- #71
metacristi
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What to explain?i don't think that the accepted knowedge of an alien culture on the other part of the galaxy,situated at roghly our level of development,is too different...I think finding one would settle things clearer.
Yes, I've never understood why M thinks science has 'e-priviledge'. I've asked on a few threads with no answer yet.Hugo Holbling said:I'll gladly take that role if you like, since all I'm getting elsewhere is insult.
I was considering two things. Firstly that all knowledge begins in experience, and secondly that certain knowledge lies in a unity of knower and known (as per Aristotle and Popper and other notables). If all experiences are theory-laden then neither of these two things would be true, knowledge would begin in theory and certain knowledge would be impossible. Also introspection suggests to me that if not all then most experiences are direct and 'pure'.On the face of it, this seems like a strange thing to say: is it a problem because you don't like this conclusion, or because there are faults in the reasoning? The former is unfortunate, perhaps, but not much else, so we'll go with the latter.
I'm not impressed by Churchland I'm afraid. However you raise a good point here, namely that experience and subject are denied by some.Is it? Given that I'm unable to do anything for myself and must constantly refer to books I've read but not properly understood, i'll note that Churchland concluded (in a paper of his concerning the problem of theory-ladenness from a neuroscientific perspective) that this "raw experience" was a misnomer: instead, all experience is necessarily interpreted first. Even a basic experience such as "i am experiencing anger" presupposes categories like experience and subject (categories that are denied, in the final analysis, by some), as well as causal chains, etc. No doubt there are others.
Bohr did not explore inner states but just adopted the scientific view. because of this he missed the fact that meditative practitioners assert that 'points of view' and 'forms of perception' are exactly what are to be avoided in pursuing knowledge through experience.According to Bohr (i.e. to ensure my reputation is upheld):
Is it? It seems exactly the point to me.The obvious objection is to note that while we may be getting the experience via our interpretation of it, there nevertheless exists a pure experience which is interpreted in the first place. That's beside the point, though:
Good points. I don't think the views of Churchland or Bohr are correct, partly for the reasons you give. There's a chicken and egg problem (as there is with all scientific explanations).what we're saying is that we have a "raw experience" that may subsequently become distorted, but if any experience must inevitably happen within the framework provided by our "points of view and forms of perception" (in Churchland's account, such a framework is required before our brain can process any experiential information - but i could be misreading it or the research to date may have altered the conclusion, of course) then there is no "raw experience" to speak of. This puts me in mind of Bohr's difficulties with maintaining the separation between subject and object, or observed and observer, but I'm merely taking this from a book (a large book, admittedly) and so i doubt if it has any bearing on the matter.
Ah, my favourite question. I think that exclusive use of the scientific approach to the acquisition of knowledge produces a horribly warped idea of reality. According to science consciousness, the thing that allows us to know anything in the first place, cannot be shown to exist, cannot be causally or reductively explained, has no reason for existing, has no purpose or function, did not evolve, cannot be studied except in the third-person (even though third-persons cannot be shown to be conscious) and consists of no more than matter self-referencing. To me Heidegger was spot on, science confuses Being with beings.What do you think?
Canute said:I may theorise from the experience, theorise on the cause of it and so on, but it's hard to see how the experience itself can be anything other than what it is.
I'm not impressed by Churchland I'm afraid.
But this is wandering into meditative practice and you may not want to go there.
Bohr did not explore inner states but just adopted the scientific view.
IMO introspective practice has epistemilogical privilege over all other forms of enquiry into truth.
The scientific view only appears to make sense because it has the luxury of hiding all its self-contradictions and paradoxes in the dusty and cobwebbed realms of academic 'metaphysics'. But in reality questions are questions, they don't come divided into neat academic categories.
I can't see a way of denying that, on the other hand I can't see how it can be demonstrated either. All I can do is go back to the chicken and egg problem here. Even if we do interpret experiences before having them it would seem odd to argue that in an evolutionary or a 'morphogenical' sense we develop the means of interpreting experiences before we develop the means of having them.Hugo Holbling said:Well, the point was that it isn't possible to have an experience other than within an interpretive framework (or rather, that was the suggestion).
I don't know that paper so can only comment on what you said about it. As such it was presented without an argument so didn't seem to call for much of a rebuttal. In addition I know some of the Churchlands other work and supposed that it followed much the same lines, but perhaps not.*shrug* Fair enough, but that isn't much of an argument. The paper I'm thinking of is in my library, so i'll let you know later what it was called; at any rate, i found it different to his usual stuff and it would seem to be worth your while locating, if you're interested.
OkWhy not? I've studied such issues myself, so you can post whatever you like.
I suppose I meant 'the scientific way of thinking', rather than meaning to imply Bohr didn't think for himself. (I don't remember mentioning complementarity).Since Bohr is one of my favourite thinkers, i'll have to rake you over the coals for that one. He didn't "just adopt the scientific view" at all - what's that supposed to mean, in any case? Instead, Bohr devised an entirely new epistemology that he applied widely and he wrote much on the demise of the boundary between subject and object. Calling complementarity "the scientific view", even if only by implication, is rather wide of the mark.
That's very even-handed of you. In brief it's because knowledge gained by direct experience is certain. All other forms of it are not. Hence, for instance, idealism is unfalsifiable and always will be however much scientific research we do. All knowledge gained through proofs or through our sensory apparatus is uncertain, relative, dependent on assumptions or premises, and as such has limits.Since i gave meta a hard time, i'll have to ask you why?
All the undecidable questions of metaphysics, plus Zeno's paradoxes of motion, Russell's paradox, Goedel's proofs, the impossibility of certain proof, the problem of infinities and infinitessimals, the undetectability of consciousness, wavicles, the 'something-nothing' problem entailed by materialism, etc. These suggest to me that science is an ineffective way of understanding anything properly, however useful it is in other ways. (BTW I'd say the same of religion for similar reasons - in case you think I'm arguing for God).What are these "self-contradictions and paradoxes" that you write of?
Canute said:I don't know that paper so can only comment on what you said about it. As such it was presented without an argument so didn't seem to call for much of a rebuttal. In addition I know some of the Churchlands other work and supposed that it followed much the same lines, but perhaps not.
... no cognitive activity takes place save as the input vectors pass through that speculative configuration of synaptic connections, that theory. Theory-ladenness thus emerges not as an unwelcome and accidental blight on what would otherwise be a neutral cognitive achievement, but rather as that which makes processing activity genuinely cognitive in the first place.
(I don't remember mentioning complementarity).
However as far as I'm aware his paradigm remained the scientific one (and vice versa).
Can you say more about what he thought about subject and object?
In brief it's because knowledge gained by direct experience is certain.
In the end one might say it is because certain knowledge requires seeing beyond the shadows to reality, and this cannot be done by reasoning, perceiving, observing, measuring, or even by conceiving, as Plato argued.
I don't like S's idea of God but epistemilogically this seems equivalent to the view of most philosophers of knowledge.
These suggest to me that science is an ineffective way of understanding anything properly, however useful it is in other ways.
Davidson would reply that Cartesian skeptics are misusing the expression "really real." It makes sense to say that the people I encounter in my dreams, or the things I see after taking hallucinogens, are not really real. For denying them reality is just a way of saying that we cannot make beliefs about these people or things cohere with the rest of our beliefs -- specifically, with our beliefs about other people and things. The expression "not really real" is, in such contexts, given its meaning by contrasting cases in which we are prepared to say that those other people or things are really real.
Davidson's point is that retail skepticism makes sense, but wholesale skepticism does not. We have to know a great deal about what is real before we can call something an illusion, just as we have to have a great many true beliefs before we can have any false ones. The proper reply to the suggestion that beavers might be illusory is this: Illusory by comparison to what?
Even a mind-bending movie like "The Matrix" supports this insight. If you see the film after having read Davidson, you will be struck by the fact that the hero has mostly the same beliefs after he is ripped out of his artificial environment as he did before. He still believes millions of the same commonplaces -- the commonplaces that make it possible for him to use the same language outside the Matrix that he used inside it. He had been fooled about what was going on around him, but had never been fooled about what sorts of things the world contains, what is good and what evil, the color of the sky, the warmth of the sun, or the salient features of beavers.
The trouble is that all the Churchlands' theorising is based on the same presumption, what Gold & Stoljar call the 'neuron hypothesis', which states that all reference to mental events are simply 'folk-psychological' and that all such events will eventually be reduced to neuroscience or 'psychopharmacology'. I feel that this view is illogical, (as does Searle, Chalmers and others) so I tend not to follow their work.Hugo Holbling said:Not to fret. I'm back with my library now, so i can say some more. The paper is called A Deeper Unity and here's a small quote:
It seems fair enough to say that all experiences derived from sensory data are theory-laden, (if one calls a set of connections in the brain a 'theory' as seems do be done in your quoted extract).The basic idea, of course, is that there is simply too much information taken into be able to make sense of it without filtering it through the equivalent of a theory (or theories) first.
I wasn't drifting off into Kuhn country, but was using 'paradigm' in its everyday sense, in which as individuals we all have one. My impression is that Bohr stuck with looking at the issue from the 'western' 'third-person' point of view (unlike Shroedinger for instance). However I accept that there is an overlap, particularly in such ideas as implicate/explicate orders 'enfolded' into one another and so on. All I know about Bohr (not much) is picked up piecemeal in discussions of QM.Well, it might be an idea to drop talk of paradigms to begin with, unless you find that type of analysis convincing. In any case, how much Bohr do you know? I'd like to know how much i can assume, either for now or in future.
I'm not sure what you mean here.It is? How do avoid the charge that you've conflated two different forms of knowledge?
I don't know. I believe that the non-dual explanation of everything is correct, and most of the Greeks held some version of that view. (This is arguable but it's my opinion at the moment).Are you a Platonist of sorts?
Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known. Those that don't, (Kant would be one I think) conclude that certain knowledge is forever beyond us.Perhaps you can expand? What is this view that "most" hold?
Ok - same difference.That probably depends on what you mean by "properly". Perhaps they just suggest that science is limited, like most other things?
Canute said:I feel that this view is illogical, (as does Searle, Chalmers and others) so I tend not to follow their work.
The issue they do not address is non-sensory experience. Because of this the eliminative materialism they propose ... begs most of the important questions about consciousness and 'knowing'.
However I accept that there is an overlap, particularly in such ideas as implicate/explicate orders 'enfolded' into one another and so on. All I know about Bohr (not much) is picked up piecemeal in discussions of QM.
I'm not sure what you mean here.
This is a consistent conclusion across most philosophies. Even Christians say we must believe rather than know.
However not everybody takes the limits of reason as as implying that we cannot know the answers or the truth.
(BTW I don't want to bore you with quotes but didn't want you to think I was posting just ad hoc opinions).
Is there an 'ism' that characterises your view on all this?
The same as the writers mentioned, the 'hard' problem and all that. I fail to see how science can explain something it cannot prove to exist.Hugo Holbling said:Out of interest, what's your objection(s)?
What consciousness is, how (or if) it is caused, and how we can know (experience) anything.Likewise, which questions are they begging?
Whoops, apologies for my temporary insanity. What makes Bohr interesting here?That's Bohm. I think you'd enjoy reading some more Bohr.
They are distinct categories of knowledge. Scientific knowledge cannot be certain for reasons given earlier. By 'knowledge' I mean what is known to the person who has the knowledge.Are the two forms of knowledge, certain and scientific (to use the terms we've seen so far), variations on the same or a conflation? What do you mean by "knowledge"?
If you're not sure then I'll stick to my opinion, which I still think is correct. I don't believe that what I said was contentious.Not all of them. I'm not sure how "consistent" this really is.
Umm, can't remember what introduction that was. I may have done. (What was it?) I don't have a quick answer on 'truth', but briefly I take a truth to be what is the case. It's a bit more complicated because if we are to know that something is the truth then it must be the sort of thing we can know. (E.g. 2+2=4 we can know is the case because it's a tautology. The existence of self-awareness we can know, because we know directly).Did you check the introduction i referred you to? What form of truth are you using?
Canute said:Whoops, apologies for my temporary insanity. What makes Bohr interesting here?
By 'knowledge' I mean what is known to the person who has the knowledge.
Umm, can't remember what introduction that was. I may have done. (What was it?)
(Are you disagreeing or asking for more of the reasoning behind my assertions? I've assumed the former and been brief. If it's the latter I'll post more quotes since other people usually write about these things more helpfully than I do).
Sorry - I didn't mean he wasn't interesting - I just couldn't remember how he connected with the topic.Hugo Holbling said:Er... because i said so? I just guessed you might be interested in his many writings on the boundary between observer and observed being fluid at best and not as rigid as some suppose.
Wow, do you think I'll have an answer to that? I generally assume that this is something we each have to decide for ourselves.That doesn't really help much, though: what is it to know something?
I wasn't saying I couldn't be bothered. I have quite a few threads here and elsewhere on the go and get confused which is which sometimes. My apologies.Ah, well. You can find it here (and my apologies for plugging something i don't intend to suppose worth anyone's while).
Ok I got that, but I haven't quite got a picture of what lies behind your questions, so I'm not quite certain how best to pitch my answers. I'll stick to 'glib and not very rigorous' for now.You can post quotes if you like but I've already read many of them before, i expect. I'd always like to hear more of your reasoning.
Hugo Holbling said:If we want to do so in a non-arbitrary way, it won't do to say that the gods aren't real because they can't be observed or tested, and so on, because we then assume that what is real is what can be tested - which is precisely what we're supposed to show. The question to ask, then, is whether this can be done in a non-circular way.
. . . . Secondly, it doesn't help to say that science is successful in certain domains for producing knowledge, because then we run up against the issue of what "successful" or "useful" are supposed to mean
. . . . that won't do either because, on the one hand, not everyone agrees that science has anything to do with finding true or truthlike theories about reality (as we saw in the other thread) and, on the other, we arrive back at the first problem of trying to explain why some methods tell us what's real while others do not.
. . . Quine's remark . . . was questioning whether there really is this "different class" and I've asked why quarks stand on an epistemological footing different from the gods.
. . . . That assumes what's to be proven, though: how do you know what's physical in the first place? If we say that empiricism may be granted the privilege because it helps us learn about the physical, we can't then say that we know what's physical because a form of empiricism tells us without expecting some smartass philosopher or an idiot like me to ask if this isn't circular reasoning.
LW Sleeth said:I singled out those quotes as examples of what’s wrong with your view
It’s been awhile since I’ve read Quine, so I am not sure which of his remarks you are referring to.
When he explains the rationalist’s preference for keeping experience “along the edges,” he has also shown us exactly why no purely mental position can be defended.
I hate to seem so biased, but to me Quine, Popper, (GREAT thinkers no doubt)
So, what’s my solution? Walk straight ahead and see if you smash into that wall, then you will know for certain.
EXPERIENCE AND KNOW! (although that's your decision since I am also an individualist)
It took the addition of experience to rationality to turn circular traps into spirals which might lead “up” to knowledge.
Canute said:Wow, do you think I'll have an answer to that? I generally assume that this is something we each have to decide for ourselves.
Ok I got that, but I haven't quite got a picture of what lies behind your questions, so I'm not quite certain how best to pitch my answers.
I have given up philosophising very much about truth because I see only two important kinds, relative or absolute.
Canute said:I don't know. I believe that the non-dual explanation of everything is correct, and most of the Greeks held some version of that view. (This is arguable but it's my opinion at the moment).
Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known.
Those that don't, (Kant would be one I think) conclude that certain knowledge is forever beyond us. “Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.” (Critique of Pure Reason)
Would you mind supplying the link to this essay?Hawkings also agrees, for reasons connected with Goedel. (Online essay somewhere called 'The End of Physics').
Because Popper also takes the scientific view of direct experience he arrives in the same place - “What we should do, I suggest, is give up the idea of ultimate sources of knowledge. And admit that all human knowledge is human: that it is mixed with our errors, our prejudices, our dreams, and our hopes: that all we can do is grope for truth even though it be beyond our reach". Problem of Induction.
This is a consistent conclusion across most philosophies. Even Christians say we must believe rather than know. However not everybody takes the limits of reason as as implying that we cannot know the answers or the truth.
Hi and welcome to the madness. I didn't claim that the Greeks were monists so this point does not apply.Theothanatologist said:Claiming that most of the Greeks held a monist view is absurd.
I quoted Aristotle - are you saying he didn't say what I said he did? I certainly did not suggest that Aristotle was an 'empiricist' in any modern sense. Don't be too quick to jump to conclusions about what I'm saying.This is also false, because while Aristotle was a proto-empiricist of sorts, Empiricism did not emerge as a bona fide philosophy until John Locke in the 17th century.
I have. Again you have misinterpreted what I said. I agree with what you say here about Kant. I am not arguing for empiricism, at least not in its restricted sense of giving primacy to sensory data.Nope, this quote doesn't get your case anywhere. It actuall pertains to the function of reason, how it transcends the principle of significance (empirical knowledge) not about how knowledge is gained via the senses. Read the book.
I don't have it to hand but a search should do it.Would you mind supplying the link to this essay?
I know.The quote doesn't indicate Popper has sworn fealty to empirical foundationalism. It only claims that truth is to be sought after, even if it is an impossiblity.
Hmm. I think you've demonstrated that you've invented most of what you thought I said. Easily done on these forums.No, you have consistently demonstrated that you don't know what you are talking about.
I wasn't saying it was satisfactory, just that there is no other way forward. Are you saying that you know how we know?Hugo Holbling said:That doesn't seem too satisfactory, especially when you use the term so often and make important points thereby.
Oh dear, I think you have me in the wrong pidgeon-hole. I just wanted to be clear what style of communication was most appropriate.Why do you require such a picture, along with an "ism" with which to categorise me? My objections apply whether I'm a solipsist or naive empiricist (like most here, apparently).
But of course not everyone agrees. This is the problem, and why one has to make ones own mind up based on pragmatic considerations (or remain forever on the spot trapped in philosophical debate). 'Knowing' is personal, so it is me who has to decide what is true and what is not as honestly as I can (or you in your case). That doesn't mean throwing philosophical considerations out of the window, just acknowledging that they are not a final guide to what is true.As my essay explained, this isn't sufficient - not least because not everyone agrees about what truth means in the first place. Avoiding this problem as you do doesn't make it go away.
You did claim that they were non-dualists, and i inferred that this meant monism. What exactly did you mean by this: " non-dual explanation of everything"?Canute said:Hi and welcome to the madness. I didn't claim that the Greeks were monists so this point does not apply.
I quoted Aristotle - are you saying he didn't say what I said he did?
I did write that Aristotle was a proto-empiricist, but i disagreed that "most philosophers" concluded with him on what constituted certain knowledge.I certainly did not suggest that Aristotle was an 'empiricist' in any modern sense. Don't be too quick to jump to conclusions about what I'm saying.
I apologize for any misinterpretations, its' late and i should be asleep. But it's still false. It is not the case that Kant thought that certain knowledge lay outside of the direct experience of the known. The faculty of reason does encourage the intellect to posit objects without a corresponding form of intuition, which lies outside of experience, but this is not a "certain knowledge" by any stretch of the imagination.I have. Again you have misinterpreted what I said. I agree with what you say here about Kant. I am not arguing for empiricism, at least not in its restricted sense of giving primacy to sensory data.
Passing the buck...I don't have it to hand but a search should do it.
C'est la vie.Hmm. I think you've demonstrated that you've invented most of what you thought I said. Easily done on these forums.
Non-dual means literally 'not-two', it does not mean 'one'. If I could explain what it means I'd be cleverer than Chuang-Tsu. Roughly it's the view that all dualisms are ultimately false, in the sense that ultimate reality and ultimate states of consciousness (roughly same thing in this view) are non-dual, beyond truth/falsity, one/many etc. Mathematically speaking it's the view from the meta-system.Theothanatologist said:You did claim that they were non-dualists, and i inferred that this meant monism. What exactly did you mean by this: " non-dual explanation of everything"?
I'll change it to 'most philosophers who conclude that certain knowledge is possible agree that it is only achievable by a 'oneness' of knower and known'. (I suppose a Christian mystic or gnostic would say becoming one with God, but personally I don't hold with God). Others (like Popper) do not take this final step but conclude certain knowledge is impossible. I take this conclusion as consistent with the first, but less well considered.Not at all. Let's look at your claim, and I will walk you through my interpretation: Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known.
At first whiff, the phrse "certain knowledge consists in direct experience of the known" seems circular, but i wasn't going to take you to task on that, and i thought it would be charitable to assume you intended that as a description of some type of empiricism. My response was that this was false, that "most philosophers" agreed or concluded with Aristotle. You will need to rebut this with evidence.
Ok - see above for my amendment assertion. Who is it that disagrees?I did write that Aristotle was a proto-empiricist, but i disagreed that "most philosophers" concluded with him on what constituted certain knowledge.
Quite agree. I didn't suggest otherwise.I apologize for any misinterpretations, its' late and i should be asleep. But it's still false. It is not the case that Kant thought that certain knowledge lay outside of the direct experience of the known.
It's you that's passing it. Try typing 'Hawking End of Phsyics' into your search engine. Or do want me to do it? Have I offended you in some way?Passing the buck...
Canute said:Are you saying that you know how we know?
Oh dear, I think you have me in the wrong pidgeon-hole. I just wanted to be clear what style of communication was most appropriate.
But of course not everyone agrees.
If you cannot tell me a better way than mine to decide then I see no reason to change. It's not enough to simply say 'it's not sufficient'. Something has to be put in its place if I'm to get rid of my method.
It's a little more subtle than it looks but I didn't want to write an essay when you asked about it.
I take the Buddhist view of true knowledge (and Aristotle's I think), if it isn't self-evident then it must be doubted.
Are you intending to continue never answering questions?Hugo Holbling said:No. Are you intending to continue the non sequiturs?
Do you read what I write?That wins an irony award. You can communicate however you like, as i already said.
It's no use taking the fact that we cannot agree intra-subjectively about what 'truth' means as entailing that we can never know any truth as individuals. It's not logical and not necessary.You miss the point again. Not everyone agrees about what truth means or refers to in the first place, so it's no use for you to talk about deciding what's true when there are already issues of pragmatism prior to these concerns.
So I should give up my idea of truth because you think it's insufficient? I think I'd rather you made a case first, or suggested a better idea.Nonsense. This is a stasis that relies on an implicit assumption of the function of critique and another mischaracterisation to boot. You don't have to change your ideas wholesale for another worldview; it's enough that you tinker with them if you find a weakness and perhaps try to strengthen them as a result.
I said I didn't want to write an essay. What I meant was that I didn't want to write an essay.*shrug* You can send me stuff privately, post it here or say nothing. I think i can cope.
I think I agree. If you doubt something then you can conceive of it being false. However if you cannot conceive of it being false it is not necessarily true.Sure, but you don't add that this doubt requires an alternative to be stated. Here i am, then - doubting.
Hugo Holbling said:It's not clear to me what "my view" is supposed to represent or why it's "wrong" because i allegedly haven't noted that empiricism came along and changed rationalism. . . . wonder if i am wasting my time here.
Hugo Holbling said:I'll look for a reference for you: chapter six of his paper Two Dogmas of Empiricism.
Hugo Holbling said:Do you likewise believe that my jumping from a tall building and subsequently smashing myself upon contact with the ground makes gravity certain? Perhaps you need to think again?
Hugo Holbling said:Why are you mischaracterising me in this way? None of my objections to the utter inability to justify an epistemological privilege of any kind here have required a rationalism shorn of experience . . .
Les said: It took the addition of experience to rationality to turn circular traps into spirals which might lead “up” to knowledge.
Hugo said: How does this process work?
Canute said:Are you intending to continue never answering questions?
Do you read what I write?
It's no use taking the fact that we cannot agree intra-subjectively about what 'truth' means as entailing that we can never know any truth as individuals. It's not logical and not necessary.
'Knowing' is personal, so it is me who has to decide what is true and what is not as honestly as I can (or you in your case).
So I should give up my idea of truth because you think it's insufficient? I think I'd rather you made a case first, or suggested a better idea.
I said I didn't want to write an essay. What I meant was that I didn't want to write an essay.
LW Sleeth said:I was teasing you because you said you like to take opposing views, and then telling me to "attack."
I hope yon't take too personally those here who get a bit testy when they debate; besides we can't afford to lose anybody that can think!
That's what I was took my interpretation from.
For my part i do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and i consider it to be a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.
No I don't, but I wouldn't set up that experiment to prove gravity either. What I would use that experiement for is to prove what happens when you jump from a tall building.
I admit I am not yet convinced that overall I missed the mark when I implied your view might be too oriented toward rationalism.
But that's okay to suggest that isn't it if it leads to interesting points being made?
But since empiricism relies only on sense experience, and I happen to know there are other types of conscious experiences, I would never award absolute epistomological privilege to empiricism, even though I would grant its demonstrated effectiveness in studying the physical aspects of reality.
That has been my point to you all along.
I'm not trying to fit you into a box. I can't think what gave you that idea. The question I asked was purposely a non sequitur, that why I asked it. You asked me what 'knowing' was. I was illustrating that there couldn't be an answer to it because The question is a non sequitur. (I haven't characterised you yet, so I can't have mischaracterised you).Hugo Holbling said:I'll gladly answer you if you're able to cease mischaracterising me, offering non sequiturs and stop worrying about which box i'll fit into.
I feel that you're reading things into what I'm writing that aren't there. That could be my fault of course.For my sins, i do indeed.
In what way? It doesn't seem one to me.Sure, but this is yet another rampant non sequitur.
I agree, but this is the whole problem with the discussion. My view is that 'truth' can only be known from direct experience. (A view I'd call empiricism if the term didn't seem to be usually interpreted as related only to sensory experience).[If you intend to discuss these matters and use terms like truth and knowledge, it's standard (indeed, basic) to ask how you understand them. Without that, we could easily misunderstand one another.
Usually I'd completely agree with you. But discussions that relate to consciousness (knowing etc) are a bit different. They always have this defintion problem at their heart. As you'll know it crops up all the time in consciousness studies. It leads to strange situations - for instance Francis Crick, in papers claiming to explain consciousness, argues at the same time that we shouldn't try to define it.makes perfect sense to ask what form of these terms you employ, especially if they happen to be ones of your own devising. Like i said, it's basic stuf.
Charitable is certainly not how I'd characterise it, but I expect I don't come across as I think I do either. You sigh and shrug as if it's as if you are bored in the company of mortals.*sigh* Another non sequitur. It helps in these kinds of discussions if you at least make an attempt to be charitable to the other participants. I'm trying to do likewise, but you seem to think I'm being difficult for the sake of it.
Of course, but this is why I was trying to figure out your angle, there are lots of ways of coming at it. But I'll give up on that since you misinterpret my motives.Good for you. Are you willing to offer the more subtle version of your ideas for me to look at, either here or privately?
Hugo Holbling said:Of course, Quine was quite mistaken: the question of efficaciousness is not his to decide, for it depends on the goals of those employing the many such myths that people have come up with over history. Moreover, if we happen to agree on such goals for a time, it isn't any more rational to award an epistomological privilege to physical objects than the gods for the same reason that Lakatos' methodology fails to provide any normative advice: the utility of a myth cannot be determined a priori.
Les said: . . . I would grant its demonstrated effectiveness in studying the physical aspects of reality.
Hugo responded: I'm afraid I'm bound to ask you how you decided that empiricism has demonstrated that (which was the point of my quoted remarks, of course). . . . countering radical skepticism (or something short of it, like we have here) by saying that it gets us nowhere doesn't justify the epistemological privilege we've been discussing.
Canute said:Les - Nice post. Also utility is strange measure of the success of science. Firstly it is anthropomorphic. Firearms weren't useful for dodo's.
Canute said:Are you sure your use of 'empricism' is correct? According to its general dictionary meaning the methods of meditative practice are just as empirical as those of science, and technically more so.
Canute said:Secondly that a piece of information is useful does not make it true. Most theistic systems were useful in their context. I don't suppose the Incas would have got the practice of human sacrifice off the ground without the knowledge that the Sun was a God.
Canute said:Perhaps I'm coming at it from the wrong direction, but I can't see how the usefulness of a piece of knowledge can be any guide to its truth unless some judgement is made as to the benefit or disbenefit of using it is jusged against some yardstick, (human happiness, material wealth or spirtual progress etc). At the moment we say science is useful but all we mean is that we use it.
olde drunk said:Les: your comments are worth a second read.
may I add that we all have annecdotal evidence of how our belief system has been a tool in gaining knowledge and manipulating physical reality. unfortunately, this does not satisfy or lend itself to scientific measurement.
that is why all truths are subjective. even empericism. they create a view based on their inner belief. as they look outward, that is all they observe.
love and peace,
olde drunk
I understand that this is what you're doing and why, but I wonder whether we should let academics steal our language. It is now impossible to use the word 'empirical' with its proper (philosophical) meaning because it has been given a narrow scientific definition and there is no term to replace it. This keeps happening and I believe that it affects the way we think about such issues. People now believe that science is more 'empirical' than experience, which is incoherent but true according to the new defintion.LW Sleeth said:You probably know that general dictionaries are often not relevant to philosophical definitions because dictionaries are intended to help with language, and so include all the ways a word is employed by the general populace. I am using empiricism as a synonym for science, and there it very strictly limits acceptable "experience" to sense experience, and acceptable information to sense data.
I think it has yes. Of course in hindsight it was a daft idea, but at the time it could be defined as a useful practice, at least as long as the crops came up. They wouldn't have done it if they hadn't thought it was useful. 'Useful' is what we think is useful.Now let's consider your example of human sacrifice. Humans fearful of the unpredictableness and destructiveness of nature believe a god is behind that, and that if they sacrifice a human, the god will be pleased and not destroy their crops, etc. Because of what they believe, after the sacrifice they feel better . . . their fear is assuaged. In that way, human sacrifice "worked" because they are not as afraid. But has it really worked?
But they had quite a civilisation so it served its purpose. I feel 'pragmatism' does not work unless you unconsciously (or explicitly) build in assumptions and values that are arbitrary. For instance, you cite the case of a knowledge that helps humans to survive in greater numbers. If you substitute cockroaches for humans the example doesn't seem to work so well.So although it appears at first that human sacrifice "works," in terms of all the effects it has, in actuality it doesn't work very well at all.
I think that's my point - it confirms our understanding but it does not confirm that our understanding is correct. It is common for scientific predictions to come true but for misunderstood reasons. When we call scientific knowledge useful we don't say anything other than that we use it.A much less dramatic example of the pragmatist idea is how well the predictions and calculations for the development of a physical tool are confirmed when we get around to testing it, snip... When we build that device and it "works" as we predicted, then a little bit more of our understanding of reality has been confirmed.
Yes I realize that. But I would argue that knowledge gained through inner experience is not just empirical but also useful. This is because my yardstick for usefulness is human happiness. Having a yardstick allows me to be pragmatic about utility without begging the question of what utility is, or having to define it self-referentially. But this is probably an idiosyncratic view.But don't get me wrong, I am not trying to limit what "works" to physical stuff. What works to make us happier, wiser, more content? I do not mean to imply that utility is only that which benefits us physically.
Canute said:I understand that this is what you're doing and why, but I wonder whether we should let academics steal our language. It is now impossible to use the word 'empirical' with its proper (philosophical) meaning because it has been given a narrow scientific definition and there is no term to replace it. This keeps happening and I believe that it affects the way we think about such issues. People now believe that science is more 'empirical' than experience, which is incoherent but true according to the new defintion.
Canute said:Regarding utility I see what you mean, but find it an odd view. It lacks any objective standards. On this view if we predict that Thalidomide will deform babies and it does then it is useful. Or have I misunderstood 'pragmatism'.
Canute said:I think it has yes. Of course in hindsight it was a daft idea, but at the time it could be defined as a useful practice, at least as long as the crops came up. They wouldn't have done it if they hadn't thought it was useful. 'Useful' is what we think is useful.
But they had quite a civilisation so it served its purpose. I feel 'pragmatism' does not work unless you unconsciously (or explicitly) build in assumptions and values that are arbitrary. For instance, you cite the case of a knowledge that helps humans to survive in greater numbers. If you substitute cockroaches for humans the example doesn't seem to work so well.
Canute said:I think that's my point - it confirms our understanding but it does not confirm that our understanding is correct. It is common for scientific predictions to come true but for misunderstood reasons. When we call scientific knowledge useful we don't say anything other than that we use it.
Canute said:Yes I realize that. But I would argue that knowledge gained through inner experience is not just empirical but also useful. This is because my yardstick for usefulness is human happiness. Having a yardstick allows me to be pragmatic about utility without begging the question of what utility is, or having to define it self-referentially. But this is probably an idiosyncratic view.
I agree. I'll look out for the thread.LW Sleeth said:Yes, I agree. It's too bad we can't share the word empirical without causing confusion. I've been contemplating doing a thread on "experientialism" which might be a better word anyway. When I researched it on Google, the only thing I didn't like about it was that the definition had it opposed to intuitionism. I know what the author meant, but I wouldn't want to eliminate intuition as a means to help one look for where to find verifying experience.
It might look like that but actually I didn't leave out. I just took into account that any timescale you choose to observe over is totally arbitrary. There is never a particular moment when you can stop observing and make a judgement.In your examples, you left out a condition I included in my response to you: observance over time.
Have you been talking to her?Not letting your wife out of the house "works" to keep her faithful, but what sort of overall relationship does it create when a person isn't faithful because they want to be?
I agree that one should try to see the bigger picture, but one can never hope to see much of it, and it'll look different depending on when you choose to look, and at what.My point is, one cannot properly evaluate any proposed theory or behavior by only looking at part of it. So to criticize pragmatism because something "appears" to work when looked at piecemeal or superficially is not a fair criticism.
I agree. However I'm not quite sure what follows from that. The fact that we can make predictions from theories only shows that we have spotted a pattern in the behaviour of some subset of physical entities. It hardly constitutes an understanding of anything, and such theories cannot be judged to either true or false.Not true. I think you are mixing up interpretation with observation. When that solar cell "works" to create a current, and we have designed that cell to do exactly what it did applying principles based on certain ways we believe reality functions, then we have confirmed to some degree our understanding of the way reality works is true.
Canute said:It might look like that but actually I didn't leave out. I just took into account that any timescale you choose to observe over is totally arbitrary. There is never a particular moment when you can stop observing and make a judgement.
Canute said:I agree that one should try to see the bigger picture, but one can never hope to see much of it, and it'll look different depending on when you choose to look, and at what.
Canute said:I'm not suggesting that science is not useful. I'm suggesting that any measure of its usefulness is arbitrary. 'Usefulness' has no objective meaning as far as I can tell, and no subjective one until one has chosen a yardstick (happiness, cheaper energy or whatever). Until this is done one cannot even measure it pragmatically.
The question of knowledge or scientific data or whatever then becomes not whether it is useful or not, a question with no meaning, but what are we trying to achieve and does it help us achieve it.
Canute said:I agree. However I'm not quite sure what follows from that. The fact that we can make predictions from theories only shows that we have spotted a pattern in the behaviour of some subset of physical entities. It hardly constitutes an understanding of anything, and such theories cannot be judged to either true or false.
Canute said:For instance microphenominalism supposes that photons are conscious. It has respectable proponents. One is David Bohm who speculates about what his pilot wave actually is. This approach is scientifically pointless, completely untestable and offering no greater predictive powers than current theories. However it could be true. If we decided it was then this would give us a completely different understanding of reality without in any way changing the way solar cells work.