Law of Conservation of Energy and Its Implications for p-Consciousness

[loseyourname]

I was just thinking about this last night. Granted, I'm not pretending to answer any questions as to whether or not p-consciousness is efficacious or whether or not it has a non-physical origin. I am attempting only to eliminate one possibility. My proposition is that if p-consciousness were non-physical, then it could not be efficacious. In addition, if p-consciousness is efficacious, then it cannot be non-physical. Here is how I reached this conclusion:

I started from the law of conservation of energy, that says energy can be neither created nor destroyed. Another way of stating this is that all energy must have an origin in the physical world. This includes the energy necessary to carry out physical functions in the human body, as well as the energy to initiate neural processes that lead to physical action. If p-consciousness is efficacious, then it is capable of initiating these neural processes. Because neural processes require energy, they must be initiated by a physical source. Let me see if I can construct a formal proof for this. I will assume for the purposes of this proof that p-consciousness is efficacious.

If p-consciousness is efficacious, then neural processes are initiated.
If neural processes are initiated, then energy must have been used.
Therefore, if p-consciousness is efficacious, energy must have been used.
If energy is used, then it must have a physical source.
Therefore, if p-consciousness if efficacious, it must have a physical source.
P-consciousness is efficacious.
Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

Edit: I can't get LaTeX to separate my lines, so you'll need to accept this series of syllogisms as a formal proof. Two hypothetical syllogisms and a modus ponens are used.

 

[Rader]

If p-consciousness is efficacious, then neural processes are initiated.
If neural processes are initiated, then energy must have been used.
Therefore, if p-consciousness is efficacious, energy must have been used.
If energy is used, then it must have a physical source.
Therefore, if p-consciousness if efficacious, it must have a physical source.
P-consciousness is efficacious.
Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

All physical objects need a energy source to put them in motion. Is energy physical until it becomes matter?

 

[loseyourname]

That's probably an important semantic issue that will need to be addressed, but since matter and energy are interchangeable, I'm still considering energy to be of material origin. It has no origin outside of the physical universe, as a dualist model would place the origin of consciousness.

To paraphrase Les' definition of "physical," a definition that I really like, anything is physical if it is constrained by material laws of cause and effect.

 

[loseyourname]

I've been going through some of the threads that flourished while I was away, and noticed a lot of the comments about Rosenberg's theory that hypnagogue was talking about. I'd just like to chime in here that the impression I get (I've ordered the book and will get a more complete impression once I've read it) is that this new theory introduces nothing non-physical. hypnagogue himself has said that it is not a form of dualism. It seems like Rosenberg is attempting to complete physicalist theory by getting at the fundamental nature of what exactly it is that nature is made of. He notes, correctly, that physics and other natural sciences describe quite well the interactions of objects without saying what these objects are. In fact, all of science can in theory be broken down into an accounting of interactions between fundamental particles (if we ever discover the graviton) without any mention of what the particles themselves are made of. While it seems to me that it might be difficult, likely impossible, to ever know this because of the unimaginably small size of these particles, nothing about his theory prima facie precludes physical description, but rather only functional description. In fact, it seems to complement it, almost as the logical end of reductionism.

 

[Rader]

I've been going through some of the threads that flourished while I was away, and noticed a lot of the comments about Rosenberg's theory that hypnagogue was talking about. I'd just like to chime in here that the impression I get (I've ordered the book and will get a more complete impression once I've read it) is that this new theory introduces nothing non-physical. hypnagogue himself has said that it is not a form of dualism. It seems like Rosenberg is attempting to complete physicalist theory by getting at the fundamental nature of what exactly it is that nature is made of. He notes, correctly, that physics and other natural sciences describe quite well the interactions of objects without saying what these objects are. In fact, all of science can in theory be broken down into an accounting of interactions between fundamental particles (if we ever discover the graviton) without any mention of what the particles themselves are made of. While it seems to me that it might be difficult, likely impossible, to ever know this because of the unimaginably small size of these particles, nothing about his theory prima facie precludes physical description, but rather only functional description. In fact, it seems to complement it, almost as the logical end of reductionism.

I have the book and will read it in a short, I think a few others have decided to buy and read it. Maybe after the new year it can be discussed.

 

[Iacchus32]

That's probably an important semantic issue that will need to be addressed, but since matter and energy are interchangeable, I'm still considering energy to be of material origin. It has no origin outside of the physical universe, as a dualist model would place the origin of consciousness.

To paraphrase Les' definition of "physical," a definition that I really like, anything is physical if it is constrained by material laws of cause and effect.

But then again maybe the dualism we're referring to here is none other than the relationship between matter and energy? Obviously in order for dualism to exist, there has to be a relationship between two "opposing" conditions, both of which have to reside within the same overall parameters (of a shared reality), except at opposing extremes. Otherwise there would be no means by which they can have an effect and/or interact with each other. In which case I would suggest that matter is the consolidation or, outside configuration of what energy is the internal aspect and/or courses through everything. Or, if this wasn't the case, and consciousness did originate outside of the physical universe, the only way it could possibly interact with the physical dimension (I believe) would be through its connection with energy which, is why I believe the two are conceivably one and the same. Certainly intelligence/information can be broadcast via a radio signal and then picked up remotely and broadcast via a loudspeaker.

 

[Rothiemurchus]

Loseyourname:
In fact, all of science can in theory be broken down into an accounting of interactions between fundamental particles (if we ever discover the graviton) without any mention of what the particles themselves are made of. While it seems to me that it might be difficult, likely impossible, to ever know this because of the unimaginably small size of these particles,

Rothie M:
The size of the particles doesn't matter.Even if we can "see " the particles with
detectors, we still won't know what particles are made of - we will
just be able to say that particle X is the same as particle Y or particle X
differs from particle Y.I think relative descriptions are as far as we can go.

Consciousness probably does have a physical source.
But if this is the case, then we need to find out
why our brains instinctively tell us otherwise i.e
why can't we reduce a feeling to a physical description?
There must be something unusual about the physics of
consciousness - if such a thing exists.

 

[Les Sleeth]

My proposition is that if p-consciousness were non-physical, then it could not be efficacious. In addition, if p-consciousness is efficacious, then it cannot be non-physical. . . .

I started from the law of conservation of energy, that says energy can be neither created nor destroyed. Another way of stating this is that all energy must have an origin in the physical world.

I don't think this premise (in blue) will hold water, unless you were willing to make a small adjustment to it. The law of conservation of energy refers to thermodynamics and closed systems (and right now it looks like the universe is not a closed system). It cannot be interpreted to mean energy, whatever that is (and indeed no one has ever observed it), is not ever created and cannot ever be destroyed. We in fact don't know what happens to energy once it's disappears from systems. It is gone, poof! It just might be destroyed, if not now, possibly a zillion years in the future.

Also, saying energy is of material origin doesn't solve the problem of the origin for energy. What's the origin of matter? Where did all that energy come from to create this universe that apparently didn't exist before the Big Bang?

However, if you were willing to stipulate that when energy is made available for work in this universe, its origin is the matter of this universe, then I could see that. But without knowing the origin and fate of everything, I don't see how you can state with certainty about what goes on beyond what we can observe.

. . . since matter and energy are interchangeable, I'm still considering energy to be of material origin. It has no origin outside of the physical universe, as a dualist model would place the origin of consciousness.

I wanted to answer this instead of your syllogisms because I think I can put a dent in your argument using your assumption about dualism. I want to dispute that it is necessarily dualistic to consider consciousness originating outside the universe. Is it dualist to recognize H20 can exist as a solid, liquid and gas? All three are the exact same substance, but their characteristics are determined by conditions.

Similarly, matter and energy could be the manifestation of something even more basic, of which consciousness is a manifestation of as well. In such a case, they all would have been given their unique characteristics by distinct sets of conditions, not because they actually have essentially different natures.

I realize some people do argue in favor of dualism. My objection here is your assumption that a proposition must be dualistic if it suggests consciousness has its origin outside the universe. Once we recognize that matter, energy and consciousness might be made of the same "stuff," your argument seems to teeter.

The issue then becomes what is most basic. Is matter and energy most basic? Or is there something yet more basic where consciousness first developed, and out of which matter and energy appeared as well? If consciousness is in the more basic condition of existence, then it might well be able to interact and control the energy condition of existence, which in turn moves the matter condition of existence.

 

[hypnagogue]

I've been going through some of the threads that flourished while I was away, and noticed a lot of the comments about Rosenberg's theory that hypnagogue was talking about.

Phew, you just saved me some work. Your original post was a good analysis of why traditional interactionist dualism cannot work (or at least, why it is inconsistent with modern physical theory). But there are subtler notions of causation than the straightforward notion of effective causation, as in "Event A occurred as a result of Event B." The role of P-consciousness in Rosenberg's framework is more akin to Aristotle's notion of 'material causation' than effective causation, which is why it can assign a causal role to P-consciousness without violating conservation of energy or other well-established physical principles.

I'd just like to chime in here that the impression I get (I've ordered the book and will get a more complete impression once I've read it) is that this new theory introduces nothing non-physical. hypnagogue himself has said that it is not a form of dualism. It seems like Rosenberg is attempting to complete physicalist theory by getting at the fundamental nature of what exactly it is that nature is made of. He notes, correctly, that physics and other natural sciences describe quite well the interactions of objects without saying what these objects are. In fact, all of science can in theory be broken down into an accounting of interactions between fundamental particles (if we ever discover the graviton) without any mention of what the particles themselves are made of. While it seems to me that it might be difficult, likely impossible, to ever know this because of the unimaginably small size of these particles, nothing about his theory prima facie precludes physical description, but rather only functional description. In fact, it seems to complement it, almost as the logical end of reductionism.

This is another somewhat subtle issue, and Rosenberg addresses it early on in his book. This comes down to whether you consider physicalism to be object based (o-physicalism) or theory based (t-physicalism). I'm not sure I have a complete handle on these terms, but I believe o-physicalism includes the intrinsic natures of physical objects whereas t-physicalism is restricted to the extrinsic relationships between objects, such as are described in any physical theory.

It appears as if you are taking physicalism to be o-physicalism, which would account for why you see Rosenberg's framework as physicalistic, or at least not incompatible with physicalism. But it is arguable if o-physicalism really should count as a type of physicalism at all, since anytime we venture into the realm of intrinsic properties we are necessarily stepping outside of the realm of purely scientific inquiry. (That which is intrinsic by definition does not interact with other things in the manner of effective causation, or else it would be extrinsic; and if a phenomenon does not interact in such a way, it is impossible to detect in the traditional way via measuring devices, even in principle. This problem of interaction is what is ostensibly makes knowing intrinsic natures so hard (if not impossible) to know, rather than issues of size of fundamental particles or the like.)

Rosenberg takes physicalism to mean t-physicalism; that is, only that which is detectable in principle via measuring devices, or knowable in principle via theoretical deduction from observed phenomena, is taken to be physical. This automatically precludes intrinsic phenomena such as P-consciousness or the question of what an electron is aside from what it does, and so on. T-physicalism amounts to a kind of functionalism, but with apparently nothing to be carrying out the functions. Thus Rosenberg's framework is not physicalistic by t-physicalism standards.

 

[hypnagogue]

I have the book and will read it in a short, I think a few others have decided to buy and read it. Maybe after the new year it can be discussed.

Would anyone be interested in a mutual reading/discussion thread? We could devote a week or two to each of the chapters and go through them one by one. I believe this has been done on philosophyforums.com with Dennett's "Consciousness Explained" with good effect. Any interest here?

edit: Please see https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=55766 if you are interested.

 

[loseyourname]

I don't think this premise (in blue) will hold water, unless you were willing to make a small adjustment to it. The law of conservation of energy refers to thermodynamics and closed systems (and right now it looks like the universe is not a closed system). It cannot be interpreted to mean energy, whatever that is (and indeed no one has ever observed it), is not ever created and cannot ever be destroyed.

That may be the case, but I'm really just assuming for the purposes of this argument that each human nervous system in concert with whatever constitutes the individual phenomenal consciousness associated with each nervous system, is a closed system with respect to any causative role it may play in human action (in this case, the action can be either organismic or mental). I simply question whether the energy used to initiate these actions can come from any source outside of the cellular processes carried out by the CNS and PNS. According to the law of conservation of energy, they cannot. To sum it up, the assumption I'm making is that each conscious moment in which an action takes place constitutes a closed system.

It is entirely possible that the thermodynamics involved in incorrect, but I highly doubt it, because it has been confirmed in every chemical reaction in which confirmation was sought. The great thing about this point of contention is that it is testable in principle. Nothing precludes scientific endeavor from measuring the energy input and output of the CNS and PNS to see that they match. On a neuronal basis, they certainly do.

Thanks for bringing out the assumption, though. It didn't previously occur to me that I was making it.

Also, saying energy is of material origin doesn't solve the problem of the origin for energy. What's the origin of matter? Where did all that energy come from to create this universe that apparently didn't exist before the Big Bang?

However, if you were willing to stipulate that when energy is made available for work in this universe, its origin is the matter of this universe, then I could see that. But without knowing the origin and fate of everything, I don't see how you can state with certainty about what goes on beyond what we can observe.

Well, I cannot state what goes on outside of this universe, but I can say unequivocally that, within this universe, energy can be neither created nor destroyed. It can only be converted to different forms, each of which can be reduced in essence to the potential or kinetic energy of fundamental particles.

I don't know the ultimate origin of all matter/energy in the universe, but I'm not sure that a cosmological question like that needs to be answered here. I'd need further convincing of its relevance.

I want to dispute that it is necessarily dualistic to consider consciousness originating outside the universe. Is it dualist to recognize H20 can exist as a solid, liquid and gas? All three are the exact same substance, but their characteristics are determined by conditions.

I cannot see what point you are making with the water. Whether it be liquid, gas, or solid, it always exists within the same spatio-temporal continuum.

Edit: Actually, I do see your point now. I've elaborated below.

Similarly, matter and energy could be the manifestation of something even more basic, of which consciousness is a manifestation of as well. In such a case, they all would have been given their unique characteristics by distinct sets of conditions, not because they actually have essentially different natures.

Perhaps it is the case that matter and energy are only two forms of a more fundamental agent that can take on a third form we have previously been unable to detect. However, I cannot see any reason to believe this third form would be anything other than physical. In the case of matter and energy, the functional necessity of these two forms is clear. One form (energy) is needed to perform work, and the other form (matter) is needed to be worked upon. What would be the function of the third form? Assuming the third form to be the source of p-consciousness and assuming that it is physically efficacious, then it would also exist to perform work upon the form of matter. Given that energy already performs this function, any model containing this third form is not parsimonious.

This isn't to say the model is to be discounted, but a function separate from that of performing work would need to be attributed to your third form.

I realize some people do argue in favor of dualism. My objection here is your assumption that a proposition must be dualistic if it suggests consciousness has its origin outside the universe. Once we recognize that matter, energy and consciousness might be made of the same "stuff," your argument seems to teeter.

Oh, I don't argue that the model of three forms is dualist - given that all three forms conform to the definition given of physical; that is, that they are contrained by material laws of cause and effect. The only qualm I would have with the above statement with respect to this model is that there is no reason given to suspect that the third form exists in a universe separate from that of the other two. Given the definition of a universe as a single spatio-temporal continuum, any agent that can be the cause of an effect on a second agent exists in the same universe as that second agent.

The issue then becomes what is most basic. Is matter and energy most basic? Or is there something yet more basic where consciousness first developed, and out of which matter and energy appeared as well? If consciousness is in the more basic condition of existence, then it might well be able to interact and control the energy condition of existence, which in turn moves the matter condition of existence.

Okay, the model breaks down a bit here. To control energy, it would be necessary to perform work upon it. But energy is defined as the capacity to perform work. If the third form is postulated as "that which controls energy," we can reformulate the postulation definitionally first as "that which performs work upon energy" and second as "that which performs work upon the capacity to perform work." The lack of syntactical coherence in this description of the third form makes the model difficult to evaluate.

 

[loseyourname]

Phew, you just saved me some work. Your original post was a good analysis of why traditional interactionist dualism cannot work (or at least, why it is inconsistent with modern physical theory). But there are subtler notions of causation than the straightforward notion of effective causation, as in "Event A occurred as a result of Event B." The role of P-consciousness in Rosenberg's framework is more akin to Aristotle's notion of 'material causation' than effective causation, which is why it can assign a causal role to P-consciousness without violating conservation of energy or other well-established physical principles.

I had actually thought about this. Aristotle's notion of material cause (bronze is the cause of the chalice) does not seem to me to constitute a cause in any sense that is still recognized. His notion of formal cause is dubious at best. The type of causation I'm referring to here is akin to efficient causation, although I had considered that efficacious phenomenal consciousness could be considered under the heading of final cause in an Aristotelian framework. Even so, it seems to me that work must be performed. The best definition of "cause" I can give to work with in this thread would be "any agent performing work upon a second agent resulting in any change to that second agent." This would encompass efficient and final causation, as well as formal causation. The thing to be considered here is that if p-consciousness is to be thought of as material cause rather than final cause, it would not perform work. In fact, a material cause can do nothing to alter the mechanical course of events brought about through the more traditional notion of causation. It would dictate the course itself, but in an equally mechanical fashion. Modeling subjective consciousness in this way seems to me to make it epiphenomenal and not efficacious.

This is another somewhat subtle issue, and Rosenberg addresses it early on in his book. This comes down to whether you consider physicalism to be object based (o-physicalism) or theory based (t-physicalism). I'm not sure I have a complete handle on these terms, but I believe o-physicalism includes the intrinsic natures of physical objects whereas t-physicalism is restricted to the extrinsic relationships between objects, such as are described in any physical theory.

It appears as if you are taking physicalism to be o-physicalism, which would account for why you see Rosenberg's framework as physicalistic, or at least not incompatible with physicalism.

Yes, I was considering intrinsic properties as a part of physicalism. This is pretty much what I meant by saying it seemed to me that Rosenberg was "completing" physicalism.

But it is arguable if o-physicalism really should count as a type of physicalism at all, since anytime we venture into the realm of intrinsic properties we are necessarily stepping outside of the realm of purely scientific inquiry. (That which is intrinsic by definition does not interact with other things in the manner of effective causation, or else it would be extrinsic; and if a phenomenon does not interact in such a way, it is impossible to detect in the traditional way via measuring devices, even in principle. This problem of interaction is what is ostensibly makes knowing intrinsic natures so hard (if not impossible) to know, rather than issues of size of fundamental particles or the like.)

The only problem I would have with this assessment is that if Rosenberg models consciousness as an intrinsic property of physical objects, he has then rendered detectable an intrinsic property, even if it is not detectable in a third-person sense.

Rosenberg takes physicalism to mean t-physicalism; that is, only that which is detectable in principle via measuring devices, or knowable in principle via theoretical deduction from observed phenomena, is taken to be physical. This automatically precludes intrinsic phenomena such as P-consciousness or the question of what an electron is aside from what it does, and so on. T-physicalism amounts to a kind of functionalism, but with apparently nothing to be carrying out the functions. Thus Rosenberg's framework is not physicalistic by t-physicalism standards.

Either way. So long as we can develop a common understanding of terms. For my purposes in this thread, I'm defining o-physicalism, at least with respect to modeling consciousness as an intrinsic property of physical things, as a form of physicalism.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I simply question whether the energy used to initiate these actions can come from any source outside of the cellular processes carried out by the CNS and PNS. According to the law of conservation of energy, they cannot. To sum it up, the assumption I'm making is that each conscious moment in which an action takes place constitutes a closed system.

Yes, but it seems you are assuming consciousness is energy. Why should we assume that consciousness is energy?

You are also wrong to suggest that anything whatsoever about biology constitutes a closed system. As a biology guy, I think you must know this already (it even contradicts your own model). Biology is very much an open system. It takes in, it metabolizes, it moves, it loses heat. There is no possible way to prevent that. That’s about as “open” as a system gets. And as I pointed out, biology is also within a universe which itself appears open.

It is entirely possible that the thermodynamics involved in incorrect, but I highly doubt it, because it has been confirmed in every chemical reaction in which confirmation was sought. The great thing about this point of contention is that it is testable in principle. Nothing precludes scientific endeavor from measuring the energy input and output of the CNS and PNS to see that they match. On a neuronal basis, they certainly do.

You are mixing apples and oranges. No one is doubting that energy is preserved through physical processes. Don’t you see, you are assuming a priori what you are arguing? Of course if you look at physical processes and measure energy, you are going to find it all adding up. We already know that! It doesn’t prove whether a state of existence which is not energy, and cannot be measured, is capable of triggering physical actions (or, whether or not that triggering function, even if it does expend energy, uses a measurable amount of energy to do so).

Well, I cannot state what goes on outside of this universe, but I can say unequivocally that, within this universe, energy can be neither created nor destroyed. It can only be converted to different forms, each of which can be reduced in essence to the potential or kinetic energy of fundamental particles.

Hmmmmmm. How can you say that if you can’t observe what happens to energy once it leaves a system? No one on Earth seems to know anything about what the nature of energy is, or what happens to energy once we cannot observe what it does (i.e., we recognize the presence of energy by movement or heat, but no one has actually observed energy itself).

If there is one thing that’s been driven into my thick head since I’ve been here it’s that energy has not been assigned any existential qualities (Tom recently reminded me of that). Energy is nothing more than a way of measuring movement power and heat. Yet you are talking about energy like it’s actually “something.”

Perhaps it is the case that matter and energy are only two forms of a more fundamental agent that can take on a third form we have previously been unable to detect. However, I cannot see any reason to believe this third form would be anything other than physical.

Why is that? The only reason I can see is that you have assumed a priori that physicalness is the basis of all. I thought that was what we were trying to decide.

In the case of matter and energy, the functional necessity of these two forms is clear. One form (energy) is needed to perform work, and the other form (matter) is needed to be worked upon. What would be the function of the third form?

LOL! There is a wonderful example of an a priori conclusion. You look at the physical, you only acknowledge physical contributions, and then you conclude anything not physical doesn’t exist.

The “third form” is what physical processes have not been shown capable of achieving. Demonstrate progressive organization with physicalness. Demonstrate subjectivity with physicalness.

Assuming the third form to be the source of p-consciousness and assuming that it is physically efficacious, then it would also exist to perform work upon the form of matter. Given that energy already performs this function, any model containing this third form is not parsimonious.

Why? Energy does the work, consciousness determines what and how work is done. That’s two totally different realms of qualities. Energy has never been proven that it can do anything but fuel things. It is dumb, mindless power. Why do you think it can decide, be creative, make decisions, learn?

This isn't to say the model is to be discounted, but a function separate from that of performing work would need to be attributed to your third form.

Right, that’s what I’ve been suggesting.

 

[Iacchus32]

Why? Energy does the work, consciousness determines what and how work is done. That’s two totally different realms of qualities. Energy has never been proven that it can do anything but fuel things. It is dumb, mindless power. Why do you think it can decide, be creative, make decisions, learn?

How is it that consciousness can be emulated through the energy which is modulated on a televison screen? How do we know for a fact that consciousness isn't some form of modulated energy signal?

 

[Les Sleeth]

How is it that consciousness can be emulated through the energy which is modulated on a televison screen? How do we know for a fact that consciousness isn't some form of modulated energy signal?

? I don't understand what you are seeing . . . can you explain how consciousness is emulated by a TV screen?

 

[hypnagogue]

The thing to be considered here is that if p-consciousness is to be thought of as material cause rather than final cause, it would not perform work. In fact, a material cause can do nothing to alter the mechanical course of events brought about through the more traditional notion of causation. It would dictate the course itself, but in an equally mechanical fashion. Modeling subjective consciousness in this way seems to me to make it epiphenomenal and not efficacious.

You are correct to note that if P-consciousness is more of a material cause, then it doesn't perform work, as in efficient causation. But assuming we take epiphenomenal to mean 'having no causal relevance,' P-consciousness would still not be epiphenomenal, because it would still play a definite role in the causal dynamics of the world. P-consciousness winds up having causal relevance in Rosenberg's framework, just not in the way we may have expected.

Aristotle's notion of material causation seem antiquated, but if you accept the conceptual need for some sort of intrinsic qualities to underpin or instantiate relational phenomena, then you are accepting the conceptual need for material causation, as I'm using the term here. Saying that P-consciousness supports material causation is just the same thing as saying that it provides the fundamental, intrinsic 'stuff' that enters into the system of relationships that we call physics. Without this intrinsic base, physical relationships could not exist anymore than a game of chess could exist without a chessboard and tokens (or a computer's hard drive, or whatever) to instantiate the abstract structure of the game.

The only problem I would have with this assessment is that if Rosenberg models consciousness as an intrinsic property of physical objects, he has then rendered detectable an intrinsic property, even if it is not detectable in a third-person sense.

When I said detectable, I meant in the 3rd person sense. For something to be detectable in this sense, some sort of efficient causation is required. The sense in which P-consciousness, or 1st person data, is detectable in Rosenberg's framework is entirely different.

 

[Iacchus32]

? I don't understand what you are seeing . . . can you explain how consciousness is emulated by a TV screen?

Well, I was sitting at the dinner table this evening, and I could hear the newscaster on TV in the other room, and I couldn't help but believe there was a live person talking in the other room. I mean if I didn't know better, I couldn't help but believe that there was someone actually there. While the same thing goes for talking to someone over the phone. Why even bother to talk if you didn't believe there was a live person on the other side of it? So at least in that sense you've emulated the trappings of consciousness, or else there would be no comprehension of it whatsoever. Does this make the TV or the telephone conscious? No. And yet both become the means (through modulated energy) by which to extend and/or articulate it. So perhaps the key word here is information? I think this much (which belies intelligence) can be modulated over the air waves.

 

[loseyourname]

Yes, but it seems you are assuming consciousness is energy. Why should we assume that consciousness is energy?

Well, let me make an attempt at clarification here. I'm assuming that if consciousness is to be causally efficacious (in the sense of efficient or final causation - a point I'll get into further below), then it must perform work. Because energy is defined as the capacity to perform work, then in order for consciousness (or any other causal factor, for that matter) to perform work, it must use energy. That isn't to say that it must be energy.

You are also wrong to suggest that anything whatsoever about biology constitutes a closed system. As a biology guy, I think you must know this already (it even contradicts your own model). Biology is very much an open system. It takes in, it metabolizes, it moves, it loses heat. There is no possible way to prevent that. That’s about as “open” as a system gets. And as I pointed out, biology is also within a universe which itself appears open.

This is another point where I'm probably being unclear, so I'll try a little harder. The thing I was trying to say is that all energy used in a biological system can be accounted for. Some is dissipated as heat, some stored as free energy (usually in the form of ATP), and some is taken in through catabolic processes. But this is all done in accordance with the law of conservation of energy. The amount taken in exactly equals the amount used minus the amount stored and the amount dissipated as heat.

You are mixing apples and oranges. No one is doubting that energy is preserved through physical processes. Don’t you see, you are assuming a priori what you are arguing? Of course if you look at physical processes and measure energy, you are going to find it all adding up. We already know that! It doesn’t prove whether a state of existence which is not energy, and cannot be measured, is capable of triggering physical actions (or, whether or not that triggering function, even if it does expend energy, uses a measurable amount of energy to do so).

Yes, but dualism itself mixes apples and oranges by the principle of interactionism. Even if consciousness is non-physical, in order to be causally efficacious to the CNS, it must be physically efficacious due to the physical nature of the CNS. My point about the possibility of accounting for energy used in brain processes is that, if consciousness is to be causally efficacious (in the traditional sense of efficient or final causation, which again, I will get into further below), then it must use energy, because it must perform work, and energy is defined as the capacity to perform work. Any function capable of triggering a physical action uses measurable energy, again, according to the laws and definitions being used here. This isn't to say it is entirely impossible that contra-causal triggering functions exist that attain their capacity to perform physical work from some outside source, but if these functions do exist, they are inconsistent with the laws and definitions used by modern physics. Either one or the other must go. Remember again that I am not attempting to prove or disprove anyone system, I'm only proving the inconsistency of a system with the known laws of physics. I stated this at the outset. Yes, I do make assumptions. Every argument does. I am fully aware that the argument can only produce a true conclusion if my assumptions are correct.

Hmmmmmm. How can you say that if you can’t observe what happens to energy once it leaves a system? No one on Earth seems to know anything about what the nature of energy is, or what happens to energy once we cannot observe what it does (i.e., we recognize the presence of energy by movement or heat, but no one has actually observed energy itself).

Energy has no existence outside of what it does. [Edit: Actually, I shouldn't be so strong with my wording. My true position (or lack of position, if you prefer) is clarified better in the next paragraph below.] Energy is defined simply as the capacity to do things, to perform work. If by "nature" you refer to intrinsin properties, then yes, no one knows what intrinsic properties, if any, energy has. But for the purposes of thermodynamics, energy is simply the ability to perform work, which can be restated as the ability to be a cause of a physical effect. Perhaps given that formulation, you can now see my concern.

If there is one thing that’s been driven into my thick head since I’ve been here it’s that energy has not been assigned any existential qualities (Tom recently reminded me of that). Energy is nothing more than a way of measuring movement power and heat. Yet you are talking about energy like it’s actually “something.”

I'm actually trying very hard not to. I would like to stress that energy, thus defined, is itself a property of physical things - again, the capacity of those things to perform work. Whether it is itself a separate thing, or only a property, is not entirely clear (though Einstein's equivalence formula seems to suggest prima facie that it might have some form of autonomous existence). For our purposes here, I would need to be convinced that it makes a difference.

Why is that? The only reason I can see is that you have assumed a priori that physicalness is the basis of all. I thought that was what we were trying to decide.

Well, I stated only that I have no reason to believe that a third form would be non-physical. Remember the definition of physical here as "constrained by material laws of cause and effect." If the two known forms of the fundamental existent (which is the name I will heretofore use to refer to the "more fundamental" aspect of matter, energy, and consciousness you are postulating) are physical, then meer chance seem to suggest that a third form, and indeed the fundamental existent itself are also physical. I'm not assuming this is necessarily the case, but as all known things are so far physical, the default value for any unknown (at least any causally efficacious unknown, due to the definition of "physical" given) should also be physical until good reason is given to think otherwise. There is no exclusion principle in place here. Both possibilities remain possibilities. This is only a preliminary working hypothesis based on the available evidence.

LOL! There is a wonderful example of an a priori conclusion. You look at the physical, you only acknowledge physical contributions, and then you conclude anything not physical doesn’t exist.

I'm not entirely certain why you think a question I asked (What would be the function of the third form?) constitutes a conclusion, but go ahead and laugh.

The “third form” is what physical processes have not been shown capable of achieving. Demonstrate progressive organization with physicalness. Demonstrate subjectivity with physicalness.

Well, this is where we run into a problem. I am aware of your concerns with several explanatory gaps in physicalist theory. I just don't see how non-physicalist theory has any fewer gaps. Demonstrate progressive organization with non-physicalness. Demonstrate subjectivity with non-physicalness. The thing about this is, if life and the subjective experiences of living organisms are the only examples available of progressive organization and subjectivity, then life and the subjective experiences of organisms are the only demonstrations that can be given. Obviously, this will not satisfy you, but it gives no reason in and of itself to believe that any alternative explanation can fill the gap.

I promise I will be getting to the matter of material causation and the "third form" below.

Why? Energy does the work, consciousness determines what and how work is done. That’s two totally different realms of qualities. Energy has never been proven that it can do anything but fuel things. It is dumb, mindless power. Why do you think it can decide, be creative, make decisions, learn?

Okay, here we go.

First, another brief clarification. Energy is being defined as the capacity to perform work. It is actually matter that performs the work itself, on another piece of matter. Perhaps it will do us well to imagine that matter is the carpenter and the nail, whereas energy is the hammer. Working from this metaphor, we can see that it is the carpenter that thus controls the actions of the hammer, and thus it is matter that determines what kind of work energy will be used to perform. If an organizational principle beyond the known laws of physics must be inserted to explain certain capacities of the work being performed, it will be an organizational principle of matter, not of energy. This can probably clear up the syntactical concerns I had in my earlier post.

Now getting to the issue of material causation. Let's work from hypnagogue's metaphor of the checker board. Without the checker board, there can be no doubt that the game cannot be carried out. However, the game of checkers as described by a third-party observer incapable of seeing the board or the pieces would be fully explained in terms of the rules of the game. That is the dilemma we face with respect to intrinsic properties. Even if they play an important role in the nature of causation itself, the process of cause and effect can be explained without ever invoking these intrinsic properties, sort of QED reduced to functionalism. Rosenberg seemingly is invoking these intrinsic properties as necessary to explain the nature of subjective experience, whereas you seem to prefer the invoking of a third form of the fundamental existent, while continuing to leave out any mention of the intrinsic properties of this existent or of its three forms. Where your respective approaches overlap is that both are being invoked as an organizing principle, so to speak, capable of explaining why matter and energy behave the way they do. I will contend here that his approach is parsimonious with respect to yours, and functionally equal, but that isn't to say that either is any more or less correct at this point. It might very well be necessary to invoke both a fundamental existent and its intrinsic properties to flesh out a complete explanation.

Your primary qualm with my assessment seems to be with my use of the term "physical." You see it as some kind of dirty word to be avoided when discussing matters of subjective experience. But I again must be clear in the way I am using the term. Physical means simply "constrained by material laws of cause and effect." If the third form you are invoking somehow enacts an organizing principle by which the behavior of matter/energy is to be explained, it would still be physical according to my definition provided it is constrained by material laws of cause and effect. In fact, I've seen nothing from you to suggest that it doesn't. If it doesn't, then there are serious issues of contracausality that will need to be addressed with respect to interactionism. The violation of the law of conservation of energy is only one of these issues.

Now lastly, I just want to stress that I am not attempting to either prove or disprove the truth of anyone model. I am only discussing the relevant implications of these models, bringing up impediments to their acceptance. Any discussion of how these impediments can be overcome is more than welcome. Simply bashing traditional physicalism, however, is a bit like the ID technique of pushing their agenda, not by arguing for it, but by harping on about the flaws in evolutionary theory, all of which are based on simple mischaracterizations. That isn't what I want to see here from either side.

 

[Rader]

Perhaps it is the case that matter and energy are only two forms of a more fundamental agent that can take on a third form we have previously been unable to detect. However, I cannot see any reason to believe this third form would be anything other than physical. In the case of matter and energy, the functional necessity of these two forms is clear. One form (energy) is needed to perform work, and the other form (matter) is needed to be worked upon. What would be the function of the third form? Assuming the third form to be the source of p-consciousness and assuming that it is physically efficacious, then it would also exist to perform work upon the form of matter. Given that energy already performs this function, any model containing this third form is not parsimonious.

I have read your last post but I will answer here. All physical systems require a third fundamental agent in order for work to be accomplished. Matter and energy do no just exchange partners as if they were on a dance floor. Information has to be injected into the system or you can not even test the thermodynamics of the system. Even simple systems like molecule interaction must have the information. Yes on a small scale you could brush that off for electromagnetic covalent bonding that occurs at random but how would you explain this when you get to complex systems like humans? And of course its not parsimonious, the complexity of humans is anything but that.

So assuming information to be the third form, to be the source of p-consciousness or at least a property of it, causing physical systems to be physically efficacious.

We now have three fundamental agents if you be, energy matter and information and none easy to define, all seem necessary to evolve a system.

 

[Iacchus32]

We now have three fundamental agents if you be, energy matter and information and none easy to define, all seem necessary to evolve a system.

Nonetheless, if consciousness can be modulated/emulated through an energy source, it must be more closely related to energy. We also have to ask if information alone comprises intelligence? It no doubt comprises structure, but like you say, as in the case with matter and energy alone, is there something else which utilizes that structure?

 

[Rader]

We also have to ask if information alone comprises intelligence?

Information is a mechanical word, that if you switch the name to something else, it has a meaning in another context. I think us humans can answer affirmative to the fact, we are the end result so far.

It no doubt comprises structure, but like you say, as in the case with matter and energy alone, is there something else which utilizes that structure?

Thats a theory of a ghost in the machine.

 

[Iacchus32]

Thats a theory of a ghost in the machine.

And yet if there were such a thing, what it would be besides an energy pattern? ... Albeit one would have to assume there was something even more essential than that in order for energy to assume a specific form. Perhaps this is what consciousness entails? Or, maybe consciousness is just a highly modified aspect of energy?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Part One

My answer takes two posts to fit. Geez we philosopher types can be windy eh?

Even if consciousness is non-physical, in order to be causally efficacious to the CNS, it must be physically efficacious due to the physical nature of the CNS.

It must be as you say.

My point about the possibility of accounting for energy used in brain processes is that, if consciousness is to be causally efficacious (in the traditional sense of efficient or final causation, which again, I will get into further below), then it must use energy, because it must perform work, and energy is defined as the capacity to perform work.

Right again, except what does it mean to “use” energy? (More below).

Yes, I do make assumptions. Every argument does. I am fully aware that the argument can only produce a true conclusion if my assumptions are correct.

My complaint is that you are using for assumptions what your argument is trying to prove is true. When I laughed, it wasn’t to ridicule, it was because of running into you taking that circular route several times.

Any function capable of triggering a physical action uses measurable energy, again, according to the laws and definitions being used here.

If I understand your meaning, this is an example of using for a premise what you are trying to prove. You cannot assume that if consciousness “uses energy” it must itself expend energy (as if it’s in possession of energy and needs to burn it to act). That is a physical requirement, not necessarily a consciousness requirement.

Consciousness might be able to “use” energy external to it because its nature might be that it is in permanent possession of power which is never depleted. This power, however, needn’t be all that much. The body and energy provided by metabolism seem all set up, sort of “at the ready,” to be kicked into motion by triggering. It’s like comparing the effort a man must make to flip a switch in a huge crane, and the work done by the crane. In between the switch and the movement of the crane is a very large force potential.

For the sake of argument, let’s assume some bit of energy is burned by consciousness itself when it uses the brain (I don’t think it is, however). Using the crane analogy again, if you had only been familiar with the level of power involved of a crane doing work, and maybe that found in its circuits, you might not have any devices capable of detecting the energy required to achieve something so subtle as flipping a switch.

This isn't to say it is entirely impossible that contra-causal triggering functions exist that attain their capacity to perform physical work from some outside source, but if these functions do exist, they are inconsistent with the laws and definitions used by modern physics.

Yet you say, “I stated only that I have no reason to believe that a third form would be non-physical.” It seems to me you do have a reason, if not to believe, to suspect it.

I'm only proving the inconsistency of a system with the known laws of physics. I stated this at the outset.

But that’s exactly what non-physicalists have been saying. Are you trying to make our case for us? Besides, the progressive development needed for chemical abiogenesis and the subjectivity of consciousness are two qualities that are presently “inconsistent” with the known laws of physics, but physicalists nonetheless insist progressive development and subjectivity must be physical in nature.

Either one or the other must go.

I just don’t see how yours is a necessary conclusion if we rely on the concept of what you labeled the “fundamental existent.” I’ll explain as I go along.

Remember the definition of physical here as "constrained by material laws of cause and effect."

That’s right, but “material” cause and effect might not be the only kinds of cause and effect. You assumption seems to be that it is.

If the two known forms of the fundamental existent (which is the name I will heretofore use to refer to the "more fundamental" aspect of matter, energy, and consciousness you are postulating) are physical, then mere chance seem to suggest that a third form, and indeed the fundamental existent itself are also physical.

How does such an inference of “chance” avoid a non sequitur classification? You lost me on that one.

I'm not assuming this is necessarily the case, but as all known things are so far physical, the default value for any unknown (at least any causally efficacious unknown, due to the definition of "physical" given) should also be physical until good reason is given to think otherwise. There is no exclusion principle in place here. Both possibilities remain possibilities. This is only a preliminary working hypothesis based on the available evidence.

How do you know all things known are physical? All things known through the physicalist methods of empiricism are physical, all things capable of objectification seem physical. This is more circular argument because you continue to imply if physicalness can’t define it or detect it, then it isn’t real or known. Here you do the same thing again, “the default value for any unknown . . . should also be physical until good reason is given to think otherwise.” For someone who has already assumed the position of physicalism, yes. Physicalists are the ones saying all they experience and know is the physical, there are others who say differently.

Well, this is where we run into a problem. I am aware of your concerns with several explanatory gaps in physicalist theory. I just don't see how non-physicalist theory has any fewer gaps. Demonstrate progressive organization with non-physicalness. Demonstrate subjectivity with non-physicalness.

I don’t think that is a good assessment of what’s going on, not with me anyway. I don’t know what the truth is going to be, I simply recognize that right now physicalist theory ain’t got all the answers, yet plenty of physicalists claim their theory can, or will, explain it all.

If you read my models, I do at least completely and totally accept the physical side of things. Yet I also have certain personal experiences which seem non-physical; I have studied as well the history of such experiences in others. When I talk to physicalists, they seem completely ignorant of either the nature or the history of the inner experience. What am I supposed to conclude but they are only looking at physicalness, and they then conclude that’s all there is. Well, duuuuuuuhhhh I say. Why do you think one can’t detect the presence of the color blue with a microphone?

The thing about this is, if life and the subjective experiences of living organisms are the only examples available of progressive organization and subjectivity, then life and the subjective experiences of organisms are the only demonstrations that can be given. Obviously, this will not satisfy you, but it gives no reason in and of itself to believe that any alternative explanation can fill the gap.

I propose models, but I don’t think they are proof. If you can find something not accounted for by any model I propose, or which contradicts known facts, then you should definitely point that out. You don’t have to offer up an alternative perfect model to find logic/factual fallacies in mine, and all it takes is one to put a model at risk. Progressive organization and subjectivity are two phenomena unaccounted for by physicalism.

Keep in mind, my call is for objectivity. I say if a theory doesn’t work, one has to stay open to other possibilities. Too often I hear talk from physicalists like “oh no, it can’t be any other way than physical.” To me that indicates a priori assumptions are in place, and that the mind is anything but objective.


(continued . . . )

 

[Rader]

And yet if there were such a thing, what it would be besides an energy pattern? ... Albeit one would have to assume there was something even more essential than that in order for energy to assume a specific form. Perhaps this is what consciousness entails? Or, maybe consciousness is just a highly modified aspect of energy?

There is no physical reason to believe consciousness is energy since the laws of physics demonstrate E=mc2 and brains can not account for subjective experience. When I am conscious information energy and matter are all working together in its presence.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Part Two

(. . . continued from previous post)

Your primary qualm with my assessment seems to be with my use of the term "physical." You see it as some kind of dirty word to be avoided when discussing matters of subjective experience. But I again must be clear in the way I am using the term. Physical means simply "constrained by material laws of cause and effect." If the third form you are invoking somehow enacts an organizing principle by which the behavior of matter/energy is to be explained, it would still be physical according to my definition provided it is constrained by material laws of cause and effect. In fact, I've seen nothing from you to suggest that it doesn't. If it doesn't, then there are serious issues of contracausality that will need to be addressed with respect to interactionism. The violation of the law of conservation of energy is only one of these issues.

Physical is most definitely not a dirty word. But I don’t think you completely grasp the implications of the “fundamental existent” model. Let me try once more to explain, not to convince you it is true, but so you don’t think I am anti-physical or dualist.

I’ll rely on the analogy of gas, liquid, and solid forms of water to elucidate. Let’s say water vapor is the fundamental existent; that is, water vapor is extended infinitely in every direction, so we’ll call it the vapor continuum. It was never created, it can never be destroyed, it can only change form. How might it change form? Part of the dynamics of the vapor continuum are temperature fluctuations. Every great once in while a spot in the continuum cools enough for the vapor to turn to liquid water. Let’s say in even a greater once in a while, cooling and warming happens over and over again at one exact spot, so that that spot becomes conditioned, acquires traits, and actually “learns” to change itself back and forth between vapor and liquid; and then later it learns to cool itself even more and create solid ice.

The “knowledge” of this is most realized in the vapor condition, because that is what defines fundamental existence. Interestingly, because “knowing” is present in the vapor, when it uses itself to form water, that water has a bit of “knowing” built into it too, though dulled by density; the same is true of the solid condition, except the knowing is even more dulled (because it’s more dense). Now, if a being were made up of vapor (consciousness) water (energy) and ice (matter), they all share a existential relationship (i.e., they are all made up of the same substance), and all share the “knowledge” that is built into them, but at different levels of knowing.

Because in this case “physical” is defined as when the fundamental stuff acquires structure, we call ice (matter) physical, and we also call water (energy) physical because (viewing from our physical perspective) it appears to be derived from ice (matter) as it “melts”; and because the vapor (spirit?) has no structure, we call it non-physical. Now, as for how vapor (as conscious fundamental existent stuff) could trigger energy to move matter, since the vapor naturally and always exists at a higher temp, when it “touches” ice, that causes a release of water. The vapor itself doesn’t give up water (energy) because that’s not the condition vapor is in. But the natural “warm” way it is will cause energy to flow. Since (returning to the reality of biology) there are huge neural networks set up to channel the flow of energy, all the “warm” consciousness has to do is touch the stored energy spots in the right place to trigger release and action.

The bigger point is, there is really no essential difference in all the absolute essence and its forms, there are just different conditions determining how they are experienced from our perspective living here in the “frozen” universe. If that’s the case, then you cannot classify the fundamental existent as physical. All that’s physical are forms of the fundamental existent, the fundamental existent is not a form of the physical.

Now lastly, I just want to stress that I am not attempting to either prove or disprove the truth of anyone model. I am only discussing the relevant implications of these models, bringing up impediments to their acceptance. Any discussion of how these impediments can be overcome is more than welcome. Simply bashing traditional physicalism, however, is a bit like the ID technique of pushing their agenda, not by arguing for it, but by harping on about the flaws in evolutionary theory, all of which are based on simple mischaracterizations. That isn't what I want to see here from either side.

No one is bashing physicalism, but since you brought up pushing an agenda, I can tell you I first started posting arguments against physicalism after hearing one too many scientists on TV science specials or in text/pop science books claim life “most likely” came about accidentally in the ocean’s chemistry, or that consciousness can be fully explained by brain functions. There are plenty of physicalists acting like their theory is all but established fact, and pushing it from the bully pulpit that universities (in courses taught by physicalist professors) and TV provide.

I don’t agree with ID only because they usually are trying to somehow make the Bible be true. To me that’s silly since the creation story there is a myth taken from ancient tribal story-telling and/or conjecture. But I don’t see anything wrong with looking for fatal flaws in a theory. That is a great way to either prove it wrong, or to indicate where a change needs to be made.

 

[Iacchus32]

There is no physical reason to believe consciousness is energy since the laws of physics demonstrate E=mc2 and brains can not account for subjective experience. When I am conscious information energy and matter are all working together in its presence.

What about electro-magnetic induction? Is it possible that consciousness is induced through the brain? And, perhaps everything else that maintains an electro-magnetic field?

 

[loseyourname]

Okay, there are getting to be a lot of issues I need to address in this thread, but I'll start with this one, because I think I can clear up the misunderstanding that I see here.

(. . . continued from previous post)I?ll rely on the analogy of gas, liquid, and solid forms of water to elucidate. Let?s say water vapor is the fundamental existent; that is, water vapor is extended infinitely in every direction, so we?ll call it the vapor continuum. It was never created, it can never be destroyed, it can only change form. How might it change form? Part of the dynamics of the vapor continuum are temperature fluctuations. Every great once in while a spot in the continuum cools enough for the vapor to turn to liquid water. Let?s say in even a greater once in a while, cooling and warming happens over and over again at one exact spot, so that that spot becomes conditioned, acquires traits, and actually ?learns? to change itself back and forth between vapor and liquid; and then later it learns to cool itself even more and create solid ice.

. . . snip . . .

The bigger point is, there is really no essential difference in all the absolute essence and its forms, there are just different conditions determining how they are experienced from our perspective living here in the ?frozen? universe. If that?s the case, then you cannot classify the fundamental existent as physical. All that?s physical are forms of the fundamental existent, the fundamental existent is not a form of the physical.

Okay, I see now that you are saying consciousness is the fundamental existent, or at least an emergent property of its organizational structure (given that pre-learning to manifest physically, it doesn't seem like it would be anything recognizable as what we now refer to as "consciousness"). I thought you were saying consciousness is one of three forms of the fundamental existent, matter and energy being the other two.

Anyway, let me get to why I still wouldn't see this as non-physical - again, using our working definition of physical. According to your model, the behavior of the fundamental existent pre-physical (and correspondingly, pre-consciousness) was a mechanical behavior. You refer to its "learning" to manifest in a given way, but this "learning" doesn't seem prima facie to be any different than the learning capacity of a CPU, or perhaps even the ocean that "learns" to deposit pebbles on the beach in an increasingly organized fashion, to use a particularly banal example.

The issue of causation here is central. If the fundamental existent is causing a certain behavior of matter/energy, and that behavior is in accordance with certain rules, then, as a causative factor, the fundamental existent itself is also physical according to our definition. Your model does not seem to introduce contracausality, but instead only an additional causative factor on top of the ones we already know of.


*Let me add here a couple unrelated issues I have with your model. The first is that no explanation is given of how phenomena that you perceive to be gaps in physicalism came into being. You postulate the fundamental existent as essentially an "organizational principle," but the laws of physics themselves are organizational principles. These are a manifestation of instrinsic properties, such as those we will be discussing in concert with the Rosenberg book. The biggest problem is that all of the known "organizational principles" of matter/energy are well-formulated in a mathematical fashion so as to enumerate all known causal relations between any objects in question. Putting aside the fact that there is no reason in principle to think that these laws alone are incapable of explaining any and all phenomena, including the ones you have concerns about, there is a more basic objection to your model in that it does not seem to provide any additional explanatory power.

There are a number of reasons for this. The obvious one comes from either reading of the potential for contracausality in the fundamental existent. If the existent is causal in nature (and thus physical according to our definition), then you have a major gap in both showing its necessity and in describing the rules by which it can be a cause. If the existent is contracausal in nature, then it just seems that you have "given up" to some degree. You are simply hypothesizing that no quantifiable mechanism exists that can explain certain phenomena, and so you simply postulate a non-quantifiable mechanism that really isn't even a mechanism in that it obeys no rules. It should be quickly apparent why this method of explanation is to be avoided if it is in any way possible to do so when we consider what the history of knowledge would be like had all past thinkers taken this path (Edit - When they were confronted with an explanatory gap in their theoretical paradigm). Perhaps you can start another thread in which you fully flesh out your model to the best of your ability and we can discuss its implications there.


** Now let us get back to the issue of accounting for energy used in a biological system. I'll be brief here in discussing the shortcomings I see with your model wrt the law of conservation of energy. It's as simple as this: volitional action (that is, action under conscious control) requires mechanical energy to be performed. This energy is measurable. In principle, we can measure all of the energy necessary to perform a given volitional action and then compare it with the energy intake of the organism in question. According to the law of conservation of energy, all motion should be accounted for after considering heat given off. The equation is incredibly simple. Just click http://library.thinkquest.org/C004970/thermo/gibbs.htm?tqskip1=1 for a brief explanation. Your model comes into conflict in that it proposes mechanical effects (the end results of which is volitional action) without a correspondingly physical (and thus measurable) source of energy. You are infusing energy into a system from the "ether," or in this case, from the fundamental existent. This actually implies that the amount of energy in the universe is constantly increasing because there are volitional actions being put into effect at all times without a corresponding energy source in the physical universe. The empirical testability of this hypothesis should be obvious. It wouldn't be easy, but there is no reason to think we cannot one day perform such a test. Okay, maybe I wasn't that brief.

 

[loseyourname]

I was searching around some of the links provided by hypnagogue, and it turns out that Galen Strawson gives a very clear and eloquent rendition of essentially the same argument I am making (minus the points I've made about causative relations). Read http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Strawson.html and see if it helps at all.

In §1 I pointed out that the word physical, as used by genuine materialists, is coextensive with "real and concrete"-so that to say something is a physical phenomenon is simply to say that it is a real (spatiotemporal) phenomenon. But then why use "physical"? Why not simply use "real"? And why bother with "real," when talking about concrete things that are assumed to exist? It is clearly redundant. All one needs, to mark the distinctions that are centrally at issue in discussion of the unfortunately named "mind-body problem," are "mental" and "nonmental," "experiential" and "non-experiential." One can simply declare oneself to be a experiential-and-non-experiential monist: one who registers the indubitable reality of experiential phenomena and takes it that there are also non-experiential phenomena. I nominate this position for the title realistic monism.

"But if one can do without 'physical,' then the word 'materialist,' used so diligently in this chapter, is just as superfluous; and it is deeply compromised by its history."

I think, nevertheless, that the word materialist, as an adjective formed from the natural-kind term matter, can be harmlessly and even illuminatingly retained. What is matter? It is whatever we are actually talking about when we talk about concrete reality, and realistic materialist monists who take it that experiential phenomena are wholly material in nature can assert with certainty that there is such a thing as matter, for they can know with certainty that there is such a thing as concrete reality (i.e. experiential phenomena). What they will want to add to this is an acknowledgment that nothing can count as matter unless it has some sort of non-experiential being-together with the working presumption (modulated by awareness of the extent of our ignorance) that current physics's best account of the structure of reality is genuinely reality-mirroring in certain ways. If in fact current physics gets nothing right, then one might say that their claim to be materialists effectively lapses; but so does everyone else's.

As a realistic materialist monist, then, I presume that physics's best account of the structure of reality is genuinely reality-mirroring in substantive ways, and that the term materialist is in good order. It has traveled far from some of its past uses, but there is no good reason to think that its meaning is especially tied to its past use, still less to one particular part of its past use, 7 and there is a sense in which its past use makes it particularly well worth retaining: it makes the claim that the present position is materialist vivid by prompting resistance that turns out to be groundless when the position is properly understood.

 

[Iacchus32]

Your model comes into conflict in that it proposes mechanical effects (the end results of which is volitional action) without a correspondingly physical (and thus measurable) source of energy. You are infusing energy into a system from the "ether," or in this case, from the fundamental existent.

So, where did all the energy come from prior to the Big Bang? It must have come from "somewhere."

 

[loseyourname]

So, where did all the energy come from prior to the Big Bang? It must have come from "somewhere."

You're missing the point. Whether or not it's possible to infuse energy into an otherwise closed system, the change in energy present in the system post-infusion should be measurable, especially when the energy is used to cause a mechanical action. I do not object to the possibility of energy being infused from outside of the universe (it would not technically violate the law provided the energy still came from "something"), only to this energy being treated as non-physical simply because it was.

 

[Iacchus32]

You're missing the point. Whether or not it's possible to infuse energy into an otherwise closed system, the change in energy present in the system post-infusion should be measurable, especially when the energy is used to cause a mechanical action. I do not object to the possibility of energy being infused from outside of the universe (it would not technically violate the law provided the energy still came from "something"), only to this energy being treated as non-physical simply because it was.

But what if there was a universal dimension prior to the Big Bang, strictly non-physical I guess, that was comprised of energy? Wouldn't this in fact account for what appeared to be nothing? ... and yet was anything but?

 

[selfAdjoint]

But what if there was a universal dimension prior to the Big Bang, strictly non-physical I guess, that was comprised of energy? Wouldn't this in fact account for what appeared to be nothing? ... and yet was anything but?

The answer to this is from Johnny Carson. Yes, and suppose there was a chicken named George who existed before the Big Bang and was composed of chicken nuggets? Gee, Iacchus, we can suppose anything but why on Earth should we?

 

[Iacchus32]

The answer to this is from Johnny Carson. Yes, and suppose there was a chicken named George who existed before the Big Bang and was composed of chicken nuggets? Gee, Iacchus, we can suppose anything but why on Earth should we?

Because we think we've pretty much got it all figured out?

 

[Les Sleeth]

The answer to this is from Johnny Carson. Yes, and suppose there was a chicken named George who existed before the Big Bang and was composed of chicken nuggets? Gee, Iacchus, we can suppose anything but why on Earth should we?

Well, I can think of two logical reasons to imagine (for modeling purposes) some existential plane that precedes and survives the formation of the universe. The first is, there is no explanation for where everything came from. If we can imagine quantum fluctionations bubbling up universes, why can't we suppose an absolute potentiality out of which everything arises and eventually returns?

A second logical reason to imagine an unobservable plane of existence is because no one can figure out what everything is made of. Everyone says its energy, but then when you try to say energy is "something" you are told its just a calculating/measuring concept. If energy is really nothing how is it doing work, composing matter, fueling life . . . ?

Something of a constitutional nature appears to be missing from the current physical model of the universe, why couldn't that be some as-yet unobserved potentiality? It wasn't that long ago virtual particles were unobserved, so just because we haven't observed it doesn't mean it is a useful modeling possibility. That's what is happening with "dark energy" now. Nobody can observe it, but we do see the universe behaving in a way that indicates something is there.

 

[Rader]

What about electro-magnetic induction? Is it possible that consciousness is induced through the brain? And, perhaps everything else that maintains an electro-magnetic field?

The components or atoms of everything that is physical do have electro-magnetic fields. If your definition of induced, is to produce (an electric current or a magnetic charge) by induction, then I would say when I am conscious my brain has electrical activity is a alive and working. If you disassemble me you will observe that I do not work. Can you come to a conclusion then, if the lack of the body is the reason why there is no more consciousness? Notwithstanding we observe things act like they should because that’s what they are and all have electro-magnetic fields that pertain to what ever there complexity is. If you took a radio or TV back in time a hundred years, would anybody think different, that nobody was in the box?

 

[loseyourname]

But what if there was a universal dimension prior to the Big Bang, strictly non-physical I guess, that was comprised of energy? Wouldn't this in fact account for what appeared to be nothing? ... and yet was anything but?

You're still missing the point. I'm not asking any questions of cosmological origins in this thread. In order to pertain to my argument, energy from this prior dimension that you are postulating would need to be continuously infused into living systems through some mechanism of conscious control, meaning that the energy level of the system would rise without any physical input. This rise would be measurable. I'm not going to say wholesale that your idea is wrong, but because of these considerations, it is inconsistent with the law of conservation of energy, if we assume the universe to be an otherwise closed system, and it is also empirically testable in principle. It can also be the case that your postulation is in fact not inconsistent with the law of conservation of energy, which would mean the universe is not a closed system. Nonetheless, given that you have given no reason to think that energy infused from outside of the universe would be any different than energy produced within the universe, there is no reason to consider the source of energy non-physical. In fact, as far as I can tell, the very idea of a non-physical causative factor with mechanical effects is incoherent. Any agent that can be the cause of a mechanical effect is being defined here as physical.

This one is probably just a semantic issue, but it's also incoherent for you to refer to a universal dimension existing prior to the universe.

 

[Iacchus32]

The components or atoms of everything that is physical do have electro-magnetic fields. If your definition of induced, is to produce (an electric current or a magnetic charge) by induction, then I would say when I am conscious my brain has electrical activity is a alive and working. If you disassemble me you will observe that I do not work. Can you come to a conclusion then, if the lack of the body is the reason why there is no more consciousness? Notwithstanding we observe things act like they should because that’s what they are and all have electro-magnetic fields that pertain to what ever there complexity is. If you took a radio or TV back in time a hundred years, would anybody think different, that nobody was in the box?

If consciousness were an energy field that passes between your ears, then one would presume that consciousness exists within that energy field. Yes, and if you destroy the body, then it is no longer capable of "conducting" this energy field.

 

[Iacchus32]

Something of a constitutional nature appears to be missing from the current physical model of the universe, why couldn't that be some as-yet unobserved potentiality? It wasn't that long ago virtual particles were unobserved, so just because we haven't observed it doesn't mean it is a useful modeling possibility. That's what is happening with "dark energy" now. Nobody can observe it, but we do see the universe behaving in a way that indicates something is there.

Forgive me for not being totally up on phyisics, but what is "dark energy?" Has it got anything to do with black holes?

 

[Iacchus32]

You're still missing the point. I'm not asking any questions of cosmological origins in this thread. In order to pertain to my argument, energy from this prior dimension that you are postulating would need to be continuously infused into living systems through some mechanism of conscious control, meaning that the energy level of the system would rise without any physical input. This rise would be measurable. I'm not going to say wholesale that your idea is wrong, but because of these considerations, it is inconsistent with the law of conservation of energy, if we assume the universe to be an otherwise closed system, and it is also empirically testable in principle. It can also be the case that your postulation is in fact not inconsistent with the law of conservation of energy, which would mean the universe is not a closed system. Nonetheless, given that you have given no reason to think that energy infused from outside of the universe would be any different than energy produced within the universe, there is no reason to consider the source of energy non-physical. In fact, as far as I can tell, the very idea of a non-physical causative factor with mechanical effects is incoherent. Any agent that can be the cause of a mechanical effect is being defined here as physical.

So, what kind of energy is given up when it is induced through an electro-magnetic field? That's typically pretty efficient isn't it?

This one is probably just a semantic issue, but it's also incoherent for you to refer to a universal dimension existing prior to the universe.

I'm not quite sure about the rest of what you're saying (above), but all I'm implying here is that the Universe was pre-existent prior to the Big Bang ... albeit in a different form or, dimension.

 

[loseyourname]

So, what kind of energy is given up when it is induced through an electro-magnetic field? That's typically pretty efficient isn't it?

Energy is conserved in induction. Mechanical energy (motion of a magnet through a field) is converted to electrical potential.

Electromagnetic Induction

Notice the "N" in Faraday's equation.

I'm not quite sure about the rest of what you're saying (above), but all I'm implying here is that the Universe was pre-existent prior to the Big Bang ... albeit in a different form or, dimension.

Fine by me. You may be right, you may not be. Ultimately, you're just speculating. What I'm saying is that whether or not your speculation is correct is irrelevant to whether or not energy is conserved in a neurological system under conscious control.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Any agent that can be the cause of a mechanical effect is being defined here as physical.

That's convenient. I think I'll define everything that's physical as spiritual, so then I get to claim every physical effect has a spiritual cause.

As I've already suggested, every key argument you make in this thread seems circular, so much so that I can't tell if you have a point or not. Since you've not addressed my complaint yet, I wonder if you really see how this is true (I'm sure you understand what a circular argument is).

Let's take your argument apart:

If p-consciousness is efficacious, then neural processes are initiated.

Efficacious means having the ability to produce a desired result, so I assume this is how you are defining an efficacious relationship between p-consciousness and the brain. In other words, consciousness causes brain effects.

If neural processes are initiated, then energy must have been used.

This is where I think your problem starts. It would be okay if you only mean the brain itself burns energy to function. If you also mean consciousness must itself burn energy, it is an utterly unsupported assumption. I'll hold off completing that idea until the end.

Therefore, if p-consciousness is efficacious, energy must have been used.

You can only correctly say that if p-consciousness initiates brain functions, then brain functions, having proven to be physical, must have used energy.

If energy is used, then it must have a physical source.

That's right, because energy is a physical concept. Right now you are getting fatally circular. The source of energy is from matter, or the presence of matter. That is how it is defined. That's why Iaachus is wrong to talk about non-physical energy; it doesn't make any sense given the official definition of energy. There is no such thing, by definition! That's not to say, however, there isn't something else which can initiate and cause, but which is NOT derived from material processes.

Therefore, if p-consciousness if efficacious, it must have a physical source.

P-consciousness is efficacious.

Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

This is nothing but a physicalist tautology! You argue consciousness is physical by first limiting the definition of effacacious only to that which is physical. The tactic is clear, you set up your "proof" so there was no other conclusion possible.

What you do not know is if something non-physical can trigger physical phenomena. But we do know that if it is non-physical, by definition it won't burn energy to function as it does (because energy is only derived from physical processes). So obviously you can't assume the lack of an energy energy trail proves consciousness is physical. In essence, you eliminate the possibility of different rules for a non-physical world by claiming up front that it must function according to physical principles. That is a textbook example of a circular argument. It's meaningless.

 

[loseyourname]

What you do not know is if something non-physical can trigger physical phenomena. But we do know that if it is non-physical, by definition it won't burn energy to function as it does (because energy is only derived from physical processes). So obviously you can't assume the lack of an energy energy trail proves consciousness is physical. In essence, you eliminate the possibility of different rules for a non-physical world by claiming up front that it must function according to physical principles. That is a textbook example of a circular argument. It's meaningless.

I'm saying that "physical" means anything that has the ability to be a mechanical cause or effect. This is because "physics" is pretty nothing more than the study of mechanical causes and effects and the relationships between them. I don't think the definition is a stretch. If it is, then insert another word. We're still talking about the same thing. Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner under this framework, but if you would prefer non-physical to mean simply "not empirically detectable," then so be it. It does no damage to my framework.

I'm not sure if you're just using the word "trigger" to avoid using the word "cause" or if you actually mean something different. I'll assume the latter for now, in which case my argument holds. If something non-physical "triggers" a physical event, it has injected energy into a physical system, as the system now has kinetic energy it did not previously have that came from no material source. The thing is, the simple fact that this immaterial energy source is not empirically detectable (although the energy itself obviously is) does not make it non-mechanical or contracausal. The conflict we seem to be having is not a conflict or ideas, but only a conflict of terminology, which is why I continue to contend that you are simply averse to the use of the word "physical" to describe consciousness, even if consciousness must necessarily behave to some extent in a mechanical manner, and the framework you have introduced gives no reason to think that it doesn't behave in an entirely mechanical manner.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I'm saying that "physical" means anything that has the ability to be a mechanical cause or effect. This is because "physics" is pretty nothing more than the study of mechanical causes and effects and the relationships between them. I don't think the definition is a stretch. If it is, then insert another word. We're still talking about the same thing. Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner under this framework, but if you would prefer non-physical to mean simply "not empirically detectable," then so be it. It does no damage to my framework.

You are wrong. Physicalness is not defined by being mechanical. That's partly why your argument is circular, because you want to kidnap every possible thing that happens and slap a physical label on it.

Physicalness is anything associated with matter, which ordinarily exists in one of three physical states: solid, liquid, or gas. The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology provides an interesting way to think about matter: “[matter is] The substance composing bodies perceptible to the senses. The distinguishing properties of matter are gravitation and inertia. Any entity exhibiting these properties when at rest is matter. . . . All material bodies have mass, which is a measure of inertia; every material body near the Earth’s surface has weight, which is a measure of the Earth’s gravitational attraction for the body.”

Mass and the effects of mass are much more defining of physicalness than anything else. Mechanicalness is exhibited in physicalness, but that isn't what defines it. It's like saying the presence of water in biology defines biology. Mechanics are just one thing that shows up in physics. So I can't go along with your concept of physical. You cannot just arbitrarily claim every characteristic exhibited in physicalness has a physical origin. You don't even know what the origin of physicalness is (of course, neither does anyone else).

And then you jump to conclusions without any evidence, like this "Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner." Why is that? You don't know that; you are just assuming that so your argument holds water. Prove that first, and then you get to use it as a fact.

I'm not sure if you're just using the word "trigger" to avoid using the word "cause" or if you actually mean something different. I'll assume the latter for now, in which case my argument holds. If something non-physical "triggers" a physical event, it has injected energy into a physical system, as the system now has kinetic energy it did not previously have that came from no material source.

Not so. Doesn't mercury drop when it gets colder? The loss of energy can also trigger/cause can't it?

The thing is, the simple fact that this immaterial energy source is not empirically detectable (although the energy itself obviously is) does not make it non-mechanical or contracausal.

No it doesn't. But you are the one attempting a proof, not me. I haven't said I can prove anything except that your argument doesn't hold water.

The conflict we seem to be having is not a conflict or ideas, but only a conflict of terminology, which is why I continue to contend that you are simply averse to the use of the word "physical" to describe consciousness, even if consciousness must necessarily behave to some extent in a mechanical manner, and the framework you have introduced gives no reason to think that it doesn't behave in an entirely mechanical manner.

As I posted above, mechanics do not define physical. But let's say we agreed that physical is defined by being mechanical. How exactly are creativity, love, and subjectivity mechanical? You nor anyone else can prove they are, yet you just assume it "entirely."

Here's what I think. In consciousness there are mechanical aspects and there are unified and flowing aspects. Physicalists seem to obsess with the mechanical aspects to the point they miss the interconnectedness of things. And then they project that failure of perception into theories which reflect what they themselves have simply missed. That's why, IMO, none of your answers address my claim that your argument is circular. If you only micro-focus on mechanics it will be difficult see you are only looking at one aspect of a multifaceted situation.

 

[Rader]

I'm saying that "physical" means anything that has the ability to be a mechanical cause or effect. This is because "physics" is pretty nothing more than the study of mechanical causes and effects and the relationships between them. I don't think the definition is a stretch. If it is, then insert another word.

Information is that word. All physical systems require a third fundamental agent in order for work to be accomplished. Information has to be injected into the system or you can not even test the thermodynamics of the system.

 

[Fliption]

Things are hectic and there's a lot going on so my brain may not be functioning properly (for a change ), but I just don't get this thread. I don't mean to interrupt an intense debate but the moment I read the original post I couldn't help but ask myself "Who cares?". This logical proof at the beginning and the whole thread since seems to dwell on what "label" we get to assign to consciousness. Is it physical or is it non-physical? Again, I asks "Who cares?". A proof one way or the other is obviously an exercise in semantics. What do we know about consciousness after reading this proof that we didn't know before? Nothing from what I can see. As a matter of fact it seems this proof glosses over the real issue of consciousness by assuming
"Consciousness is efficacious" seemingly only for the purpose of assigning it to a category. Who cares?

Everyone is defining physical and non-physical differently and always has. I have pointed this out for at least two years now. Here now we have a logical proof that consciousness is physical. What does this mean? Well, it depends on what "physical" means. So all we really have is a conclusion that is built into the definition to begin with. It tells us nothing about whether consciousness is efficacious, which is part of the real issue anyway. We just assumed that was true.

The whole discussion seems to be about who's word we get to use (all preconceived notions included) and I'm not real clear on why it matters. Please straighten me out if I'm missing something which I surely could be.

 

[loseyourname]

You are wrong. Physicalness is not defined by being mechanical. That's partly why your argument is circular, because you want to kidnap every possible thing that happens and slap a physical label on it.

Okay. So am I right to say that if I use a word other than physical, you will be happy? Because your definition does nothing different in an epistemological sense than mine does. I define physical as being anything that can be a cause or an effect and so consciousness becomes physical, even if it is a more fundamental form of existence than matter or energy. You define physical as something composed of matter/energy, and use that definition to suggest that consciousness is not physical if it is composed of something more fundamental. Is there honestly an importance difference between our actual ideas, or is it just the words?

And then you jump to conclusions without any evidence, like this "Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner." Why is that? You don't know that; you are just assuming that so your argument holds water. Prove that first, and then you get to use it as a fact.

Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner by my definition. That is the purpose of definitions. It's the same reason any man that is not married is a bachelor. It's not an argument. It's a definition. Again, I can use a different word if that will make you happy.

Not so. Doesn't mercury drop when it gets colder? The loss of energy can also trigger/cause can't it?

That's correct. I should have mentioned that change in a system can also be brought about by removing energy. Either way, energy is required.

No it doesn't. But you are the one attempting a proof, not me. I haven't said I can prove anything except that your argument doesn't hold water.

There are only three ways in which my initial argument can fail. Let me copy it here:

If p-consciousness is efficacious, then neural processes are initiated.
If neural processes are initiated, then energy must have been used.
Therefore, if p-consciousness is efficacious, energy must have been used.
If energy is used, then it must have a physical source.
Therefore, if p-consciousness if efficacious, it must have a physical source.
P-consciousness is efficacious.
Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

One way is for phenomenal consciousness to not be efficacious. The second way is if energy is somehow not necessary for the initiation of neural processes. The third way is if it is possible for energy to have a non-physical source.

Clearly, I'm attempting to establish a framework for efficacious p-consciousness, so in order to do so I must, for the purposes of my investigation, assume that it is. The second and third ways in which my argument can fail would both constitute violations of the law of conservation of energy. (Edit: Actually the second way might not violate the law after all. I just received the Rosenberg book in the mail, and I suspect he might have found a way around that little problem.) Now, don't get me wrong. It's entirely possible that the laws of physics as we know them are wrong, at least when they are applied to phenomenal causation as manifested in human consciousness. I'm not discounting this possibility. I'm simply doing what most investigators do: assuming to being with that the laws we already have in place are correct and do apply. After making this initial assumption, we then move on to make an attempt at fitting the phenomenon in question into a framework that is consistent with these laws. If it subsequently becomes clear that this won't work, we then make the contrary assumption that the laws we know do not apply to the case we are investigating. That has yet to be shown, so for the purposes of investigation, I continued to make my assumption.

As I posted above, mechanics do not define physical. But let's say we agreed that physical is defined by being mechanical. How exactly are creativity, love, and subjectivity mechanical? You nor anyone else can prove they are, yet you just assume it "entirely."

Actually, if I had to take a guess, I'd say they weren't. It is certainly counterintuitive to suggest otherwise. Thankfully, I'm not constrained by the limits of my intuition when it comes time to make an attempt at establishing a consistent framework that is not ad hoc. My research into neurology strongly suggests that a lot of what we intuit about consciousness is at best misleading, and at worst dead wrong.

Here's what I think. In consciousness there are mechanical aspects and there are unified and flowing aspects.

That's exactly what I think as well, but I'm not going to post it simply because I think it. I'm going to post only what I think I have a decent shot of demonstrating.

Physicalists seem to obsess with the mechanical aspects to the point they miss the interconnectedness of things.

Well, I think you're obsessing with the definition of "physical" that I'm using to the point that you gloss over the fact that what I've put into this thread is only a very small part of an overall framework that I've come nowhere near working out, a framework that may very well stress "interconnectedness" more than you think.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Okay. So am I right to say that if I use a word other than physical, you will be happy? Because your definition does nothing different in an epistemological sense than mine does. I define physical as being anything that can be a cause or an effect and so consciousness becomes physical, even if it is a more fundamental form of existence than matter or energy. You define physical as something composed of matter/energy, and use that definition to suggest that consciousness is not physical if it is composed of something more fundamental. Is there honestly an importance difference between our actual ideas, or is it just the words?

I'm afraid I can't see why you don't think improper definitions aren't a problem in a debate. You say, "Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner by my definition. That is the purpose of definitions." Do you think you get to make up the rules of reality? You didn't just define a term you were going to use, you stated how reality works, and for that you don't get be arbitrary. Either it is known to be true or its not. If it's not, then you don't get to use it as an assumption of as though it is a fact.

The other "defining tactic" you are employing is equally improper. What if the theme of this thread were "Can Everything be Reduced to Mind?" So then when you point out the realities of physicalness I just say, "well, I'm defining that as mind." It is a ridiculous debating ploy because your assertions can't possibly be falsified (ask anyone who's tried to debate an idealist), and because such circular arguments prevent you from saying anything meaningful to begin with.

Remember, you are the one who's argument ended with "therefore, p-consciousness has a physical source." It makes no sense, as Fliption points out, to define everything as physicalness and then to state the obvious tautology that any particular thing is physical. If everything is defined as physical, then what else can anything be?

Look at this assertion and explain to me how it doesn't render your entire assertion pointless: "I define physical as being anything that can be a cause or an effect . . ." Well, that's what everyone is debating about. That is, we are debating if something non-physical can cause physical effects. Once you define anything that causes as physical, then what is there to say about the real debate?

The real and established debate, the one I assumed you were speaking to, is if consciousness can be explained by known physical principles. Everyone already knows that however consciousness is explained, it still must be able to cause physical effects (like causing body movements).

Your syllogism appeared to be attempting to prove consciousness must have a physical source, but I say you've failed to do that because your assumptions are not established fact, and because claiming everything is physical to begin with leads to an overall circlular argument. So in the end you leave us with an unsound and illogical proof.

There are only three ways in which my initial argument can fail. Let me copy it here . . . One way is for phenomenal consciousness to not be efficacious.

I can't see how that can be true. We think and we move the body around.

The second way is if energy is somehow not necessary for the initiation of neural processes.

Right. So, there's a big hole in your argument right there.

The third way is if it is possible for energy to have a non-physical source.

But then you have to change the definition of energy. Energy is defined quite strictly as physical, so how can it be non-physical too? Now, there might some kind of initiating power other than energy (which, BTW, is a fourth way your argument can fail); but if it is energy, then it is physical.

 

[loseyourname]

I'm afraid I can't see why you don't think improper definitions aren't a problem in a debate. You say, "Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner by my definition. That is the purpose of definitions." Do you think you get to make up the rules of reality?

We do get to fuss with words somewhat when it really isn't entirely clear what they mean (if it were, we would not be having this discussion). For instance, it was once thought that breath was non-physical, that the properties of life were non-physical, that the propagation of light waves was non-physical. We gradually had to include these under the umbrella of physicalism when two things were realized. One thing was that they behaved mechanically. Another was that they were composed of matter (or in the case of light, energy quanta). So the question becomes: Which of these considerations is the reason they came to be considered physical? And correspondingly, what exactly does it mean for something to be physical?

We clearly have two options, and which you choose likely depends on what view of physicalism you take. You can take the view that only matter/energy can be considered physical, which is the view you seem to be taking. I'll explain why I don't share that view. It begins with the ontology of energy as physical stuff. Consider how it is defined: the capacity to perform work. This is a vague definition that fails to take into account the fact that certain massless particles, that do seem to be material of some sort and not simply a property of other material, are nothing more than energy quanta (string theory would hold that they are exactly the same material as matter, only with different vibrational signatures). The question we are faced with now is the same one I just asked: Given that energy and matter seem to be interchangeable manifestations of the same "stuff," is it this "stuff" that is to be considered physical? Are the physical facts nothing more than facts about relational properties between matter/energy "stuff?" You seem to think that they are.

There is another way of looking at it, though. Even before energy was known to be the same "stuff" as matter, it was still held to be a physical phenomenon. I ask why that was? My answer was that it was a mechanical property of matter and so figured into the mechanics of physical theory. Theory-physicalism, or t-physicalism, holds simply that the physical facts are those that describe relational properties, period. I take this to mean that any thing that can have a causal relation to another thing is physical. I see your view of physicalism (all that is matter/energy is everything) as matieralism. I will grant that many people, and even dictionaries, see the two as synonomous, but I'm trying my best to explain why I do not agree. I will elaborate below.

Remember, you are the one who's argument ended with "therefore, p-consciousness has a physical source." It makes no sense, as Fliption points out, to define everything as physicalness and then to state the obvious tautology that any particular thing is physical. If everything is defined as physical, then what else can anything be?

You're right. That doesn't make sense. It's also not what I did. I challenge you to find any instance of my defining everything as physicalness. I think I've been about as specific as a person could possibly be with definitions at this point, and it should be clear that I've defined "physical" to mean anything that is bound by mechanical laws of cause and effect and "physicalism" to mean the theory that states facts about causal relationships between objects are the only facts. It should be clear by now why this is. If a causal relationship behaves mechanically, then it can be described by mathematics (even if only probabilistically). If it can be described by mathematics, then it can be included into the study of physics. I think this is the most consistent definition of "physical" out there. Given this definition, I'm not even personally a physicalist, but I am at least investigating the possibility that consciousness is a phenomenon that can be explained by a physical theory (although I intuitively suspect it likely will not).

"I define physical as being anything that can be a cause or an effect . . ." Well, that's what everyone is debating about. That is, we are debating if something non-physical can cause physical effects. Once you define anything that causes as physical, then what is there to say about the real debate?

It says that for consciousness to behave in a way not describable by physical theory (and hence not be physical), it must be one of two things: It must either be contracausal, or it must be an intrinsic property of matter/energy "stuff" that is not a part of relational causality.

Your syllogism appeared to be attempting to prove consciousness must have a physical source, but I say you've failed to do that because your assumptions are not established fact, and because claiming everything is physical to begin with leads to an overall circlular argument. So in the end you leave us with an unsound and illogical proof.

You might question the soundness, but unless you disagree that the hypothetical syllogism and modus ponens are valid argument forms (you would be at odds with every single logician in the world if you did), you cannot question the logic. Anyway, all I was attempting to prove was what I stated in the paragraph above. Let me paraphrase myself:

For consciousness to be non-physical, it must either behave contracausally or be an intrinsic property of causally related agents that is not itself a relational attribute.

Right. So, there's a big hole in your argument right there.

Actually, let's examine this a bit. It isn't strictly a hole in the argument, because the argument is really only meant to establish a hypothetical conditional, not any fact about reality. Nonetheless, I get the feeling that this might actually be a fairly fruitful way in which to approach a theory of consciousness that at least isn't covered isn't by any currently known physics. I've been thinking about your idea of the fundamental existent as a causative agent of energetic action rather than of material action (obviously, energy itself is the cause of material action). Even if we consider energy to be the same "stuff" as matter, because of the definition of work, a causative agent that only acts on energy actually wouldn't perform any work. Work is defined as force applied over a certain distance, and force is defined as mass multiplied by acceleration. It should be clear that, because energy has no mass, that no force, and hence no work, is needed to cause a change in its behavior. The question of whether or not the fundamental existent is a cause of energetic behavior in a mathematically describable manner is still relevant to the question of whether or not it is physical under my framework, but it is certainly not covered by any known theory of physics.

Now, there might some kind of initiating power other than energy (which, BTW, is a fourth way your argument can fail)l.

Actually, I don't see that as being a possibility. Because work is performed when a material action is initiated, energy must be required by the definition of energy. I think looking into the initiation of energetic action is indubitably the potentially fruitful avenue we've uncovered here. Thanks for the help.

 

[StatusX]

If I understand you right, loseyourname, you're saying that consciousness causing physical events and the conservation of energy are incompatible views. I agree with this, as I'll illustrate below, but I think it might be that some of the confusion is coming from a difference in the definition of phenomenal consciousness.

Everything we have explained so far with physics has been functional relationships. No physical theory has made any claims about the intrinsic qualities of substances (neutrons or energy, for example). The hard problem of consciousness arises because experience is entirely intrinsic. This may be controversial, but I believe that every function of the human brain can be explained, from learning to believing to laughing.

First let me explain what I don't mean. I don't mean the subjective experience of finding something funny or feeling a spiritual connection to the world, or anything like that. I mean the physical processes that take place in our brain when we think about something. We will one day be able to correlate electrical activity in the brain to specific thoughts. We will be able to explain exactly what our neurons are doing when we feel sad and start to cry. This is NOT an explanation of consciousness, it is an explanation of the functional relationships between different parts of our bodies and the outside world, and there is no reason whatsoever to doubt that these are within the explanatory reach of the current scientific method.

So when you say consciousness can't have an effect on the world, I couldn't agree more, because that is the definition of consciousness. It is what we subjectively experience, not the functions carried out by our brains. Now some people may say that experiences do affect the physical world. When I feel angry, I act differently than when I'm happy. Maybe I'll decide to punch a stranger in the back of the head. That's a physical event that was caused by a subjective feeling, right? Well, wrong. That is caused by physical processes that took place in the brain. Something physical happened, say your girlfriend called and told you she never wanted to see you again, and these sound waves caused neuron firing patterns in your brain that continued to be altered by sensroy information throughout the day until you saw that guys head and it triggered a signal to be sent to the muscles in your arm. I hate these dry, obvious explanations as much as anyone else, but you have to understand the crucial point. Experience was not mentioned once. This chain of physical actions took place, and the only place for consciousness was to experience the sounds, emotions, sights, and sore fist.

Many people don't believe this, and think that if we didn't have subjective experiences, we wouldn't have felt those strong emotions, and wouldn't have punched that poor guy. This is where conservation of energy helps to illustrate the flaw in this way of thinking. Assume that it was the subjective experience of anger that caused you to punch him, and there would be no physical way to predict this action just from examining the state of your brain a few minutes prior. Now I doubt you'd argue that it took some kind of impulse from a neuron in the central nervous system to get that arm to start moving. So what caused the impulse. One second, everything was quiet, and the next, spontaneously, an impulse fired. That violates conservation of energy.

One counterargument is to say that the laws of physics as we know them do not apply in the brain. This is unappealing physically, and while I would agree we don't yet have a complete description of the universe because of the remaining gaping hole of consciousness, I think that any final explanation will be universal, and not specific to the configuration of atoms in our brain. Chalmers is on the right track suggesting that the right configuration of information gives rise to subjective experience in a system.

 

[Pavel]

Chalmers is on the right track suggesting that the right configuration of information gives rise to subjective experience in a system.

Hey man, I thought you left the consciousness topic, so I never bothered replying back to you, but here you go again . Thanks for the reference to the Chalmers paper, I did read it. I loved the way he set up the problem. I thought he was superb and I was with him all the way... until he started talking about his proposals. I'm not going through all the problems that I had with him, until the need arises in posts that fall back on his ideas. Since you mentioned information, I want to comment on it, as it was one of the problems or misunderstandings that I had.

First of all, the use of the term "information" is probably a misnomer in his paper, unless he really means information. He needs to find another, very objective and naturalistic term. Another example of what I consider misnomers is when people talk about "purpose" in the context of the biological evolution. I hear all the time "the evolution meant", or "the purpose of the protein..." Remember, the evolution is blind and everything is working the way it is, is because the organic matter, accidentally or by external natural events, got arranged into a configuration that allowed it to "survive and procreate". By the same token, the genetic code, or the "information" in the DNA is a misnomer because it attributes a conscious process to something completely blind.

Information implies a conscious process behind coding and behind its interpretation. Otherwise, it's randomn noise. In my understanding, in Chalmers' view, consciousness stands to chemical brain in the same relationship as information stands to the computer running the software. If that's the case, there's a big problem, as far as I'm concerned.

I, the programmer and the end user, am the one who assigns and interpretes the information. It's something abstract that exists only in mind, or by convention and consensus, in similar minds. My mind can assign interpretation to anything. Did you see the toast with the image of virgin Mary on the news that was being sold on E-bay for over 10 grand? The toast apparently carries information but it's up to the "viewer" to interpret that information. So, my question is what is the ontological status of this information that Chalmers categorically equates with consciousness? Who is the viewer and who is the coder in his picture, what process, specifically. To me, if I believe in pure physicality of consciousness, I see neurons made up of chemicals, that's it, there's no information per se, just like there’s no inherent information in the gene. The computer analogy is wrong because I can clearly explain the information with respect to the human mind assigning interpretation to bits. So, when you say "the right configuration of information gives rise to subjective experience in a system", specifically what information are you talking about?


Pavel.