mfb said:
You can fail to falsify a theory, but you cannot prove it - a (useful) theory can be used for an infinite set of predictions, and you cannot perform infinitely many experiments.
My fault here, my friend. The word I meant to say was "testable," not "proven."
No, he could not - Einstein would have gotten wrong results. This quote has a special meaning in quantum mechanics, and its application is unique to QM, where interpretation (see first part) is not trivial. Newtonian gravity and SR/GR do not need a separate interpretations.
The topic of what a theory "should" do is obviously one that has been argued over and over, especially in the case of quantum mechanics. You seem to be arguing the case for
instrumentalism, while I am arguing more for the case for
realism.
The mathematics of quantum mechanics is battle-tested, a fact which I am not doubting. The issue is that the mathematics of quantum mechanics itself
is not a complete theory. It's simply symbols (variables, operators, numbers, etc.). What makes something a theory is not simply the fact that its claims can be tested, but that its claims can be
interpreted as testable, with experiments themselves being interpretations of claims. Conducting a test on the claim, "When I let go of this ball, the ball will accelerate towards the ground at a rate of 9.8 m/s^2," requires an interpretation (i.e. understanding) of how it will even be possible to even test the claim. This understanding is implicit (i.e. contextual), produced from a frame of understanding about the physics/mathematics of the situation that we already have, but still very much present in the theory and is indispensable to it.
My goal is simply to make what is
implicit in the double-slit experiment (or Schrodinger's Cat experiment) more
explicit so that we can better interpret the results of the experiment and possibly conduct more experiments that can produce more elucidating results. The issue is much more than a "language thing": it is a "context" thing, which is necessary for any viable scientific theory, since the context is what allows us interpret the claim as testable. To say that the interference pattern of the electron beam expresses the probability of an electron's arrival assumes that the electron "arrives" -- i.e. travels from one place to another. But I don't know how to understand this claim if the position of the electron
must be uncertain in order to get the interference. And if it's not the probability of "arrival," then what is it the probability of, to be concise?
If you could elucidate this issue for me, I'd be very thankful.