Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

AI Thread Summary
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant is facing significant challenges following the earthquake, with reports indicating that reactor pressure has reached dangerous levels, potentially 2.1 times capacity. TEPCO has lost control of pressure at a second unit, raising concerns about safety and management accountability. The reactor is currently off but continues to produce decay heat, necessitating cooling to prevent a meltdown. There are conflicting reports about an explosion, with indications that it may have originated from a buildup of hydrogen around the containment vessel. The situation remains serious, and TEPCO plans to flood the containment vessel with seawater as a cooling measure.
  • #10,901
rmattila said:
The Swedes built a facility called FILTRA at their Barsebäck two-unit BWR site in the early 1980's. Here's a really thorough and well-written progress report of the project that resulted into a 10 000 m3 gravel bed being built next to the the units. That might be one approach to improve the capacity of old containments; however, it won't remove the problems related to preventing core-concrete interactions if a molten core falls to the bottom of the containment.

Thank you, rmattila! That was a very inspiring read. Tepco had almost 30 years to follow the Swedish example, but didn't.

Perhaps the Swedes had an extra incentive to think about cleaning up venting gases in case of a melt-down. They had built the Barsebäck BWRs a mere 20 km from Copenhagen, the Danish capital (metropolitan population: 1.9M), and the Danes kept calling for its shutdown. I found a study ("http://130.226.56.153/rispubl/reports/ris-r-462.pdf"") published just around the time the Swedes decided to build their filter system.

I think that, had there been an effective filter system for the containment venting at Fukushima Daiichi, the reluctance to vent the containment sooner, while there was still less pressure and less hydrogen would not have been as great.
 
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  • #10,902
westfield said:
This document appears to indicate the operators aligned the venting from both drywell AND S\C. No scrubbing from the drywell venting.

The document also indicates very high dose rates in the buildings and onsite well before the venting even took place. To my laybrain that seems odd - was there containment failure before they even got to vent?

source : http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110618e15.pdf"


On the SGTS\HVS contamination - why the high dose rates in the Unit 1 Turbine building early on? And why does SGTS even go into the turbine building? Why does the SGTS appear to be HEAVILY contaminated, it shouldn't have even been possible for it to be working after loss of power. So SGTS just opens itself up on loss of power? WTF. The more I read about the design of these systems the less I want to know, kind of.

Initial reports from workers at the plant described considerable damage resulted from the earthquake, prior to the tsunami. Recent interviews with workers present at the time bolster this. Radiation alarms were tripped at the #1 reactor prior to the tsunami. It is believed by a number of Japanese experts that cooling systems failed initially due to earthquake damage - breaks in the primary cooling system that initiated emergency spraying systems to kick in.

TEPCO has considerable stake in claiming that the meltdowns were entirely the result of an unforeseeable, rare event (huge tsunami) rather than being initiated by earthquake damage from shaking that was within or just barely exceeded the plant design basis.
 
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  • #10,903
Most Curious said:
The 1st few feet of the control rods were graphite rather than absorber material so a SCRAM or even orderly insertion of control rods INCREASED power until the absorber portion of the rod was in the core.

This is a simplification. Only many years later I found a more detailed description of the graphite tip problem. Here it is:

RBMK reactor's active zone is 7 meters high. Therefore, control rods' absorbing section is 7 meters high too. Since control rods sit in water filled vertical tubes, if rod would have only absorbing section (without any additional tips below it), with the rod in fully retracted position the whole tube will be water-filled. Water absorbs neutrons, which is bad for neutron balance. Therefore, adding a 7 meter long graphite tip below absorbing section improves neutron balance: graphite doesn't absorb neutrons (or more precisely, it absorbs them less than water).

However, this requires an additional 7 meter long tube extension under reactor's active zone, in order for the tip to have a place to move into when control rod is fully inserted. This in turn will require deeper basement etc. IOW: it will cost money.

So designers decided to make tips shorter than 7 meters. Say, 5 meters. Which means that if all control rods are fully retracted, the lowest 2 meters of control rods' tubes are water filled.

If in this configuration all rods are lowered simultaneously, 5 meter long graphite tips (which are already in active zone, in its 5 upper meters) will start moving down, and in this lowest 2 meters of active zone neutron absorption will be reduced, and reactivity will increase.

If it so happens that reactor's local reactivity in its lower part is already higher than average, then this reactivity spike can be the last feather on the camel's back.
 
  • #10,904
I_P said:
TEPCO has considerable stake in claiming that the meltdowns were entirely the result of an unforeseeable, rare event (huge tsunami) rather than being initiated by earthquake damage from shaking that was within or just barely exceeded the plant design basis.

The anti-nuclear community have considerable stake in claiming that the meltdowns were entirely the result of a foreseeable, common event.

You don't have a primary cooling failure and also need to vent the RPV due to excessive pressures 12,24,48 hours later.
 
  • #10,905
Most Curious said:
Sadly, the Chernobyl engineer in charge ordered the ECCS locked out - literally padlocked - to preserve test integrity!

The up and down changes in reactor power were against written safety requirement and resulted in nearly ALL of the control rods out of the core to attempt power increase. They got their power increase allright, but it was WAY too much and WAY too fast.

The RBMK has a positive void and positive temperature coefficient making control at low power levels VERY difficult and unstable.

The 1st few feet of the control rods were graphite rather than absorber material so a SCRAM or even orderly insertion of control rods INCREASED power until the absorber portion of the rod was in the core.

All of the above and a few more items made the RBMK a ticking time bomb, just waiting for a few operator errors to cause a disaster.

Most Curious,

Add to that, that they conducted their experiment in the middle of a Xenon Transient.

The operators had greatly reduced the power in preparation for their experiment, when the load controller in Kiev called and asked that Chernobyl Unit 4 remain online at the reduced power, since they really needed the capacity. It was several hours later that the load controller released the plant to go offline.

That put them right in the middle of the Xenon Transient from the initial lowering of reactor power. The reason they had so many control rods out was because they were attempting to compensate for the parasitic neutron capture due to Xenon-135.

However, if you get the reactor critical, and you start burning the Xenon-135, then you are burning away a neutron poison, so that increases reactivity, increases power, hence burning more Xenon-135...and you have yourself a positive feedback loop.

The fact that they conducted this experiment in the middle of the Xenon Transient is a real big factor in the cause of the Chernobyl disaster.

Greg
 
  • #10,906
Thank you Greg! I had forgotten what they called that, an "Iodine" or "xenon well", IIRC - what you probably more correctly called a "Xenon Transient". In any event, there were procedures in the manual that forbid them trying to overcome the "poison" problem so rapidly. Further, the reactivity reserve mandated a minimum number of rods fully inserted in the core at all times - which they violated trying to burn up the Xenon.

Like almost ALL major accidents - nuclear, aircraft or others - a whole series of events pile up, leading to disaster. At Chernobyl, they had a poorly designed test, foolish cheif engineer (pad lock ECCS?), at least three positive feedback loops in the reactor - just to name a FEW. No wonder they lost control of it!

Fukushima is similar, in my uneducated opinion. Some questionable site design features, maybe an operator error or two, an unforgiving small containment, HUGE Earth quake and enormous tusnami not to mention political issues (Permission to vent before the containment ruptures?). Point being, no single even did them in but rather a SERIES of bad events and beyond design basis problems. In some ways I am in awe the situation did not turn out even worse than it has so far.
 
  • #10,907
""Like almost ALL major accidents - nuclear, aircraft or others - a whole series of events pile up, leading to disaster.""

Bumping up against the philosophical thread now...



Ernest Gann's classic book "Fate is the Hunter" made that a theme, more so in early edition.

In my life as a plant troubleshooter it is exactly the truth - little things stack up like dominoes and eventually something pushes the first domino. Often it's a trivial initiating event and that's how the small things of the Earth confound the mighty.

Good maintenance consists of not letting the dominoes stack up. Japanese are very good at maintenance in fact our industry sent people over there to study how they achieved such good reliability.

The major dominoes there were placement of electrical equipment in basements on ocean side of plant, and failing to act in 1990's when better information regarding tidal waves came to light. I believe one personal letter from plant workers to an executive would have changed the outcome.

old jim
 
  • #10,908
Thanks htf that does help.

powering the feed pumps briefly would help the turbine avoid overspeed on loss of grid, so it does make mechanical sense



old jim
 
  • #10,909
My understanding of the test is that not overspeed of the turbine should be avoided but to demonstrate that the rotational energy of the down-spinning turbine can be used to power the main feedwater pumps. These pumps are needed to cool the reactor during a loss-of-coolant accident in an initial phase (says the GRS report). The scenario hence was loss of normal power supply during an loss-of-coolant accident. It takes a fairly long time to bring up the emergency power system (almost 1 minute according to an other report) - presumably to long for the twofold fault situation. Therefore they wanted to show that the spinning turbines can serve as an emergency power system that is immediately available. This test had failed during entry-into-service.

Rumours say that the reason why the Soviets considered this fault scenario was the Israeli attack on the reactor in Iraq in 1981.
 
  • #10,910
As a side note, low startup speed of gas turbines has been one reason why emergency power for safety systems at NPP:s is usually arranged with diesel generators. Typically, you can start an EDG within 10 s or so, while a gas turbine may take minutes to start up.

The http://www.mhi.co.jp/atom/hq/atome_e/apwr/index.html by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries has some design features that according to its designer make emergency diesel generators unnecessary: the plant allows for a longer period of time before power is needed in case of a LOCA, and this combined with a emergency gas turbine designed for a very short startup time (of the order of half a minute or so) are said to fulfil all safety criteria without any emergency diesel generators. As far as I understand, from maintenance point of view gas turbines would be a tempting option as NPP emergency power generation units.
 
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  • #10,911
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110811_01-e.pdf (11 August) "Leakage point from flexible hose in circulating cooling device for Unit 4 Spent Fuel Pool"

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110814_02-e.pdf A magnitude 6 earthquake occurred at 3:22 AM on 12 August off the Fukushima prefecture shore. This press release explains the consequences on the Fukushima Daiichi plant: boiler stops at the desalination facility, injection rate into unit 1 reactor declined to 3.2 m³/hour, and one air-control compressor breaks down at unit 1 at 5:06 AM. The small leak at SFP4 cooling system was found at 5:27 AM.

http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=soc_30&k=2011081200844 SFP1 temperature reached 39.5°C at 11:00 AM on 12 August, down from 47°C on 10 August when the SFP cooling system was started. Two more leakage points were found at the SFP4 cooling system, bringing the total number of leakage points to 4. Each leaked quantity is small, like bleeding. Damaged hoses will be replaced. An alarm rang at 6:15 PM on 12 August, and the water treatment facility stopped. As no abnormality was found, it was started again at 11:30 PM. A wrong alarm temporarily shut down the facility on 11 August too.

Fukushima Daiichi unit 1:
At 7:36 pm on August 13, we adjusted the rate of water injection through
reactor feed water system piping arrangement to approximately 3.8m3/h as
we confirmed decrease in the amount of water injection to the reactor.
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11081401-e.html

http://sankei.jp.msn.com/affairs/news/110814/dst11081413210003-n1.htm In the morning of 13 August, 6 tons of sodium carbonate (a chemical agent preventing foreign bodies from sticking to the pipes) leaked at an evaporation equipment in the desalination facility. One of the two desalination systems was stopped, bringing down the desalination capacity by one half. It will be started again on 15 August. The cause could be the hose band being loosely fastened, or the rise of temperature inside the tent.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110814_01-e.pdf Pictures of the unplugged sodium carbonate hose and subsequent repairs.

http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-npp16/daiichi-photos16.htm Another set of pictures of Fukushima Daiichi, including "Flood in Electric Equipment Room of Unit 6 (pictured on March 17, 2011)" and "Setting work of submersible pump (pictured on March 17, 2011)" in front of unit 5, which I had not seen before.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/betu11_j/images/110812d.pdf Report in Japanese about worker exposure at Fukushima Daiichi. The positions (green, orange, pink circles) and movements (red and black arrows) of the workers inside control rooms and the direction of the wind (blue arrows) are shown on the maps on page 53 (units 1&2 control room) and 54 (units 3&4 control room) (pdf page numbers). Pages 35, 36, 52, 53 provide detailed timelines of the tasks performed by four workers named "C", "D", "E", and "F". The table on page 40 describes the exposure circumstances for twenty workers (A ~ F, ア ~ セ). The column 1 on the left is their internal contamination in mSv, column 2 says if they wore a mask, column 3 if they ate or drank(有=yes, 無=no), column 4 if they wore glasses (temples may create an interstice through which contaminated air can leak), column 5 if they worked near the door. The table page 42 provides the radiations in cpm measured at units 3&4 control room on 13 March from 10:00 AM to 01:30 PM. Column 1 (on the left) at the front door, column 2 at the emergency door, column 3 at the desk unit 3 side, column 4 at the desk unit 4 side.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/betu11_j/images/110812b.pdf Very big (767 pages / 55.1 MB) report to NISA, in Japanese, about the impact of the 11 March earthquake on Fukushima Daini.

tsutsuji said:
http://mainichi.jp/select/jiken/news/20110607ddm003040107000c.html :

It was discovered that the 13 km long Yunotake fault which runs in Iwaki city 40 km south of Fukushima Daini was activated by aftershocks of the 11 March earthquake. The problem is that this fault had been overlooked in past earthquake safety designs. NISA instructs all NPP operators to review their earthquake safety assessments to ensure similar faults elsewhere are not being overlooked.

http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0812/OSK201108120219.html Tsuruga nuclear power plant units 1 & 2 are located on a crush zone thought to be a normal fault resulting from horizontal stretching forces, which differs from the reverse faults, which result from compressive forces. The probablility that a normal fault causes an earthquake or is activated by an earthquake was thought to be low. However, the magnitude 7 aftershock of 11 April 2011 activated such a normal fault, the Idosawa fault. The head of the Geographical Survey Institute's Kanto regional survey department, Mr Hiroshi Une, who is also a member of the NISA's working committee for the re-examination of Tsuruga power plant's earthquake safety, says that although Japan's normal faults are not supposed to move, since the 11 March earthquake the Earth's crust is subject to forces which are different from those observed in the past, and although there are crush zones all over Japan, the Tsuruga power plant is a case needing special attention because an active fault (the Urasoko fault, last activated 4000 years ago) is running inside the plant premises. Japco will announce its conclusions by the end of August. (The orange lines on the map are the active faults. The grey lines are the crush zones).

http://www.chunichi.co.jp/s/article/2011081290085007.html It has been found that just below Tsuruga nuclear power plant's reactors, faults called "crush zones" could move under the influence of the Urasoko active fault. Crush zones were previously thought as having "no activity", and they were not taken into account in the nuclear plant's earthquake safety design, but it was discovered that in the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake, this kind of fault had moved. Thinking the consequences for the plant again, Japco will disclose its opinion on the matter by the end of August. Hiroshi Une said: "the commonly held opinion that normal faults don't move has collapsed". Fast breeding reactor Monju is close to the Shiraki-Nyu active fault, and crush zones of the normal fault type were confirmed below the reactor. Tectonic geomorphology professor Mitsuhisa Watanabe of Toyo University says : "however robust a reactor is made, if the ground tilts, it will get broken. Keeping normal faults out of one's thought was a mistake and that must be revised".
 
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  • #10,912
tsutsuji said:
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110814_02-e.pdf A magnitude 6 earthquake occurred at 3:22 AM on 12 August off the Fukushima prefecture shore. This press release explains the consequences on the Fukushima Daiichi plant: boiler stops at the desalination facility, injection rate into unit 1 reactor declined to 3.2 m³/hour, and one air-control compressor breaks down at unit 1 at 5:06 AM. The small leak at SFP4 cooling system was found at 5:27 AM.

http://www.chunichi.co.jp/s/article/2011081290085007.html It has been found that just below Tsuruga nuclear power plant's reactors, faults called "crush zones" could move under the influence of the Urasoko active fault. Crush zones were previously thought as having "no activity", and they were not taken into account in the nuclear plant's earthquake safety design, but it was discovered that in the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake, this kind of fault had moved. Thinking the consequences for the plant again, Japco will disclose its opinion on the matter by the end of August. Hiroshi Une said: "the commonly held opinion that normal faults don't move has collapsed". Fast breeding reactor Monju is close to the Shiraki-Nyu active fault, and crush zones of the normal fault type were confirmed below the reactor. Tectonic geomorphology professor Mitsuhisa Watanabe of Toyo University says : "however robust a reactor is made, if the ground tilts, it will get broken. Keeping normal faults out of one's thought was a mistake and that must be revised".

Thanks, again, for your excellent and ongoing effort to bring out the news.

Is it possible that the geophysicists were right? Maybe crush zones did not move in the past, but are moving now?
 
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  • #10,914
zapperzero said:
Speaking of news. TEPCO says tritium was detected in intake water canal and sub-drain of unit 2, on June 13.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110624e10.pdf
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110624e7.pdf

H/T the tireless ex-skf

I have not seen any recent data that showed tritium in the sub-drains. The data you referenced was 7 weeks old and was less than 1% of the regulatory limit for tritium then. As I understand the samples of the sub-drains are made in water that is being contained for processing so there is no significant release ongoing. What point are you trying to make?
 
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  • #10,915
H3 is something that's released from the reactors even during normal operations as it's very difficult to separate from regular hydrogen in cooling water at low concentrations. It's produced from boron in the reactor and from neutron activation of deuterium in the coolant. Not sure how the quantities compare here though.

See:
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/tritium/faqs.html#normal
 
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  • #10,916
Moving the discussion from https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=3452884#post3452884" to the main thread:

rmattila said:
My recollection from the documentation published by TEPCO is that there would have been enough water on the secondary side to boil off the decay heat for 90 minutes, which does sound rather a short time window. Still, a lot can be accomplished in that time, if there are practised EOPs in place. It would be really interesting to hear the details why they failed to restart the IC after the tsunami, as the IC is something many of the the new BWR designs rely heavily upon in cases of emergency.

It appears the initial shutdown of the IC was prompted by the rapid fall in temperature after the IC was activated. There was a spec for the maximum drop in temperature per hour. It sounds there was concern about stressing the steel of the RPV:

"It is possible that a worker may have manually closed the valve (of the isolation condenser) to prevent a rapid decrease in temperature, as is stipulated by a reactor operating guideline," Tepco spokesman Hajime Motojuku told The Japan Times.

A worker may have stopped the condenser to keep cold water from coming into contact with the hot steel of the reactor to prevent it from being damaged.

However, nuclear reactors are designed to withstand this procedure in case of an emergency, said Hiromi Ogawa, a former nuclear plant engineer at Toshiba Corp.

According to Tepco, the isolation condenser's valve was confirmed open at 6:10 p.m. March 11 but it is unknown whether it was open between 3 p.m. and 6:10 p.m.

The valve was confirmed closed at 6:25 p.m. and confirmed open again at 9:30 p.m. Finally, the condenser was shut down due to a pump malfunction at 1:48 a.m. March 12, roughly eight hours after the tsunami, matching the battery life of the isolation condenser.

(http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110517x1.html" )

There was concern about the steel getting brittle from neutron bombardment over the years and unit 1 was the oldest at 40 years and rapid changes in temperatures is something brittle materials don't handle well (think of glass).

MadderDoc said:
I reckon you'll be interested in http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110618e15.pdf", on the logs and testimony of operator response during the first days after the earthquake.

From the available evidence and testimony, the operators do in fact appear to have opted for the use of just one of the IC systems (the 'A' system) for the control of reactor pressure, judging it to be sufficient to keep the vessel at 6-7MPa, while they initially relied on the HPCI system for the control of the reactor water level.

In that Tepco document it also says they understood the water level of unit 1 at 21:19, 11 minutes before IC was confirmed active again.

Earlier on, after they had lost EDG power it says "Operaters judged HPCI was not operable because indicators on the control panel were gradually faded." I don't understand why that would be, as HPCI should work on steam pressure and batteries.

Another concern I have is how the IC would behave once the core gets uncovered and the zirconium cladding starts to burn, since then hydrogen would start flowing into it if the inlet valve is open, but that hydrogen could not be condensed. Somebody had explained that the (battery operated) valves at the bottom of the IC are usually closed until enough steam had been condensed to fill it. Then valve are opened, the water is let drain back to the RPV and after that the valves are closed again.

What would happen if uncondensible hydrogen prevented the IC from ever filling to the top, as the hydrogen displaced condensible steam, preventing it from coming into contact with cool IC water?

Tepco estimates that fuel was uncovered 5 hours after the quake, i.e. before 20:00 on 3/11. The valve would have been closed at the time. If it was opened at 21:30, that would have been 90 minutes into the exposed core overheating.
 
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  • #10,917
joewein said:
rmattila said:
It would be really interesting to hear the details why they failed to restart the IC after the tsunami,
It appears the initial shutdown of the IC was prompted by the rapid fall in temperature after the IC was activated. There was a spec for the maximum drop in temperature per hour. It sounds there was concern about stressing the steel of the RPV:

Controlling the cooldown rate of the RPV is a standard procedure when running the plant to cold shutdown, and it appears that the IC in Fukushima Dai-ichi unit 1 was so powerful that it needed shutting down in order to stay within TechSpecs cooldown rate. This all seems to have been nice and well after the earthquake, when the plant had experienced what then seemed an anticipated operational occurrence.

Things changed when the tsunami hit and knocked out the AC power supply. At this time, the plant situation degraded from an AOO to an accident, and I would imagine re-activating the IC would be among the first tasks instructed by the EOP at station blackout. However, the details of what actually happened at that time are somewhat unclear to me: did they attempt to restart the IC and if they did, why did it not prevent the core uncovery?
 
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  • #10,918
rmattila said:
I would imagine re-activating the IC would be among the first tasks instructed by the EOP at station blackout. However, the details of what actually happened at that time are somewhat unclear to me: did they attempt to restart the IC and if they did, why did it not prevent the core uncovery?

The report says the valve status of the isolation return valves was not indicated on the control panel. At 15:50 they lost power to the instruments and no longer knew the reactor water level either. If they know what was done to control the isolation condenser for the rest of the afternoon they're not telling us. However, the statement about not knowing the water level or the valve status could be interpreted as a way to excuse why perhaps the correct action was not taken.

As soon as HPCI was no longer available, the IC was the only thing left to prevent the core of unit 1 from boiling dry.

If there was enough water in the IC to last for only 90 minutes (can you still find the source for that), refilling the IC tank should have been a high priority.


This also reminds me again of the issue of running out of fresh water on site. When they later started pumping highly radioactive water from the flooded basement into the condenser tank (1600 m3) at unit 1, they then wanted to pump water from the condenser to the condenser storage tank (1900 m3), but found it to be full and had to empty that water into the suppression pool surge tanks first.

They also had 10,000 m3 of water previously used in primary cooling system circuits available at the Centralized Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility, which Tepco later dumped into the ocean to make space for highly radioactive water from the basements, saying that the radioactivity of the 10,000 tons equaled that of 10 liters of unit 2 basement water.

It sounds to me like perhaps there was water available that wasn't considered. What kind of a plan did they have?
 
  • #10,919
joewein said:
If there was enough water in the IC to last for only 90 minutes (can you still find the source for that),

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0230/ML023010606.pdf, page 39/92:

Following a reactor isolation and scram, the energy added to the coolant will cause reactor pressure to increase and may initiate the isolation condenser. The capacity of this system is equivalent to the decay heat rate generation 5 minutes following the scram and isolation. With no makeup water, the volume of water stored in the isolation condenser will be depleted in 1 hour and 30 minutes. This allows sufficient time to initiate makeup water flow to the shell side of the condenser.

That appears to be a generic description of GE BWRs, so I don't know how it accurately it describes the 1F1 plant. 1F1 has rather small thermal power, so I guess the grace period could be somewhat longer.
 
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  • #10,920
Although the NHK website was quite quiet in the past few days (because of Obon holiday?), we are having Fukushima-NPP-related NHK news again today:

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20110816/index.html SARRY has been started for a test run today. If everything is OK, this test will be performed until 17 August night, after which normal operation will ensue.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20110816/1300_jisshi.html Tepco plans to install desalination systems and decontamination systems with zeolite at units 2,3,4 spent fuel pools [How about unit 1?]. The desalination system for SFP4, located on 5 truck platforms, using a special membrane and electricity [that must be reverse osmosis], will be installed by the end of this week and is expected to bring salt concentration to 1/25th in two month's time.

Tomari NPP unit 3, in Hokkaido, is going to resume commercial operation:
Nuclear reactors suspended for regular checkups need to undergo "stress tests" before resuming operations, but the central government has said that the case of the Tomari reactor is not a restart because the reactor is already activated
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110813p2g00m0dm010000c.html
 
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  • #10,921
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20110817/0525_taisaku.html Tepco is planning a new strategy to further reduce radiations in addition to building cover structures above the reactors : pumping contaminated gases directly out of the containment vessels. At present the radiations released outside through the interstices created by the explosions are 1,000,000,000 Bq/hour. This will be implemented after technical issues are solved.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20110817/index.html Based on measurements made over the past two weeks, the radiations released outside the plant premises are estimated to be less than 2,000,000,000 Bq/hour (I am not sure how this figure is related to the above one). This is 5 times less than one month ago and 10,000,000 times less than in mid-March. Tepco says that this is an estimate, with the exact value remaining unknown as no direct measurement method has been found.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20110817/1850_teishi.htmlIt was found by the Government's investigation committee that managers such as the plant manager took some countermeasure-related decisions on the day of the accident at unit 1 while ignoring that some emergency cooling equipments had been shut down by the plant operators relying on their own judgment(*). According to specialists, the failure to pass safety-related information could have made the situation worsen. It is known that from about 6:30 PM on 11 March an emergency condenser was shut down for three hours. Because they could not observe any steam, the plant operators believed that the condenser was subject to a "boil-dry" as it is called when water has run out, and they shut it down in order to preserve it from being broken(*). This event was not reported to the managers in the seismic-isolated building such as plant manager Yoshida. Mr Yoshida admitted that this failure in the information flow was "a big mistake". An Institute of Applied Energy expert says "If the emergency condenser had been running, a certain level of water should have been secured, but what was actually happenning was that the water level was quickly declining and a different water injection method should have been immediately implemented. As they were persuaded that they had some latitude until a meltdown would occur, it is possible that the situation was made more serious".

The suspicion that the earthquake caused severe damage to the reactors is strengthened by reports that radiation leaked from the plant minutes later. The Bloomberg news agency has reported that a radiation alarm went off about a mile from the plant at 3.29pm, before the tsunami hit.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...truth-behind-fukushimas-meltdown-2338819.html

Kurion Vice President and Chief Technology Officer, Dr. Mark Denton, summarized the Kurion strategy as “delivering (...): i) isotope extraction – using special inorganic media with very high isotope removal capacity (even in seawater conditions), high radiation resistance, and ability to be vitrified with little or no off-gassing and ii) isotope stabilization – by vitrification of the depleted media to volume reduce and immobilize the radionuclides in a leach resistance glass matrix waste form normally reserved for high level waste.”
http://www.timescolonist.com/business/CORRECTING+REPLACING+Kurion+Specific+Media+System+Achieving+Water/5258292/story.html?cid=megadrop_story#ixzz1VJ0XLNdU

* Note : I edited two sentences after rmattila quoted me below. I was a bit confused about who said what, but the main information remains unchanged.
 
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  • #10,922
tsutsuji said:
Tepco plans to install desalination systems and decontamination systems with zeolite at units 2,3,4 spent fuel pools [How about unit 1?].

IIRC, they never needed to pump seawater into unit 1:s SFP, since its decay heat was sufficiently low to allow waiting for fresh water to be available for cooling. Thus, there should be no need for desalination at unit 1:s SFP.
 
  • #10,923
tsutsuji said:
As a result of the testimonies of Tepco-related people it was found by the Government's investigation committee that managers such as the plant manager took some countermeasure-related decisions on the day of the accident at unit 1 while ignoring that some emergency cooling equipments had been shut down by the plant operators relying on their own judgment. According to specialists, the failure to pass safety-related information could have made the situation worsen. It is known that from about 6:30 PM on 11 March an emergency condenser was shut down for three hours. Those Tepco-related people said that because they could not observe any steam, the plant operators believed that the condenser was subject to a "boil-dry" as it is called when water has run out, and they shut it down in order to preserve it from being broken. This event was not reported to the managers in the seismic-isolated building such as plant manager Yoshida. Mr Yoshida admitted that this failure in the information flow was "a big mistake". An Institute of Applied Energy expert says "If the emergency condenser had been running, a certain level of water should have been secured, but what was actually happenning was that the water level was quickly declining and a different water injection method should have been immediately implemented. As they were persuaded that they had some latitude until a meltdown would occur, it is possible that the situation was made more serious".

This still doesn't fit to the figure given in GE:s documentation for the water reserves at the secondary side of the IC.

If I have gotten the pieces right, TEPCO now tells us that
  • The IC valve was closed at some time around 3 pm, after the quake but before the tsunami (is the accurate time given somewhere?)
  • It is "uncertain" whether the valve remained closed between 3 pm and 6:10 pm, but at 6:10 pm it was "confirmed" open.
  • The valve was closed again "around 6:30" (6:25 in some documentation) since no steam was observed, and it remained closed until 9:30 pm,
  • If they had known the IC valve was closed between around 6:30 and 9:30, that could have helped the situation.
  • No mentioning is made whether water was being fed for the IC at any time.

The way I see it, if the figure (found in GE:s generic BWR documentation) of 90 minutes is valid for 1F1, it could well be that the IC had really boiled dry between 3 pm and 6:25, and the notion of no steam was correct. Then it would not have made any difference at all if the valve was open or closed if they at no time fed any water to the IC. The crucial question is: did they? If they did at some time between 6:30 and the core damage time, then the closing of the valve apparently was the crucial error that led to the core uncovery and damage. But if they at no time fed any fresh water to the system, and its capacity really only is 90 min, then it was the failure to replenish the IC rather than the closure of the valve that was obviously the more crucial error.

EDIT: And thank you, tsutsuji. You are really doing a great job to keep many people up-to-date of the data that sometimes is quite difficult to obtain from other sources here at the other side of the world.
 
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  • #10,924
Tepco have released a new video, "Reporting from the grounds of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station".
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/110817e.wmv" (It's nearly 45 MB).

If you can see beyond the reassuring spin, it is a good insight into what it is like for the various people working there.

Two scenes provide a perspective. The first is the fitting of the facemask and switching the noisy blower on. I wonder how many of them have such facemasks - I struggle to believe it is all of them.

The second was the guy proudly showing off his cooling vest with 4 freezer packs in it. That would be worth simply 4 kgs of extra weight 30 minutes after starting an 8 hour shift.

The people on the ground there have my utmost respect for what they go through to earn a day's pay.
 
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  • #10,925
rmattila said:
<..>
If I have gotten the pieces right, TEPCO now tells us that
The IC valve was closed at some time around 3 pm, after the quake but before the tsunami (is the accurate time given somewhere?)

Yes, in the Tepco document "Response after the Earthquake.." it says:

"At 15:03, reactor pressure of Unit 1 dropped so fast and the reactor coolant
temperature decreased 55 C per hour, exceeding a criteria in the Tech.Spec. Then
operators closed MO-3A and 3B, return isolation valves of IC. IC was in stand-by
condition with other valves in the IC remained open. Operators judged that only one
train of IC was sufficient to control the reactor pressure in 6 – 7 MPa. They decided
to use Train A and started to control the pressure by operating MO-3A."


[*]It is "uncertain" whether the valve remained closed between 3 pm and 6:10 pm, but at 6:10 pm it was "confirmed" open.
[*]The valve was closed again "around 6:30" (6:25 in some documentation) since no steam was observed, and it remained closed until 9:30 pm,
[*]If they had known the IC valve was closed between around 6:30 and 9:30, that could have helped the situation.
[*]No mentioning is made whether water was being fed for the IC at any time.
[/list]

According to the same Tepco document as above, the valve was opened at 6:18 pm, and closed again at 6:25 pm, and the system was observed to be functional. (I.e. this is in direct inconsistence with your information that steam was not observed) I've interpreted this to mean that once DC had been restored to indicate the status of the valves, the functionality of the IC system was briefly checked, found to be OK, and the system was then left on stand by (perhaps because the water level in the RPV had been unknown since 3:50 pm , so no data was available to guide the operation of the valves).

"In MCR, operators found indication light of MO-3A and MO-2A after temporary
restoration of DC power. The indicators showed the valves were closed. Then an
operator opened the valves at 18:18 and confirmed the light indicated the valve
status from close to open. Also steam generation was confirmed after the valve
operation. At 18:25, the operator closed the return line isolation valve (MO-3A)."


Then later,

"Reactor water levels were become clear for Unit 1 at 21:19"

The water level indicated was 200 mm above TAF. Shortly following that, apparently the IC system was then activated (and according to data water level in the RPV was indeed on the increase for a while thereafter ) :

"At 21:30, the operator opened the MO-3A and confirmed that steam was generated."

The way I see it, if the figure (found in GE:s generic BWR documentation) of 90 minutes is valid for 1F1, it could well be that the IC had really boiled dry between 3 pm and 6:25, and the notion of no steam was correct. Then it would not have made any difference at all if the valve was open or closed if they at no time fed any water to the IC. The crucial question is: did they? If they did at some time between 6:30 and the core damage time, then the closing of the valve apparently was the crucial error that led to the core uncovery and damage. But if they at no time fed any fresh water to the system, and its capacity really only is 90 min, then it was the failure to replenish the IC rather than the closure of the valve that was obviously the more crucial error.<..>
Maybe the notion that no steam was observed at 6:18 - 6:25 pm is incorrect, seeing we are told the opposite thing in the above-mentioned document. The increase in water level after 21:30 might indicate that the IC was functioning and supplied water to the pressure vessel, no alternative ways of injection had been implemented at that stage, so apart from IC there was only HPCI that could theoretically have fed the water.
 
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  • #10,926
http://mainichi.jp/select/weathernews/20110311/news/20110817k0000m040142000c.html Sources close to the Government investigation committee say that Tepco said that nobody had foreseen the possibility of an hydrogen explosion before it occurred. It was also said that because they had no instruction manual for venting, they had to study the procedure using the plant blueprints. As a consequence of the blackout, necessary equipments such as batteries were ordered. As precise information concerning the needed types were not provided, several different types were delivered, and it became difficult to sort them afterwards. Some equipments were delivered to Fukushima Daini or to J-Village and they had to go to take them there. It was said that the support from Tepco's main headquarters was not sufficient. Concerning unit 4, although the possibility of hydrogen flowing backwards from unit 3 to unit 4 is being considered, it remains unknown if there was enough pressure for such a backward flow. Concerning seawater injection, it was apprehended that the quantity of freshwater in the fire suppression tank was limited and that it would become necessary at some stage to use seawater. When Tepco's main headquarters ordered to stop seawater injection, as that would have provoked terrible consequences, they pretended they had done so, while continuing seawater injection. The helicopter water drops forced to suspend blackout recovery work. A number of times the helicopter seemed to miss its target. Tepco said that no damage due to the earthquake was observed at units 2,3,5 where the East-West standard earthquake intensity was exceeded.

After reaching the bottom of the page, I discovered a link to an English translation (translating the top part of the Japanese article only) : http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110817p2a00m0na016000c.html

The "no steam" event is reported in the English language NHK news too :
The worker told the investigators that the system appeared to be operating at boiling temperature but was not producing steam.
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/17_28.html

http://mainichi.jp/select/weathernews/news/20110817dde001040067000c.html A NISA official, Mr Yamagarbagea had the following reactions : the NISA was putting much value on countermeasures against hydrogen explosions inside containment vessels, but was not sufficiently evaluating the risk of a hydrogen explosion inside the reactor building. Concerning the absence of a manual for venting during a blackout he said "venting was supposed to be operated from the (electric power supplied) control room. The lesson will be learned and implemented in safety measures in the future".
 
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  • #10,927
Hello, all! I finally had to un-lurk...

tsutsuji said:
The suspicion that the earthquake caused severe damage to the reactors is strengthened by reports that radiation leaked from the plant minutes later. The Bloomberg news agency has reported that a radiation alarm went off about a mile from the plant at 3.29pm, before the tsunami hit.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...n-2338819.html

While there is certainly evidence that there were likely severe problems with the plants after the earthquake but prior to the tsunami, does anyone have a reference to any radiation alarm actually showing a radiation increase before the tsunami? I believe I have only seen reports of the monitoring post alarm which went off due to a monitoring station that was off-line and not reporting any data (ie. was probably damaged or disconnected by the earthquake) rather than an alarm due to an increase in radiation.

A special thank-you also, to Tsutsuji, for all your effort helping to keep us informed!
 
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  • #10,928
tsutsuji said:
<..>
The "no steam" event is reported in the English language NHK news too :
http://mainichi.jp/select/weathernews/news/20110817dde001040067000c.html <..>

The 'no steam observed' in that article seems to me to have reference to the period shortly after the quake, and before the tsunami, i.e. not to the period shortly after 6 pm, when the Tepco document clearly states that steam was observed. Also it seems to me (as a layman), that an recently switched on operating IC might not necessarily initially produce steam, but would do that only once a certain heat up on the shell side had occurred.
 
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  • #10,929
MadderDoc said:
According to the same Tepco document as above, the valve was opened at 6:18 pm, and closed again at 6:25 pm, and the system was observed to be functional. (I.e. this is in direct inconsistence with your information that steam was not observed) I've interpreted this to mean that once DC had been restored to indicate the status of the valves, the functionality of the IC system was briefly checked, found to be OK, and the system was then left on stand by (perhaps because the water level in the RPV had been unknown since 3:50 pm , so no data was available to guide the operation of the valves).

This would be a consistent explanation, however I have very difficult time grasping how the system could be left standing by instead of activating it, if the reactor was completely without feedwater. After an hour or so, the decay heat would boil off some 10 kg/s of coolant from the reactor, which means the core level dropping by some 3 cm per minute, or almost two meters per hour, if the IC is not removing the decay heat by boiling off water from the secondary side. Even though you are uncertain of your level measurements, it should be obvious that your level is dropping fast if you don't run the IC. A rule of thumb is that the core will be uncovered within half to one hour, if the decay heat removal is lost right after the scram. It appears they were able to remove the heat for a short while until they disengaged the IC for the first time at 15:03, but then it becomes very confusing to follow what was being done and why.

The way I see it, disconnecting the IC to stay within the TechSpecs RPV cooling rate for normal operation was probably quite appropriate as long as there was AC power at the plant, but when they entered the station blackout situation, the situation changed and the appropriate EOP:s should have instructed to prioritize the cooling of the reactor to optimizing the RPV transient budget. It's absolutely necessary to have the core covered at all times, while a one-time violation of the RPV cooldown rate most probably is no big deal, and this difference in consequences should somehow be reflected in the EOPs to make sure that the operators err in the correct direction, if they are unsure of the core status.

It can be that the deterioration of the situation from an AOO to a beyond-design basis accident did not affect the operations in the way it should have done, but this is probably something that will take a long time and proper examination to find out. For me, i think the biggest question regarding the whole series of accidents at Fukushima is this: why did they lose unit 1 even though it had the IC that appears to have been more or less functional? If the operators indeed disengaged the IC not realizing they were at risk of exposing the core, the situation ironically reminds that at TMI, where the core was left to get exposed by shutting down cooling systems as the operators thought there was sufficient cooling in the core. Preventing the reactor safety systems from fulfilling their task by intervening according to false understanding of the situation is something that should not happen.
 
  • #10,930
I_P said:
TEPCO has considerable stake in claiming that the meltdowns were entirely the result of an unforeseeable, rare event (huge tsunami) rather than being initiated by earthquake damage from shaking that was within or just barely exceeded the plant design basis.

I assume that the judgement that the shaking was within or just barely exceeded the design basis was based on a publication by TEPCO of the Seismic Data measured at Fukushima (http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110516e27.pdf). From the table, 18 maximum response accelerations were reported for Dai-Ichi, one each for each direction (i.e. north-south, east-west and up-down) for each of the 6 reactors. 3 of the 18 exceeded design parameters by 25% (unit 2, E-W), 15% (unit 3, E-W) and 21% (unit 5, E-W), respectively. However, 17 of the 18 observations are marked with an asterisk showing that only about 2-3 minutes of the earthquake was recorded, due to a glitch in the software but TEPCO said that the error probably wasn't that significant.

Notwithstanding this report, it is clear that this was a huge earthquake and that strong shaking lasted between 3 and 5 minutes (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=fast-facts-japan). When earthquakes are that long, simply measuring peak acceleration may be an incomplete statistic. What impact does earthquake duration have on structural damage? First, I looked at Effect of Earthquake Duration on Structural Reliability, Lindt & Goh, 2004, but they only looked at durations of 30 to 90 seconds (page 1591). Earthquakes of 3 to 5 minutes are apparently quite outside the norm.

I then looked at a FEMA publication called Structural Dynamics of Linear Elastic Single-Degree-of-Freedom (SDOF) Systems (http://www.nibs.org/client/assets/files/bssc/Topic03-StructuralDynamicsofSDOFSystemsNotes.pdf ). Among other things, it covers the important issue of resonances induced by earthquakes in structures. It is well worth reading to understand the next point, unless you are familiar with the subject. On page 88, there is a "Four-way Log Plot of (the) Response Spectrum (Plotted vs. Period)." It would seem that this is the same type of plot in TEPCO's publication on page 5. TEPCO's pdf is of very good quality and one can zoom in on the two 4-way log plots to see them better. Figure 2-2 is of ground motion at the GN4 Observation Point. If you look carefully at the zoomed-in 4-way plot, it looks like the plot of the South Point exceeds 500 gals (peak ground acceleration) for wavelengths (TEPCO calls it a period) between about 0.06 seconds to about 0.22 seconds. The plot appears to approach 1000 gals at a wavelength of just over 0.1 seconds in the E-W direction. If you call it 950 gals, that would be more than twice the approximately 450 gals design basis. The N-S plot (Fig. 2-4) also appears to significantly exceed 500 gals for a wavelength of 0.1 seconds. (I am looking at the lines on the plot that are in the SW to NE direction and that are labeled "50," "100," "200," "500," "1000," and "2000." Outside the top right of the plot there is a label shown diagonally in the same direction as "cm/s2," which would be gals.)

On page 6 of TEPCO's report, Fig. 4-1 seems to show the acceleration response spectra for the base mat of unit 1 exceeding 1000 gals for a wavelength of just over 0.5 seconds. Likewise, Fig. 4-2 shows the response spectra for unit 2 as substantially exceeding 1000 gals for a wavelength peaking at about 0.3 seconds. Similarly, Fig. 4-3 shows a peak for unit 3 of about 1500 gals for a wavelength peaking also at 0.3 seconds. Fig. 4-4 for unit 4 is lower but still has peaks that clearly appear to be above 500 gals. Fig. 4-5 is for unit 5 and shows a peak exceeding 1000 gals also at a wavelength of about 0.3 seconds. Fig 4-6 is for unit 6 and shows a peak approaching 1000 gals at a wavelength of about 1.25 seconds. These are all in the E-W direction.

In the N-S direction, Fig. 4-9 for unit 3 shows a peak almost at 1000 gals for a wavelength of about 0.45 seconds. Figures 4.7 (unit 1) and 4.8 (unit 2), show peaks clearly above 500 gals and maybe closer to 800 - 900 gals at a wavelength also of about 0.45 seconds. Figures 3-1 through the top plot of 3-6 clearly show the data recording stopping abruptly.

Unless I am completely misunderstanding these plots, it would seem that the peak accelerations at Fukushima Dai-Ichi greatly exceeded the design basis of about 450 gals at least at specific wavelengths.

So, I looked further to see if there were other measurements of earthquake intensity. I looked at Analysis of Cumulative Absolute Velocity (CAV) and JMA Instrumental Seismic Intensity (I_JMA) Using the PEER-NGA, Strong Motion Database, Campbell and Bozorgnia, 2010 (http://peer.berkeley.edu/publicatio...s_2010/webR_PEER10_102_Campbell_Bozorgnia.pdf).

On pdf pg. 14,
Cumulative absolute velocity (CAV) is defined as the integral of the absolute value of an acceleration time series... (and) ...includes the cumulative effects of ground motion duration. This is a key advantage of CAV over other peak ground motion and response-spectral parameters and is one of the reasons that EPRI (1988) found it to be the ground motion parameter that best correlated with structural damage out of the many ground motion parameters that it investigated.

The authors then defined a slightly different measure that they termed standardized CAV in which accelerations below a threshold value are not counted (pdf pg. 16) on the basis that small magnitude earthquakes of long duration (which may cause no damage whatsoever) could have a large CAV. On that same page, they note that
(t)he USNRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1997) uses standardized CAV as one of the ground motion measures to determine whether a nuclear power plant must be shut down after an earthquake when the operating basis earthquake (OBE) ground motion is exceeded.
On page 22:
The CAV check is exceeded if anyone of the three components of the standardized CAV from the free-field ground motion is greater than 0.16 g-sec. If both the response spectrum check (see pdf pp. 21 & 22 for details) and the CAV check are exceeded, the OBE is considered exceeded and plant shutdown is required.
The paper then goes into detail regarding the JMA seismic intensity scale (I_JMA) (JMA = Japan Meteorological Agency). The rest of the paper is interesting but can be skipped for the purposes of this discussion.

I then looked at Damage Indicating Parameters and Damage Modes of Mechanical Components by K. Ochiai (Japan Nuclear Technology Institute), K. Kobayashi (TEPCO) and A. Chigama (IAEA) (http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/4_sessionC/C-24.pdf ). On pdf page 3, there is a table that compares I_JMA and standardized CAV. Damage measured by I_JMA is due to a "Large Effective Inertia Force" and is related to "First Excursion Damage." In other words, I-JMA best measures the damage caused by a transient large amplitude deflection. Damage measured by standardized CAV is due to "Much Energy Accumulation" and is related to "Cumulative Damage (Fatigue/Ductility Exhaustion)." In short, standardized CAV is a measure of fatigue due to repeated cycling of structural elements and is related to the total energy absorbed by the structure.

Page 5 has a chart for several earthquakes plotting standard CAV on the y-axis and I_JMA on the x-axis. The S-CAV scale is from 0 to 4.5. Page 6 shows peak accelerations at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS No. 7 unit of 673 gals N-S and 1007 gals E-W at the turbine pedestal top. Page 7 shows several data points for K-K, but none exceeding a S-CAV of 3 (on the right hand side where the units for S-CAV are in (g-sec)). Now, please skip to page 11. On the lower right is a chart again plotting S-CAV against 2 JMA scales. on that chart is a shaded box labeled "Design Base" which has a maximum S-CAV of about 2.25. Let's focus on that number.

I then looked at a Preliminary Report done by ITER consult on the accident at Fukushima Dai-Ichi (http://www.iter-consult.it/ITER_Report_Fukushima_Accident.pdf) dated May 2011. On page 13, it states that
Daiichi units 2, 3 and 5 exceeded their maximum response acceleration design basis in E-W direction by about 20%. Recording was over 130-150 seconds,
which is in agreement with TEPCO's report referenced above.

However, the ITER report goes on to say:
Various parameters have been proposed in the literature for estimation of the destructive power of an earthquake. Among these parameters, the CAV (cumulative absolute velocity) has been recently proposed. Using the data recorded in the Tohoku event, the CAV can be evaluated in 10:eek:, whereas in Kashiwazaki-Kariva earthquake of 2007 the CAV was equal to 2 with a recorded Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) much higher tha(n) in Fukushima. This is apparently due to the exceptional duration of the Tohoku event.

Recalling the report on Damage Indicating Parameters, the charts showed standardized CAV with a maximum of 4.5 and the "Design Base" at about 2.25, yet here they are mentioning a CAV of 10:bugeye: for the Tohoku (March 11, 2001) earthquake. It is not clear whether the 10 is a CAV or a standardized CAV. See Fig. 2.1 of the Campbell and Bozorgnia paper on pdf page 15 for a chart showing the difference between CAV and S-CAV. Even if the 10 is CAV, that would still give a very large value for recomputed standardized CAV for the Tohoku earthquake.

Now referring back to page 9 of the Damage Indicating Parameters presentation, they report a piping vibration test with a maximum acceleration of 1,877 gals that resulted in a crack during the "5th excitation" (repetition of the test). The S-CAV was reported as 23.2 g-sec or about double the CAV of the Tohoku earthquake. On page 10, they show the "Damaging Excitation Motion" test run (looks like a seismogram) and compare it to an actual seismogram from Unit 1 (presumably at K-K) at the same scale with a peak acceleration of 884 gals and an S-CAV of 2.4 g-sec. They did not have a crack in a pipe until the 5th repetition. In other words, a pipe break (which would cause a LOCA) did not take place in the test until the piping had been subjected to 5 simulated earthquakes of more than twice the intensity (measured by CAV) each of the Tohoku earthquake.

If the CAV for the Tohoku earthquake reported by ITER was calculated at Fukushima Dai-Ichi (it isn't clear), then it means that the earthquake that hit that power plant was truly huge, but yet maybe unlikely to have caused a break in piping, if the test at K-K is comparable to Fukushima.

One caveat on the ITER report as on page 2 they report:
In fact 12 out of 13 back-up D/Gs on site, located in the basements of the turbine buildings, were disabled. Only one air-cooled D/G (all others were seawater-cooled) was able to supply electrical power to units 5 and 6, which remained under full control after some initial troubles.
I had made that statement in a prior post and we all now know that is wrong, but I knew I had read it somewhere and I hadn't made it up. So the possibility exists that the ITER report has other errors in it.

In conclusion, it isn't altogether clear that "the shaking (at Fukushima) was within or just barely exceeded the design basis." The intensity as measured by CAV or S-CAV may have greatly exceeded the design basis.
 
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  • #10,931
http://mainichi.jp/select/weathernews/news/20110729ddm008040075000c.html This is a 29 July article, but I don't remember if this information was already reported in this thread : Tepco had mentioned in May the possibility of an earthquake damage to a HPCI pipe as the possible cause of the sudden pressure decline on 12 March at unit 3. But as a result of new investigations, this is now ruled out. It became clear that a worker had entered a location close to the HPCI pipe for a flow adjustment shortly after the HPCI stopped. If there had been a steam leak, the high temperature would have prevented this worker to work so closely.

http://www.tohoku-epco.co.jp/news/atom/1183461_1065.html Tohoku Electric reports to NISA that they have checked their seismometers and are able to confirm that their seismometers are safe from the record gap troubles which happened at Fukushima Daiichi and Daini during the 11 March earthquake.

http://mainichi.jp/select/wadai/news/20110811k0000m040125000c.html It has been found that Kansai Electric failed to report to NISA some test results in 2009 and 2010 about a steam-turbine related equipment at Ohi nuclear plant unit 3. Units 1 and 2 have 4 extraction steam pipes, but unit 3 has 5. As the Kansai Electric employee copy-pasted the unit 1 and unit 2 form, he forgot the 5th one.
 
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  • #10,932
rmattila said:
snip >

It's absolutely necessary to have the core covered at all times, while a one-time violation of the RPV cooldown rate most probably is no big deal, and this difference in consequences should somehow be reflected in the EOPs to make sure that the operators err in the correct direction, if they are unsure of the core status.
<snip.

While it is absolutely necessary to have the core covered at all times at this moment we don't even know if the large overshot of the predetermined cooldown rate was perhaps itself a complicating factor at Unit #1. Exceeding the cooldown rate even once is not a small deal, particularly in a plant that has already been stressed by a major earthquake and could well be a contributing factor to the units later problems. While probably not high on the list it cannot be discounted.

The thermal stress of fast cooldown cycling with fast heatup (when IC was turned off) is really pushing things in a plant so old, so brittle and so shaken by the quake.

I'm agreeing that of course the core should be covered but pointing out that nothing is at all black and white. Cycling the IC system while they were chasing the cooldown\heatup may not turn out to have been a good thing to do but should they have just let it exceed the cooldown rate instead? Well no, they didn't want to risk breaking the plant any further so they would not want to do that. It would have been a massive gamble to let the temperature drop uncontrolled.
 
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  • #10,933
westfield said:
I'm agreeing that of course the core should be covered but pointing out that nothing is at all black and white. Cycling the IC system while they were chasing the cooldown\heatup may not turn out to have been a good thing to do but should they have just let it exceed the cooldown rate instead? Well no, they didn't want to risk breaking the plant any further so they would not want to do that. It would have been a massive gamble to let the temperature drop uncontrolled.

Since the pressure vessel must have enough transient budget to withstand a large break LOCA in a steam line, which leads to a very rapid cooldown, I don't see a significantly slower cooldown attainable by IC a massive gamble from point of view of safety. It might have been a gamble from point of view of continued plant operation afterwards, but I doubt it. After all, after they had lost all AC power, they were at a beyond design basis situation, and saving the further operability of the plant should not be a factor affecting operations at that stage.
 
  • #10,934
In appreciation of Tsutsuji-san efforts to keep us informed about the events, his account was upgraded to a gold one :smile:
 
  • #10,935
Borek said:
In appreciation of Tsutsuji-san efforts to keep us informed about the events, his account was upgraded to a gold one :smile:

Thank you Borek. I hope I will be able to keep being worthy of this honour.

http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201108/2011081100397 (11 August) The NISA found two modelling mistakes in the earthquake safety calculations of Fukushima Daini unit 2. The influence of earthquakes had been underestimated for two reactor-related equipments. Other plants using the same Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy technology must check if they made the same mistake.

http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=soc_30&k=2011081700310 SARRY had a filter clogged, probably due to the presence of rust in the pipes, and it took two hours to change the filter, Tepco reported on 17 August.

http://www.nikkei.com/tech/news/article/g=96958A9C93819595E3E5E2E0E38DE3EAE2EAE0E2E3E39790E0E2E2E2;da=96958A88889DE2E0E2E5EAE5E5E2E3E7E3E0E0E2E2EBE2E2E2E2E2E2 The launch of SARRY using highly contaminated water is planned for 18 August in the middle of the day. If any of the three systems (Kurion, Areva, SARRY) breaks down, the remaining two can go on with the water purification, which should contribute to the stabilisation of the facility. The utilisation rate for the 10-16 August week is 88%. The rate from the 17 June start till now is 69%. After the water levels in the buildings have declined enough, Tepco will be able to raise the injection rates into the reactors and cool them more effectively.

http://www.nikkei.com/news/category...E5E2E6858DE3E5E2EAE0E2E3E39180EAE2E2E2;at=ALL The NISA reports that 24 seismometers have been found all over Japan with the same data recording software bug that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi and Daini during the 11 March earthquake. The Hokkaido, Chubu, and Kyushu electric power companies, with Japco and Jaea made the necessary repairs.

Kazuro Hirahara, president of the Seismological Society of Japan:
We expect aftershocks for more than five years in areas surrounding the hypocentral region. There is the possibility that an earthquake measuring close to magnitude 8.0 could strike.
(...)
we had missed the fact that a huge amount of energy had been stored under the sea near the Japan Trench. We have set up a panel at the Seismological Society of Japan to identify problems and look into what went wrong with our forecast.
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201108170256.html

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110815004956.htm Cracks found in seabed off Sanriku coast
 
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  • #10,936
MadderDoc said:
The 'no steam observed' in that article seems to me to have reference to the period shortly after the quake, and before the tsunami, i.e. not to the period shortly after 6 pm, when the Tepco document clearly states that steam was observed. Also it seems to me (as a layman), that an recently switched on operating IC might not necessarily initially produce steam, but would do that only once a certain heat up on the shell side had occurred.

Mainichi's source for the "manager Yoshida did not know IC is shut down" story is a memorandum on the hearings at the fact-finding panel which is summarized in the lower part of http://mainichi.jp/select/weathernews/20110311/news/20110817k0000m040142000c.html : 担当作業員がICを11日午後6時半から約3時間、停止させたが、吉田所長らは把握せず、動いていることを前提に対策を講じた - The employee in charge shut down the IC on the 11th from half past 6 PM for 3 hours. Yoshida and other plant managers did not know about it and were deciding countermeasures on the premise that it was still running.

Both Mainichi and NHK seem to understand their source(s) nearly the same way, except that the "no steam observed" part is being reported only by NHK. If what you say is right, it could mean that the memorandum writer made a mistake. Other news sources don't report this story.
 
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  • #10,937
tsutsuji said:
Pages 8 and 9 of http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/betu11_j/images/110524d.pdf explain why the breakers tripped :

Okuma 1L : breaker O-1 trips because of the damage of breaker O-81
Okuma 2L : breaker O-32 trips because of the damages of breaker O-82 and disconnector O-82
Okuma 3L : breaker O-33 trips because of the arc at tower No. 7 (arc traces were observed, showing a conductor touched or came close to the tower)
Okuma 4L : breaker O-34 trips because of the arc at tower No. 11 (arc traces were observed, showing a conductor touched or came close to the tower)
Yonomori 1L : breaker O-93 trips because conductors touched or came close to each other. Also, Yonomori tower No. 27 collapsed.
Yonomori 2L : breaker O-94 trips because conductors touched or came close to each other. Also, Yonomori tower No. 27 collapsed.

For people who are curious about this Tepco 24 May press release "Submission of a report on investigation of causes of damage situation of power facilities inside and outside of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station to NISA" which was never translated into English, I found that the NISA's evaluation, which contains much of what Tepco said on that topic is available in English on the NISA website :

TEPCO believes that the damage of electric facilities such as major transformers was caused by the earthquake since the tsunami did not reach the Shin-Fukushima Substation.
In addition, these electric facilities were designed with some margin against the seismic design guideline (JEAG5003) issued by the private sector, but since they were damaged nevertheless, a detailed analysis is required to investigate the cause of these damages.
http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110528-4.pdf page 22/33
 
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  • #10,939
http://fukushima.over-blog.fr/article-le-corium-de-fukushima-2-effets-et-dangers-81400782.html"

“The worst case would be a corium locking himself in the concrete or soil, which not only provides the best possible shape to maintain its integrity, increase the number of neutrons recovered, but in addition, the mass would de facto inaccessible, which would make it impossible to cool."

Would saturated concrete/soil/bedrock make a good neutron reflector?

Could there be another moderator affecting things?

Would it be harder for a fissioning corium to create voids if 'locked in'?

What about Uranium and Plutonium migrations in a 'locked' corium - will the concentrations of fissile material vary throughout the corium?

Still so many questions!
 
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  • #10,940
tsutsuji said:
TEPCO believes that the damage of electric facilities such as major transformers was caused by the earthquake since the tsunami did not reach the Shin-Fukushima Substation.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11051613-e.html

This link is to a press release on May 16, 2011 regarding damage to electrical facilities at Fukushima Daiichi. There are links to ten attachments with further details, including schematics and photos. http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110516e17.pdf has an overall schematic of the Shin Fukushima substation. It appears to show 7 different feeds from the grid into Fukushima. 6 failed for different reasons and one(?) was down for maintenance (part of the legend is unreadable). It would seem as if there was plenty of redundancy here.
 
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  • #10,941
Bodge said:
Would saturated concrete/soil/bedrock make a good neutron reflector?
It would be quite a bit worse than just water
Could there be another moderator affecting things?
No.

Would it be harder for a fissioning corium to create voids if 'locked in'?
I suppose you mean "would it make more, or less bubbles while it's eating into soil?" The answer is "probably, less". It may be that it would not go straight down, but instead spread out, like a root system or something. Dilution would probably happen, too, decreasing its specific temperature.

What about Uranium and Plutonium migrations in a 'locked' corium - will the concentrations of fissile material vary throughout the corium?

Probably, yes. At Chernobyl, a few kg of Pu ended up gathered all in one place. Went critical after rainwater infiltrated the basement, years after the accident. Some brave soul eventually went in there and sprayed gadolinium on it.

BUT! We have no indication that corium is critical right now.
 
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  • #10,942
MJRacer said:
It would seem as if there was plenty of redundancy here.

I laughed for real. All the lines went to a single substation. How is that "redundant"?
 
  • #10,943
Bodge said:
Please can somebody explain where the Xe-131m in Reactor 2's containment is coming from?

In addition to being a fission product, Xe-131m is also produced by decay of I-131.
 
  • #10,944
zapperzero said:
I laughed for real. All the lines went to a single substation. How is that "redundant"?

It is redundant because (a) "all the lines" did not go to a single substation and (b) the substation had its own internal redundancies.

If you look at (http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110516e25.pdf"), you can observe that the substation had two main busses: one at 275kV and one at 500kV. There were 6 separate lines connecting these busses to the switchyards at the plant itself: Okuma 1L, 2L, 3L and 4L and Yonomori 1L and 2L. The 2 Yonomori lines suffered 2 faults: a cave in at the substation and a tower collapse close to the plant. Okuma 3L suffered a broken cable and both 3L and 4L were affected by a tilting of a steel structure at the substation. Okuma 1L suffered damage to a transformer at the substation. However, Okuma 2L was undamaged but tripped at the substation (presumably the trip was due to the damage at the plant). All the lines except Okuma 1L (which tripped at the plant) tripped at the substation, presumably due to downstream damage, but trips are not considered damage.

So the internal redundancy at the substation worked as 1 of the 6 lines (Okuma 2L) there survived and the failures involved separate elements. Okuma 3L and 4L were not redundant with respect to each other, because they shared a steel structure that was tilted, but they were redundant with respect to the other 4 lines. Likewise, Yonomori 1L and 2L were not redundant with respect to each other as they shared Tower #27 which collapsed, but they were redundant with respect to the other 4 lines.

The surviving line, Okuma 2L, suffered a fault at the switchyard for units 1 and 2 (at the plant and not at the substation), where a circuit breaker and a line switch failed (see http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110516e23.pd"). Again, these were separate elements, so failure of these 6 lines was caused by separate failures in separate elements, with only 2 elements in common among only 2 lines at a time. It was not a failure of redundancy. It was a massive earthquake.

In fact, the redundancy of the substation (i.e. many separate elements) was used to restore power using parts of Yonomori 1L and Okuma 3L to a "Portable MC" supplying power to Units 1, 2, 3 and 4 on March 18. Part of Yonomori 2L was used to restore power to Unit 5 on March 20.

Finally, Appendix 1 shows a 66kV line identified as 1F. Appendix 9 identifies the same line as the Toden Genshiroku Line. From the way it is drawn, it appears to be completely independent of the Shin Fukushima substation. According to Appendix 1, it suffered a damaged cable (another independent element). Power was restored on March 15. So no, not "all the lines" appear to have gone through a single substation.:smile:
 
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  • #10,945
drussell said:
While there is certainly evidence that there were likely severe problems with the plants after the earthquake but prior to the tsunami, does anyone have a reference to any radiation alarm actually showing a radiation increase before the tsunami?

According to Bloomberg's original news the monitoring post was set to go off at high levels of radiation. But I guess if there would have been high levels of radiation 1.5 km from the no. 1 reactor also some other monitoring posts would have been triggered?

Surely this cannot be the only monitoring post at the Fukushima plant, can it?

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-19/fukushima-may-have-leaked-radiation-before-quake.html

A monitoring post on the perimeter of the plant about 1.5 kilometers (1 mile) from the No. 1 reactor went off at 3:29 p.m., minutes before the station was overwhelmed by the tsunami that knocked out backup power that kept reactor cooling systems running, according to documents supplied by the company. The monitor was set to go off at high levels of radiation, an official said.

“We are still investigating whether the monitoring post was working properly,” said Teruaki Kobayashi, the company’s head of nuclear facility management. “There is a possibility that radiation leaked before the tsunami arrived.” Kobayashi said he didn’t have the exact radiation reading that would trigger the sensor.

Why has TEPCO not given us any more information about this monitoring post? Or have they?

The next information about possible radiation comes from the workers who entered no. 1 reactor building but according to news this was in the night of 11th day - so way after tsunami:

Workers entered the No. 1 reactor building in the night to assess damage to the reactor but a few seconds later their dosimeter’s alarm was triggered, according to the sources at Tokyo Electric Power Co. The building was believed to be filled with steam with high radiation dose, prompting the workers to evacuate.

Based on dosimeter readings, radiation was estimated at around 300 millisieverts per hour, according to the sources, a result suggesting a large amount of radioactive materials from nuclear fuel in the reactor was already released.
http://www.nuclearevents.info/ines-scale/level-7/fukushima-daiichi-japan-level-7-update-may-16-2011/

Something TEPCO has confirmed is that at 18:30 pm (12th of March) they measured 0.07 micro-Sv/h neutrons - so this is also after tsunami:

3/12 18:30 0.07 micro-Sv/h neutrons confirmed between North Gate and West Gate (possibility of criticality accident)

http://www.geocities.jp/swingi70/_gl_images_/P1020249toudenn.jpg

Summary:
11th of March 3:29 pm - the monitoring post went off
in the night of 11th of March - dosimeters showing 300 mSv/h inside the no. 1 reactor
12th of March 18:30 pm - 0.07 micro-Sv/h neutrons confirmed
 
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  • #10,947
http://www.47news.jp/CN/201108/CN2011081901000911.html Yesterday SARRY was connected in series with the French and American systems. Today they are going to connect it independently from those systems, with the goal of increasing the water treatment facility's capacity from the present 45 tons per hour to 95 tons per hour.

http://www.jiji.com/jc/eqa?g=eqa&k=2011081900799 Tepco has announced that the independently connected SARRY has been started with a 25 ton per hour flow. They plan to increase the flow to 50 tons per hour.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110819_02-j.pdf (not translated yet) Yesterday's decontamination factors using Kurion and SARRY in series. It seems the Areva system was not used.

http://www.47news.jp/47topics/e/218724.php Tepco is reducing little by little the water injection rate into unit 3 reactor, with the goal of reaching 6 tons per hour on August 20.
 
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  • #10,948
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  • #10,949
The obvious answer to the I-131/Xe-131m question is ongoing transient criticalities.

Is there enough pu-240 for significant spontaneous fission?

Can we trust the decay heat calculations, which are based on all fission stopping at SCRAM?
 

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