DevilsAvocado said:
Astronuc, do you know if BWR Mark I have http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boilin...ems#Emergency_Core_Cooling_System_.28ECCS.29" (ECCS) that can be directly operated by steam and provide water without electrically driven pumps...?
I don't know the specifics of Unit 1, particularly the order or sequence of events in the shutdown. According to the Wiki article cited: "HPCI is powered by steam from the reactor, and takes approximately 10 seconds to spin up from an initiating signal, and can deliver approximately 19,000 L/min (5,000 US gal/min) to the core at any core pressure above 6.8 atm (690 kPa, 100 psi)." It's not clear to me if that was an issue.
When the plant is completely shutdown, there is no steam, so those pumps used for cooling while the plant is shutdown, I would expect are run by electrical power. The site lost the connection with the grid, and the other units went down, so the EDGs would have to provide the electricity. They did so for one hour and then stopped, ostensibly because the tsunami compromised the fuel supply (did the fuel supply get flooded so they pumped water into the EDGs? or did the tsunami knock out the fuel pumps? or EDGs directly?).
We still don't have a clear picture of the sequents of events.
As for protecting against an earthquake and tsunami, every site is required to provide protection against natural events, including floods, hurricanes, tornados, fires, earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis, and seiches.
The bible for designing, constructing and operating a nuclear plant is
Reg Guide 1.70 -
http://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/idmws/ViewDocByAccession.asp?AccessionNumber=ML011340122
Regulatory Guide 1.070 (Revision 3), Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition.
Chapter 2 mandates consideration of seismic and hydrological phenomena:
2.4 Hydrologic Engineering
The following sections should contain sufficient information to allow an independent hydrologic engineering review to be made of all hydrologically related design bases, performance requirements, and bases for operation of structures, systems, and components important to safety, considering the following phenomena or conditions:
1. Runoff floods for streams, reservoirs, adjacent drainage areas, and site drainage, and flood waves resulting from dam failures induced by runoff floods,
2. Surges, seiches, and wave action,
3. Tsunami,
4. Nonrunoff-induced flood waves due to dam failures or landslides,
5. Blockage of cooling water sources by natural events,
6. Ice jam flooding,
7. Combinations of flood types,
8. Low water and/or drought effects (including setdown due to surges, seiches, or tsunami) on safety-related cooling water supplies and their dependability,
9. Channel diversions of safety-related cooling water sources,
10. Capacity requirements for safety-related cooling water sources, and
11. Dilution and dispersion of severe accidental releases to the hydrosphere relating to existing and potential future users of surface water and groundwater resources.
Somewhere I would expect to be a calculation or statement as to the maximum height of a tsunami. That will have to be revisited.
However, assuming that the Japanese authorities follow the NRC, and usually other national regulatory authorities have followed the NRC, they would have had the same or similar language for all sites in Japan, and the responsible architect/engineer and utility would have to consider protection of the emergency/safety systems from earthquakes and tsunamis.