DaveC426913
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Your viewpoint ignores the idea that new additions can be imbued with identity once added.Noesis said:What an interesting paradox. I have thought about essentially the same question multiple times. From a particular viewpoint, the crux of answering the question lies in establishing some threshold where once crossed the object in question no longer retains its identity. I believe this can be given quite a measurable, i.e., mathematical, representation.
Already the framing of the question establishes some threshold since it is assumed that the ship, or the human vessel, remain static throughout time. Small changes are also likely to be dismissed: If a splinter is removed from the ship or a hair removed from my body, we are still likely to not question the persistence of the object's identity. I think interesting conclusions can be drawn from these thoughts, although some are, granted, fairly academic.
i.e. if half the planks on Theseus' ship are replaced with new planks, it does not follow that only half the ship is Theseus' ship; it is more reasonable that the new planks are inaugerated into the "Theseus' Ship Club".
I don't think this will work. I would not have to remove many pieces from a computer program for it to stop working. In fact, the removal of a single character - virtually any single character I might care to choose - is quite likely to be fatal. I would then erroneously conclude that that single character is the most important component in the program.Noesis said:Of more practical concern: I think this provides a simple algorithm to determine what is responsible for something's function. Basically: remove things until it stops doing what it was doing. Removing planks one by one might provide considerable insight as to what keeps the ship afloat in the first place, in case Theseus was wondering. If technically feasible, I think this would be a fantastic way to attempt to identify the basis of consciousness. Ideally one could start by removing one molecule at a time and analyzing throughout, initially it'd be far more practical to start at a coarser grain by, say, removing entire neural compartments or neural assemblies.
I think the algorithm can also be abstracted away from a material setting, although will probably be more difficult to carry out in general. For example, in regards to an argument of what constitutes life, one could identify a living object and then start to subtract parameters until it was clear that the object could not possibly be alive without these remaining parameters. Then this fundamental set must be the basis of life. This might sound very oversimplified since, after all, it has been traditionally very difficult to establish a working definition of what life is. However, I think the main impediment has been what Dave mentions in another post: human versus non-human is a very different question than alive, or animate, versus inanimate.
Likewise, I would not have to remove many components of a human for it to stop working too. I cannot thus conclude that the particular component I last removed is the difference between life and death.
Same would likely apply to consciousness.
Thus is the nature of complex, interdependent systems. I think these are excellent examples of 'the whole is greater than the sum of its parts'.

