The so-called Darwinian model of free will

[moving finger]

The so-called "Darwinian model" of free will

See http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html#introduction

The above link introduces the "Darwinian model", which purports to show how indeterminacy can endow an otherwise deterministic agent with free will.

I prefer to call this model the Accidental model, rather than the Darwinian model (for reasons that will become clear later). With all due respect, I feel that calling it the Darwinian model is insulting to Darwin (imho I do not believe Charles Darwin would have wanted to be associated with this model).

The main problem with most “indeterminacy” models of “free will” decision-making is that introducing indeterminacy arbitrarily into the decision-making process leads not to “free will”, but to capricious (irrational) behaviour. In the Accidental model, an attempt is made to remove the capriciousness without destroying the indeterminacy. This is done by having a 2-stage decision-making process. In the first stage a “random idea generator” (hereafter RIG) creates multiple alternate ideas according to an indeterministic process (this is the source of indeterminacy); in the second stage a “sensible idea selector” (hereafter SIS) examines the various alternate ideas created by the prior indeterministic stage, and rationally (and deterministically) selects one of the ideas for action.

This model may seem superficially to provide a means of generating “free will”. There is a random element (the RIG) combined with a deterministic element (the SIS). The model is thus claimed to be both indeterministic and yet not capricious (it makes, up to a point, rational choices). But does it endow “free will”?

Firstly we need to ask whether or not we have eliminated the capriciousness. If the RIG generates too FEW alternate ideas as input to the SIS, then the system will still appear to behave capriciously (the SIS will have insufficient choices for rational action because of the limited number of ideas generated by the RIG, hence overall behaviour will be dictated by the RIG). Therefore the RIG needs to generate a reasonable number of alternate ideas for each decision.

Secondly we need to ask whether or not we have eliminated determinism. If the RIG generates too MANY alternatives as input to the SIS, then the system’s behaviour will start to be dominated by the SIS, which operates deterministically. Therefore the RIG needs to generate not too many alternate ideas for each decision.

Can we say whether this model actually endows “free will”?

I cannot answer that question definitively without making an assumption on the definition of “free will”, and that is a notoriously difficult thing to do (I do not agree that the definition provided in the above link is rigorous enough).

In the absence of an agreed definition of free will, what I CAN do is both (1) to show how this model applies to “machines” and (2) to examine some of the strange consequences (which I have chosen to call flaws) of the Accidental model.

1 – Applying the Accidental model to machines
Imagine that we have a deterministic computer-based decision making machine (this should not be difficult, our present-day lives are surrounded by such machines, I am typing on one now).
We now add to this machine a “random idea generator” which generates random ideas based on a truly indeterministic process (possibly powered by some quantum-based device). The RIG generates alternate ideas for action, inputs these ideas to the computer, and the computer then decides which of these ideas to turn into action. The computer in this case is performing the role of the SIS.
Now, IF it is true that the Accidental model endows “free will”, THEN it also follows that the machine we have just created has “free will”.

Would you agree that this simple machine has “free will”?

If not, why not?

2 – Flaws in the Accidental model
Some may consider the implication that “free will” is endowed upon the simple machine described above a “flaw” in the Accidental model. I certainly do.
Let us take a closer look at some other fundamental flaws in this model.
Applying the Accidental model to a human subject, let us take a very simple “free will” decision process as an example, and work through exactly how the Accidental model is supposed to operate.
The precise nature of the decision is not important, but let us assume that seen from a totally objective perspective the human agent has a total of 5 (and no more than 5) different alternate courses of action for this particular decision. We can label these 5 different courses of action as A, B, C, D and E.

We need a benchmark against which to measure the Accidental model. Let us define the “Ideal Deterministic model” (ID model) as a world where ALL possible courses of action (and not just a selected number of the possible courses of action) are offered up to the SIS for consideration, and the SIS operates in the same manner as before, ie it selects the most rational course of action. The SIS is deterministic, therefore clearly each time we run the ID model we will get the same results from the same starting point. In each case, the ID model will select the most rational course of action from ALL possible courses of action (and not just a select few possible courses of action).

Let us also suppose that we can “interrogate” the agent after each decision, to ask it questions relating to that decision. Now we take our simplistic scenario, where we have a total of 5 possible courses of action.

Applying the ID model to our scenario, we find (let us say) that the SIS ranks these alternate courses in terms of rationality in the order E>D>C>B>A (where the SIS determines that E is the most rational course of action, and A the least). In this case, the model will always (deterministically) select E as the chosen course of action. Advocates of the Accidental model would clearly claim that the ID model does not exhibit any free will.
(Note the actual number of possible courses of action is not important – it could be 5, 50, 500 or 5,000 – the logic stays the same.)

Now let us take the same scenario, and apply the Accidental model. In this case, the RIG throws up a limited number of possible alternate solutions. Since there are a maximum of 5 possible solutions, the RIG clearly must throw up less than 5 possible solutions. Let us say that we run the model once and it throws up the 3 solutions C, D and E. The SIS works as before, and ranks these as before in the order E>D>C. In this case the agent chooses E as the course of action. When we interrogate the agent and ask it why it chose “E” as the best course of action, it will naturally say “well I considered three possible courses C, D and E, and E seemed the most rational course to me”. Nothing wrong with the logic there at all.

Now run the Accidental model again, and we see that the RIG throws up a different combination of possible solutions, let us say A, B and C. Again the SIS ranks these in order of preference C>B>A, and the agent chooses C as the course of action. When we interrogate the agent this time and ask it why it chose “C” as the best course of action, it will probably say “well I considered three possible courses A, B and C, and C seemed the most rational course to me”. Again nothing wrong with that logic in isolation.

If we now ask it “but in fact there is rationally an even better course of action, which is E. Why did you not choose E as a course of action” it will probably respond “ummmmm, oh well, I just never considered E as a possibility!”

The question I have at this point is : Is this what we consider to be free will? To be able to choose a non-optimum solution simply because such a choice is non-deterministic (which is what the Accidental model boils down to)?

We can run the Accidental model many times, and we will find that it does not behave predictably, since it chooses different courses of action depending upon the random output of the RIG. This is exactly what is supposed to happen, and advocates of this model will claim that it is precisely this type of indeterminism which endows the agent with free will...

Does anyone out there genuinely believe that this (the behaviour of the Accidental model) is what humans mean when they speak of human free will?

The Accidental (or Darwinian) model clearly therefore does not endow free will, and I have yet to see an explanation of how indeterminacy in any form can endow an otherwise deterministic agent with anything that could be called free will... does anyone know of a better model?

MF

 

[Q_Goest]

You ask if indeterminacy can endow free will, but one could equally ask, can determinacy endow free will? Both questions make the assumption that we merely need to consider one or the other in order for the concept of free will to emerge.
I'd have to say the basic assumption, that we merely need to look to the two possibilities of determinacy and indeterminacy, is incorrect. Basically, the question is flawed. Free will is a feature of consciousness. An unconscious mechanism has no free will regardless of whether it is made up of deterministic or indeterminate mechanisms. How consciousness comes about and why it should give rise to something called free will is unknown. A better question would be imho, "Can reductionism give rise to consciousness and can reductionism give rise to free will?"

Edit: To elaborate, reductionism assumes all phenomena emerge from the interaction of causally deterministic and possibly indeterministic mechanisms or processes. One can break something up into small bits, larger than atoms or molecules but as small as or smaller than living cells, and the properties these bits have must produce all the phenomena we see. There is also the concept of emergence as defined by Laughlin and others which I understand to say that such properties as superconductivity, phase transition, superfluidity and other phenomena can not be calculated to emerge from the interaction of subatomic particles, but this is a slightly different type of emergence theory than the emergence of consciousness in a brain if and only if one proposes quantum phenomena have nothing to do with consciousness.

Whether such emergent phenomena as proposed by Laughlin and others can give rise to consciousness requires there be quantum interactions in the brain. At least, that's the way I read his work. Feel free to point out any error there. The point is to clarify what emergent phenomena means. Emergent can mean the phenomena emerging from subatomic particles - but to suggest emergence of some phenomena depends on the properties of something as large as a neuron or even smaller is incorrect, I don't believe there is any such theory of emergence. If one can define something as large as a neuron that has no quantum mechanical interactions, then any phenomena which comes out of those interactions can be defined in reductionist terms. So without the process or mechanism of emergence being defined at this level, the question of determinate or indeterminate mechanisms giving rise to consciousness which can also give rise to "free will" is reduced to the question of "Can reductionism give rise to consciousness and can reductionism give rise to free will?" Thus the above question.

In answering that, I think it seems obvious to most that the answer is yes, consciousness can come about from the interaction of neurons at a macroscopic leve, thus consciousness is governed by determinate physical interactions, and free will is governed only by determinate mechanisms. However, there is also a possibility that neurons interact on a quantum mechanical level, (a view held as highly as non-local hidden variable theories), in which case we have to go back to quantum indeterminacy to describe consciousness and thus free will depends on quantum indeterminate processes unless non-local hidden variable theories are real. So, "Can macroscopic reductionism give rise to consciousness and can macroscopic reductionism give rise to free will?" may be a more appropriate question.

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

I'd say that the function of the decision making process and the manner in which it works would be the measure of free will.
The example of possible decisions A, B, C, D, and E with E being the most logical course of action is too perfect. In reality there isn't likely to be anyone course that is the very best.
Consider a situation where there are multiple possible courses with approximately the same value in regards to being logically the best. The decision maker must decide what sort of outcome is preferable to it's self or situation even though say three of these outcomes are more or less equal in preferablility. Let's say that the decision maker does not "flip a coin" nor does the decision maker follow any explicit rules for making the decision, the decision making process will then likely lie somewhere between determinate and indeterminate wouldn't it? Would you say that this is about where the idea of free will fits in?

 

[moving finger]

You ask if indeterminacy can endow free will, but one could equally ask, can determinacy endow free will? Both questions make the assumption that we merely need to consider one or the other in order for the concept of free will to emerge.

Agreed that the source of free will (if it exists) may not lie “simply” in either deterministic or indeterministic processes – there may also be (as you describe) emergent phenomena at work.
However, the statement “the world operates deterministically” must be (assuming the law of the excluded middle) either true or false. Hence the world is either deterministic or it is not. A world (or a system or a process) which is not deterministic is by definition indeterministic.
Therefore if free will exists then “whatever process it is that endows free will” (whether or not that process is based on consciousness, whether or not that process is emergent) must be (overall) either a deterministic or an indeterministic process (there is no third way).

I am not disputing that “free will may be based on emergent properties”. What I am saying is that (whatever the source of free will) it must be based on either a deterministic or an indeterministic process.

Free will is a feature of consciousness. An unconscious mechanism has no free will regardless of whether it is made up of deterministic or indeterminate mechanisms.

How would you define free will? With respect, unless or until this definition is provided, OR we can provide an account of how consciousness endows some kind of free will, then the statement “Free will is a feature of consciousness” is (with respect) a statement of belief.

Consciousness may indeed (as you suggest) be an emergent phenomenon (I prefer to use the term epiphenomenon, but you may disagree with some of the connotations of that term) of the brain. However it is not clear to me how such consciousness would then endow an agent with free will (where such free will does not exist in the absence of consciousness), and in the absence of descriptions of any of the properties of the free will thus endowed, it makes it difficult (even impossible) to provide any genuine understanding, or constructive critique, of the statement “free will is a feature of consciousness”.

Can you give an example of another emergent phenomenon (apart from consciousness) that we could discuss in greater depth, to try to understand exactly what is going on in "emergence"?

However, there is also a possibility that neurons interact on a quantum mechanical level, (a view held as highly as non-local hidden variable theories), in which case we have to go back to quantum indeterminacy to describe consciousness and thus free will depends on quantum indeterminate processes unless non-local hidden variable theories are real.

We need to be very careful with terminology here – by “indeterminate” do you mean the same as “indeterminable”, an epistemic property, or “indeterministic”, an ontic property. These are very different.

Many Thanks

MF

 

[moving finger]

I'd say that the function of the decision making process and the manner in which it works would be the measure of free will.

I agree with this – but we may disagree on the details (see my preferred definition of free will below).

The example of possible decisions A, B, C, D, and E with E being the most logical course of action is too perfect. In reality there isn't likely to be anyone course that is the very best.

Given a “deterministic sensible idea selector” (which is what is proposed in the Darwinian model), and given the same “input” each time, then it is necessarily the case that re-running the SIS will always “rank” the options in the same order each time. I agree it may be the case that the SIS may decide that two options are of “equal rank” (for example it may decide E=D>C>B>A), but the logic of my argument would still be essentially the same as before. If the SIS is then constrained to always pick “one” option, then in the case of E=D it would presumably just not be able to complete it’s task (unless we also provide a random selector stage after the SIS to cater for this possibility – but this would only make the final choice random and would not endow anything that could be called free will).

Consider a situation where there are multiple possible courses with approximately the same value in regards to being logically the best.

“Approximately the same” is not synonymous with “exactly the same”. The SIS is deterministic, thus no matter how small the difference in value the SIS can (in principle) still discriminate.

The decision maker must decide what sort of outcome is preferable to it's self or situation even though say three of these outcomes are more or less equal in preferablility.

Again, “more or less equal” is not the same as “equal”.

Lets say that the decision maker does not "flip a coin" nor does the decision maker follow any explicit rules for making the decision, the decision making process will then likely lie somewhere between determinate and indeterminate wouldn't it?

Is there something “between determinate and indeterminate”? What might that be?
Take any given process, it is either determinisitic or it is not. If it is not deterministic then by definition it is indeterministic. Logically (it seems) there is no “third way”.
Can you can explain what the properties of this third way might be?

Would you say that this is about where the idea of free will fits in?

My oipinion? I think free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism (but importantly, being compatible with determinism, it does not REQUIRE indeterminism), but I probably don’t define free will the same way as most people who believe in what we might call “genuine free will”. I can offer my definition of free will, which is :
Free will (definition) : Free will is the ability of an agent to behave rationally yet not necessarily predictably, where the source of the agent’s unpredictability is largely based on the complexity of the agent’s deterministic decision-making processes, and is not solely down to any indeterministic processes.
In this definition I use the term “predictable” in the sense of an observer being able to predict the agent’s actions (ie predictability is an epistemic property).
To my mind, the important issue is not so much “what is my definition of free will”, but more importantly “is my concept of free will compatible with either a deterministic or an indeterministic model of the universe?” (because there is no third way). If one’s chosen definition of “free will” is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism then (with all due respect) one’s concept of free will is fundamentally flawed.
with respect
MF

 

[TheStatutoryApe]

“Approximately the same” is not synonymous with “exactly the same”. The SIS is deterministic, thus no matter how small the difference in value the SIS can (in principle) still discriminate.
-------------------------
Again, “more or less equal” is not the same as “equal”.

This is an important point in decision making though. Nothing in the real world, which humans whom supposedly possesses freewill make decisions based off of, is perfectly quantifiable. This is why I say "approximately" and "more or less" because nothing will be "exactly" or "perfectly" equal. So you might say then that which ever has the "higher value" in such a case would receive the priority. If an outcome though is analyzed properly it will be analyzed in multiple fashions and in consideration to multiple attributes. In this way each outcome will have multiple values. Outcome 'E' could have a strong value under element 'x' but a weak value under element 'y' while outcome 'D' has a strong 'y' and weak 'x'. Then the value of each element to the outcome must be decided based on contexts and differing contexts could yield differing values for the elements. The value of the context must be determined. Evaluating a decision like this could easily go on for quite some time. The process has to finish at some point if it is to be useful. So either you have to set particular deterministic rules that will make the process choose one over the other or set in a "flip of the coin" function to make the decision randomly. Which would best parallel a human's decision making though? And if the final decision is based on the "flip of a coin" function is it then a deterministic or non-deterministic process(assuming that the coin flip is truly random)?

Is there something “between determinate and indeterminate”? What might that be?
Take any given process, it is either determinisitic or it is not. If it is not deterministic then by definition it is indeterministic. Logically (it seems) there is no “third way”.
Can you can explain what the properties of this third way might be?

Sorry. This is the product of my preferance to stray from binary thinking. I don't like to consider things to be only one way or another because in my experience things never seem to turn out simply one way or another. Perhaps some things are deterministic while others aren't or perhaps everything really is deterministic but due to a lack of ability to measure and quantify certain elements of reality they are non-deterministic in a pragmatic sense.

 

[moving finger]

If an outcome though is analyzed properly it will be analyzed in multiple fashions and in consideration to multiple attributes. In this way each outcome will have multiple values. Outcome 'E' could have a strong value under element 'x' but a weak value under element 'y' while outcome 'D' has a strong 'y' and weak 'x'. Then the value of each element to the outcome must be decided based on contexts and differing contexts could yield differing values for the elements. The value of the context must be determined. Evaluating a decision like this could easily go on for quite some time. The process has to finish at some point if it is to be useful. So either you have to set particular deterministic rules that will make the process choose one over the other or set in a "flip of the coin" function to make the decision randomly.

Agreed. The decision-making in the Darwinian model is carried out by the SIS, which is purely deterministic. No matter how complex the decision-making algorithm, no matter how many variables or how many “multiple fashions” or “multiple attributes” are involved, the SIS will carry out this process relentlessly deterministically, such that re-running it with the same input, no matter how complex the decision-making algorithm, will always produce the same output (that is the definition of deterministic). That output may indeed include an “equal ranking” of some possible options, but this does not detract from the argument or change the conclusion that “there is nothing involved in the decision-making which could reasonably be called free will”.

Which would best parallel a human's decision making though? And if the final decision is based on the "flip of a coin" function is it then a deterministic or non-deterministic process(assuming that the coin flip is truly random)?

The SIS is purely deterministic, hence (if it is able to identify an option with a maximum value) it will always behave deterministically, there is clearly no free will here.
If you are however suggesting that another “stage” be added to the model, subsequent to the SIS, which involves a truly indeterministic choice between two equivalent choices by the SIS (in the case where for example the SIS decides that choices E and D have equal value), then this would be the equivalent of the “flip of a quantum coin”, and would result in an indeterministic outcome. But are you suggesting this indeterministic coin-flip is the source of free will?

Is there something “between determinate and indeterminate”? What might that be?
Take any given process, it is either determinisitic or it is not. If it is not deterministic then by definition it is indeterministic. Logically (it seems) there is no “third way”.
Can you can explain what the properties of this third way might be?

Sorry. This is the product of my preferance to stray from binary thinking. I don't like to consider things to be only one way or another because in my experience things never seem to turn out simply one way or another.

I am not saying the world is black and white in the sense “everything is deterministic” or “everything is indeterministic”. What I am saying is that each “thing”, each component of our universe, must be either deterministic or indeterministic.
Are you suggesting here that you believe there exist some things/processes which are genuinely neither deterministic nor indeterministic? Can you rationalise and defend this, or is it just (with the utmost respect) hand-waving?
MF

 

[Tournesol]

Firstly we need to ask whether or not we have eliminated the capriciousness. If the RIG generates too FEW alternate ideas as input to the SIS, then the system will still appear to behave capriciously (the SIS will have insufficient choices for rational action because of the limited number of ideas generated by the RIG, hence overall behaviour will be dictated by the RIG). Therefore the RIG needs to generate a reasonable number of alternate ideas for each decision

.

Ye-e-es If you fiddle with the parameters it will stop working.A kidney or heart will stop working under
the wrong circumstances too. The point is
that there is at least one way in which it could work.

Imagine that we have a deterministic computer-based decision making machine (this should not be difficult, our present-day lives are surrounded by such machines, I am typing on one now).
We now add to this machine a “random idea generator” which generates random ideas based on a truly indeterministic process (possibly powered by some quantum-based device). The RIG generates alternate ideas for action, inputs these ideas to the computer, and the computer then decides which of these ideas to turn into action. The computer in this case is performing the role of the SIS.
Now, IF it is true that the Accidental model endows “free will”, THEN it also follows that the machine we have just created has “free will”.

Would you agree that this simple machine has “free will”?

If not, why not?

"Why not" has to have something to do with the definition of FW being
employed. If it is the ability to make unpredictable choices, then yes it
does. If it is that ability combined with certain levels of consciousness
and rationality, then no, it doesn't. If you think artificial intelligence is
possible, then yo need to explain why FW would not be included along with
other human faculties. If you think AI is impossible you need to explain
why -- are people equipped with non-physical souls ?

If we now ask it “but in fact there is rationally an even better course of action, which is E. Why did you not choose E as a course of action” it will probably respond “ummmmm, oh well, I just never considered E as a possibility!”

The question I have at this point is : Is this what we consider to be free will? To be able to choose a non-optimum solution simply because such a choice is non-deterministic (which is what the Accidental model boils down to)?

It is also the ability to generate better, more optimal solutions in the first
place. You speak as though your solutions A..E are hardwired givens. But they
have
to come from somewhere. If not from some kind of trial-and-error (even over
evolutionary time), then where ? A faculty that could generate
the optimal solution in any given situation would indeed be more worth
having than FW as I describe it, but I do not see how such a faculty could
exist naturalistically -- it would be a kind of omniscience. The first time
someone's RIG ever comes up with a particular idea is IMO the creative process itself.
It is true that everybody before that was behaving sub-optimally in relation
to it. But your
only alternative would be to be born as gods, knowing everything.

 

[Tournesol]

Agreed. The decision-making in the Darwinian model is carried out by the SIS, which is purely deterministic.

It think I used the pharse "more or less deterministic". A SIS which
operated on a fixed set of rules would not be much good, as there
would be no capacity to learn form experience. OF course learning
ability need not be partiuclarly indeterminstic.

 

[moving finger]

It think I used the pharse "more or less deterministic".

"more or less deterministic"?

That sounds like a good escape route

We are left with the same puzzle. If the SIS is not entirely deterministic, then in what sense can the inclusion of indeterminism in the SIS "endow free will"?

It's like trying to grab hold of a slippery snake, which has lots of escape routes to evade capture

A SIS which operated on a fixed set of rules would not be much good, as there would be no capacity to learn form experience.

I disagree. I can see how a completely deterministic machine could learn from experience. I don’t see what “learning” has to do with indeterminism.

OF course learning ability need not be partiuclarly indeterminstic.

Exactly right. In fact, why need learning ability be indeterministic at all? If I am going to learn from experience I am sure that I would want that learning to be rational (deterministic) and not random (indeterministic).

MF

 

[moving finger]

Firstly we need to ask whether or not we have eliminated the capriciousness. If the RIG generates too FEW alternate ideas as input to the SIS, then the system will still appear to behave capriciously (the SIS will have insufficient choices for rational action because of the limited number of ideas generated by the RIG, hence overall behaviour will be dictated by the RIG). Therefore the RIG needs to generate a reasonable number of alternate ideas for each decision

Ye-e-es If you fiddle with the parameters it will stop working.A kidney or heart will stop working under the wrong circumstances too.

Sorry, I’m not sure what is being objected to here. I am not suggesting “fiddling with the parameters”, I am just looking to see what properties the RIG must have in order for it to be effective. One property is that, in order to be effective, it must offer up less than 100% of all possible actions (otherwise the entire model becomes deterministic), but at the same time must offer up a reasonable percentage of all possible actions (otherwise the entire model becomes capricious).

The point is that there is at least one way in which it could work.

Surely whether it “works” or not is demonstrated by whether it endows something that could be called free will? Which I respectfully suggest has not yet been shown.

Imagine that we have a deterministic computer-based decision making machine (this should not be difficult, our present-day lives are surrounded by such machines, I am typing on one now).
We now add to this machine a “random idea generator” which generates random ideas based on a truly indeterministic process (possibly powered by some quantum-based device). The RIG generates alternate ideas for action, inputs these ideas to the computer, and the computer then decides which of these ideas to turn into action. The computer in this case is performing the role of the SIS.
Now, IF it is true that the Accidental model endows “free will”, THEN it also follows that the machine we have just created has “free will”.
Would you agree that this simple machine has “free will”?
If not, why not?

"Why not" has to have something to do with the definition of FW being employed. If it is the ability to make unpredictable choices, then yes it does.

Is this what you mean by free will? Simply the ability to make unpredictable choices? Surely not. Any random number generator can do that.

If it is that ability combined with certain levels of consciousness and rationality, then no, it doesn't.

What would the inclusion of consciousness and rationality add to the model (in terms of endowing free will)? Surely nothing could be more rational than the SIS, which is already included?

If you think artificial intelligence is possible, then you need to explain why FW would not be included along with other human faculties.

Implicit in this is the assumption that free will (however we define it) exists. The assumption may be wrong.

If you think AI is impossible you need to explain why -- are people equipped with non-physical souls ?

Sorry, I do not understand the question. I need “to explain why….. what”? “Why are people equipped with non-physical souls?” I am not suggesting they are.

If we now ask it “but in fact there is rationally an even better course of action, which is E. Why did you not choose E as a course of action” it will probably respond “ummmmm, oh well, I just never considered E as a possibility!”
The question I have at this point is : Is this what we consider to be free will? To be able to choose a non-optimum solution simply because such a choice is non-deterministic (which is what the Accidental model boils down to)?

It is also the ability to generate better, more optimal solutions in the first place. You speak as though your solutions A..E are hardwired givens. But they have to come from somewhere. If not from some kind of trial-and-error (even over evolutionary time), then where ? A faculty that could generate the optimal solution in any given situation would indeed be more worth having than FW as I describe it, but I do not see how such a faculty could exist naturalistically -- it would be a kind of omniscience. The first time someone's RIG ever comes up with a particular idea is IMO the creative process itself.

You have a very valid point here, and it may indeed be the case that there is something akin to the RIG in the human brain (I never suggested this could not be the case). The RIG would then serve the purpose of generating random ideas which we can analyse rationally. This may be where “intuition” comes from (or may be an element of intuition).
In order to generate apparently random ideas, must the RIG necessarily be indeterministic in this case? I would suggest that an indeterminable RIG would serve the purpose (of generating apparently random ideas) just as well. A computer random number generator is deterministic yet not determinable (unless one knows the algorithm).
The problem is, I do not see how this alone (whether the RIG is truly indeterministic or just indeterminable) can generate something that we call “free will”. Again I would cite the example of the simple deterministic machine, with a RIG tacked onto the front of it. The machine output may no longer be determinable, but in what sense are you suggesting that it then has free will?
MF

 

[Q_Goest]

Ok MF, I don't know if this will help at all or not, but I'll throw it out there for consideration. Consider it "just a thought".

Regarding free will - is this a feature of consciousness in the sense that a conscious entity experiences a sensation that the future has yet to be determined? Or is free will a mechanism that can be reduced to deterministic and indeterministic processes? The first definition seems more reasonable to me, free will seems to be something we experience. People seem to know what free will is but it's rather difficult to define except in terms of how it feels to have it or experience it. Free will is the experience that we are making choices. It is not the process of making that choice. So to answer the question, "Does free will require indeterminate processes" seems to be the wrong question, I define it as a feature of consciousness. I think it's incorrect to try to define it in terms of determinism and indeterminism. It is not a process, it is an experience of making a choice just as the color red is not a process it is something we experience when we see a particular color.

One could come back and ask then a more pointed question, "Does making a decision require indeterminate processes?" I think this is a bit more to the point of your question. It's still not very good because it still makes some assumptions about what may or may not be happening. The only indeterminate processes we know of are QM processes, and as you've pointed out it may be incorrect to ask the question if these processes are determinate or not. One could suggest non-local hidden variable theorems can explain determinate processes so the universe is determinate. But such a process may (or may not) be beyond our ability even in principal to know. (is that ontic or epistemic? Please explain, I'm not up on all the philosophical terms yet.)

I think the better question to ask is the one I've suggested earlier, and one that helps reduce the question to the possibility that QM processes may be relied upon by the brain in order to give rise to consciousness.

How would you answer the question, "Can macroscopic reductionism give rise to consciousness and can macroscopic reductionism give rise to free will?"

If you say "Yes, macroscopic reductionism is sufficient," then the answer to the question, "Does free will require determinate or indeterminate processes?" the answer is "determinate processes". Would you agree to that? I don't know there are any other good responses. If we assume consciousness is computational or if we assume more broadly that it relies on laws of physics at a macroscopic level then there really doesn't seem to be an alternative response. Can you think of any logical way one could respond, "Yes, macroscopic reductionism is sufficient but it depends on indeterminate processes."? For example, one might suggest the flip of a theoretical "GhostCoin" is indeterminate (whatever that is), and thus can get us away from having to concede that consciousness is dependant on determinate processes. But I think once we get above the level of quantum uncertainty, things such as die rolls, coil flips and random number generators in computers are all determinate and I think you'd agree with that.

So if one can prove computationalism is false, if one can create a working theory which includes a test that can be used to prove that a given phenomenon is not reducible to its constituent parts (at a macroscopic level), then what we have proven is that consciousness depends on something other than what I'm referring to here as "macroscopic reductionism". It must depend on quantum mechanics.

That said - please note that this of course assumes no "emergent" phenomena can come out of such a system which arises from a "macroscopic reduction" of the system. If (a BIG if) we assume such emergent properties exist then we need to come up with a theory about those emergent properties which is something that's never been done before nor even seriously considered. Emergent properties are only seriously considered at the QM level as far as I know. So I'll dismiss emergence as a possible way out of the conundrum if macroscopic reductionism is insufficient.

 

[moving finger]

Regarding free will - is this a feature of consciousness in the sense that a conscious entity experiences a sensation that the future has yet to be determined?

Imho I believe so, yes. (Caveat : The “danger” of expressing free will simply in this way is that it then “seems like an illusion” – which with all due respect I think does a dis-service to the concept of free will. I believe free will is alive and kicking, it just needs to be defined very carefully, and it is probably not what most people like to think it is).

Or is free will a mechanism that can be reduced to deterministic and indeterministic processes?

Imho, by definition any given mechanism msut be (overall) either deterministic or indeterministic – if this is not the case, what could the “third way” be?

The first definition seems more reasonable to me, free will seems to be something we experience.

Agreed (with the caveat given above)

People seem to know what free will is but it's rather difficult to define except in terms of how it feels to have it or experience it. Free will is the experience that we are making choices. It is not the process of making that choice. So to answer the question, "Does free will require indeterminate processes" seems to be the wrong question, I define it as a feature of consciousness. I think it's incorrect to try to define it in terms of determinism and indeterminism. It is not a process, it is an experience of making a choice just as the color red is not a process it is something we experience when we see a particular color.

This is good. I like it. But I wonder if this definition of free will (that free will is just a feeling, like the sensation of seeing the colour red) would be acceptable to those who profess to “believe in” the everyday concept of free will? It would be interesting to know Tournesol’s opinion on this?

One could come back and ask then a more pointed question, "Does making a decision require indeterminate processes?" I think this is a bit more to the point of your question.

This is not the question I was trying to address, but let’s go with this for the time being.

It's still not very good because it still makes some assumptions about what may or may not be happening. The only indeterminate processes we know of are QM processes, and as you've pointed out it may be incorrect to ask the question if these processes are determinate or not. One could suggest non-local hidden variable theorems can explain determinate processes so the universe is determinate. But such a process may (or may not) be beyond our ability even in principal to know. (is that ontic or epistemic? Please explain, I'm not up on all the philosophical terms yet.)

Epistemic is what we “know”. Ontic is what “is”.
The core philosophy of classical physics is based on the premise that we can in principle “know” what “is”. The quantum revolution buried that idea for good (there is a fundamental limit, what I like to call the epistemic horizon, to what we can ever “know” about “reality”).

I think the better question to ask is the one I've suggested earlier, and one that helps reduce the question to the possibility that QM processes may be relied upon by the brain in order to give rise to consciousness.
How would you answer the question, "Can macroscopic reductionism give rise to consciousness and can macroscopic reductionism give rise to free will?"

Do you mean "Can (macroscopic) reductionism explain consciousness”?
Before I can attempt to answer that question, I would first have to ask “what exactly is it that we are trying to explain?”. We could explore this, but it may take us a long way off-topic – perhaps we should start another thread for this question?
On the second question “can (macroscopic) reductionism explain free will?", I would first have to ask “what do you mean by free will?” The definition of free will I have offered above (see post #5 of this thread) is :
Free will (definition) : Free will is the ability of an agent to behave rationally yet not necessarily predictably, where the source of the agent’s unpredictability is largely based on the complexity of the agent’s deterministic decision-making processes, and is not solely down to any indeterministic processes.
In this definition I use the term “predictable” in the sense of an observer being able to predict the agent’s actions (ie predictability is an epistemic property).

I believe that free will as I have defined above is completely understandable in terms of reductionist principles.

If you say "Yes, macroscopic reductionism is sufficient," then the answer to the question, "Does free will require determinate or indeterminate processes?" the answer is "determinate processes". Would you agree to that?

No. I don’t see that reductionism is necessarily linked to determinism (in the sense that “deterministic processes” implies “reductionism”). This would imply that reductionsim is incompatible with indetermnism, and I don’t see why that should be the case?
Reductionism has nothing necessarily to do with determinism.

I don't know there are any other good responses. If we assume consciousness is computational or if we assume more broadly that it relies on laws of physics at a macroscopic level then there really doesn't seem to be an alternative response. Can you think of any logical way one could respond, "Yes, macroscopic reductionism is sufficient but it depends on indeterminate processes."?

But then, with respect, I personally do not believe that the introduction of indeterminism helps us to explain anything, so there is no point asking me whether there is any meaning to the statement “macroscopic reductionism is sufficient but it depends on indeterminate processes”.

For example, one might suggest the flip of a theoretical "GhostCoin" is indeterminate (whatever that is), and thus can get us away from having to concede that consciousness is dependant on determinate processes. But I think once we get above the level of quantum uncertainty, things such as die rolls, coil flips and random number generators in computers are all determinate and I think you'd agree with that.

Yes. I see no “benefit” that any kind of ontic indeterminism endows on the world – it does not explain concepts like free will or consciousness.

So if one can prove computationalism is false, if one can create a working theory which includes a test that can be used to prove that a given phenomenon is not reducible to its constituent parts (at a macroscopic level), then what we have proven is that consciousness depends on something other than what I'm referring to here as "macroscopic reductionism". It must depend on quantum mechanics.

OK. Can you provide an example of a phenomenon that is not reducible to its constituent parts?

MF

 

[Q_Goest]

How do you know if something is reducible to its parts without a theory of how to do that? How do you reduce something to its parts and then determine if a phenomenon can exist or not? Is there a theory and a test of some sort one can utilize that can logically and mathematically reduce a given mechnism to its constituent parts, and then provide a test with which you can determine if the phenomenon is still possible or not?

With this theory and test in hand we can go around and reduce phenomena and test all sorts of things! Unity and the binding problem would be the first target.

 

[Tournesol]

but the logic of my argument would still be essentially the same as before. If the SIS is then constrained to always pick “one” option, then in the case of E=D it would presumably just not be able to complete it’s task (unless we also provide a random selector stage after the SIS to cater for this possibility – but this would only make the final choice random and would not endow anything that could be called free will).

You have defined FW as the ability to make rational choices that are
unpredictable. If D and E are both rational, and you choose randomly between
them (the Buridan mechanism), that seems to fulfill your criteria.

(However the real problem is that you are assuming that because the SIS is
more-or-less deterministic, it always makes the same choices given the same
inputs -- although deterministic systems can adjust their weightings on the
basis of feedback).

Is there something “between determinate and indeterminate”? What might that be?
Take any given process, it is either determinisitic or it is not. If it is not deterministic then by definition it is indeterministic. Logically (it seems) there is no “third way”

If a process is deterministic, B will follow on A 100% of the time. If it is
not, it will be less than 100%. Less than 100% could be 99.9%; it could be
0.01%. It seems to me that it is mostly middle ground.

Can you can explain what the properties of this third way might be?
My oipinion? I think free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism (but importantly, being compatible with determinism, it does not REQUIRE indeterminism), but I probably don’t define free will the same way as most people who believe in what we might call “genuine free will”. I can offer my definition of free will, which is :
Free will (definition) : Free will is the ability of an agent to behave rationally yet not necessarily predictably, where the source of the agent’s unpredictability is largely based on the complexity of the agent’s deterministic decision-making processes, and is not solely down to any indeterministic processes.
In this definition I use the term “predictable” in the sense of an observer being able to predict the agent’s actions (ie predictability is an epistemic property)

Meaning that you can no longer say "Fred has FW" but rather "Fred has FW as
judged by John, but not as judged by Mary, who has access to a supercomputer
loaded with information about human psychology".

To my mind, the important issue is not so much “what is my definition of free will”, but more importantly “is my concept of free will compatible with either a deterministic or an indeterministic model of the universe?” (because there is no third way). If one’s chosen definition of “free will” is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism then (with all due respect) one’s concept of free will is fundamentally flawed.

If one has good reaon to suppose that FW exists in the first place. Some
people claim that there is good reason to define FW in a way that is
incompatible with both determism and indeterminism, and conclude
that FW does not exist.

 

[Q_Goest]

MF said: No. I don’t see that reductionism is necessarily linked to determinism (in the sense that “deterministic processes” implies “reductionism”). This would imply that reductionsim is incompatible with indetermnism, and I don’t see why that should be the case?

Yes, I don't think I've made the point very clear. The point is not that indeterminism is incompatible with reductionism. I accept your argument that one might in theory be able to reduce any mechanism to its constituent parts and those parts may be indeterminate, and reductionism can include both determinate and indeterminate processes.

The point is that we all seem to recognize such things as the roll of a die or the toss of a coin are determinate, and we intuitively understand this because such objects are relatively large and not affected by quantum uncertainty. The question regarding free will depends on what assumptions we make about consciousness. If we assume consciousness can be created by macroscopic things like switches then free will depends only on determinate mechanisms. If we assume consciousness depends on quantum mechanical things, then free ill may (or may not) depend on mechanisms that are indeterminate. So the question, is free will endowed by interdeterminate mechanisms has everything to do with our assumptions about what physical processes are needed for consciousness.

I realize this isn't an answer to your question nor is it likely to feel like a good answer to you because it doesn't address your desire to understand what possible processes are used by a conscious entity to endow free will. But if we assume free will is a feature of consciousness, a feeling or experience, then the assumptions we make as to how consciousness can come about (ie: computationalism versus some QM mechanisms) directly affects our conclusions regarding free will.

 

[Tournesol]

= If we assume consciousness can be created by macroscopic things like switches then free will depends only on determinate mechanisms.

Not all macroscopic systems are deterministic.

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html#amplification

 

[Q_Goest]

Tournsel, yes I can accept the point that perhaps chaotic behavior can in fact be due to 'quantum indeterminism' if we look hard enough (is that your point?)

However, computer switches (or "symbol manipulation") are completely determinate processes. There is unfortunately no room there for indeterminate behavior by a computer except perhaps for us to suggest:
1. QM results in the computer "breaking" (ex: stress fractures within the chip might be at least be due to bonding energy and when the bond breaks and results in catastrophic failure might be very very slightly affected by indeterminate QM processes.).
2. A computer switch governed by radioactive decay.
3. etc... (processes that break the machine or otherwise are not simply computational) (Double yuck!) lol

But a computer that hasn't failed nor is it connected to some other QM mechanism is completely deterministic.

 

[moving finger]

Not all macroscopic systems are deterministic.
http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html#amplification

with respect, this does not show that any system is necessarily ontically indeterministic

May your God go with you

MF

 

[moving finger]

The question regarding free will depends on what assumptions we make about consciousness. If we assume consciousness can be created by macroscopic things like switches then free will depends only on determinate mechanisms. If we assume consciousness depends on quantum mechanical things, then free ill may (or may not) depend on mechanisms that are indeterminate.

With respect, there is no conclusive evidence that QM is necessarily ontically indeterministic. The results of QM can be explained in terms of deterministic non-local hidden variables.

So the question, is free will endowed by interdeterminate mechanisms has everything to do with our assumptions about what physical processes are needed for consciousness.

Perhaps.

I realize this isn't an answer to your question nor is it likely to feel like a good answer to you because it doesn't address your desire to understand what possible processes are used by a conscious entity to endow free will. But if we assume free will is a feature of consciousness, a feeling or experience, then the assumptions we make as to how consciousness can come about (ie: computationalism versus some QM mechanisms) directly affects our conclusions regarding free will.

Not necessarily. Even though free will may be a feature of consciousness, it may not necessarily depend very much on how consciousness comes about.
MF

 

[Q_Goest]

With respect, there is no conclusive evidence that QM is necessarily ontically indeterministic. The results of QM can be explained in terms of deterministic non-local hidden variables.

Yes, <with respect> you may pound that home with every keystroke, but it does nothing to change the conclusion that:
1) If we assume consciousness can be created by macroscopic things like switches then free will depends only on determinate mechanisms.
2) If we assume consciousness depends on quantum mechanical things, then free ill may (or may not) depend on mechanisms that are indeterminate.

CONCLUSION: The most important point here is if one assumes that consciousness can be created by "symbol manipulation" (computationalism) then one also assumes free will is NOT endowed by indeterminate processes.

Even though free will may be a feature of consciousness, it may not necessarily depend very much on how consciousness comes about.

I don't really understand that conclusion. If free will is a feature of consciousness then if consciousness depends on indeterminate mechanisms, then free will also depends on them since free will depends on consciousness. Conversely, if consciousness depends only on determinate processes, then free will may be "endowed" by only determinate processes. It all depends on your initial assumptions.

Note also one of the assumptions here is that free will is part of consciousness only which means it does not exist independant of consciousness. This is an assumption one could dispute in order to change the conclusion above.

Also, you asked:

Can you provide an example of a phenomenon that is not reducible to its constituent parts?

I'll toss this one back and ask: Is there any theory which can be used to "reduce" a mechanism to its constituent parts in order to determine if a phenomenon is capable of emerging or not? Perhaps that question is better addressed in a separate thread. Thoughts?

 

[moving finger]

1) If we assume consciousness can be created by macroscopic things like switches then free will depends only on determinate mechanisms.
2) If we assume consciousness depends on quantum mechanical things, then free ill may (or may not) depend on mechanisms that are indeterminate.
CONCLUSION: The most important point here is if one assumes that consciousness can be created by "symbol manipulation" (computationalism) then one also assumes free will is NOT endowed by indeterminate processes.

The full argument would seem to run thus :
1 : Premise : consciousness is necessary for free will
2 : Premise : consciousness is based only on deterministic processes
3 : Therefore (1,2) free will is based only on deterministic processes
Both premises could be challenged, and I’m not sure about the logic of step 3.

Even though free will may be a feature of consciousness, it may not necessarily depend very much on how consciousness comes about.

I don't really understand that conclusion. If free will is a feature of consciousness then if consciousness depends on indeterminate mechanisms, then free will also depends on them since free will depends on consciousness.

Your argument would seem to run thus :
1 : Premise : Consciousness contains one or more indeterministic processes
2 : Premise : Free will is a feature of consciousness
3 : Therefore (1,2) free will contains one or more indeterministic processes
I don’t see that (3) necessarily follows from the premises.

Can you provide an example of a phenomenon that is not reducible to its constituent parts?

I'll toss this one back and ask: Is there any theory which can be used to "reduce" a mechanism to its constituent parts in order to determine if a phenomenon is capable of emerging or not?

I guessed not
MF

 

[Q_Goest]

Hey MF <wave>, it seems I can't get this across very well - perhaps it’s the lake that separates. <no, must be blunt, must not talk riddles> Maybe it would help to realize I'm not choosing sides, just pointing out which believes what.

There are 2 possibilities, let's look at one at a time. Here's the first possibility:
1) If we assume consciousness can be created by macroscopic things like switches then free will depends only on determinate mechanisms.
CONCLUSION: Free will is NOT endowed by indeterminate processes.

Here's the second possibility:
2) If we assume consciousness depends on quantum mechanical interactions, then free ill may (or may not) depend on mechanisms that are indeterminate. (Personally, I find this less important, not because indeterminism is a possible mechanism for free will, but because . . . <oh - it'snotimportant> )
CONCLUSION: Since free will depends on consciousness, and consciousness could depend on quantum mechanical indeterminite mechanisms, then free will could also depend on indeterminate mechanisms. Note that the only reason "could" is used in this sentence is because you will invariably suggest that non-local hidden variable theories could exist that are determinate, making this statement false, and reducing this second possibility to the first. I don't like going along with that, but that is your view so I thought I'd use your own views to show what is possible.

Those are the only two possibilities I see today.

Regarding the last question, I believe you're correct. Hopefully that will change very soon, but I need to find a publisher.

 

[moving finger]

There are 2 possibilities, let's look at one at a time. Here's the first possibility:
1) If we assume consciousness can be created by macroscopic things like switches then free will depends only on determinate mechanisms.

I disagree.
I am not deliberately trying to be obstructive, I am simply looking at the issue (imho) rationally.
The following is pure speculation (I am not saying I believe this is what really happens in our world, but it seems rational and possible to me). I can envisage a possible world which includes one or more indeterministic processes, yet consciousness could still be a purely deterministic process in this possible world. Now if free will emerges from consciousness then (it seems to me) it is possible that this free will could incorporate indeterminism, even though the “substrate” (for want of a better word) of consciousness is purely deterministic.
Your argument may be correct if we assume that free will is a necessary part of consciousness, such that free will is always included “within” consciousness. If this is the case, then I guess your argument would run as follows :
1 : Premise : consciousness is deterministic
2 : Premise : free will is necessarily a part of cosnciousness
3 : Each part of consciousness is deterministic (1)
4 : Free will is deterministic (2,3)

Here's the second possibility:
2) If we assume consciousness depends on quantum mechanical interactions, then free ill may (or may not) depend on mechanisms that are indeterminate. (Personally, I find this less important, not because indeterminism is a possible mechanism for free will, but because . . . <oh - it'snotimportant> )
CONCLUSION: Since free will depends on consciousness, and consciousness could depend on quantum mechanical indeterminite mechanisms, then free will could also depend on indeterminate mechanisms. Note that the only reason "could" is used in this sentence is because you will invariably suggest that non-local hidden variable theories could exist that are determinate, making this statement false, and reducing this second possibility to the first. I don't like going along with that, but that is your view so I thought I'd use your own views to show what is possible.

I’m not sure that this argument tells us anything useful, except that “no matter what comprises consciousness, free will may or may not incorporate indeterminism”, which doesn’t seem like a step forward?
What I am really interested in is the question “is ontic indeterminacy a necessary pre-requisite for free will?”, which so far it seems we are nowhere near to answering.
May your God go with you
MF
(ps good luck with finding a publisher )

 

[vanesch]

Even though free will may be a feature of consciousness, it may not necessarily depend very much on how consciousness comes about.
MF

Can one not also take the stance that free will is an illusion, and that consciousness only passively *observes* a physical phenomenon in a body (whether or not this is deterministic or stochastic), which gives that consciousness the *impression* that he took a "free will decision" but that it was the elementary processes in the body which just led it to act that way, whether or not that action was consciously experienced ?
I always take my silly example of the "conscious rock" which "feels pain" when its crystals break, for instance. It doesn't decide on anything although, when heated it might take the "free will decision" to expand a bit and experiences that as "mind over matter" and hey, I expand when I want to :-), just because it consciously experiences the "urge to take that decision", which was in fact deterministically determined by the laws of physics: crystals expand when they are heated.

It might be that certain physical configurations lead to this "conscious observing" or not, but there is no behavioural way to find this out, ever.

 

[moving finger]

Can one not also take the stance that free will is an illusion, and that consciousness only passively *observes* a physical phenomenon in a body (whether or not this is deterministic or stochastic), which gives that consciousness the *impression* that he took a "free will decision" but that it was the elementary processes in the body which just led it to act that way, whether or not that action was consciously experienced ?

Yes, and this is exactly how I believe consciousness operates in resepct of "free will". What you have described fits with (is consistent with) my preferred definition of free will which goes :

Free will (definition) : Free will is the ability of an agent to behave rationally yet not necessarily predictably, where the source of the agent’s unpredictability is largely based on the complexity of the agent’s deterministic decision-making processes, and is not solely down to any ontically indeterministic processes.

In this definition I use the term “predictable” in the sense of an observer being able to predict the agent’s actions (ie predictability is an epistemic property).

If we take this definition of free will, and the agent’s decision making process is just as unpredictable to the agent as it is to the outside world, then it will appear to the agent’s consciousness that it is acting freely.
The definition is also consistent with ontic indeterminism, but ontic indeterminism is not necessary for this type of free will to exist.
I believe that free will defined in this way can explain everything that we know and experience in respect of free will.

What this definition does NOT show is that “we could have done differently to what we actually did (given identical circumstances)”.

Some might say that it is a necessary pre-requisite of free will that “we could have done differently to what we actually did”. My response would be “sorry, there is no evidence that this kind of free will exists. If you think that you could have done differently than what you actually did (given identical circumstances) then you are deluding yourself”.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

with respect, this does not show that any system is necessarily ontically indeterministic
May your God go with you
MF

So what ? Systems can be actually indeterministic withiout being
necessarily deterministic. The question is where the balance of evidence
lies, not absolute necessity.

 

[Tournesol]

Can one not also take the stance that free will is an illusion, and that consciousness only passively *observes* a physical phenomenon in a body (whether or not this is deterministic or stochastic), which gives that consciousness the *impression* that he took a "free will decision" but that it was the elementary processes in the body which just led it to act that way, whether or not that action was consciously experienced ?

One can take the stance that we have such an illusion of FW.
One cannot take the stance that such an illusion just is FW,
any more than thinkign you are Napoleon means youactually are Napoleon.

In any case, you would need to explain why that account is preferable to others.

 

[Tournesol]

I believe that free will defined in this way can explain everything that we know and experience in respect of free will.

No, it leaves at least one thing out...

What this definition does NOT show is that “we could have done differently to what we actually did (given identical circumstances)”.

Some might say that it is a necessary pre-requisite of free will that “we could have done differently to what we actually did”. My response would be “sorry, there is no evidence that this kind of free will exists. If you think that you could have done differently than what you actually did (given identical circumstances) then you are deluding yourself”.

You are confusing two diffeent issues together
here:
a)whether could-have-done-otherwise is
part of our concept of free will, and

b) whether
there is real evidence for it.

We can see that a) is the case simply by noting that there has
been centuries of dispute between the claims of FW and determinism;
if CHDO had never been part of our concept of FW, that would
not have been the case. You may have removed it from your
definition, but all that shows is that you are using an idiosyncratic definition.

As to b), the only evidence against CHDO is evidence for
strict ontic determinism -- which, you say, is lacking, along with evidence
for indeterminism. But if (in)determinism is an open question, so is CHDO.

To say "there is no evidence for indeterminism, therefore determinism is
true, and CHDO is false" is a dubious manouvre -- you are dodging the issue
of whether there is support for determinism.

 

[moving finger]

The question is where the balance of evidence
lies, not absolute necessity.

if you are saying "the evidence shows that the world may be indeterministic, but the evidence is not conclusive enough to allow us to conclude that it is necessarily indeterministic", then I agree with you

MF

 

[moving finger]

I believe that free will defined in this way can explain everything that we know and experience in respect of free will.

No, it leaves at least one thing out...

What this definition does NOT show is that “we could have done differently to what we actually did (given identical circumstances)”.

The important question is : Is the concept “we could have done differently to what we actually did (given identical circumstances)” something that we genuinely “know and experience in respepct of free will”, or is it simply an assumption?

You are confusing two diffeent issues together here:
a)whether could-have-done-otherwise is part of our concept of free will, and
b) whether there is real evidence for it.

(Hereafter “could have done otherwise” is abbreviated to CHDO)
Statement (a) containing “our concept of free will” is a subjective statement. Tournesol’s “concept of free will” may be different to moving finger’s “concept of free will”.
I have provided my definition of free will, which I claim encapsulates everything that we genuinely experience when we say that we have free will.
I would argue that “CHDO” is not something that we “genuinely experience”, rather it is a belief that (some of us) hold (which belief may or may not be true).

We can see that a) is the case simply by noting that there has been centuries of dispute between the claims of FW and determinism; if CHDO had never been part of our concept of FW, that would not have been the case.

CHDO has never been part of moving finger’s concept of free will, and I would guess that it is also not part of many others’ concept of free will. I am not sure whom you refer to when you say that “CHDO is part of our concept of free will”, and regardless of how many “votes” you have in support of your view, “argumentum ad numerum” (arguing on the basis that more people support your particular proposition) is logically fallacious. To establish the soundness of the CHDO concept, it needs to be SHOWN that the hypothesis "CHDO is a necessary element of free will" is a logically sound hypothesis, and not “dictated by popular vote”.

You may have removed it from your definition, but all that shows is that you are using an idiosyncratic definition.

CHDO has not been “removed from my definition”. It never has been part of my definition, because I see no logical basis to support CHDO.
To suggest that a particular definition is simply “idiosyncratic” is merely an unsubstantiated matter of opinion. Even if it could be shown that the “majority of people believe that CHDO is a necessary element of free will” this would prove nothing – this is equivalent to an “argumentum ad populum” (arguing by appealing to the people) and/or “argumentum ad numerum” (arguing on the basis that more people support your particular proposition) – both of which are logically fallacious arguments. Logical truth is not determined by democratic vote.

As to b), the only evidence against CHDO is evidence for strict ontic determinism -- which, you say, is lacking, along with evidence for indeterminism. But if (in)determinism is an open question, so is CHDO.

The real problem with the concept of CHDO, which disqualifies it as a scientific hypothesis, is explained in the following :

The Reason Why “CHDO is a necessary element of free will” Is An Unsupportable Hypothesis
1) CHDO is supposed to be a necessary element of free will.
2) It follows from (1) that any agent without CHDO does not possesses free will. CHDO thus “endows” the ability to act freely on an otherwise “unfree” agent.
3) CHDO is incompatible with strict determinism. I expect that you will agree with this.
4) Therefore IF CHDO does exist, it must be based on indeterminsim.
5) The fundamental problem is that nobody can come up with any workable hypothesis (including a coherent model) which shows just how indeterminism is supposed to endow free will on an otherwise “unfree” agent. In other words, there is no workable hypothesis which shows how CHDO “works in respect of endowing free will”.
(By “show how CHDO works” I do not mean simply show how indeterminism allows different possible futures, I mean show how this indeterminism can be translated into anything that we could recognise as "free will in action". In other words, CHDO as the basis of free will is an empty concept with no real explanatory power).

Why should we logically reject CHDO as being necessary for free will?
It is incorrect to reject CHDO on the grounds of personal preference.
It is incorrect to reject CHDO on the grounds of popular vote.
It is incorrect to reject CHDO on the grounds of being falsified experimentally.
It is possible to reject CHDO on the basis of Occam’s razor (though this is not done here).
It is correct to reject "CHDO as being necessary for free will" on the basis (as explained above) that it cannot provide a coherent and workable hypothesis which has any explanatory power in respect of free will.

To say "there is no evidence for indeterminism, therefore determinism is true, and CHDO is false" is a dubious manouvre

This statement assumes incorrectly the reasons for rejection of “CHDO as the basis for free will”, hence is irrelevant.

May your God go with you

MF

 

[Tournesol]

I believe that free will defined in this way can explain everything that we know and experience in respect of free will.

No, it leaves at least one thing out...

What this definition does NOT show is that “we could have done differently to what we actually did (given identical circumstances)”.

No, of course not. No definition shows the actual existence of anything. If we
are unable to discover unicorns, the conlusion is tha unicorns, as defined
do not exist; we do not react by changing the definition. Likewise, if we make
the empirical discovery that there is no CHDO, the conclusion is that Fw does
not exist (as determinists indeed claim), not that it needs to be re-defined.

The important question is : Is the concept “we could have done differently to what we actually did (given identical circumstances)” something that we genuinely “know and experience in respepct of free will”, or is it simply an assumption?

It's part of the definition of FW. Defining a word in a partiuclar way assumes
nothing about what is or is not true.

You are confusing two diffeent issues together here:
a)whether could-have-done-otherwise is part of our concept of free will, and
b) whether there is real evidence for it.

(Hereafter “could have done otherwise” is abbreviated to CHDO)
Statement (a) containing “our concept of free will” is a subjective statement. Tournesol’s “concept of free will” may be different to moving finger’s “concept of free will”.

You find out what the conventional defintion of a word is by reference to
dictionaries etc. I have argued that the traditional definition must include
CHDO, or there would have been no centuries-long debate between libertarians
and determinists.

I have provided my definition of free will, which I claim encapsulates everything that we genuinely experience when we say that we have free will.

Do we experience someone else's inability to predict our actions ?

You obviously half-way agree that CHDO is part of FW , or you would not have
included unpredictability as a substitute. Without that extra element, FW
would just reduce to raionallity, and it is difficuly to see hwo people
could wrangle for 2,000 years about whether rationallity is compatible with
the laws of nature.

I would argue that “CHDO” is not something that we “genuinely experience”, rather it is a belief that (some of us) hold (which belief may or may not be true).

And you repat your usual error here: one can believe that CHDO is part of the
definition of FW without believieng it actually exists; indeed determinists
believe that is is part of the defitition, and that FW doesn't exist
precisely becuase of the incompatibility of CHDO with the nature of
physical law, as they see it.

We can see that a) is the case simply by noting that there has been centuries of dispute between the claims of FW and determinism; if CHDO had never been part of our concept of FW, that would not have been the case.

CHDO has never been part of moving finger’s concept of free will, and I would guess that it is also not part of many others’ concept of free will. I am not sure whom you refer to when you say that “CHDO is part of our concept of free will”,

All the people who have taken sides on the free-will vs determinism debate
over the ages.

and regardless of how many “votes” you have in support of your view, “argumentum ad numerum” (arguing on the basis that more people support your particular proposition) is logically fallacious.

Only if you make your usual mistake of confusing matters of definition with
matters of fact.

Empirical statemens are true or false, and their truth
or falsehood is not given by popular assent.

Defintions are not so much true and false as conventional or unusual. Popular
assent is indeed enough to establish that a definition is conventional;
indeed, it is the only way.

To establish the soundness of the CHDO concept, it needs to be SHOWN that the hypothesis "CHDO is a necessary element of free will" is a logically sound hypothesis, and not “dictated by popular vote”.

That statement is entirely based on your usual mistake.

You may have removed it from your definition, but all that shows is that you are using an idiosyncratic definition.

CHDO has not been “removed from my definition”. It never has been part of my definition, because I see no logical basis to support CHDO.
To suggest that a particular definition is simply “idiosyncratic” is merely an unsubstantiated matter of opinion.

I have substantiated my claim by reference to the existence of a
free-will/determinism debate in philosophy.

Even if it could be shown that the “majority of people believe that CHDO is a necessary element of free will” this would prove nothing – this is equivalent to an “argumentum ad populum” (arguing by appealing to the people) and/or “argumentum ad numerum” (arguing on the basis that more people support your particular proposition) – both of which are logically fallacious arguments. Logical truth is not determined by democratic vote.

No, it does not prove anything as a matter of fact, by itself.

As to b), the only evidence against CHDO is evidence for strict ontic determinism -- which, you say, is lacking, along with evidence for indeterminism. But if (in)determinism is an open question, so is CHDO.

The real problem with the concept of CHDO, which disqualifies it as a scientific hypothesis, is explained in the following :

The Reason Why “CHDO is a necessary element of free will” Is An Unsupportable Hypothesis
1) CHDO is supposed to be a necessary element of free will.

2) It follows from (1) that any agent without CHDO does not possesses free will. CHDO thus “endows” the ability to act freely on an otherwise “unfree” agent.

As a necessary but insufficient criterion. Other things, such as ratioanllity,
are needed to.

3) CHDO is incompatible with strict determinism. I expect that you will agree with this.

Yes.

4) Therefore IF CHDO does exist, it must be based on indeterminsim.

Yes.

5) The fundamental problem is that nobody can come up with any workable hypothesis (including a coherent model) which shows just how indeterminism is supposed to endow free will on an otherwise “unfree” agent. In other words, there is no workable hypothesis which shows how CHDO “works in respect of endowing free will”.

Indeterminism implies that there is more than possible outcome to a given
situation, whether or not that situation involves a rational agent.

The difficult bit is to see how indeterminism fails to undermine rationality
(ie how it fails to result in the situation of an agent possesing CHDO,
but not possessing rationallity, and therefore lacking FW, since rationality
is a necessary criterion of FW).

That hard problem is precisely what "Buridan vs Darwin" addresses.

(By “show how CHDO works” I do not mean simply show how indeterminism allows different possible futures, I mean show how this indeterminism can be translated into anything that we could recognise as "free will in action". In other words, CHDO as the basis of free will is an empty concept with no real explanatory power).

*You* definition of FW requires
1) unpredictability in the eyes of an observer
2) rationallity


1) is given a-fortiori by indeterminism (epistemic unpredictability is a
corollary of ontic indeterminism).

2) is explained by my argument.

What is your actual objection ? Are you saying that I have failed to rescue
rationallity ? Or are you appealing to some further aleged feature of FW?
(ie to a *third* definition ?)

Why should we logically reject CHDO as being necessary for free will?
It is incorrect to reject CHDO on the grounds of personal preference.
It is incorrect to reject CHDO on the grounds of popular vote.
It is incorrect to reject CHDO on the grounds of being falsified experimentally.
It is possible to reject CHDO on the basis of Occam’s razor (though this is not done here).
It is correct to reject "CHDO as being necessary for free will" on the basis (as explained above) that it cannot provide a coherent and workable hypothesis which has any explanatory power in respect of free will.

It is part of the defintion of FW, not something proposed in order to explain
it. (But what underpins CHDO, indeterminism, *would* explain your substitute for CHDO, namely
epistemic unpredictability -- ontic indeterminism explains epistemic unpredictability )

 

[moving finger]

No definition shows the actual existence of anything. If we are unable to discover unicorns, the conlusion is tha unicorns, as defined do not exist; we do not react by changing the definition.

Here you are confusing “definition of CHDO” with “definition of free will”
Your logic would seem to run as follows :
“If we are unable to discover unicorns, the conlusion is that unicorns, as defined
do not exist”
The corollary in the case of CHDO is :
If we are unable to discover CHDO, the conlusion is that CHDO, as defined
does not exist.
The non-existence of CHDO says nothing necessarily about the existence or non-existence of free will.

if we make the empirical discovery that there is no CHDO, the conclusion is that Fw does not exist (as determinists indeed claim), not that it needs to be re-defined.

The correct conclusion in this case is that “TO-FW does not exist” (where by TO-FW we mean “free will as defined by Tournesol”).
Free will in the sense defined by MF (let us call this MF-FW) does not require CHDO, hence showing that CHDO does not exist would have no implications for the existence of MF-FW.

The important question is : Is the concept “we could have done differently to what we actually did (given identical circumstances)” something that we genuinely “know and experience in respepct of free will”, or is it simply an assumption?

It's part of the definition of FW.

Its part of the definition of TO-FW. It is not part of the definition of MF-FW.

I have argued that the traditional definition must include CHDO, or there would have been no centuries-long debate between libertarians and determinists.
And what about compatibilists?

The reasons for the debate are complex, imho it is not simply the case that all sides in the debate agree on the concept of CHDO. A compatabilist for example would not necessarily agree that CHDO exists, but also would not agree that FW does not exist.
The debate on “free will” actually has its origins long before terms like libertarian,
determinist and compatabilist were coined. It has long been thought by some that “we are captains of our own fate” in the sense that we humans can somehow act more or less independently of the physical world. Philosophers have argued for centuries how or whether such a concept can possibly be coherent – witness the ongoing debate on Cartesian dualism. This, and not CHDO, is at the root of free will. The concept of CHDO is simply one small component in this ongoing debate.
My position here is that the hypothesis of CHDO must rest on indeterminism (which you agree with), that (as far as I am aware) nobody has ever shown how indeterminism can endow anything to an agent apart from an element of random behaviour, and free will (if it is anything to do with being “captains of our own fate”) is not endowed by random behaviour. My claim is therefore that the hypothesis of CHDO has no explanatory power in respect of what we think of as free will, and certainly the hypothesis of CHDO does nothing to support the position that “we are captains of our own fate”.
I would be very happy to be shown that I am wrong in this.
Can you show how indeterminism (which we agree must be at the foundation of CHDO) endows anything to an agent which explains how the agent might be “captain of its own fate”?
Does the hypothesis of CHDO make any testable predictions?

Do we experience someone else's inability to predict our actions ?

Yes. I can test by experiment the predictions of the hypothesis “Tournesol is unable to consistently predict my actions”– and show that it is indeed true.

You obviously half-way agree that CHDO is part of FW , or you would not have included unpredictability as a substitute.

Actually the reverse is true. Unpredictability is an epistemic property. The world could be 100% deterministic, an ontic property, (and if it is I think you agree this would rule out CHDO), and yet it still would be unpredictable.

Without that extra element, FW would just reduce to raionallity, and it is difficuly to see hwo people could wrangle for 2,000 years about whether rationallity is compatible with the laws of nature.

With respect, FW is not “just about rationality”, FW is about the question “how can we be captains of our own fate?” and thus (in many ways) it is about complexity, chaos, game theory, evolution, survival of the fittest, consciousness – concepts that we are only just beginning to understand.
Fundamentally, imho the free will question is “how can we define and model free will such that both the definition and model explain how we can be captains of our own fate?”, and how can this model and definition of free will at the same time be coherent, consistent, explanatory, and fit with what we actually observe?
It is not obvious to me that CHDO is an essential or even useful part of either this model or definition.

Empirical statemens are true or false, and their truth or falsehood is not given by popular assent.

The truth of any statement depends on the definitions of the terms used. If the agents debating the truth of the statement do not agree on the definitions of the terms used then they may not agree on the truth of the statement.

To suggest that a particular definition is simply “idiosyncratic” is merely an unsubstantiated matter of opinion.

I have substantiated my claim by reference to the existence of a free-will/determinism debate in philosophy.

And I have answered that claim above.
Even if it were the case that “CHDO has always been part of the concept of free will” (which I have disputed), it is clear that the basic free will question (“how can we define and model free will such that it explains how we can be captains of our own fate?”) is still unresolved – CHDO contributes nothing to the explanatory power of the model - perhaps its time for a new paradigm.

The difficult bit is to see how indeterminism fails to undermine rationality (ie how it fails to result in the situation of an agent possesing CHDO, but not possessing rationallity, and therefore lacking FW, since rationality is a necessary criterion of FW).

The difficult bit imho is seeing how indeterminism allows us to be “captains of our own fate”. I can’t see how it does, can you?

That hard problem is precisely what "Buridan vs Darwin" addresses.

With respect, Buridan vs Darwin may address, but does not provide an answer to, the free will question. It shows how indeterminism must be at the root of CHDO, but it does not show how indeterminism endows any agent with the ability to be “captain of its own fate”.
So far, I have not seen any explanation of how indeterminism can endow anything that could be called free will – in other words, the “CHDO hypothesis” is an empty hypothesis – there is nothing behind it which actually explains anything useful about free will.

*You* definition of FW requires
1) unpredictability in the eyes of an observer
2) rationallity
1) is given a-fortiori by indeterminism (epistemic unpredictability is a
corollary of ontic indeterminism).

An ontically indeterministic system is epitemically unpredictable, but that does not allow us to conclude that epistemic unpredictability implies ontic indeterminism.
A deterministically chaotic system is by definition deterministic, but nevertheless it is unpredictable.
MF-FW requires unpredictability, and unpredictability is consistent both with determinsim and with indeterminism, hence MF-FW is consistent both with a deterministic and with an indeterministic world.

What is your actual objection ? Are you saying that I have failed to rescue rationallity ? Or are you appealing to some further aleged feature of FW?
(ie to a *third* definition ?)

My objection is that IF CHDO exists, the “source” of CHDO must be indeterminism – but indeterminism simply causes random behaviour - neither you nor anyone else can come up with an explanatory model which shows how indeterminism endows anything on an agent which we would recognise as free will in action (ie which “allows us to be captains of our own fate”). Therefore CHDO has no real explanatory power in respect of free will.
If you believe that you can come up with an explanatory model which shows how such indeterminism endows anything on an agent which we would recognise as free will in action (ie how it is that we could claim to be “captains of our own fate”) then I would be only too pleased to take a look at it (the explanations of Buridan vs Darwin I have seen so far do not explain how indeterminism endows anything that could be called free will in this sense).
MF

 

[Tournesol]

Here you are confusing “definition of CHDO” with “definition of free will”
Your logic would seem to run as follows :
“If we are unable to discover unicorns, the conlusion is that unicorns, as defined
do not exist”
The corollary in the case of CHDO is :
If we are unable to discover CHDO, the conlusion is that CHDO, as defined
does not exist.
The non-existence of CHDO says nothing necessarily about the existence or non-existence of free will.

If CHDO is part of the definition of FW, it says something the existence of FW,
(just as the presence or absence of a horn on an animal's
forehead says something about the (non)existence of unicorns).

The correct conclusion in this case is that “TO-FW does not exist” (where by TO-FW we mean “free will as defined by Tournesol”).

and philosophical tradition.

Free will in the sense defined by MF (let us call this MF-FW) does not require CHDO, hence showing that CHDO does not exist would have no implications for the existence of MF-FW.

Its part of the definition of TO-FW. It is not part of the definition of MF-FW.
The reasons for the debate are complex, imho it is not simply the case that all sides in the debate agree on the concept of CHDO. A compatabilist for example would not necessarily agree that CHDO exists, but also would not agree that FW does not exist.

Compatiblists feel the need to come up with substitutes for CHDO.
Even you do, in the form of epistemic unpredictability.

The debate on “free will” actually has its origins long before terms like libertarian,
determinist and compatabilist were coined. It has long been thought by some that “we are captains of our own fate” in the sense that we humans can somehow act more or less independently of the physical world. Philosophers have argued for centuries how or whether such a concept can possibly be coherent – witness the ongoing debate on Cartesian dualism. This, and not CHDO, is at the root of free will. The concept of CHDO is simply one small component in this ongoing debate.

It is an extraordinary claim that CHDO is quite separate from being "captains of our own fate". It is a concept arrived at precisely by putting the poetic
concept "captains of our own fate" on a precise footing. If we are not
COF's , presumably we are cuasally determined by the rest of the universe - and therefore have no CHDO.
If you have an alternative analysis , fine -- but don't just pretend that
the two concepts have nothing to do with each other.

My position here is that the hypothesis of CHDO must rest on indeterminism (which you agree with), that (as far as I am aware) nobody has ever shown how indeterminism can endow anything to an agent apart from an element of random behaviour,

That is of course precisely what I have shown.

and free will (if it is anything to do with being “captains of our own fate”) is not endowed by random behaviour.

That of course depends on one's definition of FW. I have shown
that indeterminism does endow my defintion (CHDO+a realistic
amount of ratoanllity). I can't see how how it can fail to
endow your definition (epistemic unpredictability+irrationallity),
since that is essentially a weaker variant of my defintion.
I have asked you before where you think the specific failure to "endow free will" lies, and you seem to be avoiding the question.

My claim is therefore that the hypothesis of CHDO has no explanatory power in respect of what we think of as free will, and certainly the hypothesis of CHDO does nothing to support the position that “we are captains of our own fate”.

You clearly have no alternative way of putting the vague and poetic
COF requirement on a precise and logical footing, so that is a vacuous complaint.

I would be very happy to be shown that I am wrong in this.
Can you show how indeterminism (which we agree must be at the foundation of CHDO) endows anything to an agent which explains how the agent might be “captain of its own fate”?

It shows a) how an agent is not a causal puppet of the universe in general
(simply by being indeterministic)
b) how an agent is nonetheless not a puppet of indeterminism itself.
since the RIG is filered and selected byt the SIS -- the SIS is the element
of control.
What else is there ? When are you going to stop saying that I am wrong and start saying why I am wrong.

Does the hypothesis of CHDO make any testable predictions?
Yes. I can test by experiment the predictions of the hypothesis “Tournesol is unable to consistently predict my actions”– and show that it is indeed true.
Actually the reverse is true. Unpredictability is an epistemic property. The world could be 100% deterministic, an ontic property, (and if it is I think you agree this would rule out CHDO), and yet it still would be unpredictable.

Whatever. The traditional theory of FW requires ontic indeterminism, and I have shown how this can exist without endangering rationality of a realistic
kind.

With respect, FW is not “just about rationality”, FW is about the question “how can we be captains of our own fate?” and thus (in many ways) it is about complexity, chaos, game theory, evolution, survival of the fittest, consciousness – concepts that we are only just beginning to understand.

Your previously stated definition does require rationallity.
You seem to be withdrawing that deifinition in favour of a statement to
the effect that we can't even specify what FW is (concepts that we are only just beginning to understand.=).
Is that correct ?
Would it not be more honest to make you abandomnment of your previous
definition of FW explicit, if that is what you are indeed doing ?

Fundamentally, imho the free will question is “how can we define and model free will such that both the definition and model explain how we can be captains of our own fate?”, and how can this model and definition of free will at the same time be coherent, consistent, explanatory, and fit with what we actually observe?

I believe I have done all that. Replacing my defintion of FW with another
,
less tractable defintion does not overturn that at all. If the name of the
game is to come up with a definition that works, that is what I have done.
The fact that you can come up with another defintion that doesn't work,
doesn't affect that.

It is not obvious to me that CHDO is an essential or even useful part of either this model or definition.

Then why halfway buy into it with epistemic unpredictability?

The truth of any statement depends on the definitions of the terms used. If the agents debating the truth of the statement do not agree on the definitions of the terms used then they may not agree on the truth of the statement.

OK. What is the defintion of "Captain of one's Fate" ?

Even if it were the case that “CHDO has always been part of the concept of free will” (which I have disputed), it is clear that the basic free will question (“how can we define and model free will such that it explains how we can be captains of our own fate?”) is still unresolved – CHDO contributes nothing to the explanatory power of the model - perhaps its time for a new paradigm.

CHDO is part of the defintion. Ontic indeterminsim is part of the model,

The difficult bit imho is seeing how indeterminism allows us to be “captains of our own fate”. I can’t see how it does, can you?

That depends on what you mean by COF. What do you mean by COF?

With respect, Buridan vs Darwin may address, but does not provide an answer to, the free will question. It shows how indeterminism must be at the root of CHDO, but it does not show how indeterminism endows any agent with the ability to be “captain of its own fate”.

It does explain that if being COF is a combination of CHDO and rationallity.
It also does if COF is your alternative defintion of FW.
It only doesn't if COF is maintained as a completely fuzzy, ill-defined
concept -- or rather we can't tell whether it does or not. But that is
a completely spurious manouvre. It is not a valid
form of argument to reject defnitions where they are offered in favour
of a vague, illogical approach.

So far, I have not seen any explanation of how indeterminism can endow anything that could be called free will – in other words, the “CHDO hypothesis” is an empty hypothesis – there is nothing behind it which actually explains anything useful about free will.

I have written hundereds of words of explanation. There is no substance
to your rejection because you either don't know what you mean by
FW, or you mean something I can explain easily. Either way , you have no real argument.

An ontically indeterministic system is epitemically unpredictable, but that does not allow us to conclude that epistemic unpredictability implies ontic indeterminism.

I didn't say it did. But if I can suceed in showing how ontic indeterminsim
is hypothetically compatible with FW, I have succeeded afortiori in showing
how epistemic unpredictability is also compatible.

MF-FW requires unpredictability, and unpredictability is consistent both with determinsim and with indeterminism, hence MF-FW is consistent both with a deterministic and with an indeterministic world.

Irrelevant. The question is whether my model
is explains FW as defined by you: it does. (Bearing
in mind that COF is not a defintion, but an attempt
at avoiding precision).

My objection is that IF CHDO exists, the “source” of CHDO must be indeterminism – but indeterminism simply causes random behaviour - neither you nor anyone else can come up with an explanatory model which shows how indeterminism endows anything on an agent which we would recognise as free will in action (ie which “allows us to be captains of our own fate”).

Whether it does or not depends on the definition of FW being used.
It does according to my defintion and your clear defintion.
Whether it does or not according to COF is unclear, since no-one
knows what COF means. Youcan't have it both ways.
You can't employ a delibarately vague concept, and then make
definitive statements about whether it has been explained or not.

therefore CHDO has no real explanatory power in respect of free will.
If you believe that you can come up with an explanatory model which shows how such indeterminism endows anything on an agent which we would recognise as free will in action (ie how it is that we could claim to be “captains of our own fate”) then I would be only too pleased to take a look at it (the explanations of Buridan vs Darwin I have seen so far do not explain how indeterminism endows anything that could be called free will in this sense).

No-one knows what "this sense" is. You clearly cannot specify what
the problem is. You expect us to take your word that a concept
you cannot specify logically has not been explained, but there is no
reason why anyone should.

 

[moving finger]

If you have an alternative analysis , fine -- but don't just pretend that the two concepts have nothing to do with each other.

With respect Tournesol, I’m not “pretending” anything – I am simply asking if anyone can SHOW how these two concepts – CHDO and free will – are actually associated with each other (apart from the rather meaningless method of defining one in terms of the other).
In other words, and to be specific, can anyone show how the basic principle underlying CHDO, ie indeterminism, results in an agent which is now COF, where it is NOT COF in the absence of indeterminism?

My position here is that the hypothesis of CHDO must rest on indeterminism (which you agree with), that (as far as I am aware) nobody has ever shown how indeterminism can endow anything to an agent apart from an element of random behaviour,

That is of course precisely what I have shown.

Where have you shown this? If you are referring here to the Darwinian model, I don’t see how this model shows how the basic principle underlying CHDO, ie indeterminism, results in an agent which is now COF, where it is NOT COF in the absence of indeterminism.

and free will (if it is anything to do with being “captains of our own fate”) is not endowed by random behaviour.

That of course depends on one's definition of FW. I have shown that indeterminism does endow my defintion (CHDO+a realistic amount of ratoanllity).
Indeterminism endows CHDO, yes. But that is not the point I am making here.

Can you or anyone else show how indeterminism (which is necessary for CHDO) also results in an agent which is now COF, where it is NOT COF in the absence of indeterminism?

I have asked you before where you think the specific failure to "endow free will" lies, and you seem to be avoiding the question.

With respect, I am trying to make the essential question as clearly as possible. Let me repeat it again :
Can you or anyone else show how indeterminism (which is necessary for CHDO) also results in an agent which is now COF, where it is NOT COF in the absence of indeterminism?
Now, which question is it that you think I am avoiding?

You clearly have no alternative way of putting the vague and poetic COF requirement on a precise and logical footing, so that is a vacuous complaint.

Imho the only way to truly understand free will is first to identify and then abandon the ideas which are not working, such as the idea that CHDO is a part of free will – and then to move to a new paradigm which involves a definitioon of free will in terms of concepts that DO work. But I cannot explain how this can be done as long as you insist on clinging to the concept that “CHDO must be part of free will”. First of all we have to establish whether or not CHDO provides any real answers.

Can you show how indeterminism (which we agree must be at the foundation of CHDO) endows anything to an agent which explains how the agent might be COF?

It shows a) how an agent is not a causal puppet of the universe in general (simply by being indeterministic)

OK, I can see how indeterminism results in “random behaviour” in an otherwise rational machine, but how is it that “tacking on indeterminism” suddenly makes an agent “captain of its own fate” where it was not COF before? How exactly is it supposed to work?

b) how an agent is nonetheless not a puppet of indeterminism itself. since the RIG is filered and selected byt the SIS -- the SIS is the element of control.

Imho this still does not show how an otherwise deterministic agent has now suddenly been transformed into an agent which is COF.

What else is there ? When are you going to stop saying that I am wrong and start saying why I am wrong.

I am trying to show you why it is wrong. I am trying to show you that “this is not enough”. What you suggest only endows indeterminism, it does not endow free will in the sense of the agent now being COF.
The Darwinian model, as far as I can see, is simply a random idea generator tacked onto the front of a deterministic decision-maker. I can see how the entire system would then no longer be deterministic, but how is it that you think such a system is NOW suddenly COF where it was NOT COF in the absence of the random idea generator?

The traditional theory of FW requires ontic indeterminism, and I have shown how this can exist without endangering rationality of a realistic kind.

You have shown how indeterminism can exist, yes, and also how it could endow CHDO. I do not dispute that. But the indeterminism you have introduced is nothing more than a “random element” in an otherwise deterministic machine – how is it that this machine can now claim to be COF?

Your previously stated definition does require rationallity.
You seem to be withdrawing that deifinition in favour of a statement to
the effect that we can't even specify what FW is (concepts that we are only just beginning to understand.=).

I am withdrawing nothing. My belief is that we have to re-think what we actually mean by free will, because the “traditional concept” of free will as you like to call it, is incoherent. We need a new paradigm – but we cannot work towards a new paradigm as long as we continue to cling onto ideas (such as indeterminism and CHDO) that do not work (ie have no explanatory power).

Would it not be more honest to make you abandomnment of your previous definition of FW explicit, if that is what you are indeed doing ?

I am trying to understand firstly whether or not I am correct in my belief that indeterminism and CHDO are vacuous concepts in terms of explaining free will – once that is established we may be able to work towards a new definition that does explain what is going on.

Fundamentally, imho the free will question is “how can we define and model free will such that both the definition and model explain how we can be captains of our own fate?”, and how can this model and definition of free will at the same time be coherent, consistent, explanatory, and fit with what we actually observe?

I believe I have done all that. Replacing my defintion of FW with another, less tractable defintion does not overturn that at all. If the name of the
game is to come up with a definition that works, that is what I have done.

You believe you have done that?
Great!
Then you surely can explain eaxctly how indeterminism (which is necessary for CHDO) also results in an agent which is now COF, where it is NOT COF in the absence of indeterminism?

It is not obvious to me that CHDO is an essential or even useful part of either this model or definition.

Then why halfway buy into it with epistemic unpredictability?

We can verify experimentally that human agents behave unpredictably. Therefore it must be the case EITHER that they are at least epistemically unpredictable OR that they are indeed ontically indeterministic. One or the other (or both) must be true in order to fit the observed facts.

OK. What is the defintion of "Captain of one's Fate" ?

My brief suggestion : An agent which is captain of its fate can be said to be acting rationally and at the same time not controlled or unduly influenced by external factors.
I am very happy to accept improvements to the definition, or even a completely different definition, if you have any to suggest.

I have written hundereds of words of explanation. There is no substance to your rejection because you either don't know what you mean by
FW, or you mean something I can explain easily.

I agree you have written hundreds of words, but I cannot see the explanation in there anywhere.
OK, If you are so convinced you are right and I am wrong, and that your concept of CHDO is part of free will, what exactly do you mean by free will?
MF

 

[Q_Goest]

There are two disparate assumptions here.

Assumption #1: "Free will is endowed by indeterminism."
- If you can prove that, and if you further assume that free will is a feature of consciousness, you have proven that consciousness is not computational, that it relies on quantum mechanics and that quantum mechanics is indeterminate. I say this because no other known natural phenomenon can provide for indeterminate processes.*

Assumption #2: "Free will is endowed by determinate processes."
- If you can prove that, and if you further assume that free will is a feature of consciousness, you have proven that one of the most contensious features of consciousness is determinate which would imply, but not prove, that consciousness is computational.

Would you agree? How can one prove either case? It doesn't seem like there's a resolution to be had, because in the end, the results of what you have proven speak volumes about consciousness itself. You'll need more than a good argument if you're to prove either. You need a theory which can examine the phenomenon analytically and determine if it is possible or not.

Personally, I think the best you can do is to suggest free will is a feature of consciousness, and attempt to disprove/prove that. But that seems like an axiom as opposed to something which needs to be proven. You could also create definitions around that assumption, such as what I've suggested earlier, that free will is the sensation of making a decision, and one can then argue whether that sensation feels as if it is determinate or not, but not if it is truly determinate or not. Certainly the sensation feels 'random', but can you also say that the sensation feels indeterminate? It seems the argument is based on a gut feel regarding this sensation - more than any strict logic which can be built upon to prove either case.

*Note: Yes, MF, I know, I know. <grin> Determinism/indeterminism is beyond our ability to know because of non-local hidden variables, etc… We must however make the assumption that if we prove something is indeterminate, then we've also proven indeterminacy exists and the most likely candidate is QM.

 

[moving finger]

Why the Darwinian Model Does Not Work

What else is there ? When are you going to stop saying that I am wrong and start saying why I am wrong.

As succinctly as possible - here is what is wrong with the Darwinian model (in fact, here is what is wrong with the whole idea that "indeterminsim endows free will").

Taking the definitions of RIG and SIS as before, let us suppose we "run" the model twice under identical conditions. In other words we are simply doing what the model claims to do which is to "allow it to do otherwise" given identical circumstances. Let us call these two runs "Run 1" and "Run 2" .

In Run 1 the RIG throws up (randomly) a finite number of possible courses of action. Let us suppose that included in the possible courses of action thrown up by the RIG are actions A and B. The SIS examines these and selects Action A as the "best choice" out of the ones made available by the RIG. Therefore, given a "free choice" between A and B, the SIS deterministically chooses A.

In Run 2 the RIG throws up (randomly) another finite number of possible courses of action. This time action B is included in the actions thrown up, but action A is not. The SIS examines these and now selects Action B as the "best choice" out of the ones made available by the RIG.

Clearly the model has indeed "done otherwise" in Run 2 compared to Run 1, just as (it would seem) CHDO requires - in Run 1 it chose A and in Run 2 it chose B.

But did the model “do otherwise” in run 2 out of “free will choice to do otherwise”, or was it “constrained to do otherwise” by the RIG? The RIG remember is responsible for “throwing up possible alternative choices”. In run 2, the RIG did NOT throw up the possibility of choice A, thus in effect the RIG BLOCKED the agent from the possibility of choosing A, even when A would have been (rationally) a better choice than B!

Is this an example of “Could Have Done Otherwise”? Or would a more accurate description be “Forced to Do Otherwise”? The agent in run 2 was effectively forced to choose B rather than A (it was forced to do otherwise in run 2 than it had done in run 1) because of the limited choices afforded to it by the RIG. Perthaps a better acronym for this kind of model is thus FDO (forced to do otherwise) rather than CHDO?

The important question that we need to ask is : Since the model chose A rather than B in run 1, exactly WHY did it choose B in Run 2?

It is the answer to this question "WHY" which shows us where the Darwinian model fails.

Did the model choose B rather than A in run 2 because it was "acting freely" in its choice, and preferred B to A? No clearly not (because in a straight choice between A and B the model always chooses A).
Or did the model choose B rather than A in run 2 because its choices were actually being RESTRICTED by the RIG, such that it was NOT POSSIBLE for it to choose to do A in Run 2, even though A was always a better choice than B? Yes, this is indeed clearly the case.

Which kind of "free will" would you prefer to have?

One where you can choose rationally between all possible courses of action (the deterministic model)...
Or one where your choices are necessarily restricted by indeterminism such that you may be forced to take a non-optimum choice, whether you like it or not (the Darwinian model)?

Free will is supposed to be "acting freely of restrictions"...
Please do point out any errors in interpretation or conclusion.

MF

Postscript : For the avoidance of doubt, I am not here assuming or asserting that the world is either deterministic or indeterministic. I am simply looking at some of the characteristics and implications of the so-called of Darwinian model of "free will", to discover whether it has any explanatory power in the sense of endowing anything that could be described as free will in any sense of the word. I think it is quite clear from the above example that the Darwinian model (and this fact is shared by all indeterministically-driven models of free will), rather than endowing anything that we might wish to have in the form of free will, in fact "robs us" of the possibility of making optimum choices. The Darwinian model is designed to deliberately restrict (via the RIG) some of the choices available to an agent, thereby forcing the agent to make non-optimal choices in the misnomer of "CHDO".

MF

 

[moving finger]

There are two disparate assumptions here.
Assumption #1: "Free will is endowed by indeterminism."
- If you can prove that, and if you further assume that free will is a feature of consciousness, you have proven that consciousness is not computational, that it relies on quantum mechanics and that quantum mechanics is indeterminate. I say this because no other known natural phenomenon can provide for indeterminate processes.*
Assumption #2: "Free will is endowed by determinate processes."
- If you can prove that, and if you further assume that free will is a feature of consciousness, you have proven that one of the most contensious features of consciousness is determinate which would imply, but not prove, that consciousness is computational.

Before we can do either, we need to agree a definition of free will. The basic problem is that "libertarians" will not accept a definition of free will which is based on determinism (evidence my debate with Tournesol above), and determinists will of course not accept a definition of free will which is based on indeterminism (or - determinists simply deny the existence of free will).

Would you agree? How can one prove either case?

imho the solution to the problem is to
(1) remain open-minded on exactly "what free will is" (ie do not rule anything in or anything out), then
(2) explore the implications of various models and paradigms (as I have been examining the implications of the Darwinian model in post #37 above), to see "what kind of free will" (ie what are the proeprties of the free will that) these models endow, then
(3) ask oneself, for each model, "is this the kind of free will that is worth having?" (as I have done for the Darwinian model in #37 above)
(4) repeat steps 1 to 3 for all possible models (indeterministic and deterministic), and decide which one(s) is(are) best

As far as I can see, my analysis of the Darwinian model (above) can be applied generally to all indeterministic models of decision making. The general conclusion is that indeterminism does not endow anything that we would "want" to have as free will - it endows at worst only random behaviour or (at best, in the case of the Darwinian model) it necessarily restricts the choices available to us, so that we are always forced (by the random behaviour) to make non-optimum choices.

It doesn't seem like there's a resolution to be had, because in the end, the results of what you have proven speak volumes about consciousness itself.

There is no resolution as long as people remain dogmatic and prejudiced in their definitions, along the lines of "free will MUST contain an element of CHDO, by definition!".

I am asking people to free their minds of preconceptions, free themselves of dogma, and start looking at the world objectively and scientifically. Only this way can we arrive at a true understanding.

You'll need more than a good argument if you're to prove either.

The "proof" is in demonstrating the properties of various models - using the 4-step process I have outlined above, and eliminating those models which do not work.

You need a theory which can examine the phenomenon analytically and determine if it is possible or not.
Personally, I think the best you can do is to suggest free will is a feature of consciousness, and attempt to disprove/prove that.

That may turn out to be the case. But I think we can do more than that. I think we can ask questions like "is indeterminism necessary for free will, and what are the consequences of this hypothesis?"

But that seems like an axiom as opposed to something which needs to be proven. You could also create definitions around that assumption, such as what I've suggested earlier, that free will is the sensation of making a decision, and one can then argue whether that sensation feels as if it is determinate or not, but not if it is truly determinate or not. Certainly the sensation feels 'random', but can you also say that the sensation feels indeterminate? It seems the argument is based on a gut feel regarding this sensation - more than any strict logic which can be built upon to prove either case.

I feel the road to understanding free will is NOT to get locked in dogmatic definitions of "what free will is" or "what free will is not", and then get backed into a corner trying to defend thoise definitions. The road to understanding is to rise above definitional prejudice and dogma, and examine the real consequences of some of the proposed models.

*Note: Yes, MF, I know, I know. <grin> Determinism/indeterminism is beyond our ability to know because of non-local hidden variables, etc… We must however make the assumption that if we prove something is indeterminate, then we've also proven indeterminacy exists and the most likely candidate is QM.

lol - yes, ok, point taken . I know i can be like a stuck record. the important point is that we have NOT proven that QM is indeterminate (only that it might be).

MF

 

[Tournesol]

An agent which is captain of its fate can be said to be acting rationally and at the same time not controlled or unduly influenced by external factors

If "not controlled by" means "not causally determined by" that is
simply a re-statement of my definition of free will. If it does not
mean that...what does it mean ?

 

[moving finger]

If "not controlled by" means "not causally determined by" that is
simply a re-statement of my definition of free will. If it does not
mean that...what does it mean ?

I'm happy to agree that my suggested definition of "captain of one's fate" is essentially the same as your definition of free will. I have no problem with that at all.

I have pointed out why I consider the "Darwinian model" fails to endow anything that could be considered to be "free will" in post #37 of this thread, would you care to respond?

With respect

MF

 

[Q_Goest]

MF, your argument in post #37 above seems reasonable to me, and I'd agree there seems to be no obvious beneficial factors to having a random or indeterminate ability to select between any given number of choices. But on the other hand, this doesn't seem like an argument that can provide any insight into why free will should emerge from a choice being made or endowed by the process of making that choice regardless of whether that choice is deterministic or not. I don't suppose it was intended for that though, it is an attempt to dispute indeterministic processes as being beneficial which could be true. But being beneficial doesn't do anything to suggest why something would be endowed by a physical process.

If a choice is nothing more than a switch comparing two inputs and either making a determinate switch position or an indeterminate switch position, then how is this magical switch which gives rise to this feeling of free will any different from another switch? Do all switches produce the sensation of free will? (rhetorical question, don't answer <lol>)

If you are a computationalist, you might suggest that free will emerges from the sum total of all switch positions or in other words, by the sum of all computations. There is no single switch which endows anything.

If you disagree that computationalism can provide for consciousness (what is the term for that - "anti-computationalist"? hehe) then you might complain that deterministic processes in the brain can't provide for consciousness because there's no need to be aware of making a decision when the decision is simply the result of a calculation. The determinist's "free will" doesn't have any meaning whatsoever. There is no choice made and there is no such thing as a choice, so why should one expect a sensation from such a thing?

The comeback would seem to be that the determinist would say a choice WAS made, that two or more concepts emerged in the computation and a selection was made. I think this largely proves the point that it doesn't matter if you're a computationalist or an anti-computationalist, free will doesn't emerge except from conscious experience.

Before we can do either, we need to agree a definition of free will.

Def: Free will is a feature of consciousness. It is not a process, so suggesting it is determinate or indeterminate is false IMHO. Suggesting free will is endowed by determinate or indeterminate processes is no different than suggesting love, hate, curiosity or any other emotion is endowed by determinate or indeterminate processes. The question about free will being endowed by a process is non-sensical to begin with. That's my story and I'm stickin' to it! lol

I think we can ask questions like "is indeterminism necessary for free will, and what are the consequences of this hypothesis?"

I respectfully disagree. To suggest you can ask questions as you've proposed presupposes they can be answered in such terms as determinate and indeterminate processes. Since free will is a feature of consciousness, you can't answer the question without having some pre-defined concept of consiousness.

I feel the road to understanding free will is NOT to get locked in dogmatic definitions of "what free will is" or "what free will is not", and then get backed into a corner trying to defend thoise definitions. The road to understanding is to rise above definitional prejudice and dogma, and examine the real consequences of some of the proposed models.

Yep. Doing my best to sidestep any dogmatic concepts of processes endowing such things! <lol>

 

[meL]

Try to herd cats.

The answer comes out
like an arrow.

 

[moving finger]

Try to herd cats.
The answer comes out
like an arrow.

that cats are unpredictable, yes

MF

 

[moving finger]

Modelling Decision-Making Machines

We have seen (post #37) that the simple so-called Darwinian model, which comprises a single Random Idea Generator folowed by a Sensible Idea Selector, does not endow any properties to an agent which we might recognise as “properties of free will”. In particular, rather than endowing the ability of Could Have Done Otherwise (CHDO), the simple RIG-SIS combination acts to RESTRICT the number of possible courses of action, thus forcing the agent to make non-optimal choices (a feature I have termed Forced to Do Otherwise, FDO, rather than CHDO).

What now follows is a description of a slightly more complex model based on a parallel deterministic/random idea generator combination, which not only CAN endow genuine CHDO but ALSO is one in which the random idea generator creates new possible courses of action for the agent, rather than restricting possible courses of action.

Firstly let us define a Deterministic Idea Generator (DIG) as one in which alternate ideas (alternate possible courses of action) are generated according to a rational, deterministic procedure. Since it is deterministic the DIG will produce the same alternate ideas if it is re-run under identical circumstances.

Next we define a Random Idea Generator (RIG) as one in which alternate ideas (alternate possible courses of action) are generated according to an epistemically random procedure. Since it is epistemically random the RIG may produce different ideas if it is re-run under epistemically identical circumstances.
Note that the RIG may be either epistemically random and ontically deterministic (hereafter d-RIG), or it may be epistemically random and ontically indeterministic (hereafter i-RIG). Both the d-RIG and the i-RIG will produce different ideas when re-run under epistemically identical circumstances. (For clarification – a d-RIG behaves similar to a computer random number generator (RNG). The RNG produces epistemically random numbers, but if the RNG is reset then it will produce the same sequence of numbers that it did before).

Next we define a Deterministic Idea Selector (DIS) as a deterministic mechanism for taking alternate ideas (alternate possible courses of action), evaluating these ideas in terms of payoffs, costs and benefits etc to the agent, and rationally choosing one of the ideas as the preferred course of action.

Finally we define a Random Idea Selector (RIS) as a mechanism for taking alternate ideas (alternate possible courses of action), and choosing one of the ideas as the preferred course of action according to an epistemically random procedure. Since it is epistemically random the RIS may a produce different choice if it is re-run under epistemically identical circumstances (ie with epistemically identical input ideas).

These four basic building bloocks, the DIG, RIG, DIS and RIS, may then be assembled in various ways to create various forms of “idea-generating and decision-making” models with differing properties.

In what follows I shall distiguish between genuine Could Have Done Otherwise (CHDO, where the agent can rationally choose between a set of possibilities which includes at least all of the rational possibilities) and Forced to Do Otherwise (FDO, where the agent EITHER simply chooses randomly, ie the choice is not rational, OR is forced to choose from a set of random possibilities which may not include all of the rational possibilities). As we have seen in post #37, the so-called Darwinian model is an example of FDO.

Deterministic Agent
DIG -> DIS
The Deterministic agent comprises a DIG which outputs rational possible courses of action which are then input to a DIS, which rationally chooses one of the ideas as the preferred course of action.
.The Deterministic agent will always make the same choice given the same (identical) circumstances.
Clearly there is no possibility of CHDO.
A Libertarian would claim that such an agent does not possesses free will, but a Compatabilist might not agree.

Capricious (Random) Agent
DIG -> RIS
The Capricious agent comprises a DIG which outputs possible courses of action which are then input to a RIS.
Also known as the Buridan’s Ass model.
The Capricious agent will make epistemically random choices, even under the same (epistemically identical) circumstances.
Clearly there is the possibility for the agent to “choose otherwise” given epistemically identical circumstances, but since the choice is made randomly and not rationally this is an example of FDO.
I doubt whether even a Libertarian would claim that such an agent possesses free will.
(Note that making the agent ontically random, ie indeterministic, rather than epistemically random does not change the conclusion.)

So-called Darwinian Agent
RIG -> DIS
The so-called Darwinian agent comprises a RIG which outputs possible courses of action which are then input to a DIS.
See http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html#introduction for a more complete description of this model.
The so-called Darwinian agent will make rational choices from a random selection of possibilities.
As shown in post #37 of this thread, even if the RIG is truly indeterministic (i-RIG) the random nature of generation of the alternative possibilities means that this model forcibly restricts the choices available to the agent, such that non-optimum choices may be made. The model thus endows FDO and not CHDO.
Because of this property (ie FDO rather than CHDO) no true-thinking Libertarian should claim that such an agent possesses free will, even in the case of an i-RIG where the agent clearly behaves indeterministically.

Parallel DIG-RIG Agent
DIG -> }
..... -> } DIS
RIG –> }

The parallel DIG-RIG agent comprises TWO separate idea generators, one deterministic and one random, working in parallel. The deterministic idea generator outputs rational possible courses of action which are then input to a DIS. Also input to the same DIS are possible courses of action generated by the random idea generator. The DIS then evaluates all of the possible courses of action, those generated deterministically and those generated randomly, and the DIS then rationally chooses one of the ideas as the preferred course of action.
Since a proportion of the possible ideas is generated randomly, the Parallel DIG-RIG agent (just like the Capricious and Darwinian agents) can appear to act unpredictably. If the RIG is deterministic (a d-RIG) then the Parallel DIG-RIG agent behaves deterministically but still unpredictably. If the RIG is indeterministic (an i-RIG) then the Parallel DIG-RIG behaves indeterministically (and therefore also unpredictably).
Since a proportion of the possible ideas is also generated deterministically and rationally (by the DIG), not only does the agent NOT behave capriciously but also the agent is NOT in any way restricted or forced by the RIG to choose a non-optimal or irrational course of action (all rational courses of action are always available as possibilities to the DIS via the DIG, even if the RIG throws up totally irrational or non-optimum possibilities).
The Parallel DIG-RIG model therefore combines the advantages of the Deterministic model (completely rational behaviour) along with the advantages of the Darwinian model (unpredictable behaviour) but with none of the drawbacks of the Darwinian model (the agent is not restricted or forced by the RIG to make non-optimal choices).
If the Parallel DIG-RIG is based on a d-RIG then it behaves deterministically but unpredictably. Importantly, it does NOT then endow CHDO (since it is deterministic) therefore presumably would not be accepted by a Libertarian as an explanatory model for free will. Interestingly though, this model (DIG plus d-RIG) explains everything that we observe in respect of free will (it produces a rational yet not necessarily predictable agent), and the model should be acceptable both to Determinists and Compatabilists alike (since it is deterministic).
If the Parallel DIG-RIG is based on an i-RIG then it is both indeterministic and unpredictable. Therefore it does endow CHDO (and this time it is GENUINE CHDO, not the FDO offered by the Darwinian model), therefore presumably would be accepted by a Libertarian (but obviously not by either a Determinist or a Compatabilist) as an explanatory model for free will.

Conclusion
We have shown that the so-called Darwinian model incorporating a single random idea generator gives rise to an indeterministic agent without endowing genuine CHDO. However, a suitable combination of deterministic and indeterministic idea generators, in the form of the Parallel DIG-RIG model, can form the basis of a model decision making machine which does endow genuine CHDO, and is genuinely both indeterministic yet rational.

Constructive criticism welcome!

MF

 

[selfAdjoint]

Moving finger, I really appreciated this careful post. http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/notebooks/symbolic-dynamics.html", via Marcus's Atiyah thread on Strings Branes and LQG, and comments on Peter Woit's blog which Marcus links to, is another way to bring stochastic behavior (even the "real" kind) out of continuous deterministc physics by means of limiting coarse-graining strategies. The essay is by Cosma Shalizi, a very respected mathematician in this area (Nonlinear stochastic models), and I especially want to tout the many links he gives, which taken together amount to a copious training resource on it.

 

[Q_Goest]

MF, I like the way you've laid this out. Your thinking is clear, and it forms a fairly good basis to discuss advantages/disadvantages of deterministic and indeterministic processes to AI. Taking the focus of the discussion away from simply "what processes endow free will" and focusing on what advantages/disadvantages there are to AI would IMHO be of great benefit to this discussion.

I noticed you also broke out the DIS from the RIS as up until now the logic you've used to berate indeterminism was focused on JUST the RIS and not the RIG which is where indeterminism may actually be of use. More on this in a moment.

Finally, thanks also for putting in bold the abbreviations as my memory is as useful as a spaghetti strainer for drinking coffee. Now I only need to remind myself to scroll up!

It's interesting you've concluded that indeterminate processes can be of value in decision making. The conclusion you've reached is echoed by the "Darwin" model, here:

Objection 3: "Indeterminism would disrupt the process of rational thought, and result in a capricious, irrational kind of freedom not worth having."
Is that so ? Computer programmes can consult random-number generators where needed (including 'real' ones implemented in hardware). The rest of their operation is perfectly deterministic. Why should the brain not be able to call on indeterminism as and when required, and exclude it the rest of the time ? And if random numbers are useful for computers, why should indeterministic input be useless for brains ? Is human rationality that much more hidebound than a computer ? Even including all the stuff about creativity ? Pseudo-random numbers (which are really deterministic) may be used in computers, and any indeterminism the brain calls on might be only pseudo-random.

I'd agree that for an AI computer program, some type of RIG, whether determinate or not could potentially make use of such a feature.

One thought on reading this - it seems the insinuation you've provided is that when talking about a RIG is that the ideas generated may or may not be of value at all:

As shown in post #37 of this thread, even if the RIG is truly indeterministic (i-RIG) the random nature of generation of the alternative possibilities means that this model forcibly restricts the choices available to the agent, such that non-optimum choices may be made. The model thus endows FDO and not CHDO.

Similarly, you've insinuated that the DIG only provides useful solutions:

The Deterministic agent comprises a DIG which outputs rational possible courses of action which are then input to a DIS, which rationally chooses one of the ideas as the preferred course of action.

Note also you've similarly implied the DIS chooses optimal solutions and the RIS chooses poor ones, or at best, random ones. This seems fairly reasonable and you may have some good logic behind why you hold these views. However, it seems to me the reasoning you may have is that anything indeterministic or random will weigh every choice (RIS) or create every solution (RIG) on equal footing. That is, a RIS for example, won't try to determine the best, it will pick one solution at random. Similarly the RIG will simply bubble up ideas and provide as many useless ones as useful ones. The thing is, I don't see why that should necessarily be the case. Certainly a RIG or RIS could be designed to do so, but that doesn't mean it is an optimal solution for its function.

Take for example radioactive decay. What is indeterministic (or random if you don't like the i word) is WHEN it decays. Despite that, the decay process must still remain probabilistic. That feature of indeterminism can also be made use of, and if I'm not mistaken it largely is for computer programs that require the use of a random number generator. One can 'design' a RIG that incorporates a process that minimizes useless ideas and maximizes useful ones while at the same time coming up with ideas a DIG might not. Similarly, a RIS could be designed to incorporate a process that minimizes useless ideas and maximizes useful ones. The benefit of such a RIS would be the ability to keep a predator guessing, so to speak. If we always made the most logical choice, wouldn't a predator use that to its advantage by assuming for example, you will always run away instead of fight? It would seem to me that there are benefits to doing non-optimal things at times, since honestly we can't and don't always (or even usually) try to weigh choices as logically the best or worst. People and animals often do what is 'not optimal' and in so doing glean an advantage of surprise.

Hope that was constructive.

PS: The link in your last post doesn't work, you might want to check it.

 

[moving finger]

PS: The link in your last post doesn't work, you might want to check it.

Apologies, it has been fixed now - it is

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html#introduction

will respond to rest of your post later.

Thanks

MF

 

[moving finger]

It's interesting you've concluded that indeterminate processes can be of value in decision making.

Yes, and that conclusion was totally counter-intuitive to me!
In fact the conclusion is more than just “indeterminate processes can be of value in decision making”, it’s that “random (both epistemically and ontically random) processes can be of value in decision making”. It’s no secret that up until that post I had taken the position that randomness simply makes decision-making random, and that’s it. I have to “eat humble pie”, but I’m happy to do so because I now feel that I have a much better understanding of what’s going on.

The conclusion you've reached is echoed by the "Darwin" model, here:
Quote:
Objection 3: "Indeterminism would disrupt the process of rational thought, and result in a capricious, irrational kind of freedom not worth having."
Is that so ? Computer programmes can consult random-number generators where needed (including 'real' ones implemented in hardware). The rest of their operation is perfectly deterministic. Why should the brain not be able to call on indeterminism as and when required, and exclude it the rest of the time ? And if random numbers are useful for computers, why should indeterministic input be useless for brains ? Is human rationality that much more hidebound than a computer ? Even including all the stuff about creativity ? Pseudo-random numbers (which are really deterministic) may be used in computers, and any indeterminism the brain calls on might be only pseudo-random.

Yes, I agree.
The reason why randomness can “add value” to an otherwise deterministic decision-making machine is simply because the random idea generator may be able to throw up possible solutions which are not included in the “set of possible solutions” afforded by a deterministic idea generator – the total set of possible solutions available to the agent is therefore possibly greater if it uses both deterministic and random idea generators.

I'd agree that for an AI computer program, some type of RIG, whether determinate or not could potentially make use of such a feature.
One thought on reading this - it seems the insinuation you've provided is that when talking about a RIG is that the ideas generated may or may not be of value at all:

As shown in post #37 of this thread, even if the RIG is truly indeterministic (i-RIG) the random nature of generation of the alternative possibilities means that this model forcibly restricts the choices available to the agent, such that non-optimum choices may be made. The model thus endows FDO and not CHDO.

I think this follows. If the RIG is simply “thowing out random ideas” then it is quite possible (in one particular run) that all of the ideas generated in that run may be of no value; equally it is possible that some of the ideas may be of value, hence it is true that “the ideas generated may or may not be of value at all”.

Similarly, you've insinuated that the DIG only provides useful solutions:

The Deterministic agent comprises a DIG which outputs rational possible courses of action which are then input to a DIS, which rationally chooses one of the ideas as the preferred course of action.

I didn’t actually say “useful solutions” – I said “rational solutions” – and this seems quite reasonable to me. It is quite possible that, for a particular problem, the DIG will produce no “useful” solutions at all (even though it still provides rational possible solutions). I am assuming of course that the deterministic idea generator is operating according to a rational deterministic algorithm – given this it seems reasonable that it will produce rational possible solutions. It is exactly because the DIG produces only rational solutions that the RIG might add value – by providing random or non-rational solutions which might be more useful than the rational solutions of the DIG.

Note also you've similarly implied the DIS chooses optimal solutions and the RIS chooses poor ones, or at best, random ones. This seems fairly reasonable and you may have some good logic behind why you hold these views. However, it seems to me the reasoning you may have is that anything indeterministic or random will weigh every choice (RIS) or create every solution (RIG) on equal footing. That is, a RIS for example, won't try to determine the best, it will pick one solution at random.

I guess this is correct – because this is how I define the RIS (it picks a solution at random – it does not try to evaluate the solutions).

Similarly the RIG will simply bubble up ideas and provide as many useless ones as useful ones. The thing is, I don't see why that should necessarily be the case. Certainly a RIG or RIS could be designed to do so, but that doesn't mean it is an optimal solution for its function.

I completely agree that we could explore more complex models, mixing random and deterministic behaviour in the idea generators and idea selectors for example – my intention here was to take the simplest possible cases to see if they provide an agent with the properties we are looking for (eg CHDO and unpredictability combined with rational behaviour), and I think I have done that. We can develop more complex models of course, but the conclusion stays the same – indeterminism and randomness can add value for decision making agents.

Take for example radioactive decay. What is indeterministic (or random if you don't like the i word) is WHEN it decays. Despite that, the decay process must still remain probabilistic. That feature of indeterminism can also be made use of, and if I'm not mistaken it largely is for computer programs that require the use of a random number generator. One can 'design' a RIG that incorporates a process that minimizes useless ideas and maximizes useful ones while at the same time coming up with ideas a DIG might not. Similarly, a RIS could be designed to incorporate a process that minimizes useless ideas and maximizes useful ones. The benefit of such a RIS would be the ability to keep a predator guessing, so to speak. If we always made the most logical choice, wouldn't a predator use that to its advantage by assuming for example, you will always run away instead of fight? It would seem to me that there are benefits to doing non-optimal things at times, since honestly we can't and don't always (or even usually) try to weigh choices as logically the best or worst. People and animals often do what is 'not optimal' and in so doing glean an advantage of surprise.

Agreed. I am not suggesting that my simple model of parallel and pure DIG-RIG is the way that people and animals actually behave (that never was my intention), only that this simple model is an example of indeterminism and randomness “adding value” for decision making agents.

Hope that was constructive.

Very much so! Thanks
MF

 

[Tournesol]

But did the model “do otherwise” in run 2 out of “free will choice to do otherwise”, or was it “constrained to do otherwise” by the RIG? The RIG remember is responsible for “throwing up possible alternative choices”. In run 2, the RIG did NOT throw up the possibility of choice A, thus in effect the RIG BLOCKED the agent from the possibility of choosing A, even when A would have been (rationally) a better choice than B!

It was not constrained by the R.I.G. because the RIG is not external.
Whatever the internal causal basis of your actions is, it is not
something external to you that is overriding your wishes and pushing you around.

Is this an example of “Could Have Done Otherwise”? Or would a more accurate description be “Forced to Do Otherwise”? The agent in run 2 was effectively forced to choose B rather than A (it was forced to do otherwise in run 2 than it had done in run 1) because of the limited choices afforded to it by the RIG. Perthaps a better acronym for this kind of model is thus FDO (forced to do otherwise) rather than CHDO?

That agent is the totality of SIS, RIG and everything else. One part
of you does not constrain or force another.

Did the model choose B rather than A in run 2 because it was "acting freely" in its choice, and preferred B to A? No clearly not (because in a straight choice between A and B the model always chooses A).
Or did the model choose B rather than A in run 2 because its choices were actually being RESTRICTED by the RIG, such that it was NOT POSSIBLE for it to choose to do A in Run 2, even though A was always a better choice than B? Yes, this is indeed clearly the case.
Which kind of "free will" would you prefer to have?

The kind you are describing does not sound very attractive, but I can always amend the model so that "If the RIG succeeds in coming up with an option on one occasion, it will always include it on subsequent occasions".
After all, I only have to come up with a model that workds

 

[Tournesol]

We have seen (post #37) that the simple so-called Darwinian model, which comprises a single Random Idea Generator folowed by a Sensible Idea Selector, does not endow any properties to an agent which we might recognise as “properties of free will”. In particular, rather than endowing the ability of Could Have Done Otherwise (CHDO), the simple RIG-SIS combination acts to RESTRICT the number of possible courses of action, thus forcing the agent to make non-optimal choices (a feature I have termed Forced to Do Otherwise, FDO, rather than CHDO).

Of course RIG+SIS is not restricted compared to pure determinsim, because
under pure determinism there is always exactly one (physically) possible choice. Other options are may be considered as theories or ideas, but
they weill be inevitably rejected.

In what follows I shall distiguish between genuine Could Have Done Otherwise (CHDO, where the agent can rationally choose between a set of possibilities which includes at least all of the rational possibilities) and Forced to Do Otherwise (FDO, where the agent EITHER simply chooses randomly, ie the choice is not rational, OR is forced to choose from a set of random possibilities which may not include all of the rational possibilities).

I think that is misleading. It would be better to talk about
sub-optimal CHDO and irrational CHDO. In particular it is
a conceptual error to talk about agents being "forced"
by internal processes that constitute them.

As we have seen in post #37, the so-called Darwinian model is an example of FDO.

It turns out to be sub-optimal CHDO only by making unnecessary assumptions.

So-called Darwinian Agent
RIG -> DIS
The so-called Darwinian agent comprises a RIG which outputs possible courses of action which are then input to a DIS.
See http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html#introduction for a more complete description of this model.
The so-called Darwinian agent will make rational choices from a random selection of possibilities.
As shown in post #37 of this thread, even if the RIG is truly indeterministic (i-RIG) the random nature of generation of the alternative possibilities means that this model forcibly restricts the choices available to the agent, such that non-optimum choices may be made. The model thus endows FDO and not CHDO.
Because of this property (ie FDO rather than CHDO) no true-thinking Libertarian should claim that such an agent possesses free will, even in the case of an i-RIG where the agent clearly behaves indeterministically.

There is no reason to suppose that the RIG, having succeeded in coming up
with option A at time t will fail to come up with it again -- this objection
is based on an arbitrary limitation.

Parallel DIG-RIG Agent
DIG -> }
..... -> } DIS
RIG –> }

The parallel DIG-RIG agent comprises TWO separate idea generators, one deterministic and one random, working in parallel. The deterministic idea generator outputs rational possible courses of action which are then input to a DIS. Also input to the same DIS are possible courses of action generated by the random idea generator. The DIS then evaluates all of the possible courses of action, those generated deterministically and those generated randomly, and the DIS then rationally chooses one of the ideas as the preferred course of action.
Since a proportion of the possible ideas is generated randomly, the Parallel DIG-RIG agent (just like the Capricious and Darwinian agents) can appear to act unpredictably. If the RIG is deterministic (a d-RIG) then the Parallel DIG-RIG agent behaves deterministically but still unpredictably. If the RIG is indeterministic (an i-RIG) then the Parallel DIG-RIG behaves indeterministically (and therefore also unpredictably).
Since a proportion of the possible ideas is also generated deterministically and rationally (by the DIG), not only does the agent NOT behave capriciously but also the agent is NOT in any way restricted or forced by the RIG to choose a non-optimal or irrational course of action (all rational courses of action are always available as possibilities to the DIS via the DIG, even if the RIG throws up totally irrational or non-optimum possibilities).
The Parallel DIG-RIG model therefore combines the advantages of the Deterministic model (completely rational behaviour) along with the advantages of the Darwinian model (unpredictable behaviour) but with none of the drawbacks of the Darwinian model (the agent is not restricted or forced by the RIG to make non-optimal choices).
If the Parallel DIG-RIG is based on a d-RIG then it behaves deterministically but unpredictably. Importantly, it does NOT then endow CHDO (since it is deterministic) therefore presumably would not be accepted by a Libertarian as an explanatory model for free will. Interestingly though, this model (DIG plus d-RIG) explains everything that we observe in respect of free will (it produces a rational yet not necessarily predictable agent), and the model should be acceptable both to Determinists and Compatabilists alike (since it is deterministic).

It doesn't explain the subjective sensation of having multipl epossibilities that are open
to you at the present moment, nor the phenomenon of regret, which
implies CHDO. Of course, I have argued against compatiblism (and
hence against d-RIG as adequate for a fully-fledged idea of FW)
in my article.