joewein
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htf said:And why did the emergency cooling system of reactor #1 fail much earlier than in units 2 and 3?
According to the AREVA report the design of unit 1 differs from units 2 and 3 with regards to the offline cooling system.
Unlike its siblings units 2 and 3, unit 1 was an older type called BWR3 (the others were of a type called BWR4). One difference between them is that the BWR4 has a Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system. During a loss of all grid and backup power a steam turbine running off decay heat in the core could still pump water from the Suppression Chamber into the reactor core. The BWR3 makes do with an isolation condensor, which relies on electric pumps to cool and condense steam from the reactor using cold outside water. Once the pumps stop, the isolation condenser stops cooling steam. With the RCIC at least liquid water was being injected as long as there was battery power to control valves and the water in the suppression chamber wasn’t boiling yet.
According to the AREVA report, cooling in the isolation condenser in unit 1 stopped at 16:36 on March 11, less than an hour after the backup diesel generators had failed. By contrast, the RCIC pump in unit 3 continued until 02:44 on March 13, about 35 hours after loss of backup power. In unit 2 the RCIC survived until 13:25 on March 14, some 46 hours after the accident.
Furthermore, the isolation cooling system in unit 1 seems to have been manually switched off while the Residual Heat Removal System was still operating on Emergency Diesel power and wasn't immediately restarted when the diesels (and consequently the RHRS) failed.