappling hook structure to become caught on surrounding structure and serve as an anchor. Assuming an ascending hose length of 150 feet, for a 2 inch diameter hose the water weight is about 200 pounds, or for a 4 inch diameter hose the water weight is about 800 pounds. It's seen that such weights are similar to what conventional grappling hooks experience.

In simplest deployment method, at beginning of lift operation a sufficient length of hose, such as lay-flat discharge/irrigation hose (Figure 3) often encountered on the order of miles in length, is prepared at a safe staging area for lifting (Figure 4A). During air transport the entire hose section can hang from lift cable (Figure 4B), ready for imprecise laying of the hose (Figure 4C), likely followed by some pulling/dragging near the end of the lay to achieve good longitudinal placement. Irrigation hose can have excellent abrasion and puncture resistance. By laying a relatively long section of hose, intermediate coupling operations on the ground can be avoided, although are also a viable approach if radiation levels permit.

A benefit of this lay/minimal pull deployment method is that the grappling hook at hose outflow end is naturally stabilized for its placement. In particular rotational and for/aft motion is stabilized, with also some side to side stabilization due to lateral friction and hose constraint with debris on the ground.

For a 100 gallons per minute flow rate through 1 mile of hose, a 4 inch diameter hose will have only about a 12 psi pressure drop, with greater drops for smaller hoses. Assuming a 150 foot hose rise over the building wall, an additional 65 psi of pressure is added for pumping to overcome, which is well within reasonable range. Medium duty lay flat irrigation hose is typically rated for 150 psi.

Although spring/pull-line directional control of water discharge is possible, it's likely sufficient to simply implement a water outflow pattern that is somewhat divergent to compensate for any misalignment with storage pool, considering the high flow rate effectively discharged directly into the area, as apposed to attempting to discharge from outside of the building and near ground level as has been done thus far. Also, discharge distance effectively adjusted by varying pumping pressure.

In the case of buildings with intact rooftops (such as unit 2) yet inability to water spent fuel pools due to excessive radiation levels, a hole of sufficient size can be punctured above the spent fuel pool area and a single hook metal structure with hose can be deployed by air lift into the puncture to then catch upon pumping (Figure 5, again not necessarily drawn to scale) as described earlier. All intact reactor buildings have already lost negative gauge pressure (including units 5 and 6 in which intentional vents were made in the rooftops).
 

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  • #845
AntonL said:
Here is a time line of the explosions and reported CV venting
Unit 1 - 12.03.2011 at 15:36 : CVv 15:00 on 12.03.11
Unit 3 - 14.03.2011 at 11:01 : CVv 09:20 on 13.03.11
Unit 4 - 15.03.2011 at 06:14
Unit 2 - 15.03.2011 at 06:20 : CVv 11:55 on 13.03.11

There is a correlation between Unit 1 CV venting and Hydrogen blast.

Below SFP data FU = fuel units followed by pool volume and heat load of the FU
Unit 1 - 292 FU 1200m3 60kW
Unit 2 - 587 FU 1425m3 400kW
Unit 3 - 514 FU 1425m3 200kW
Unit 4 - 1331 FU 1425m3 2000kW + 200 brand new FU (yes 2MW not a typo)

This sets a new light on my earlier proposal
Unit 1 exploded due to H2 leak of venting system - possibly Earth quake damage
Unit 2 to 4 exploded due to hydrogen generation from equipment pools.

Very interesting that units 4 and 2 had explosions withing 6 minutes of each other both on the 15 March.
 
  • #846
http://www.youtube.com/user/KurtsFilmeVideo#p/u

Speculation again but it's possible that those bits of roof (steel) still remaining on building 3 are actually being supported by the gantry crane. Although against that I remember there was opinion that the crane might have landed on a low level building adjoining the north side of building 3.

And at exactly 2.50 into the video could that long green object lying on the ground be a green gantry crane blown out of one of the buildings likely 3 as the most explosive. So three alternatives for what happened to the gantry crane?
 
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  • #847
JUrban said:
Spent fuel pool watering method

filling of unit 4 SFP by concrete lifter
[PLAIN]http://bilder.bild.de/BILD/news/fotos/2011/03/22/japan-ticker/SONDERKONDITIONEN__20257190__MBQF-1300804062,templateId=renderScaled,property=Bild,height=349.jpg

I am amazed by the protection suits, two piece, open collar, construction helmet ...
Compare to clothing in this video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aprycG9mlZc&feature=relmfu

and workers/inspectors then drive home in their cars, I presume after a hosing down, but is that effective?
 
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  • #848
Arcer said:
Very interesting that units 4 and 2 had explosions withing 6 minutes of each other both on the 15 March.

So, Unit 4 with the same starting volume of coolant in the SFP (1425 M2), but with a heat load 10 times greater than the SFP of Unit 3, generated enough heat and hydrogen to explode, but only did so 19 hours later than Unit 3, and with (apparently) a smaller explosion.

And Unit 3 exploded, albeit 26 hours after venting the overheating reactor vessel.

Again, I wish I cold compare the seismic recordings of Units 1-4 and compare their magnitude.

No expert on explosions, but I think the faint upward blast component from the explosion of Unit 1 was a ground-reflected shock wave. There was very little material ejected straight upward by the primary blast, compared to Unit 3, and yes, perhaps that had something to do with the concrete walls of Unit 3.

These data still do not contradict, and may in fact, support my contention that the explosion in Unit 3 was a combination of two things, hydrogen from delayed leakage of the primary containment and hydrogen from the SFP, vs an explosion immediately following hydrogen leakage from a damaged venting system in Unit 1, and delayed explosion of hydrogen only from the SFP of Unit 4.

Anton?
 
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  • #849
AntonL said:
I am amazed by the protection suits, two piece, open collar, construction helmet ...

Surprising - yes. But somehow I think they knew what they were doing.
 
  • #850
Borek said:
Surprising - yes. But somehow I think they knew what they were doing.

I hope they had respirators or some type of filtered breathing apparatus.
 

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